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PREFACE
The prominence of secondary material in the following pages re
quires a word of explanation . The law of mortgages embraces so
many remotely related topics that it is impossible , in the time al
lotted to it in our schools , to cover the subject completely and thor
oughly by the ordinary " case method .” Of the several alternatives
that this condition leaves us , the editor has chosen that of covering
by cases , with a fair degree of thoroughness , certain selected topics .
It is with a view to presenting to the student , in a suggestive way,
some of the topics not covered by cases , that the editor has intro
duced into the book excerpts from text-books and from judicial
opinions , and extensive editorial notes . This material is not designed
to be made a part of the regular work of the course but to be a sup
plement to that work . It is designed to dispose of topics which , in
the absence of any such material in the book , the editor , in using the
book , would have felt obliged to touch upon by lecture . It is the
editor 's belief that this matter covers the ground in a way more
satisfactory to the student than lectures , and to the obvious saving
of class - room time for more profitable use. This material has been
distributed through the book with a view to presenting , with the
cases and the class - room discussion , a fairly systematic treatment of
the subject , but the bulk of it will be found in the first hundred
pages . In introducing into the book this secondary material , as in
the framing of al
l
notes , the editor has endeavored to avoid plac
ing before the student the answers to the problems presented by the
cases , or those related problems which it seemed to him practicable
to work out by class - room discussion .
Another feature of this book deserving comment is the rele
gation , to a position o
f comparative obscurity , o
f
the question as
to whether a mortgage vests a legal title in themortgagee , and
those questions as to incidents o
f
the mortgage relation which
are dependent upon that theoretical question - problems which
have occupied a more conspicuous place in the subject a
s
it has
commonly been taught . This has left an opportunity to give





f realizing the mortgage debt , but
have usually been slighted in the teaching o
f
the subject . This
shifting of emphasis the editor believes justified from every
( iii )
PREFACI
point of view . With reference to the function of giving infor
mation , it brings forward those topics which are of the greater
importance . With regard to the function of developing the “ legal
mind,” this course brings forward complex problems of a sort which
are not as abundant in the curriculum as the more elementary sort
which are thus slighted . Conceding that the elementary problem
is the more troublesome, there is good use , especially in the
third year , for more work of the complex sort .
The editor is confident that these broad positions will meet gen
eral approval. He dares not hope , however, that any one will ap
prove in a
ll particulars the manner in which they have been applied .
The cases reported in this book have almost all been subjected to
more o
r
less editing . In order that a multiplication o
f
foot -notes
might be avoided , omissions and interpolations have been indicated
in the text , the former by asterisks , the latter b
y
square brackets . It
should b
e




the reporter ' s statement of facts , and of the arguments of counsel
have not been indicated . Obvious typographical errors have been
corrected without comment , but in doubtful cases the original has
been preserved .
The editorial notes do not pretend to completeness . Only those
cases have been cited which seemed o
f peculiar interest , except in a
few instances where the unavailability o
f authorities elsewhere led
the editor to cite all the cases with which he was acquainted .
The editor desires to acknowledge his indebtedness to Tiffany ' s
Real Property , Pomeroy ' s Equity Jurisprudence , and Jones ' s Mort
gages , not only for the excerpts therefrom which appear in this book ,
but also for help received from them , first and last , in the study o
f
mortgage law . Great help has also been derived from Kirchwey ' s
Cases on Mortgages and Wyman ' s Cases on Mortgages . Other ob
ligations , too numerous to mention here , are evidenced upon the
following pages .
EDGAR N . DURFEE .
Ann Arbor , Mich . , January 4 , 1915 .
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THEORETICAL NATURE OF THE MORTGAGE .
LANGDELL, CLASSIFICATION OF RIGHTS AND WRONGS , 13 Harv .
L . Rev . 539 -540 . An obligation is either personal or real, according
as the obligor is a person or thing.
A real obligation is undoubtedly a legal fiction , but it is a very
useful one . It was invented by the Romans, from whom it has
been inherited by the nations of modern Europe . That it would
ever have been invented by the latter is very unlikely , partly be
cause they have needed it less than did the ancients , and partly
because they have not, like the ancients , the habit of personifying
inanimate things. The invention was used by the Romans for the
accomplishment of several important legal objects , some of which
no longer exist, but others still remain in full force. It was by
means of this that one person acquired rights in things belonging to
others ( jura in rebus alienis ) . Such rights were called servitudes
( i. e., states of slavery ) in respect to the thing upon which the obli
gation was imposed , and they included every right which one could
have in a thing , short of owning it. These servitudes were divided
into real and personal servitudes , being called real when the obligee
as well as the obligor , i. e., the master ( dominus ) as well as the
slave (servus ) , was a thing , and personal when the obligee was a
person . The former , which may be termed servitudes proper , have
passed into our law under the names of easements and profits a
prendre . The latter included the pignus and the hypotheca , i. e .,
the Roman mortgage , which was called pignus when the thing mort
gaged was delivered to the creditor , and hypotheca when it was con
stituted by a mere agreement , the thing mortgaged remaining in
the possession of its owner .
SALMOND , JURISPRUDENCE ( 3d ed . ) , § 81 . The distinction between
real and personal rights is closely connected but not identical with
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that between negative and positive rights . It is based on a dif
ference in the incidence of the correlative duties. A real right
corresponds to a duty imposed upon persons in general ; a personal
right corresponds to a duty imposed upon determinate individuals .
A real right is available against the world at large ; a personal
right is available only against particular persons . The distinction
is one of great prominence in the law , and we may take the fol
lowing as illustrations of it. My right to the peaceable occupation
ofmy farm is a real right, for all the world is under a duty towards
me not to interfere with it . But if I grant a lease of the farm to
a tenant , my right to receive the rent from him is personal ; for
it avails exclusively against the tenant himself . For the same rea
son my right to the possession and use of the money in my purse
is real; but my right to receive money from some one who owes it
to me is personal. I have a real right against every one not to be
deprived of my liberty or my reputation ; I have a personal right to
receive compensation from any individual person who has impris
oned or defamed me. I have a real right to the use and occupation
of my own house ; I have a personal right to receive accommoda
tion at an inn .
A real right, then , is an interest protected against the world at
large ; a personal right is an interest protected solely against de
terminate individuals. The distinction is clearly one of importance .
The law confers upon me a greater advantage in protecting my
interests against a
ll persons , than in protecting them only against
one o
r
two . The right o
f
a patentee , who has a monopoly as against
all the world , is much more valuable than the right o
f
him who
purchases the good -will of a business and is protected only against
the competition o
f
his vendor . If I buy a chattel , it is an important
question , whether my interest in it is forthwith protected against
every one , o
r only against him who sells it to me . The main pur
pose o
f mortgages and other forms o
f
real security is to supple
ment the imperfections o
f
a personal right b
y
the superior advan
tages inherent in a right o
f
the other class .
* * * * *
The distinction between a real and a personal right is otherwise
expressed by the terms right in rem ( o
r
in re ) and right in per
sonam . These expressions are derived from the commentators on
the civil and canon law . Literally interpreted , jus in rem means




a thing , jus in personam a right
against o
r
in respect of a person . In truth , however , every right
is a
t
the same time one in respect o
f
some thing , namely , its object ,
and against some person , namely , the person bound . In other
words , every right involves not only a real , but also a personal
relation . Yet although these two relations are necessarily co -ex
istent , their relative prominence and importance are not always
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th
e
same . In real rights it is the real relation that stands in the
forefront o
f
the juridical conception ; such rights are emphatically
and conspicuously in rem . In personal rights , on the other hand ,
it is the personal relation that forms the predominant factor in
the conception ; such rights are before all things in personam . For
this difference there is more than one reason . In the first place ,
the real right is a relation between the owner and a vague multi
tude o
f persons , no one o
f
whom is distinguished from any other ;
while a personal right is a definite relation between determinate
individuals , and the definiteness o
f
this personal relation raises it




a real right is
commonly to b
e
found in the character o
f
the real relation , while
a personal right generally derives its origin from the personal rela
tion . In other words , if the law confers upon me a real right , it is
commonly because I stand in some special relation to the thing
which is the object o
f
the right . If , on the contrary , it confers on
me a personal right , it is commonly because I stand in some special
relation to the person who is the subject o
f
the correlative duty .
If I have a real right in a material object , it is because I made
it , o
r
found it , o
r
first acquired possession of it , or because by
transfer o
r
otherwise I have taken the place of some one who
did originally stand in some such relation to it . But if I have a
personal right to receive money from another , it is commonly be
cause I have made a contract with him , or have come in some
other manner to stand in a special relation to him . Each o
f
these
reasons tends to advance the importance of the real relation in real
rights , and that o
f
the personal relation in personal rights . The
former are primarily and pre -eminently in rem ; the latter primarily
and p
e
-eminently in personam .
Ib . , $ 83 . Rights may be divided into two kinds , distinguished
by the civilians as jura in re propria and jura in re aliena . The
latter may also be conveniently termed encumbrances , if we use
that term in its widest permissible sense . A right in re aliena o
r
encumbrance is one which limits o
r derogates from some more
general right belonging to some other person in respect o
f
the
same subject -matter . All others are jura in re propria . It fre
quently happens that a right vested in one person becomes subject
o
r
subordinate to an adverse right vested in another . It no longer
possesses it
s full scope or normal compass , part of it being cut
off to make room for the limiting and superior right which thus
derogates from it . Thus the right of a landowner may be subject









to the right of a mortgagee to sell or take possession ;
o
r
to the right of a neighboring landowner to the use o
f
a way or
other easement ; o
r




land in respect of
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restrictive covenants entered into by the purchaser as to the use of
it ; for example , a covenant not to build upon it.
A right subject to an encumbrance may be conveniently desig
nated as servient , while the encumbrance which derogates from it
may be contrasted as dominant . These expressions are derived
from , and conform to , Roman usage in the matter of servitudes .
The general and subordinate right was spoken of figuratively by
the Roman lawyers as being in bondage to the special right which
prevailed over and derogated from it. The term servitus, thus de
rived , came to denote the superior right itself rather than the
relation between it and the other ; just as obligatio came to denote
the right of the creditor, rather than the bond of legal subjection
under which the debtor lay .
The terms jus in re propria and jus in re aliena were devised
by the commentators on the civil law , and are not to be found
in the original sources. Their significance is clear. The owner
of a chattel has jus in re propria — a right over his own property ;
the pledgee or other encumbrancer of it has jus in re aliena - a
right over the property of some one else .
There is nothing to prevent one encumbrance from being itself
subject to another . Thus a tenant may sublet ; that is to say , he
may grant a lease of his lease , and so confer upon the sub -lessee
a jus in re aliena of which the immediate subject -matter is itself
merely another right of the same quality . The right of the tenant
in such a case is dominant with regard to that of the landowner ,
but servient with regard to that of the sub -lessee . So the mort
gagee of land may grant a mortgage of his mortgage ; that is to
say, he may create what is called a sub -mortgage. The mortgage
will then be a dominant right in respect of the ownership of the
land , but a servient right with respect to the sub -mortgage . So
the easements appurtenant to land are leased or mortgaged along
with it ; and therefore , though themselves encumbrances , they are
themselves encumbered . Such a series of rights, each limiting and
derogating from the one before it, may in theory extend to any
length .
A right is not to be classed as encumbered or servient , merely
on account of it
s natural limits and restrictions . Otherwise all
rights would fall within this category , since none o
f
them are un
limited in their scope , all being restrained within definite bound
aries b
y
the conflicting interests and rights o
f
other persons . All
ownership o
f





alienum non laedas . Every man must so restrain
himself in the use o
f his property , as not to infringe upon the
property and rights o
f
others . The law confers no property in
stones , sufficiently absolute and unlimited to justify their owner
in throwing them through his neighbors windows . No land -owner
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may by reason of his ownership inflict a nuisance upon the public
or upon adjoining proprietors . But in these and al
l
similar cases
we are dealing merely with the normal and natural boundaries of
the right ,not with those exceptional and artificial restrictions which
are due to the existence o
f
jura in re aliena vested in other persons .
A servient right is not merely a limited right , for all are limited ;
it is a right so limited that its ordinary boundaries are infringed .
It is a right which , owing to the influence of some other and su
perior right , is prevented from attaining its normal scope and
dimensions . Until we have first settled the natural contents and
limits o
f
a right , there can be no talk of other rights which qualify
and derogate from it .
It is essential to an encumbrance that it should , in the technical
language o
f
our law , run with the right encumbered by it . In
other words the dominant and the servient rights are necessarily
concurrent . By this it is meant that an encumbrance must follow
the encumbered right into the hands o
f
new owners , so that a
change o
f ownership will not free the right from the burden im
posed upon it . If this is not so — if th
e right is transferable free
from the burden — there is no true encumbrance . For the burden
is then merely personal to him who is subject to it , and does not
in truth limit o
r derogate from the right itself . This right still
exists in its full compass , since it can be transferred in its en
tirety to a new owner . For this reason an agreement to sell land
vests an encumbrance o
r jus in re alicna in the purchaser ; but an
agreement to sell a chattel does not . The former agreement runs
with the property , while the latter is non -concurrent . So the fee
simple o
f
land may be encumbered by negative agreements , such
a
s
a covenant not to build ; for speaking generally , such obligations
will run with the land into the hands o
f
successive owners . But
positive covenants are merely personal to the covenantor , and dero
gate in n
o way from the fee simple vested in him , which he can
convey to another free from any such burdens .
Concurrence , however , may exist in different degrees ; it may be
more or less perfect or absolute . The encumbrance may run with
the servient right into the hands o
f
some of the successive owners
and not into the hands o
f
others . In particular , encumbrances
may be concurrent either in law or merely in equity . In the latter
case the concurrence is imperfect o
r partial , since it does not pre
vail against the kind o
f





a purchaser for value without notice o
f
the dominant right . Ex
amples o
f
encumbrances running with their servient rights at law
are easements , leases , and legal mortgages . On the other hand
a
n agreement for a lease , an equitable mortgage , a restrictive cove
nant a
s
to the use o
f
land , and a trust will run with their re
















It must be carefully noted that the distinction between jura in
re propria and jura in re aliena is not confined to the sphere of
real rights or jura in rem . Personal , no less than real rights may
be encumbrances of other rights. Personal, no less than real rights
may be themselves encumbered . A debtor , for example , may grant
a security over the book debts owing to him in his business or
over his shares in a company , as well as over his stock in trade .
A life tenancy of money in the public funds is just as possible as
a life tenancy of land. There can be a lien over a man 's share in
a trust fund , as well as over a chattel belonging to him . The true
test of an encumbrance is not whether the encumbrancer has a
jus in rem available against all the world , but whether he has a
right which will avail against subsequent owners of the encum
bered property .
The chief classes of encumbrances are four in number , namely ,
Leases, Servitudes , Securities , and Trusts .
1. A lease is the encumbrance of property vested in one man
by a right to the possession and use of it vested in another .
2 . A servitude is a right to the limited use of a piece of land
unaccompanied either by the ownership or by the possession of it ;
for example , a right of way or a right to the passage of light or
water across adjoining land .
3. A security is an encumbrance vested in a creditor over the
property of his debtor , for the purpose of securing the recovery of
the debt ; a right , for example , to retain possession of a chattel until
the debt is paid .
4 . A trust is an encumbrance in which the ownership of prop
erty is limited by an equitable obligation to deal with it for the
benefit of some one else . The owner of the encumbered property
is the trustee ; the owner of the encumbrance is the beneficiary .
Ib ., § 84 . The relation between principal and accessory rights
is the reverse of that just considered as existing between servient
and dominant rights. For every right is capable of being affected
to any extent by the existence of other rights ; and the influence
thus exercised by one upon another is of two kinds , being either
adverse or beneficial . It is adverse , when one right is limited or
qualified by another vested in a different owner . This is the case
already dealt with by us. It is beneficial , on the other hand , when
one right has added to it a supplementary right vested in the same
owner. In this case the right so augmented may be termed the
principal , while the one so appurtenant to it is the accessory right .
Thus a security is accessory to the right secured ; a servitude is
accessory to the ownership of the land for whose benefit it exists ;
the rent and covenants of a lease are accessory to the landlord 's
ownership of the property ; covenants for title in a conveyance
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are accessory to the estate conveyed ; and a right of action is ac
cessory to the right for whose enforcement it is provided .
A real right may be accessory to a personal ; as in the case of
a debt secured by a mortgage of land . A personal right may be
accessory to a real ; as in the case of the covenants of a lease . A
real right may be accessory to a real ; as in the case of servitudes
appurtenant to land . And finally a personal right may be acces
sory to a personal ; as in the case of a debt secured by a guarantee .
HOLLAND, JURISPRUDENCE ( 10th ed .) , pp. 222 -226 . The iura in re
alienal which have hitherto been considered (Servitudes ) are given
with a single purpose . Their object is to extend the advantages
enjoyed by a person beyond the bounds of his own property . But
there is also a right of the same class which is given , not with
this object , but for the merely subsidiary purpose of enabling the
person to whom it is granted to make sure of receiving a certain
value to which he is entitled ; if not otherwise , then at all events
by means of the right in question . The other rights in re aliena
enable the person entitled to them to enjoy the physical qualities
of a thing. This right, which is known as Pledge , merely enables
a person who is entitled to receive a definite value from another ,
in default of so receiving it , to realize it by eventual sale of the





sale is one o
f
the component rights o
f
ownership ,
and may be parted with separately in order thus to add security
to a personal obligation . When so parted with , it is a right o
f
pledge , which may be defined as “ a right in rem , realizable by sale ,




accessory security to a right in per
sonam . "





pledge are , on the one hand ,





· which he can readily turn into money , and which he can follow
even in the hands o
f
third parties ; on the other hand , to leave
the enjoyment o
f
the thing in the meantime to its owner , and
to give him every facility for disencumbering it when the debt
for which it is security shall have been paid .
The methods b
y
which these objects can best b
e
attained , and
the degree in which they are attainable , must vary to some extent
with the nature o
f
the thing pledged . Probably the rudest method
is that which involves an actual transfer o
f
ownership in the thing
from the debtor to the creditor , accompanied by a condition for
it
s
retransfer upon due payment of the debt . Such was the fiducia
o
f
the older Roman law , such is the Scotch wadset , and such is
1 From the context it appears that Mr . Holland , unlike Mr . Salmond ,
confines the term “ jus in re aliena " to a sub -classification o
f rights in rem .










the English mortgage , o
f
lands o
r goods , at the present day , except
in so far as it
s theory has been modified by the determination o
f
the Court o
f Chancery and o
f
the Legislature to continue , as long
a
s possible , to regard the mortgagor as the owner o
f
the property .
Lord Mansfield was unsuccessful in attempting to induce the Courts
of Common Law to take the same view .
Another method , which must always have been practiced , is that
in which the ownership o
f
the object remains with the debtor , but
its possession is transferred to the creditor . This was called b
y
the Romans pignus . As a rule the creditor cannot make use o
f
the
thing which is thus in his custody . If he is to take its profits by
way o
f




sale without express agreement , but this became
customary , and was a
t
least presumed .
Yet another mode o
f creating a security is possible , b
y
which
not merely the ownership o
f
the thing but its possession also re
mains with the debtor . This is called b
y
the Roman lawyers and






y judicial decision , o
r by agree
ment . Those implied by law , generally described as tacit hypothecs ,
are probably the earliest . They are first heard o
f
in Roman law
in connection with that right o
f
a landlord over the goods o
f
his
tenant , which is still well known on the continent and in Scotland




Distress . Similar rights were subsequently granted to wives , pu
pils , minors , and legatees , over the property o
f
husbands , tutors ,
curators , and heirs respectively .
The action by which the practor Servius first enabled a land
lord to claim the goods o
f
his defaulting tenant in order to realize
his rent , even if they had passed into the hands of third parties ,
was soon extended so as to give similar rights to any creditor over
property which it
s
owner had agreed should be held liable for a
debt . A real right was thus created b
y
the mere consent o
f
the
parties , without any transfer o
f possession , which , although op
posed to the theory o
f
Roman law , became firmly established as
applicable both to immovable and movable property . Of the mod
ern states which have adopted the law of hypothec , Spain perhaps
stands alone in adopting it to the fullest extent . The rest have , as
a rule , recognized it only in relation to immovables . Thus the
Dutch law holds to the maxim mobila non habent sequelam , and
the French Code , following the coutumes o
f
Paris and Normandy ,
lays down that les meubles n 'ont pas de suite par hypotheque . But
by the Code de Commerce , ships , though movables , are capable o
f
hypothecation ; and in England what is called a mortgage , but is
essentially a hypothec , o
f
ships is recognized and regulated b
y
the
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the port at which the ship itself is reg
istered . So also in the old contract of " bottomry , " the ship is made
security for money lent to enable it to proceed upon it
s voyage .
SALMOND , JURISPRUDENCE , S 85 . In a former chapter we con
sidered the distinction between common law and equity . We saw
that these two systems o
f
law , administered respectively in the
courts o
f
common law and the Court o
f Chancery , were to a con





was the establishment o
f
a distinction between two classes o
f rights ,





common law . Equitable rights
( otherwise called equities ) are those which were recognized solely
in the Court o





the Judicature Act , 1873 , this distinction still exists , and
must be reckoned with as an inherent part of our legal system .
That which would have been merely an equitable right before the
Judicature Act is merely an equitable right still .
Inasmuch a
s all rights , whether legal o
r equitable , now obtain
legal recognition in all courts , it may be suggested that the dis
tinction is now o
f
n
o importance . This is not so , however , for in
two respects , a
t
least , these two classes o
f
rights differ in their
practical effects .
1 . The methods o
f
their creation and disposition are different .
A legal mortgage o
f
land must be created b
y
deed , but an equitable
mortgage may be created b
y
a written agreement o
r by a mere
deposit o
f
title -deeds . A similar distinction exists between a legal
and an equitable lease , a legal and an equitable servitude , a legal
and a
n equitable charge o
n
land , and so on .
2 . Equitable rights have a more precarious existence than legal
rights . Where there are two inconsistent legal rights claimed ad
versely by different persons over the same thing , the first in time
prevails . Qui prior est tempore potior est jure . A similar rule
applies to the competition o
f
two inconsistent equitable rights . But
when a legal and an equitable right conflict , the legal will prevail
over and destroy the equitable , even though subsequent to it in
origin , provided that the owner o
f
the legal right acquired it for
value and without notice o
f
the prior equity . As between a prior
equitable mortgage , for example , and a subsequent legal mortgage ,
preference will be given to the latter . The maxim is : Where there
are equal equities , the law will prevail . This liability to destruc
tion b
y
conflict with a subsequent legal right is an essential feature
and a characteristic defect o
f
all rights which are merely equitable .
Ib . , § 91 . Closely connected but not identical with the distinction
between trust and beneficial ownership is that between legal and
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equitable ownership . One person may be the legal and another
the equitable owner of the same thing at the same time . Legal
ownership is that which has its origin in the rules of the common
law , while equitable ownership is that which proceeds from rules
of equity divergent from the common law . The courts of common
law refused to recognize equitable ownership , and denied that the
equitable owner was an owner at all . The Court of Chancery
adopted a very different attitude. Here the legal owner was rec
ognized no less than the equitable , but the former was treated as
a trustee for the latter . Chancery vindicated the prior claims of
equity , not by denying the existence of the legal owner , but by
taking from him by means of a trust the beneficial enjoyment of
his property . The fusion of law and equity effected by the Judica
ture Act, 1873, has not abolished the distinction ; it has simply
extended the doctrines of the Chancery to the courts of common
law , and as equitable ownership did not extinguish or exclude legal
ownership in Chancery , it does not do so now .
MAITLAND , EQUITY, p . 122. Equitable estates and interests are
rights in personam but they have a misleading resemblance to rights
in rem . This resemblance has been brought about in the following
way . The trust will be enforced not only against the trustee who
has accepted it and his representatives and volunteers claiming
through or under him , but also against persons who acquire legal
rights through or under him with knowledge of the trust - nor is
that al
l
, it will be enforced against persons who acquire legal rights
o
r
under him if they ought to have known o
f
the trust . The Court
of Chancery set up a standard of diligence for purchasers and a
high one , one so high that it certainly is difficult for a purchaser
to buy land without obtaining constructive notice o
f
all trusts which
concern that land . Still now and again the difficulty is surmounted ,
and then the true character o
f equitable rights becomes apparent
- a purchaser acquires a legal right bona fide , for value , and with
out notice either actual or constructive of the trust , and he holds
the land successfully against cestui que trust , and cestui que trust
may then comfort himself with the reflection that the land never
was his .
Curtis , J . , in The Young MECHANIC , Fed Cas . 18180 ( U . S .
C . C . , 1855 ) . Equitable liens * * * arise out o
f
constructive
trusts and are neither jus in re nor jus ad rem ; but simply a duty ,
binding on the conscience of the owner of the thing , and which a
court o
f equity will compel him specifically to perforii .
EDITORIAL NOTE : HISTORY O
F
ENGLISH MORTGAGE LAW TO THE
TIME OF LORD MANSFIELD . The idea o
f
a lien held b
y
one person
upon the property o
f




n obligation seems a simple one , but for various rea
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sons this simple concept has never found a simple expression in the
laws of any people . Instead we have laws framed upon concepts
which are wholly foreign to this simple lien idea and which required
twisting and stretching to make them serve the end . This is con
spicuously true of our law of real property mortgages. The result
is a body of law full of fictions , contradictions and technicalities
which are intelligible only when approached historically .
A history of mortgage law must begin in the middle ages, but
we may pass by a
ll
medieval forms o
f gage , other than the con
ditional feoffment hereafter discussed , with the observation that
they were numerous and o
f
diverse origin and nature3 Some o
f
them more nearly approximated , in their operation , the modern
mortgage than did the conditional feoffment , but there is appar
ently no historical connection o
f any importance here . It is the con
ditional feoffment from which the modern mortgage developed ,
and we will proceed at once to its examination .
Subject to great variation o
f




f security was a conveyance (which , in most cases , meant , o
f
course , a feoffment ) upon condition that , if a certain sum o
f
money was paid by the feoffor to the feoffee a
t
a certain time , the
conveyance should be void . 4
This form of transaction soon acquired the name "mortgage . "
Although not unknown at an earlier period , it came into prom
inence between the age o
f
Bracton and that of Littleton ( in or
about the fourteenth century ) and steadily grew in favor until it
2 See The Pledge Idea , J . H . Wigmore , 10 Harv . L . Rev . 321 , 11 Ib . 18 .
3 See The Gage o
f
Land in Mediaeval England , H . D . Hazel
tine , 17 Harv . L . Rev . 549 , 18 ib . 36 .
4 The following is a translation of a charter of defeasance , accom
panying a conditional feoftment of the year 1341 , taken from Madox ,
Formulare Anglicanum .
" This indenture witnesseth that as John Balet o
f
Enebourne has given
and granted to Thomas Monalf and to his heirs a farm called Crowes .
croft and a meadow called Lawrencemede with their appurtenances in
Enebourne as more fully appears by a charter of feoffment to said
Thomas by him made : I , the aforesaid Thomas , will and grant for my
self and formy heirs and executors that if said John or his heirs pay or
cause to be paid to me or to my heirs and my executors ten pounds in
money a
t any time within the next ten years ensuing after this writing ;
in that case that the said charter o
f
feoffment be annulled and held void
for all time : And if the said John or his heirs do not pay or cause to be
paid to the said Thomas or to his heirs or to his executors the aforesaid
ten pounds at any time within the specified term of ten years next ensu
ing ; that said charter stand in its force and nature to him the said
Thomas and to his heirs forever without impeachment of said John or
o
f
his heirs forever .
" In Witness Whereof , the aforesaid Thomas and John mutually have
placed their seals on this indenture ; by these witnesses , Walter de Nor
tone , Curtle T . More . Given a
t
Neuburiz the Saturday next following the
feast o
f
the Apostles Saint Philip and Saint Jacob , in the 14th year of the
reign o
f King Edward III , after the Conquest . "






land , became the mortgage
o
f
the classical period o
f
the common law , and , with the substi
tution o
f grant for feoffment , is substantially the mortgage o
f




were , it is safe to say , the lender ' s reasons - in other words , it rep
resents the demand o
f
the lending class for satisfactory security .





is to say , its operation as enforced by the courts — we must examine
separately the doctrines of law and equity .
We will first consider the state of the law , using that word in the
narrow sense . Wemust remember that throughout this period , as at
the present day , there was a very definite and comparatively simple
law o
f
conditional estates , o
f
which we may say that it succeeded
quite well in giving effect to the express provisions o
f
conditional
conveyances . It is not surprising , then , that a conveyance condi
tioned to be void o
n the payment o
f
a sum ofmoney was treated by
the courts o
f
law like any other conveyance on condition subsequent ,
by making a quite literal application o
f
it
s stipulations . The result , o
f
course , was that , prior to the time fixed for payment , the feoffee had
a
n
estate in fee simple , defeasible on performance o
f
the condition ;
that upon performance of the condition by payment of the sum
named at the day named , a right o
f reentry arose in favor of the
feoffor , upon the exercise o
f
which the estate revested in him ;
while upon default , or non -performance o
f
the condition , b
y
fail
ure to pay the sum named on the day named , the estate o
f
the




o specialized rules for mortgages that could
b
e
called a " law o
f mortgages , ” but that mortgages were governed
by the law of conditional estates . 5
We will next consider the status of the mortgage in equity dur
ing the same period . These years see the growth o
f Chancery
from a semi -judicial office of doubtful authority to a fully devel
oped court , exercising a limited jurisdiction , but , within its limita
tions , enjoying practical supremacy over the courts o
f
law . It is
impossible to say when the Chancellors first interfered in the mort




the Chancellors was that the mortgage , while in
form a conveyance on condition subsequent , was intended merely
a
s
a security for money ; that the function o
f security was per
formed if the mortgagee got back his money , even after the day





5 Littleton , for example , while he applies to this form o
f
transaction ,
the term "mortgage , ” treats o
f it under the head of Estates Upon Condi
tion , without showing any differentiation in the law applicable to it . Ten
ures , $ $ 332 -344 .
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upon default worked a hardship upon the mortgagor , against which
equity should relieve. At the suit of the mortgagor they would
compel the mortgagee to reconvey the estate , upon payment of the,
debt, even though it was long past the “ law day " named for pay
ment, so that the mortgagee had acquired absolute ownership of
the land at law . This relief was called “ redemption .” ? At first ,
we may assume , it was granted only in cases of unusual hardship ,
as where the land was worth many times the debt , but presently
became a matter of course and of right in al
l
cases . At this point
the mortgagee found that his legal rights , which hitherto had been
entirely adequate to his purposes , were so no longer . He had the
legal title to the land , a
s
before , but he was now liable at any time
to b
e
hailed into the Court o
f
Chancery and compelled to relinquish
his title , and this equitable liability would extend , o
f
course , to any
purchaser with notice . The result was that , until the mortgagor
chose to redeem , the mortgagee was left without his money and
without the power o
f disposing o
f
the land to raise the money .
For relief from this situation the mortgagee was , himself , forced
to seek the Court of Chancery , and that court , perceiving that the
right to redeem could not be indefinitely extended without impair
ing the usefulness o
f mortgages , granted a decree o
f
" foreclosure , ”
cutting off or " foreclosing ” the mortgagor ' s equitable right to
redeem and leaving the mortgagee ' s legal title absolute .




f mortgages , but the elaboration o
f
that doc
6 The stock justification o
f
the equitable doctrine ofmortgages is that
it gives effect to the real intention of the parties , regarding the substance
rather than the form . So far as concerns the original interposition of
equity , this is , o
f
course , specious . While the purpose of the parties was
to secure the payment o
f
a sum o
f money , they manifestly intended , and
so evidenced in the most conclusive way , to accomplish this purpose by
means of a conditional conveyance . What equity really did , then , was not
to give effect to the intention o
f
the parties , but to defeat their intention ,
to limit their freedom o
f
contract , and to impose upon them rules of law
which they could not avoid by any form of agreement or by any expres
sion o
f
intention . Under the guise o
f enforcing the intention o
f
the par
ties , the court in reality enforced the intention which it conceived that
they in good conscience ought to entertain . In this regard the doctrine
of equity which declares the mortage a mere security is of one piece
with that which declares that agreements , however explicit , which clog
the equity o
f redemption , are void . Hazeltine v . Granger , post ; Pierce
v . Robinson , post .
The true justification o
f
the equitable doctrine o
f mortgages lies in the
fact that lender and borrower are not usually on an equal footing and that
the latter needs protection against the former , needs protection even
against himself in his borrowing transactions . This is , of course , the
same idea which lies behind the usury statutes . See Vernon v . Bethell ,
post , n . 1 , Chap . VI .
7 The term " redemption " is also applied to voluntary payment and
discharge o
f
a mortgage , out o
f
court .
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trine should be traced in its main features . The right of the mort
gagee to redeem the land in equity constituted , of course , an
“ equitable estate " in the land , which was called the " equity of
redemption .''8 Under the rule that equity follows the law , this
equitable estate , like a
ll




f legal estates , vi
z
. , it descended to the heir , could be con
veyed o
r
devised , and could be cut u
p
into lesser estates , and in
general , could be dealt with in the same manner as a legal estate ,
always subject , o
f
course , to the outstanding rights o
f
the mort
gagee . In short , the mortgagor was treated in equity as the real
owner of the land , though at law he was held to have parted with
his title . Consistently with this position , the interest of the mort
gagee in the land , though held a
t
law to b
e ownership , was regarded
in equity a
s
a security only . From this it followed that the debt
was regarded as the principal right and the interest in the land as
a mere incident o
r accessory o
f
the debt . Therefore this interest
in the land automatically followed the debt when the latter was
transferred by assignment and no conveyance of the land was nec
essary . Likewise this interest passed with the debt to executors o
r
administrators and not to heirs . Thus the interest o
f
the mortgagee
in the land came to be , in equity , a personal o
r
chattel interest .
This is substantially the equitable doctrine o
f mortgagee as it
stood at the middle o
f
the eighteenth century . Up to this point the
rules o
f
law remained in the form outlined above , but , by reason
of the practical supremacy of equity within the field of its activity ,
the equitable doctrines had come to be the real , substantial “ law
of mortgages , " so recognized everywhere except in courts of law .
In 1756 Lord Mansfield came to the Court of Kings Bench . Learned
in the civil law ,he never sympathized with the separation of law and
equity and a
s
a result was constantly making equitable innovations
upon the common law . In 1760 , in the case o
f
Martin v .Mowlin , con
struing a will , he said : “ A mortgage is a charge upon the land ;
and whatever would give the money would carry the estate in
the land along with it . The estate in the land is the same thing as
the money due upon it . It will be liable to debts ; it will go to
executors ; it will pass b
y





frauds . The assignment of the debt , or
forgiving it , will draw the land after it , as a consequence ; nay ,
it would do it , though the debt were forgiven only by parol ; for
the right to the land would follow , notwithstanding the statute
8 By a natural process this term comes to be loosely used to denote the
mortgagor ' s interest in the land from the time the mortgage is executed
until the mortgage relation is terminated , entirely regardless o
f
whether
such interest is legal or equitable , or whether it amounts to a mere right
to redeem o
r
to general ownership .
92 Burr . 969 .






formance , ted ; butwhat
o
f
frauds . ” After decisions o
f
similar import in Ren v . Bulkeley , 10
in 1779 , and Eaton v . Jacques , 11 in 1780 , we come , in 1781 , to the
much cited case o
f King v . S
t
. Michaels . 12 This was a case o
f
pauper settlement . In the course of his opinion Lord Mansfield
said : " If the estate on which a pauper resides is substantially his
property , that is sufficient , whatever forms of conveyance there
may be ; and therefore a mortgagor in possession gains a settle
ment , because the mortgagee , notwithstanding the form , has but a
chattel , and the mortgage is only a security . It is an affront to
common sense to say themortgagor is not the real owner . ' 13
STEPHEN , J . , in Evans v . MERRIKEN , 8 Gill . & J . 39 (Md . 1836 ) .
By the deed of mortgage , th legal estate becomes vested in the
mortgagee , defeasible at law upon the p rformance of the condi




the time stipulated ; but upon
default of the mortgagor in the non -payment of the money at th t
time , it becomes indefeasible at law , and defeasible only in equity ,
where the mortgage is considered only as a security for the debt ,
and the mortgagor , notwithstanding his default , will be permitted
to redeem . It is true in 2 Burr . 978 , Lord Mansfield , in deliv
ering the opinion o
f
the court , says , “ a mortgage is a charge upon
the land , and whatever would give the money , will carry the estate
in the land along with it , to every purpose . The estate in the land
is the same thing a
s
the money due upon it . It will be liable to
debts ; it will go to executors ; it will pass by a will , not made and






f the debt , o
r forgiving it , will draw the land
after it as a consequence ; nay it would do it , though the debt
were forgiven only b
y parol ; for the right o
f
the land would fol
low , notwithstanding the statute o
f
frauds . ”
But in Doug . Rep . 22 , his lordship at a later period o
f
his
judicial life , in deciding that a mortgagee might recover in eject
ment (without giving notice to quit ) against a tenant claiming
under a lease from the mortgagor , granted after the mortgage with
out the privity o
f
the mortgagee , held the following language , “ when
the mortgagor is left in possession , the true inference to be drawn
is an agreement that he shall possess the premises at will in the
strictest sense , and therefore , no notice is ever given him to quit ,
1
0 Doug . 292 .
1
1 Doug . 455 .
1
2 Doug . 630 .
1
3 These views o
f Lord Mansfield were not accepted by the English
courts , and by the law of England today the mortgagee has , after default ,
the absolute legal title , and the mortgagor but an equitable interest .
See Maitland , Equity , 281 . And see Lord Redesdale ' s strictures on
Lord Mansfield in Shannon v . Bradstreet , 1 Sch . & Lef . 52 , 65 . Other
decisions o
f
Lord Mansfield himself greatly qualified these declarations .
See Keech v . Hall , 1 Doug . 21 ; Moss v . Gallimore , 1 Doug . 279 .
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and he is not even entitled to reap the crop , as other tenants at
will are, because al
l
is liable to the debt , on payment o
f
which the
mortgagee ' s title ceases . The mortgagor has no power , express
or implied , to let leases not subject to every circumstance of the
mortgage . ” And the Supreme Court o
f
the United States , in speak
ing upon the subject o
f




and the interest acquired by the mortgagee , in the thing mortgaged ,
express themselves in the following terms , “ it is true that in dis
cussions in courts of equity , a mortgage is sometimes called a lien
for a debt ; and so it certainly is , and something more . It is a
transfer o
f
the property itself , as security for the debt . This must
be admitted to be true a
t
law , and it is equally true in equity , for
in this respect equity follows the law .
“ It does not consider the estate of the mortgagee as defeated
and reduced to a mere lien , but it treats it as a trust estate , and




a qualified estate and
security . When the debt is discharged there is a resulting trust
for the mortgagor . It is therefore only in a loose and general
sense that it is sometimes called a lien , and then only by way o
f
contrast to an estate absolute and indefeasible . " 14 From these
decisions , it results that the mortgagee must be considered as hav
ing an estate o
r
interest in the subject matter o
f
the mortgage , not





the mortgage deed , but an interest commensurate with
the object contemplated to be attained b
y
it , as a security for the
payment o
f
the debt due from the mortgagor to the mortgagee .
From these general views and considerations , relative to the re
spective rights o
f
the parties to the instrument o
f mortgage , we
are led to the consideration o
f
the question arising in this case ,
and involved in the decision o
f
this controversy . And that ques
tion is , whether the issue o
f
a female slave , herself , the subject o
f
the mortgage , born after the title o
f
the mortgagee has become
absolute a
t
law , and during the possession o
f
the mortgagor , is
liable for the payment o
f
the mortgage debt . For it must be borne
in mind that the question is not whether the mortgagee is entitled
to hold the issue a
s
his own property in absolute right , but as se
curity for the payment o
f
his debt only . Upon the fullest consid
eration we have been able to bestow upon the subject , aided by
a
ll
the lights and information with which we have been furnished ,
by an examination of the decisions of the courts of our sister
states upon similar subjects , we have come to the conclusion that
right and justice require that the issue so born should be liable ,
and that neither the principles o
f
law nor equity forbid it . In
the language o
f
Lord Mansfield , before adverted to , when speak
1
4 Quotation from Conard v . Atlantic Ins . Co . , 1 Peters ( U . S . )
386 , 441 .
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ing of the growing crop , when possession is taken by the mort
gagee, we think , “ al
l
is liable to the debt , on payment o
f
which the
mortgagee ' s title ceases . " ' 15
AGNEW , J . , in Tryon v . MUNSON , 77 Pa . St . 250 ( 1874 ) . The
mortgage passes to the mortgagee the title and right of possession
to hold till payment shall be made . He may , therefore , enter at
pleasure , and take actual possession - use the land and reap its
profits . Now this title or lawful right to possess , and actual pedis
possessio , are not ideal or contemplative merely , but are real and
tangible . True , the right is conditional , and will cease on payment
o
f
the debt ; but until the condition is performed , the title and pos
session are as substantial and real a
s though they were absolute .
The evidence of this is that the mortgagee may dispossess and
hold out the mortgagor until he performs the condition , or until
the perception o
f
the profits reaches the same result . Thus we per
ceive an interest o
r
estate in the land itself , capable o
f enjoyment ,
and enabling the mortgagor to grasp and hold it actually , and not
a mere lien o
r potentiality , to follow it by legal process and con
demn it for payment . The land passes to the mortgagee by the
act of the party himself , and needs no legal remedy to enforce the
right . But a lien vests no estate , and is a mere incident of the




law , which may be limited .
STORRS , J . , in GOODMAN V . White , 26 Conn . 316 ( 1857 ) . After
the delivery o
f
the first mortgage deed the legal title to the land
conveyed was in the first mortgagee . An equitable right , an equity
of redemption , was all that remained in the former owner , and all
that he could mortgage to a third person . It is true that a second
mortgage purports to be a conveyance o
f
the land itself , and as
between the parties to the instrument it is such ; and whenever
the estate o
f the first mortgagee is divested the second mortgage
will operate fully as a conveyance of the land . But so long as
the first mortgage is outstanding , the second mortgagee receives





mortgagor ' s equity or equita

















SANDERS v . REED .
SUPREME COURT O
F
NEW HAMPSHIRE , 1842 .
1
2
N . H . 558 .
Trespass , for breaking the plaintiff ' s close , and cutting certain




f September , 1839 , Norris Colburn , being in
1
5 Compare Duval v . Becker , 81 Md . 537 .
1
6 Compare Chamberlain v . Thompson , 10 Conn . 243 ; Bates v . Coe ,
1
0 Conn . 280 ; Clinton v . Westbrook , 38 Conn . 9 .
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possession of the premises , conveyed the same to Stephen G . Tyler ,
and on the same day took a mortgage back from Tyler , which
mortgage , on the 21st day of November, 1839 , was duly assigned
to the plaintiffs . Tyler remained in the actual possession of the
premises , from the date of his mortgage deed until the 3d day
of March , 1841 , when the plaintiffs took possession . The trees
were cut by the defendant , under a license from Tyler , between
the first day of January , 1841 , and the first day of March , of the
same year.
On the 17th day of May , 1837 , Colburn , being the owner of this
land , mortgaged it, with other real estate , to Susan Robeson , to
secure the payment of certain notes signed by him and Milton
Chaplin . On the 16th day of April , 1841 , Chaplin paid the notes
to Mrs. Robeson , and they were delivered to him , but the mort
gage deed still remains in her hands , undischarged . The notes
were joint and several , but as between Colburn and Chaplin they
were the proper debts of Colburn . The payments were made by
Chaplin , with the avails of the sale of that portion of the lands
mortgaged to Mrs. Robeson not included in the mortgage to the
plaintiffs , excepting about two hundred dollars , paid from his own
money. This last sum is secured by an attachment of the real
estate of Colburn .
Colburn occupied the land until the date of his deed to Tyler ,
and Tyler occupied until the 3d day of March , 1841, when the
plaintiffs took possession . Colburn and Tyler , during the time of
their occupancy , dealt with the premises as their own , by cutting
timber ,manufacturing the same, and selling , without le
t , hindrance ,
o
r
molestation , either from the mortgagee or the assignees .
Mrs . Robeson lived thirty miles from the premises , and the plain
tiffs live fifteen miles from the same , and no evidence exists that
either o
f
them had any knowledge o
f
the manner the mortgagors
were dealing with the premises , nor does it appear that they at
tempted to ascertain .
PARKER , C . J . There is a principle in equity , that a surety is
entitled to the benefit o
f any security which the creditor may have
taken from the principal .
Whether Chaplin could have availed himself o
f
this principle ,
and have held under the mortgage to Mrs . Robeson , is a ques
tion which it does not seem necessary to settle in this case . He
paid the notes and discharged the debt , without obtaining the
mortgage , and without making any claim to the benefit o
f
it , so
far as appears from this case . For the balance which he paid ,
h
e
has made an attachment , and is secured . There is no reason for
thrusting an interest upon him which he has never claimed .
In fact , it may admit of doubt whether he would be entitled to
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e
charbiect to his rightnor have any
flsiense .
Pettengill
Wintiffs' right he land at the
the benefit o
f
such a principle against Tyler , a bona fide purchaser ,
o
r against the plaintiffs , as assignees o
f Tyler ' s mortgage , unless
they can be made chargeable with notice that Chaplin was a surety ,
and therefore took su j ct to his rights a
s
such . The defendant
is in n
o way connected with Chaplin , or have any rights o
f
the
latter been urged in the argument as sustaining the def .
It is settled that a mortgagee may maintain trespass against a
mortgagor for cutting timber upon the land , unless his assent is
shown , or is fairly to be deduced from the circumstances o
f
the
case . Smith v . Moore ( 11 N . H . Rep . 551 ) ; 5 N . H . Rep . 54 ,
Pettengill v . Evans . There is no evidence o
f
assent in this case ,
and the plaintiffs ' right of action would be clear , had they held
the first mortgage upon the l d a
t
the time .
But it is contended that the mortgage to Mrs . Robeson was in
force , as a valid title to the land , at the time when the timber was
cut ; and that if there was any right o
f
action for the cutting , it
was in her , and not in the plaintiffs ; or , a
t





that mortgage , and the actual possession o
f
the defendant , the
plaintiffs , who were second mortgagees , had neither the actual nor
constructive possession , and cannot therefore maintain this action .
We are of opinion that this objection cannot avail .
A mortgage ( as was stated in the case Smith v . Moore ) is re
garded a
s
a mere security for the debt , o
r
a
s passing the legal es









ll lawful protection o
f
his interests .
Tested by this rule , Mrs . Robeson is not in this case to be
regarded as having the legal estate , at the time when this timber
was cut , notwithstanding her mortgage was then in existence , be
cause that is not necessary , in order to the protection o
f
her inter
ests . Her mortgage has been satisfied ; and , so far as appears ,
she made no claim on account o
f
this act , a
s injurious to her . She
has no interest to b
e protected , and no reason to make any objec
tion , nor can she now maintain any action . There is no fair pur
pose to be answered by considering the legal estate in her , as the
result would only be to defeat a right o
f
action which would other
wise lawfully exiši in une plaintiffs , and this without any benefit
to her .
Tyler , who made the second mortgage , had no more right to do
acts o
f
waste against the second mortgagee , o
r
his assignee , than
he had as against the first . Each mortgagee , for the purpose o
f
protecting his rights , is to be regarded , a
s against the mortgagor ,
a
s holding the legal estate . Any act o
f
waste , without the assent
o
f
either , may be regarded as injurious to both . The paramount
right o
f
action in such case may be regarded a
s
in the first mort
gagee , so long a
s
the first mortgage exists ; and it may be supposed
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to be a good defense to an action by the second mortgagee , that
the first mortgage still existed , unless it could be shown that the
first mortgagee assented , and therefore had no right of action ,
But it appearing that the first mortgage is extinguished , and that
no paramount right exists , and the defendant therefore not being
answerable to any one else , there seems to be no good reason why
he who was a wrongdoer , as to both , should not answer to the second
mortgagee, who , after the extinguishment of the first mortgage ,
may well be regarded as having been the owner of the legal estate,
so far as that is necessary to the preservation of his rights under
the mortgage. The first mortgage , under such circumstances , is
to be regarded as having been a mere security .
This view of the matter does not prejudice any right of the
defendant. He stands confessedly in the place of the mortgagor ,
and had no right , as against either mortgagee , to do any act of
waste. As against either mortgage, standing alone , an act of
waste , without assent , would be a wrong , for which trespass might
be maintained .
The first mortgage having been removed without any entry by the
mortgagee , the defendant is relieved from any danger of a claim
upon that mortgage , and the case therefore now stands as if that
mortgage had never existed . To interpose that mortgage, as a con
veyance of the legal estate , would be to interpose a technical objec
tion for the purpose of working injustice , and would enable a mort
gagor to impair the security of the second mortgagee with impunity




JOHNSON , C . J . , in MARTIN V . ALTER , 42 Ohio S
t
. 94 ( 1884 ) . In
the case o
f
a mortgage in the usual form , the legal estate remains
in the mortgagor in possession , even after condition broken as to
a
ll
the world , except the mortgagee .
The legal title remaining in the mortgagor is liable to levy and
sale o
n execution . It descends to his heirs , subject to the condi
tional estate to the mortgagee .
The latter may maintain ejectment or take other legal steps to
obtain possession after condition broken , but until he does so , the
mortgagor is at law owner o
f
the fee . The mortgage is a condi
tional conveyance which becomes void upon payment o
f
the debt ,
without a formal reconveyance .
Shaw , C . J . , in Ewer v . HOBBS , 5 Metc . 1 (Mass . 1842 ) . The
first great object o
f
a mortgage is , in the form o
f
a conveyance in




r hypothecation of real estate , for the payment of a debt , or the
performance o
f
some other obligation . The next is , to leave to
the mortgagor , and to purchasers , creditors , and al
l
others claim




m , the full and entire control , dispo
sition and ownership of the estate , subject only to the first purpose ,
that o
f securing the mortgagee . Hence it is that , as between
mortgagor and mortgagee , the mortgage is to be regarded as a
conveyance in fee ; because that construction best secures him in
his remedy and his ultimate right to the estate , and to its inci
dents , the rents and profits . But in al
l
other respects , until fore
closure , when the mortgagee becomes the absolute owner , themort
gage is deemed to be a lien o
r charge , subject to which the estate
may be conveyed , attached , and in other respects dealt with , as
the estate o
f
the mortgagor . And a
ll
the statutes upon the sub
ject are to be so construed ; and all rules o
f
law , whether admin
istered in law or in equity , are to be so applied as to carry these
objects into effect . In an early case in Massachusetts , it was held
b
y
Chief Justice Parsons , that where a mortgage was made to
partners , in such form as would ordinarily create a tenancy in
common in other grantees — inasmuch a
s it was designed to secure




one partner , would
vest in the survivor for the purpose o
f
collection , and subject to the
partnership debts — the estate should b
e
held to be a joint tenancy ,
in order that by the principle of survivorship , applicable to that
tenure , the real security might accompany the debt . Appleton v .
Boyd , 7 Mass . 131 . This doctrine was earnestly opposed by Mr .
Justice Story in the case o
f
Randall v . Phillips , 3 Mason 378 , who
insisted that such mortgage , so far as it operated as a transfer o
f
the legal estate , was to be construed as a tenancy in common , and
not a joint tenancy . But at the same time he maintained that on
the death o
f
one partner , the heirs o
f
the deceased would take a
moiety , charged with an implied trust to hold for the survivor , as
security fo
r
the debt . 17
CARTWRIGHT , J . , in LightCAP V . BRADLEY , 186 Ill . 510 (1900 ) .
Leaving out o
f
consideration the effect o
f
a mortgage in the statu
tory form , it is true that a mortgage o
r
trust deed like the one in
question here , which purports to convey title , does , as between
the mortgagor and mortgagee , convey such title ; but it is only
a qualified conveyance o
f
the land , and the mortgagor parts with
the title only a




r obligation . In the development o
f
the law of real




" Although , as between mortgagor and mortgagee , it is a transmis
sion of the fee , which gives the mortgagee a remedy in the form of a real
action , and constitutes a legal seizin ; yet to most other purposes , a mort
gage before the entry of the mortgagee is but a pledge and real lien ,
leaving the mortgagor to most purposes the owner . ” Shaw , C . J . , in
Howard v . Robinson , 5 Cush . (Mass . ) 119 . Compare Gooding v . Shea ,
post .
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land , usually requiring a judgment to complete the transfer of title
and to vest it in the mortgagee . Afterward , a form of mortgage
came into use which vested title of itself , and the pledge changed
into an estate in fee without judicial foreclosure upon the mort
gagor's default . This mortgage vested absolute title in the mort
gagee upon condition broken . Courts of equity , however, recog
nizing the purpose of the mortgage as merely a pledge to secure a
debt, established a right of the mortgagor to redeem . They created
a new estate in the form of the equity of redemption and a remedy
for the creditor to cut off this estate . A proceeding was devised to
extinguish the mortgagor 's right to redeem and to vest title in the
mortgagee, and this was the proceeding now known as strict fore
closure . ( 9 Ency . of Pl. & Pr. 118 .) Equity assumed jurisdiction
to relieve the mortgagor against a forfeiture upon default , and he
was relieved from it on payment of the debt . ( 1 Jones on Mort
gages , § 8 .) Courts of law , following the lead of courts of equity ,
have adopted many equitable principles as to the titles of the re
spective parties , and at law the title of the mortgagee can be used
only for the purpose of securing his equitable rights under it. “ As
to all persons except the mortgagee and those claiming under him ,
it is everywhere the established modern doctrine that a mortgagor
in possession is at law , both before and after breach of the condi
tion , the legal owner.” ( 1 Jones on Mortgages , § 11.) In many
of the states a mortgage confers no title or estate upon the mort
gagee, and it is nothing but a mere security for a debt or obligation .
This state has adhered to the rule that at law a title vests in the
mortgagee, but only for the protection of his interests . For the
purpose of protecting and enforcing his security the mortgagee
may enter and hold possession by virtue of his title and take the
rents and profits in payment of his mortgage debt. He may main
tain the possessory action of ejectment on the strength of such
title , but the purpose and effect of the action are not to establish
or confirm title in him , but , on the contrary , to give him the rents
and profits which undermine and destroy his title. (United States
Mortgage Co . v . Gross , 93 Ill . 483 . ) When the rents and profits




the mortgagee are at an end . The mortgagor ' s interest in the
land may be sold upon execution ; his widow is entitled to dower
in it ; it passes as real estate by devise ; it descends to his heirs ,
b
y
his death , as real estate ; he is a freeholder by virtue o
f
it ; he
may maintain an action for the land against a stranger and the
mortgage cannot be set up as a defense . The mortgagee has no
such estate a
s
can be sold on execution ; his widow has no right
to dower in it ; upon his death the mortgage passes to his personal
representatives a
s personal estate , and it passes by his will as per
sonal property . ( 1 Jones on Mortgages , § 15 . ) The title o
f
the









comber -have ,have at an e
mortgagee , even after condition broken , is not an outstanding title
o
f
which a stranger can take advantage , but it is available only to
the mortgagee or one claiming under him . (Hall v . Lance , 25
Ill . 277 . ) The mortgagor may sell and convey his title or mort
gage it to successive mortgagees , and his grantee o
r mortgagee
will succeed to his estate and occupy his position subject to the
encumbrance .
Fitch v . Pinckard , 4 Scam . 69 , was an action of ejectment , and
there was a question whether an equity o
f redemption was liable
to execution and would pass to the purchaser a
t
a
n execution sale .
The court , holding that it would pass , said that the earliest doc
trine in England settled that the whole legal estate was in the
mortgagee , but that the strictness o
f
the law has yielded to the prin
ciple o
f
justice and equity , and the doctrine held in the United
States in regard to the estate o
f
the mortgagor is , that he is to be
treated a
s
the real owner of the estate for a
ll
beneficial purposes ,
subject only to the rights and encumbrance of the mortgagee .
Cottingham v . Springer , 88 Ill . 90 , was also an action of eject
ment , where the same question arose . The court cited Fitch v .
Pinckard , supra , and reiterated what was there said . After refer
ring to the common - law rule that the mortgagee held the legal title
in fee and that the mere equitable right o
f
the mortgagor could
not be sold on execution , the court said ( p . 93 ) : “ But many o
f
the states — and ours o
f
the nu ber — have , by enactment , made
great modifications o
f
the rule . Our legislature at an early day
provided that when the mortgagor paid and satisfied the debt and
the mortgage had been recorded , he might compel the mortgagee
to enter a satisfaction o
f
the mortgage on the margin o
f
the rec
ord , which should operate a
s
a discharge and release o
f
the same
and forever bar a
ll
actions that might be brought thereon . This
provision is found in the act establishing the recorder ' s office ( Pub .
Laws of 1819 , p . 19 , § 5 ) and has been continued in force ever





it reinvested the mortgagor with the title simply b
y
the
mortgagee stating , over his signature , on the margin of the record ,
that he had received satisfaction o
f
the debt , and dispensing with
a release o
r reconveyance for the purpose . ” The court also said




a scire facias and
a sale of the property under an execution at law recognized the
equity o
f redemption as an interest or title that might be sold on
execution , subject to the same incidents that other sales o
f
real
estate are under when sold under ordinary executions at law .
In Barrett v . Hinckley , 124 Ill . 32 , which was an action of eject
ment b
y Hinckley against Barrett and others , the court held that
the title o
f
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tion in furtherance of his interest as a means of coercing the pay
ment of the debt ; that if a mortgagee conveys the mortgaged prem
ises without assigning the debt , the grantee will hold the legal title
in trust for the holder of the debt, and that the mortgage interest ,
as distinct from the debt , has no determinate value and is no fit
subject for assignment . The court also said ( p . 46 ) : " It must
not be concluded from what we have said that the dual system
respecting mortgages , as above explained , exists in this state pre
cisely a
s
it did in England prior to its adoption in this country ,
for such is not the case . It is a conceded fact that the equitable
theory o
f
a mortgage has , in process o
f
time , made in this state ,
a
s
in others , material encroachments upon the legal theory which
is now fully recognized in courts of law . Thus , it is now the
settled law that the mortgagor or his assignee is the legal owner
of the mortgaged estate , as against all persons except the mort
gagee o
r
his assigns . (Hall v . Lance , , 25 Ill . 250 ; Emory v .
Keighan , 88 id . 482 . ) As a result of this doctrine , it follows that
in ejectment b
y
the mortgagor against a third party the defendant
· cannot defeat the action by showing an outstanding title in the
mortgagee . (Hall v . Lance , supra . ) So , too , courts of law now
regard the title o
f
a mortgagee in fee in the nature o
f
a base or












Limitations , the mortgagee ' s title is ex
tinguished by operation o
f
law . ( Pollock v . Maison , 41 Ill . 516 ;
Harris v . Mills , 28 id . 44 ; Gibson v . Rees , 50 id . 383 . ) Hence the
rule is a
s well established at law as it is in equity , that the debt is
the principal thing and themortgage an incident . ”
The mortgagee is the legal owner for only one purpose , while ,
a
t
the same time , the mortgagor is the owner for every other pur
pose and against every other person . The title o
f
the mortgagee
is anomalous , and exists only between him and the mortgagor and
for a limited purpose . Delano v . Bennett , 90 Ill . 533 , was an
action o
f ejectment . E . T . Warren , the owner o
f
two -fifths of the
land in controversy , mortgaged the same to the Kennebeck Bank o
f
Maine . The bank conveyed said two - fifths to Benjamin Wales and
others , and Delano claimed the same through mesne conveyances
from the grantees o
f
the bank . It was held that the deed from the
bank purporting to convey this two - fifths interest did not convey
anything , and the court said ( p . 536 ) : “ The mortgage is deemed





the mortgagee in the land without an assignment o
f
the debt is considered in law as a nullity . ” The title is never out
o
f
the mortgagor , except a
s




n incident of the mortgage debt , for the purpose of obtaining
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tions the title of the mortgagee or trustee ceases at law as well as
in equity . When the debt, the principal thing, is gone , the inci
dent, the mortgage , is also gone . ( Pollock v . Maison , 41 Ill . 516 . )
The mortgagor ' s title is then freed from the title of the mortgagee ,
and he is the owner of the premises , not by any new title , but by
the title which he always had . Statutes o
f
limitation do not trans
fer title from one to another , and a Statute o
f
Limitations which
would have the effect o
f transferring the legal title back from
the mortgagee to the mortgagor would be unconstitutional . (New
land v . Marsh , 19 Ill . 376 . ) The title of the mortgagor becomes
perfect because the title o
f





the mortgage debt o
r obligation and terminates with it .
(Barrett v . Hinckley , supra . ) 18
RUNYAN v . MERSEREAU .
SUPREME Court o
f
New YORK , 1814 .
1
1 Johns . ( N . Y . ) 534 .
Per Curiam . This was an action o
f
trespass , quare clausum
fregit . The plaintiff proved himself in possession o
f
the locus in
quo , and showed a title derived under a judgment against one
James Leonard , who , it appeared , had mortgaged the land to
Joshua Mersereau . B
y
the pleadings , the question presented to
the court is , whether the freehold was in the plaintiff , who had
purchased the equity o
f
redemption , under the judgment against
the mortgagor , o
r
in Joshua Mersereau , the mortgagee .
Courts o
f
law , both here and in England , have gone very far
towards , if not the full length of , considering mortgages , at law ,
a
s
in equity , mere securities for money ; and the mortgagee as
having only a chattel interest . Lord Mansfield (Doug . 610 ) says :
A mortgagee , notwithstanding the form , has but a chattel , and
the mortgage is only a security ; that it is an affront to common
sense to say the mortgagor is not the real owner . Mortgages are
not considered as conveyances of land within the statute of frauds ,
and the forgiving o
f
the debt , with the delivery o
f
the security ,
is holden to be an extinguishment of the mortgage . Mortgages
will pass by a will not made with the solemnities of the statute of
frauds . The assignment o
f
the debt , or forgiving it , even by parol ,
draws the land after it a
s
a consequence . The debt is considered
the principal , and the land as an incident only .
The interest o
f
the mortgagee cannot be sold under execution .





the cases on this
subject ; they have been repeatedly reviewed b
y
this court . ( 3
1
8 Compare Woodside v . Adams , 40 N . J . L . 417 . For an interesting
analogy , see Williston , Sales , § 330 .
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Johns . Cases 329 , 1 Johns. Rep. 590 , 4 Johns. Rep . 42.) The light
in which mortgages have been considered , in order to be consistent ,
necessarily leads to the conclusion that the freehold must be con
sidered in the plaintiff , and he, of course , is entitled to judg
ment. 19
COMSTOCK , C . J., in KORTRIGHT v . Cady , 21 N . Y . 343, 362 ( 1860 ) .
In the early history of mortgage law , the courts of equity , depart
ing from the letter of the contract , but adhering to the intention
of the parties , adopted the just and liberal doctrine that a mortgage
was but a pledge or security , always redeemable until foreclosure .
The courts of law followed in the same direction . As Lord Redes
dale observed (Mitf . 428 ) : “ The distinction between law and
equity is never in any country a permanent distinction . Law and
equity are in continual progression , and the former is constantly
gaining upon the latter . A great part of what is now strict law
was formerly considered as equity , and the equitable decisions of
this age will unavoidably be ranked under the strict law of the
next.” Such , preeminently , has been the course of jurisprudence
on this subject . The doctrines originating in the courts of equity ,
respecting the rights of mortgagor and mortgagee, have been in
corporated into the code of the common law , so that there is now
no difference between the two systems . This has been true in
substance for nearly a century past . In Martin v . Mowlin ( 2
Burr. 978 ) , decided by the English King's Bench in 1760 , it was
held that whatever words in a will would carry the money due
upon a mortgage would carry the interest in the land . Lord Mans
field said : " A mortgage is a charge upon the land , and whatever
would give the money would carry the estate in the land along
with it. The estate in the land is the same thing as the money
· due upon it . It will be liable to debts ; it will go to the executor ;
it will pass by a will not made and executed with the solemnities
required by the statute of frauds. The assignment of the debt ,
or forgiving it, will draw the land after it as a consequence ; nay ,
it would do it though the debt were forgiven only by parol.” So,
in The King v . St. Michaels (Doug . 632 ) , it was said by the same
judge , that “ a mortgagor in possession gains a settlement , because
the mortgagee , notwithstanding the form , has but a chattel , and
the mortgage is only a security .” To the same effect is The King
v . Edington ( 1 East. 288 ) , and such is the uniform tenor of the
English authorities . (See 6 Conn. 159 .)
In this state , the rules of law and equity in regard to mortgages
have never differed in any degree ; it being the doctrine of both
systems that a mortgage is but a personal interest merely . This
19 For earlier cases in New York , see Johnson v . Hart, 3 Johns . Cas.
(N . Y .) 322; Jackson v. Willard , 4 Johns. ( N . Y .) 41 .
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proposition , in its full length and breadth , was determined in Run
yan v . Mersereau ( 11 Johns . 534 ) , where the question arose in the
most direct manner whether the freehold was in the mortgagor or
mortgagee . The plaintiff , deriving title under the mortgagor , sues
in trespass for cutting timber ; the defendant justifying under a
license from the mortgagee . It was held that the action was main
tainable ; the decision being explicitly on the ground that the former
was the real owner o
f
the land , while the latter had a chattel
interest only . So it has been held in repeated decisions that the
mortgagee cannot , in any way , convey , devise , mortgage or in
cumber the land , while the mortgagor can do all these things ; that
judgments against a mortgagee , which are a lien on all legal estates ,
d
o not affect his interest in the lands mortgaged ; that such an
interest does not descend to heirs , but goes to the personal repre
sentative a
s
a chose in action ; that it is not subject to dower o
r
curtesy ; that it passes b
y
a parol transfer , and b
y
any transfer of
the debt ; and , finally , that it is extinguished by payment , or by
whatever extinguishes the debt . ( 3 Johns . Cas . 329 , 1 J . R . 590 ,
4 id . 42 , 7 id . 278 , 15 id . 319 , 6 id . 290 , 2 Paige 68 , 58
6 , 5 Wend .
603 , 2 Barb . Ch . 119 . )
But it has been said that the mortgagee could maintain ejectment
against the mortgagor , until our Revised Statutes abolished that
remedy in such a case , and that even since those statutes , the
mortgagee , being in possession , may retain it until the debt is paid .
All this is true ; but it presents no anomaly or inconsistency in the
law . The mortgagee ' s right to bring ejectment or , being in pos
session , to defend himself against an ejectment b
y
the mortgagor ,
is but a right to recover or to retain the possession o
f
the pledge
for the purpose of paying the debt . ( 6 Conn . 163 . ) Such a right
is but the incident o
f
the debt , and has no relation to a title or estate
in the lands . Any contract for the possession of lands , however
transient o
r
limited , will carry the right to recover that possession ;
and such was deemed to be the nature and construction o
f
a mort
gage , it being considered that the parties intended the possession
o
f
the thing hypothecated should g
o
with the contract . Ejectment
was not , in fact , a real action at the common law . That remedy ,
in its origin , was only to recover possession according to some





title was at length allowed to be brought into controversy . ( 3
B
l
. 199 , 200 . ) When the legislature , b
y
express enactment , denied
this remedy to mortgagees , they undoubtedly supposed they had
swept away the only remaining vestige o
f
the ancient rule of the





freehold ; yet I see nothing inconsistent or anomalous in allowing
the possession , once acquired for the purpose o
f satisfying the
mortgage debt , to be retained until that purpose is accomplished .
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When that purpose is attained , the possessory right instantly ceases,
and the title is , as before, in the mortgagor , without a reconvey
ance . The notion that a mortgagee 's possession , whether before
or after default , enlarges his estate , or in any respect changes the
simple relation of debtor and creditor between him and his mort
gagee , rests upon no foundation . We may call it a just and law
ful possession , like the possession of any other pledge ; but when
its object is accomplished , it is neither just nor lawful for an in
stant longer .
There are terms of the ancient law which have come down to
us, having long survived the principles of which they were the
appropriate expression . Thus the words “ law day ” once , and very
expressively , marked the time when all legal rights were lost and
gone, by the mortgagor 's default. There is now no such time until
foreclosure by a judicial sentence or sale under a power. But the
term is still in use , serving no other purpose than to engender con
fusion and uncertainty in minds which derive their conceptions
from words rather than things. So we have the terms, “ redemp
tion ” and “ equity of redemption ,” which belonged to a system of
law that gave the legal estate, defeasibly before default and abso
lutely afterwards , to the mortgagee , and which , while that system
prevailed , were descriptive of the mortgagor 's right to go into
equity , on the condition of paying his debt , to redeem a forfeited
estate and demand a reconveyance . These descriptive words yet
survive, and are in use , although the ideas they once represented
have long since become obsolete. Even the word " forfeiture ,” still
so often used , is no longer , in reference to this subject, the ex
pression of any principle, as it once was. There is now no for
feiture of a mortgaged estate . The mortgagor 's rights may be
foreclosed by a sentence in the courts , or by a sale had in the man
ner prescribed by the statute law , if he has himself , in the contract ,
given authority thus to sell ; but, until foreclosure , his estate , the
day after a default , is exactly what it was the day before . Contro
versies like the present would cease to arise , if the mere terms of
the law were no longer confounded with its principles .
The proposition , that a tender of the money due on a mort
gage , made at any time before a foreclosure , discharges the lien ,
is the logical result of premises which are admitted to be true.
These are , that the mortgagor has the same right after as before
a default to pay his debt, and so clear his estate from the incum
brance ; and that payment being actually made, the lien thereby
becomes extinct . We have, then , only to apply an admitted prin
ciple in the law of tender , which is , that tender is equivalent to pay
ment as to al
l
things which are incidental and accessorial to the
debt . The creditor , by refusing to accept , does not forfeit his right
to the very thing tendered , but he does lose all collateral benefits o
r
NATURE OF THE MORTGAGE .
securities . ( 3 Johns. Cas. 243 , 12 J. R . 274 , 6 Wend . 22 , 6 Cow .
728 ; Coggs v. Bernard , 2 Lord Ray . R . 916 .) Thus, after the
tender of a money debt , followed by payment into court, interest
and costs cannot be recovered . The instantaneous effect is to dis
charge any collateral lien , as a pledge of goods or the right of dis
tress. It is not denied that the same principle applies to a mort
gage, if the tender be made at the very time when the money is
due. If the creditor refuses , he justly loses his security . It is im
possible to hold otherwise although the tender be made after
wards, unless we also say that the mortgage , which was before a
mere security , becomes a freehold estate by reason of the default .
That this is not true has been sufficiently shown.
CHRISTIANCY , J., in LADUE V. DETROIT & MILWAUKEE RAILROAD
Co ., 13 Mich . 380 , 394 ( 1865 ) . That a mortgage in this state , both at
law and in equity , even when given to secure a debt actually sub
sisting at its date , conveys no title to the land to the mortgagee
( especially since the statute o
f
1843 , taking away ejectment by the
mortgagee ) ; that the title remains in the mortgagor until fore
closure and sale , and that the mortgage is but a security , in the
nature o
f




this court : Dougherty v . Randall , 3 Mich . 581 ;
Caruthers v . Humphrey , 12 Mich . 270 ; and Crippen v . Morrison ,





New York , from which our system o
f
law in regard to mortgages has been , in a great measure , derived :
Jackson v . Willard et al . , 4 Johns . 41 ; Collins v . Torrey , 7 Johns .
278 ; Runyan v . Mersereau , 11 Johns . 534 ; Gardner v . Heart , 3
Denio 232 ; Edwards v . Ins . Co . , 21 Wend . 467 ; Waring v . Smyth ,
2 Barb . Ch . 119 ; Bryan v . Butts , 27 Barb . 504 ; The Syracuse City
Bank v . Tallman , 31 Barb . 201 ; Cortwright v . Cady , 21 N . Y . 343 .
This view o
f
a mortgage is also sustained by several o
f
the Eng
lish decisions , and substantially this is the more generally received
American doctrine , as will sufficiently appear b
y
reference to the
decisions , most o
f
which have been carefully collected in the elab
orate brief o
f
the defendant ' s counsel , but which are too numerous
to be cited here . There are exceptions and peculiarities in partic
ular states , in some of which , as in some o
f
the New England





n estate upon a condition
continues to rankle in the la
w o
f
mortgages , like a foreign sub
stance in the living organism , but is rapidly being eliminated and
thrown off by the healthy action o
f
the courts under a more vig
orous application o





this antiquated doctrine are now recognized in most of the
states o
f
this Union , the title , for nearly al
l
practical purposes ,
being now recognized , both a
t
law and in equity , as continuing in





















the mortgagor , and the mortgage as a mere lien for the security o
f
the debt . But wherever any vestige o
f
this now nearly exploded
idea continues to prevail in connection with the more liberal doc
trines o
f
modern times which the courts have been compelled , from
time to time , to adopt , it serves only to confuse and deform the
law of mortgages by various anomalies and inconsistencies , making
it a chaos o
f
arbitrary and discordant rules resting upon no broad
o
r just principle ; hile , b
y
recognizing the mortgage as a mere
lien for the security o
f
the debt , at law as well as in equity , and
thus giving it effect according to the real understanding and in
tention o
f
the parties , the law o
f mortgages becomes at once a
system o
f
homogeneous principles , easily understood and applied ,
and just in their operation .




secured by it , it necessarily results , 1s
t
, That the debt or liability
secured is the principal , and the mortgage but an incident or ac
cessory . See cases above cited ; also , Richards v . Synes , Bar
nadiston ' s Ch . R . 90 ; Roath v . Smith , 5 Conn . 133 ; Lucas v . Harris ,
2
0 Ill . 165 ; Vansant v . Allmon , 23 Ill . 30 ; Ord v . McKee , 5 Cal .
515 ; Ellison v . Daniels , 11 N . H . 274 ; Hughes v . Edwards , 9
Wheat 489 ; Green v . Hart , 1 Johns . 580 ; McGan ' v . Marshall , 7
Humph . 121 ; 4 Kent ' s Com . 193 ; McMillan v . Richards , 9 Cal . 365 .
2
d . That anything which transfers the debt (though by parol or
mere delivery ) , transfers the mortgage with it , see cases above
cited , especially Vansant v . Allmon , 23 Ill . 30 ; Ord v McKee , 5
Cal . 515 ; Ellison v . Daniels , 11 N . H . 274 . See also , Martin v .
Mowlin , 2 Burr . 987 ; Clark v . Beach , 6 Conn . 164 ; Southern v .
Mendurn , 5 N . H . 420 ; Wilson v . Kimball , 27 id . 300 , 36 N . H . 39 ;
Crowl v . Vance , 4 Iowa 434 , I Blackf . 137 , 5 Cow . 202 , 9 Wend .
410 , 1 Johns . 580 .
3
d . That an assignment o
f
the mortgage without the debt is a
mere nullity : Ellison v . Daniels , 11 N . H . 274 ; Jackson v . Bron
son , 19 Johns . 325 ; Wilson v . Throop , 2 Cow . 195 ; Weeks v . Eaton ,
1
5
N . H . 145 ; Peters v . Jamestown Bridge Co . , 5 Cal . 334 ; Webb
v . Flanders , 32 Me . 175 , 4 Kent ' s Com . , ubi supra ; Thayer et al .
v . Campbell et a
l
. , 9 Mo . 277 .
4th . That payment , release , or anything which extinguishes the
debt , ipso facto extinguishes the mortgage : Lane v . Shears , 1
Wend . 433 ; Sherman v . Sherman , 3 Ind . 337 ; Ryan v . Dunlap ,
1
7 Ill . 40 ; Armitage v . Wickliffe , 12 B . Monroe 496 ; Paxon v .
Paul , 3 Harris & McH . 399 ; Perkins v . Dibble , 10 Ohio 434 ; Breck
enridge v . Ormsby , 1 J . J . Marsh 257 ; Cameron v . Irwin , 5 Hill
272 . ( It will be seen from these authorities that some , if not all ,
of these incidents or characteristics of a mortgage are recognized
by some o
f
the courts which still hold the mortgage to be a con
veyance o
f





e . 179 : 277
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terly inconsistent, as such incidents can only logically flow from
the doctrine that the estate still remains in the mortgagor , and
that the mortgage is but a lien for security of a debt.)
BEARDSLEY, J., in GARDNER v . HEARTT , 3 Denio 232 ( N . Y . S .
Ct. 1846 ) . A mortgage creates a specific lien on the land mort
gaged , as a judgment duly docketed does a general one on the land
of the judgment debtor . But the mortgagee , as such , has no title
to the land mortgaged : he has neither jus in re nor ad rem , but a
mere security for his debt ; title to the land , notwithstanding the
mortgage, remaining in the mortgagor .20
SIMPSON v . DEL HOYO .
COURT OF APPEALS of New York , 1883 .
94 N . Y . 189 .
Earl , J . In October , 1877 , Mrs. Del Hoyo , being the owner of
certain real estate in the city of New York , was induced , by false
pretenses and fraudulent representations of Henry M . Lowenstein ,
to convey such real estate to his daughter , Rosa H . Lowenstein .
Thereafter she, upon some alleged consideration passing to her
from her father , executed to him a mortgage upon the same real
estate to secure the payment of $ 1 ,000 , which was collateral security
for the payment of her bond for the same amount. Subsequently
he assigned the bond and mortgage to this plaintiff who , as we
must assume upon this appeal , paid value for the same, acting in
good faith , with no knowledge whatever of the fraud committed
upon Mrs . Del Hoyo , or of her equities . Subsequently to the exe
cution and assignment of the mortgage, Miss Lowenstein recon
veyed the land to Mrs. Del Hoyo. This action was to foreclose
the mortgage ; and Mrs. Del Hoyo in her answer alleged the fraud
perpetrated upon her by Lowenstein as a defense to the action .
It must be conceded that if Lowenstein himself had continued to
hold the mortgage, and were plaintiff in this action attempting
to foreclose the same, Mrs . Del Hoyo would have a good defense ;
and her defense has thus far been sustained upon the ground that
the plaintiff as assignee could have no better right or position as
against her than Lowenstein , the assignor , could have had . The
courts below applied to this case the familiar rule that the pur
chaser of a non -negotiable chose in action takes it subject to all
the equities existing between the original parties thereto , not only ,
but to al
l
the latent equities o
f





thus stated , has been many times announced in the de
2
0 Compare Verner v . Betz , 46 N . J . Eq . 256 .
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cisions of this court and cannot be disputed . But it has its excep
tions, and we do not think it is applicable to this case .
Mrs. Del Hoyo conveyed the real estate to Miss Lowenstein by
an absolute deed with full covenants , thus conferring upon her the
apparent title and ownership of the property , and under that con
veyance she took possession of the property , and was in the pos
session thereof at the time of the execution of the mortgage, and
of its assignment to the plaintiff . Mrs . Del Hoyo thus clothed her
grantee with the apparent right to deal with the property as owner .
She could have conveyed the property to a bona fide purchaser ,
and he would have taken a title , good as against her and against
her grantor , Mrs . Del Hoyo .
When real or personal property is obtained from one by fraud
upon the purchase thereof , and the vendor thus intentionally parts
with the title , the vendee can always , b
y
a sale to a bona fide pur
chaser for value , give a title good as against the vendor . If Miss
Lowenstein could give a conveyance , good as against her grantor ,
she could execute a mortgage to one parting with value , and taking
it in good faith , which would be equally effectual , as she could
have done if the property had been personal instead o
f
real . So
if this mortgage to her father had been taken by him for value ,




the mortgage holds under Miss Lowenstein .
He took it on the faith that she , as the apparent owner of the
real estate , had the right to execute it . When he took it he could
inquire o
f
her whether it was valid and effectual , she a
t the time
having the legal title to the land ; and when his inquiries had





It would lead to great inconvenience and great insecurity if per
sons taking o




the mortgagor who owned the land and had the record title thereto ,
and a
t
their peril ascertain whether any fraud had been perpe
trated upon some prior owner o
f
the land .





assignor . He did not even guarantee the payment of the same , but
it was bought on the faith and credit o
f
the mortgagor ' s title . In
such a case , as against the plaintiff , an innocent bona fide pur
chaser o
f
the mortgage , Mrs . Del Hoyo is estopped from denying
the title o
f
her grantee , and her right to deal with the property as
owner . For this conclusion the cases of McNeil v . Tenth Na
tional Bank ( 46 N . Y . 335 , 7 Am . Rep . 341 ) , Moore v .Metropol
itan National Bank ( 55 N . Y . 41 , 14 Am . Rep . 173 ) , and Greene
v . Warnick , ( 64 N . Y . 220 ) furnish ample authority .
But without invoking the rule of law announced in the cases
cited , there is another ground upon which our decision may rest .
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It is a familiar rule of law that a fraudulent purchaser of real or
personal property obtains the legal title to the property purchased ,
and that he may convey a good title to any bona fide purchaser
from him for value. He may not only convey the property , but
he may deal with it as owner, and may mortgage it ; and whoever
purchases the property or takes a mortgage thereon from him or
under him , in good faith , for value, or deals with him in good
faith in reference thereto will be protected against the claims of
the defrauded vendor . The real estate may be conveyed , or a
mortgage thereon may be assigned to several successive partici
pants in the fraud , or several successive mala fide purchasers . But
the moment the real estate or the mortgage reaches the hands of
a bona fide purchaser for value , the rights and equities of the de
frauded owner are cut o
ff . (Bumpus v . Platner , 1 Johns . Ch . 213 ;
Demarest v . Wynkoop , 3 id . 129 ; Griffith v . Griffith , 9 Paige 315 ;
Smart v . Bement , 4 Abb . C
t
. App . Dec . 253 ; Paddon v . Taylor , 44
N . Y . 371 . )
The trial judge held that it was immaterial to determine whether
o
r
not the plaintiff was an innocent purchaser o
f
the mortgage for
value . In this , as we have seen , he erred . Upon the new trial , the
fraud being established , it will be incumbent upon the plaintiff to
show satisfactorily how he came b
y
the mortgage , and that he took





law we lay down , the court must find , not only
that h
e purchased the mortgage for value , but that he purchased
it innocently and in good faith .
Mrs . Del Hoyo claims a right to be subrogated to an interest in






her and until after the reconveyance
to her , for the amounts paid by her upon that mortgage in igno
rance o
f plaintiff ' s mortgage . This claim is , upon the facts found
by the court , well founded , and may be allowed and adjusted upon
the new trial , in case she fails entirely to defeat plaintiff ' s mort
gage . (Barnes v . Mott , 64 N . Y . 397 , 21 Am . Rep . 625 ; Green v .
Milbank , 3 Abb . N . C . 138 ; Snelling v .McIntyre , 6 id . 469 . )
Mrs . Del Hoyo seems to have been greatly wronged , and should
have all the relief any rule of law can give her without violating
the rights o
f any other person equally innocent with her .
The judgment should be reversed and new trial granted , costs
to abide event .
All concur .
Judgment reversed . 21
2
1 See also Parker v . Barnsville Savings Bank , 107 Ga . 650 ; Ely v . Sco
field , 35 Barb . ( N . Y . ) 330 ; Fallas v . Pierce , 30 Wis . 443 , 454 . See 10
Mich . L . Rev . 587 ; 11 Mich . L . Rev . 495 . Compare Wood v . Holly Co . ,
100 Ala . 326 , 351 .
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HUBBELL V. MOULSON .
Court OF APPEALS OF New YORK , 1873 .
53 N . Y . 225 .
ANDREWS , J. The plaintiffs claim title under Alfred Hubbell ,
the mortgagor , to the undivided half of premises mortgaged by him
to Hiram Sibley , December 1, 1846 , to secure the payment of
$ 7,000 . The action is ejectment , and it was necessary for the plain
tiffs, in order to recover under their complaint , to show that they
were entitled , as against the defendants , to the possession of the
premises at the time of the commencement of this action . The
defendants are the grantees of Sibly , the mortgagee, under a deed
dated June 7 , 1849 , and are in possession , claiming under that deed .
They stand, by reason of that conveyance , in privity with the mort
gagee , and their right to the possession is the right of the mort
gagee , and the right of the plaintiffs depends upon the same prin
ciples as if Sibley was in possession and the action had been brought
against him . ( Jackson v . Mueller , 10 J . R . 479 ; Jackson v . Bowen ,
7 Cow . 13 ; Robinson v . Ryan , 25 N . Y . 320 .) The plaintiffs on the
trial offered to prove that the mortgage debt had been paid by the
receipt by Sibley , before the commencement of the action , of rents
and profits from the land sufficient to satisfy it . The evidence was
excluded . If the mortgage was in law subsisting and unsatisfied
when this action was commenced , then it cannot be maintained , as
the authorities are decisive that ejectment will not lie b
y
a mort
gagor against a mortgagee in possession . (VanDuyne v . Thayre ,
1
4 Wend . 233 ; Phuyfe v . Riley , 15 Wend . 248 ; Pell v . Ulmar , 18
N . Y . 139 ) . Leaving out o
f
view the alleged title under the statute
foreclosure , the question arises whether the receipt by a mortgagee
in possession o
f
rents and profits sufficient to satisfy the mortgage
debt , does ipso facto extinguish it and discharge the lien of the
mortgage . If it does not , then the evidence was properly excluded .
If admitted , it would not have shown a right in the plaintiffs to
the possession o
f
the premises when the action was brought .




his mortgage a lien only , and not an estate in the land
mortgaged . (Runyan v . Mersereau , 11 J . R . 537 ; Jackson v . Craft ,
1
8
id . 110 ; Jackson v . Bronson , 19 id . 325 ; Kortright v . Cady , 21
N . Y . 243 ; Stoddard v . Hart , 23 id . 560 . ) In harmony with this
view it was held in Kortright v . Cady that a tender of the mort
gage debt after it became due discharged the lien o
f
the mortgage
and prevented a subsequent foreclosure . And it was held in Ed
wards v . The Firemen ' s Fire Ins , and Loan Co . ( 21 Wend . 467 ,
2
6 id . 541 ) that upon a tender after default by a mortgagor of the
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mortgage debt , ejectment would lie in his favor upon the refusal
o
f
the mortgagee to surrender the possession . But while n
o title
in a strict sense vests in the mortgagee of land until foreclosure ,
yet his interest is in some cases treated and regarded as a title , for
the purpose o
f
protecting and enforcing the equities between par
ties . An instance o
f
this is found in Mickles v . Townsend ( 18 N .







deed against a person claiming as assignee o
f
a mortgage , which existed at the time of his prior conveyance o
f
the mortgaged premises with warranty but which was assigned to







the mortgagor to the mort










to prevent the plaintiff ' s recovering dower at law , in
disregard o
f
the equity of the defendant to have the mortgage first
satisfied out o
f
the land . ( Cowen , J . , 21 Wend . 485 . )
It is easy to see that where the English doctrine prevails , that
the mortgage conveys a legal title to the mortgaged premises , the
right of the mortgagor to an account o
f
the rents and profits o
f
the
land received by the mortgagee is purely and exclusively o
f equita
ble cognizance . At law , the mortgagee is the owner of the estate ,
and takes the rents and profits in that character . In equity , the
mortgagor is regarded as the owner until foreclosure , and his right
to a
n
account is incident to his right o
f redemption . ( 2 Wash . on
Real Property , 161 , 205 ; Seaver v . Durant , 39 Vt . 103 ; Parson
v . Welles , 17 Mass . 419 . ) But the necessity to resort to an ac
counting in equity , in order to have the rents and profits applied
to the satisfaction o
f
the mortgage , is not obviated b
y
the fact
that here the mortgagor retains the legal title . The mortgagee in





the mortgagor . ( 2 Pow . on Mort . 946 , a ; 2 Wash .
205 . ) They are applied in equity as an equitable set -off to the
amount due on the mortgage debt . (Ruckman v . Astor , 9 Paige
517 . ) The law does not apply them as received to the payment o
f
the mortgage . It depends upon the result of an accounting upon
equitable principles , whether any part o
f
the rents and profits re
ceived shall be so applied . The mortgagee is entitled to have them
applied , in the first instance , to reimburse him for taxes and neces
sary repairs made upon the premises ; for sums paid b
y
him upon
prior incumbrances upon the estate , in order to protect the title ,
and for costs in defending it ; and if he has made permanent im
provements upon the land , in the belief that he was the absolute
owner , the increased value b
y





e charged with rents and profits h
e might have re
ceived , if his failure to recover them is attributable to his fraud
o
r willful default . ( 2 Powell on Mort . 957 , note ; 4 Kent 185 ,
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2 Wash . 218 ; Cameron v . Irwin , 5 Hill 272 ; Mickles v . Dillaye ,
17 N . Y . 80 .) In many cases complicated equities must be deter
mined and adjusted before it can be ascertained what part , if any ,
of the rents and profits received is to be applied upon themortgage
debt. In the absence of an agreement between the parties there is
no legal satisfaction of the mortgage by the receipt of rents and
profits by a mortgagee in possession to an amount sufficient to sat
isfy it, and his character as mortgagee in possession is not divested
until they are applied by the judgment of the court in satisfaction
of the mortgage . These considerations lead to an affirmance of the
judgment without considering the question of the validity of the
statute foreclosure .
The plaintiff 's claim to recover upon the allegation of a right to
the possession of the premises when the action was commenced .
The defendants were in possession , claiming under the mortgagee,
whose mortgage was outstanding and unsatisfied . The action is
not for a redemption or for an accounting , and the plaintiffs are
not in the attitude of resisting an attempt by the mortgagee to
enforce the mortgage.
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w , and is deThe te
rm “ m
o
r( a ) LEGAL MORTGAGES .
JONES , MORTGAGES , § 60 . The term “mortgage ” has a technical
signification a
t
law , and is descriptive o
f
a
n instrument having all
the requisites necessary to establish it in a court of law , as dis
tinguished from that which may be so regarded in a court o
f equity .
A mortgage which only a court of equity will recognize is prop
erly designated an “ equitable mortgage . ” 1
TIFFANY , REAL PROPERTY , § 510 . A mortgage , being a convey
ance o
f , or a contract concerning , an interest in land , must , under
the Statute of Frauds , be in writing . Though , as before shown ,
the view that a mortgage is a lien merely has for most purposes
displaced the view that it is an estate on condition , the old form
o
f conveyance on condition is usually retained . 3 In states where
1 While it is certain that there are some requisites o
f
form for a legal
mortgage , it is very difficult to say just what they are . There have not
been many cases testing this question , a circumstance which may be ex
plained by the following considerations ( 1 ) in the vast majority of cases ,
mortgages are drawn by lawyers upon carefully perpared legal blanks
and a superabundance of form is used ; ( 2 ) in the small number of cases
in which the standard forms are departed from , litigation arising thereon
is , in the vast majority o
f
cases , by equitable suit , in which the distinc
tion between legal and equitable mortgages is usually immaterial .
Of course the same considerations which make authorities on this
question scarce , make the question relatively unimportant .
2 Difficult questions under the Statute of Frauds arise in cases where
parties have attempted by parol to revive a mortgage which has been paid
( see Jones , SS 362 , 943 - 948 ) , or to extend the security of a mortgage to a
debt other than that described in the mortgage (see Jones , $ $ 357 , 947 ) .
See also , application of the Statute to informal eguitable mortgages ,
post .
3 The following typical form is taken from Jones , Legal Forms , 503 ,
where it is presented as a standard form in Colorado , a lien state .
" This indenture , made this . . - - - - - - - day of - - - - - -
1
9 . - - - , between . - - - - - - - - - - - , of the first part , and
- - - , o
f
the second part , witnesseth , that the
said party o
f
the first part , for and in consideration of the sum o
f
37
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the legal theory still obtains , conformity with the essentials of a
conveyance is essential in order that the instrument may be suffi
cient to vest the legal title in the mortgagee , and the omission of
the words of inheritance necessary in a conveyance in fee simple
will have the effect of reducing the estate of the mortgagee to
one for life only . In states where the equitable theory of a mort
gage prevails , there is no necessity that the instrument have the
essentials of a conveyance , it being sufficient that the instrument
show an intention to mortgage , and that it be executed as required
by the statute . The statute quite frequently authorizes a simple
and concise form , stating the bare essentials of a mortgage, and
it is, of course , sufficient if this be followed .
The mortgaged land must always be described in the mortgage
- - - - - dollars to - - - - - - - - - _ in hand paid
by the said party of the second part, the receipt whereof is hereby con
fessed and acknowledged , hath granted , bargained , sold and conveyed ,
and by these presents doth grant, bargain , sell, convey and confirm , unto
the said party of the second part , his heirs and assigns , forever , all the
right , title , interest , claim and demand which the said party of the first
part has in and to the following described lot or parcel of land , namely :
" To have and to hold the same, together with all and singular the ap
purtenances and privileges thereunto belonging or in anywise thereunto
appertaining ; and all the estate , right, title , interest , and claim whatsoever ,
of the said party of the first part, either in law or equity, to the proper
use , benefit and behoof of the said party of the second part , his heirs and
assigns forever . And the said party of the first part, the aforesaid tract
or parcel of land and premises unto the said party of the second part, his
heirs and assigns, against the claim or claims of all and every person
whomsoever , does and will warrant and forever defend by these presents .
" Provided always , that these presents are upon this express condition ,
that if the said party of the first part, his heirs , executors or administra
tors , shall well and truly pay , or cause to be paid , to the said party of the
second part, his heirs , executors , administrators , or assigns , the sum of
- - - - - - - - -dollars in manner particularly specified in a certain
promissory note bearing even date herewith , executed by the said party
of the first part to the said party of the second part, then and thenceforth
these presents , and everything herein contained , shall cease and be void ,
everything herein contained to the contrary notwithstanding .
" In witness ," etc . .
There is , of course , much variation upon the basic theme of convey
ance and condition , which , apart from the matter of mere style , consists
in the addition of clauses and stipulations which do not change the funda
mental nature of the mortgage but merely superadd special conditions or
covenants . Some of the more usual stipulations of this sort will be noted
hereinafter .
In England , perhaps the commonest form of mortgage is the mort
gage for years , which differs from our typical mortgage , in the substitu
tion , for the grant in fee, of a lease for years, usually a very long term .
The condition is the same as in a mortgage in fee . This form of mort
gage , while not unknown with us ( e. g. Nugent v. Riley , 1 Metc . (Mass . )
117 ) , is exceedingly rare .
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with sufficient particularity to enable it to be identified , as in the
case of any other conveyance , but a reference to another instru
ment, in which the property is described , is sufficient for this
purpose .
The requisites as to execution are ordinarily expressly named
in the statute . An acknowledgment is usually requisite , as in the
case of absolute transfers of land , only as a preliminary to the
record of the conveyance .4
A mortgage must be delivered as if an absolute conveyance ,
and there are a number of decisions to the effect that the mort
gage must be accepted by the mortgagee , and that, until such ac
ceptance, other persons may acquire rights in the premises , as
by judgment or attachment liens, which will take precedence of
the unaccepted mortgage .
















$ 511 . Though the condition or proviso that th
e
conveyance
shall be void in case o
f compliance by the mortgagor with his
contract , termed the “ defeasance , " is usually inserted in the con
veyance to the mortgagee , this is not , in most jurisdictions , neces
sary , and it may be contained in a separate instrument . This
practice has , however , been criticised , as liable to be productive o
f
injury to the mortgagor .





law , it is necessary that the two instruments be deliv
ered a
t approximately the same time , o
r
a
t least that they be parts
o
f











a nature as the conveyance itself , — that is , if the latter is under





the same instrument , and it must be executed
with the other formalities required in the case of a conveyance of
land . 5





Mortgages are subject to the same requirements as deeds as to execu
tion by a wife to relinquish dower or homestead .
5 The doctrine stated in the text represents one extreme , the other be
ing that a deed absolute which is shown by parol evidence to have been
intended as a security is a legal mortgage , and therefore does not pass
the title but merely creates a lien . Taylor v . McLain , 64 Cal . 514 (over
ruling Hughes v . Davis , 40 Cal . 117 , which had overruled Jackson v .
Lodge , 36 Cal . 28 — there are over a dozen decisions from the Supreme
Court of California dealing with this question ) ; Odell v . Montross , 68 N .




transaction has almost universally been accepted without
question a
s falling short o
f
the requirements for legal mortgages and ,
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The defeasance should be recorded with the absolute convey
ance . In some states it is provided that, if the defeasance be not
recorded , the grantee shall take nothing under the conveyance , or
shall derive no benefit from the record of the conveyance ,
while in others it is provided that, in such case, the conveyance
shall pass an absolute title , except as against the maker of the
instrument, hi
s





defeasance , which is the rule
in the absence o
f any statute on the subject . In the first class o
f
states , therefore , it is to the advantage o
f
the mortgagee to see
that the defeasance is recorded , while in the latter class , the mort
gagor o
r
those claiming under him can alone suffer from the ab
sence o
f
the defeasance from the record .
JONES , MORTGAGES , § 62 . A deed of trust to secure a debt is in
legal effect a mortgage . It is a conveyance made to a person
other than the creditor , conditioned to be void if the debt be paid
a
t
a certain time , but if not paid that the grantee may sell the land
and apply the proceeds to the extinguishment of the debt , paying




sale does not change the character o
f
the instrument any more than
it does when contained in a mortgage . Such a deed has all the
essential elements o
f






a debt . It passes the legal title just as a mortgage
does , except in those states where the natural effect o
f
a conveyance
is controlled by statute ; and in states where a mortgage is con
sidered merely as a security , and not a conveyance , a trust deed is
apt to be regarded in this respect just like a mortgage . 6 Both
instruments convey a defeasible title only ; the mortgagee ' s or trus
tee ' s title in fee being in the nature of a base or determinable fee ;
and the right to redeem is the same in one case as it is in the
other . The only important difference between them is , that in
therefore , as passing the complete title a
t
law , whether or not it was in
equity a mortgage .
Even where it is held that parol evidence is admissible a
t
law to show
that an absolute deed is a mortgage , this does not necessarily make it a
legal mortgage or prevent the title from passing . German Ins . Co . v .
Gibe , 162 11
1
. 251 ; McAnnulty v . Seick , 59 Iowa 586 ; Haggerty v . Brower ,
105 Iowa 395 .
6 The minority view that a trust mortgage passes the legal title , al
though an ordinary mortgage does not , is maintained in Sacramento
Bank v . Alcorn , 121 Cal . 379 (compare the California doctrine presented
in the previous note ) ; Stephens v . Clay , 17 Colo . 489 ; Soutter v . Miller ,
1
5 Fla . 625 . The trust mortgage is almost universally used when it is de




bonds payable to , o
r designed to be





the one case the conveyance is directly to the creditor, while in
the other it is to a third person for his benefit .
TIFFANY , REAL PROPERTY , § 513. A mortgage is usually given to
secure the payment of a sum of money , and the debt is usually
evidenced by a note , bond, or other instrument , separate from the
mortgage, though this is not necessary .
A mortgage given to secure a debt existent at the making of
the mortgage, or contemporaneous therewith , is valid , even as
against subsequent purchasers and creditors , although it does not
explicitly state the amount of such debt or liability, provided there
are means of ascertaining such amount. And extrinsic evidence
is admissible for the purpose of showing the debt which the mort
gage was intended to secure . The statement in the mortgage as
to the sum secured is not conclusive in that regard , and it may be
shown by the mortgagor that the lien was for a less sum , or even
that the mortgage was not a lien for the payment of money , as
stated therein , but was given for a different purpose .
A mortgage which is in terms security for a certain amount
cannot , as against third persons, be extended by agreement be
tween the mortgagor and mortgagee so as to cover sums subse
quently advanced by the latter to the former . But, as between
the parties to the mortgage, a written agreement , made after its
execution , that it shall be security for a debt other than that which
it was first intended to secure , is effective , this constituting in
effect an equitable lien on the land for such additional sum .
( b ) EQUITABLE MORTGAGES .
JONES , MORTGAGES , $ 162 . It has been noticed that a conveyance ,
accompanied by a condition contained either in the deed itself or in a
separate instrument executed at the same time , constitutes a legal
mortgage , o
r
a mortgage at common law . In addition to these
formal instruments which are properly entitled to the designation
o






a common -law mortgage are often
used by parties for the purpose o
f pledging real property , o
r
some
7 There is some conflict o
f authority as to the extent to which a mort
gage , securing an existent and ascertained debt , must disclose its amount
See cases cited in Jones , 8344 .
As to the description of the debt in a mortgage to secure future ad
vances , see post , Chap . II , Sec . 3 .
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interest in it, as security for a debt or obligation , and with the





the parties in such cases , and gives effect to their
intentions . Mortgages o
f
this kind are therefore called equitable
mortgages .
BRIDGEPORT ICE CO . v . MEADER .
UNITED STATES Circuit Court OF APPEALS , 1895 .
7
2 Fed . 115 .
(Suit in equity to foreclose an equitable mortgage . One Soulard
was the promoter o
f
the defendant , the Bridgeport Ice Co . On





machine for the manufacture o
f
ice . It was stipulated in writing
that the Ice Company should pay plaintiff the sum o
f
$ 2
3 ,000 , as
follows : $ 5 ,750 on delivery , $ 5 ,750 when it had withstood fifteen
days ' test , the balance in negotiable notes , of certain terms , which ,
it was stipulated , should be secured by a mortgage of the machine ,
and o
f
the buildings and real estate on which it was to be erected ,
o
r by personal endorsements satisfactory to plaintiff . The machine
was delivered in May , 1891 , and was accepted b
y
defendant in
April , 1892 . In September , 1891 , the defendant corporation was
organized and , in October , its directors ratified the contract made
by Soulard with plaintiff and issued promissory notes to plaintiff
for the amount remaining unpaid thereon , but the mortgage stipu
lated for was never executed , nor was personal security satisfac
tory to plaintiff given . The defendant is insolvent . ]
SPEER , J . * * * * * * * *
On the hearing , the circuit court of the Northern District of Ala
bama (the Honorable Alex . Boarman , judge presiding ) , decreed
that the plaintiff was entitled to a lien for the balance due him ;
that the lien should relate back to and commence from the date
o
f
the original contract , to wit , May 17 , 1891 ; that the amount due
o
f
the purchase -price o
n
the ice machine was $ 11 ,385 . 87 , with in
terest from the 26th day o
f April , 1893 . And upon the failure of
the defendant to pay this debt , with interest and costs , within thirty
days from the enrollment o
f
the decree , it was ordered that a special
master ,appointed in the decree , should sell the property on which the
lien was established at public outcry , for cash , and for the satisfac
tion o
f
the debt . From this decree the appeal is taken .
It is well settled that an agreement to give a mortgage , for a
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valuable consideration , upon property which is sufficiently speci
fied , is in a court of equity regarded as the creation of the mort
gage itself . This is held , for the reason that equity will treat that
as done which ought to be done. 1 Jones , Mortg ., § 163 ; Ketchum
v . St. Louis , 101 U . S . 30
6 ; Gest v . Packwood , 39 Fed . 525 ; Will .
Eq . Jur . p
p
4
8 , 298 ; O 'Neil v . Seixas , 85 Ala . 80 , 4 So . 745 ; 2
Story , Eq . Jur . , § 1231 . It is insisted , however , that the contract
o
f
the parties in this case was in the alternative , — that the pur





the original contract o
f May 17 , o
r
that he might
secure the debt by personal indorsement satisfactory to the vendor .
It seems a sufficient reply to this to point out the fact that the de
fendant company made no offer o
f personal indorsement , satisfac
tory to the plaintiff , or otherwise , and the plaintiff was therefore
remitted to such remedy for the total noncompliance with the con
tract as the doctrine above stated will afford him . With this view ,
h
e brings his bill , not , strictly to enforce the specific performance
o
f
the contract , but , rather , to have the court declare its legal
effect , considered in connection with the further fact that the plain
tiff has performed all that he agreed to do , and defendant , while
receiving and accepting the ice machine , has not only not paid the
debt , but even refused to give the evidence o
f
the debt which it
had promised . Nor is it a sufficient reply to this proceeding to




law , complainant waived hi
s right to fore
close the equitable mortgage which the conduct o
f
the parties had
created . The owner o
f
a note and a mortgage to secure the same
can sue on the note , and thereafter foreclose the mortgage . The
remedies o
f
law and equity are concurrent for the enforcement o
f
the demand . Nor did the plaintiff , after seeking this jurisdiction ,
while retaining his bill here , forfeit any o
f
h
is powers by attempt
ing , in the state courts o
f
Alabama , to secure payment o
f
the judg
ment which the circuit court o
f
the United States a
t
law had









the state court , but
since the Supreme Court o
f
Alabama afterward annulled and va
cated this sale , it is now a
s
if there had been no sale . Nor does





with the ice company preceded the creation o
f
the company itself .
After the ice company was organized , it was fully informed a
s
to the terms o
f
the contract . It received , tested , and accepted the
machine , and paid a portion o
f
the purchase money . It must ,
therefore , be held to have ratified the agreement of its promoter .
" It is well settled that a party may , by express agreement , create
a charge o
r
claim in the nature o
f





is the owner or in possession , and
that equity will establish and enforce such charge o
r
claim , not
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only against the party who stipulated to give it, but also against
third persons , who are either volunteers , or who take the estate
on which the lien is agreed to be given with notice of the stipula
tion . Such agreement raises a trust which binds the estate to
which it relates , and all who take title thereto with notice of such
trust can be compelled in equity to fulfill it.” Pinch v . Anthony ,
8 Allen 536 .
* * * * *
Affirmed .8
LOVE v . SIERRA NEVADA MINING CO .
SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA , 1867.
32 Cal. 639 .
SHAFTER , J .: In the opinion delivered in this case on the former
hearing , we considered " that it was unnecessary to determine
whether the entire transaction was sufficient to constitute an equita
ble mortgage, for if such should be found to be the case it could
not be enforced in the present state of the pleadings , because the
decree must be based upon the allegations of the complaint; and
it is alleged that the mortgage was executed by the corporation
that is to say , that it is a legal mortgage .” Though there is an
averment in the complaint that the mortgage , the foreclosure of
which is sought in this action , was executed by the company , still
the document is set forth in haec verba , and if it is not the mort
gage of the defendant by legal as distinguished from equitable
conclusion , the averment may be rejected as surplusage . We held
in Stoddard v. Treadwell, 26 Cal. 303 , that a contract may be
declared on according to its legal effect o
r
in haec verba . If the
former mode should be adopted , then the defendant may , by the
rule o
f
the common law , in a proper case , crave oyer o
f
the instru
ment ; and if it appear that its provisions have been misstated , he
may set out the contract in haec verba and demur on the ground
of variance . But where a plaintiff himself sets forth the contract
in the terms in which it is written , and then proceeds to put a
false construction upon it
s
terms , the allegation , as repugnant to
the terms , should be regarded as surplusage , to be struck out on
motion . Utile per inutile non vitiatur . From this it follows that
if the complaint in this case discloses all the facts essential to an
equitable mortgage binding upon the defendant , then , if the aver
ments are true in fact , the plaintiff is entitled to the benefit o
f
them .
& Accord : In re Howe , 1 Paige ( N . Y . ) 125 ; Carter v . Holman , 60 Mo .
498 ; Remington v . Higgins , 54 Cal . 620 .
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And further, by the one hundred and forty - seventh section of the
Practice Act , the court " may grant him any relief consistent with
the case made by the complaint and embraced within the issue .”
We have re -examined the complaint in the light thrown upon it
by the re-argument , and are satisfied that it contains all the facts
essential to an equitable mortgage . As the facts averred are iden
tical with the facts found or admitted , it is unnecessary to state
the form in detail ; for, in passing upon the legal effect of the
finding , we must necessarily consider and pass upon the legal
effect of the averments .
As the statement on motion for new trial does not specify the
particulars in which the evidence is alleged to be insufficient , we
must assume not only the facts admitted in the pleadings , but
those also which are se
t
forth in the findings . It appears from
these two sources conjointly , that the defendant corporation on the
16th o
f April , 1860 , by Josiah Bates and Samuel S . Atchinson , its
trustees , duly authorized for that purpose , made and delivered to
the plaintiff and four others , its promissory note for the sum of
forty thousand pounds sterling , payable one day from the date
thereof , with interest thereon from date until paid , at the rate of
twenty per cent . per annum . That the consideration o
f
said note
was forty thousand pounds , loaned and advanced by the payees
and others to the corporation before the date o
f
the note . That
to secure the payment o
f
the note the corporation at the date
thereof , by its said trustees , Bates and Atchinson , executed ,
acknowledged and delivered to the payees the “mortgage " set out
in the complaint . In the indenture referred to the parties are de
scribed a
s
“ The Sierra Nevada Lake Water and Mining Company ,
a corporation , b
y
their trustees , Josiah Bates and Samuel Atchin
son , o
f
the first part , and plaintiff ( and the other payees in the
note , naming them ) parties o
f
the second part . " . The conclusion
o
f
the indenture is a
s follows :
“ In witness whereof the said parties o
f
the first part have here
unto set their several hands and seals the day and year above
written . " Josiah Bates , [ Seal . ]












the mortgage is to the effect that Bates
and Atchinson were personally known to the notary as trustees of
said corporation , and that they personally appeared and acknowl
edged each for himself that he executed the instrument for the
uses and purposes therein mention d “ a
s and for the free act and
deed of said Sierra Nevada Lake Water and Mining Company . "
At the execution of the note and mortgage Bates was president
o
f
the company , and Bates and Atchinson were a majority o
f
the
trustees ; and a
t
and before that time they agreed for and on















said corporation with the said mortgagees to subscribe
the name o
f
“ The Sierra Nevada Lake Water and Mining Com
pany " to the said mortgage , and intended so to do , but failed
by accident o
r
mistake . The plaintiff was personally interested in
the securities to the amount o
f twenty - four thousand eight hundred
and forty -seven pounds sterling , with interest from the date o
f
the
note ; and the other payees , Ridgway , F . and H . Wedgwood , and
Robe , made defendants herein , refused to join a
s plaintiffs in this
action . The remaining defendants are creditors o
f
the i ra
Nevada Lake Water and Mining Company , judgment liens
o
n the property described in t rtgage , but subsequent thereto .
It is a rule of conveyancing long established , that deeds executed
by an attorney or agent must be executed in the name o
f
the con
stituent . It was so resolved in Coombes ' Case ( 5 Coke 135 , by
Fraser ) , and the rule was recognized and applied b
y
us in Echols
v . Chenery , 28 Cal . 159 . Tested b
y
this rule , the instrument in
suit is not a legal mortgage of the Sierra Nevada Lake Water
and Mining Company . The paper is signed and sealed , not b
y
the
corporation , but b
y
Bates and Atchinson , acting , so far as the
signatures , seals and testatum clause throw any light upon the sub
ject , for themselves and in their own right . Though the mortgage
does not bind the company at law , it by no means follows , how








for his principal , though inoperative a
t
law for want of a formal
execution in the name o
f
the principal , is binding in equity if the
attorney had authority ; and if the instrument so defectively exe
cuted be a conveyance o
f




n agreement to convey , and will be good against the principal ,
subsequent lien creditors and subsequent purchasers with notice .
Or , more precisely stated , an agreement in writing to create a
mortgage , or a mortgage defectively executed , or any imperfect
attempt to create a mortgage , or to appropriate specific property
to the discharge o
f
a particular debt , will create a mortgage in
equity , or a specific lien , which will have precedence o
f
subsequent
judgment creditors . (Am . Leading Cases 605 ; Leading Cases in
Equity 666 , and cases there cited . ) The jurisdiction is some
times put upon the ground that equity will aid the defective exe
cution o
f
a power — sometimes upon the jurisdiction to reform mis
takes in written instruments , and sometimes upon the maxim that
equity considers that as done which ought to be done . These dif
ferent modes o
f expression all amount to the same thing in sub
stance . It was held by this court in Beatty v . Clark , 20 Cal . 12 ,
that “ though equity will not aid the non - execution o
f
a power ,
still , where a party undertakes to execute a power , and by mistake
does it imperfectly , equity will , in favor o
f
creditors and others
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peculiarly within it
s protective favor , aid the defective execution . ”
We held in Bodley v . Ferguson , 30 Cal . 511 , that a deed of land
bad a
s
a conveyance might be good in equity as a contract to
convey ; and that the equitable right to the legal title was as avail
able for the purposes o
f
defense in an action o
f ejectment , under
our system , as the legal title . We held in Daggett v . Rankin , 31
Cal . 322 , “ that an agreement in writing to give a mortgage , o
r
a
mortgage defectively executed , o
r
a
n imperfect attempt to create
a mortgage , o
r
to appropriate particular property to the discharge
of a particular debt , will create a mortgage in equity , or a specific
lien upon the property so intended to be mortgaged . ” We consid
ered further " that the maxim in equity upon which this doctrine
rests is that equity looks upon things agreed to be done as actually
performed ; the true meaning o
f
which is that equity will treat the
subject -matter , as to collateral consequences and incidents , in the
same manner as if the final acts contemplated by the parties had
been executed exactly a
s they ought to have been . ( See also Ra




t bar bring it broadly within these principles . Bates and





the corporate powers were to be executed . The corporation gave
the note described in the complaint b
y
Bates and Atchinson , they




the corporation , ” to give a mortgage collateral to
the note , to which mortgage the name o
f
the company was to be




take . The power being given , it is apparent on the face o
f
the
indenture that the trustees intended to act under the power in
the matter of executing the mortgage . The corporation is named




the first part , by Josiah Bates and
Samuel Atchinson , Trustees . ” The note which the mortgage was
given to secure is described a
s
a note made by the company . Fur
thermore , the trustees state in their acknowledgment that they exe
cuted the mortgage " as and for the free act and deed o
f
said
Sierra Nevada Lake Water and Mining Company . "
It urged that the defective execution o
f
the mortgage was
caused by a mistake o
f
law , and that therefore the defective execu
tion can not be aided . The answer is that where there is a defective
execution of a power , it is a matter of no equitable moment whether
the error came of a mistake of law or a mistake of fact . It is
enough that the power existed and that there was an attempt to





s by aiding its defective execution ; which aid is ad





quoted . Or , as in the class of cases to which this belongs , the
instrument defectively executed a
s
a deed is considered a
s properly
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executed as a contract for a deed ; and therefore as requiring neither
reformation nor aid , but as ripe for enforcement according to the
methods peculiar to courts of equity . Under our laws a contract
for a mortgage need not be under seal ; and when made through an
attorney , his authority need not be evidenced by a sealed instru
ment. (Wood 's Digest 106 , § 6 ; Ang . & Ames on Corps. 193 -266 .)
Though the indenture in this case is under the seals of the trus
tees , yet when considered as an agreement for a mortgage, it may
be treated as a simple contract , nevertheless (Lawrence v . Taylor,
5 Hill 107 ; Worrall v . Munn , 1 Seld . 239 ; Wood v . A . & R . R . R .
Co., 4 Seld . 167 ) , and we consider it clear, from the authorities ,
that it is not indispensable , in order to bind the principal at law
even , that such contract should be executed in the name and as the
act of the principal . On the contrary , it will be sufficient , if upon
the whole instrument it can be gathered from the terms thereof
that the party described himself and acts as agent and intends
thereby to bind his principals and not to bind himself. (Haskell
v . Cornish , 13 Cal. 45 ; McDonald et al. v . Bear River and A . W .
and Mining Company , 13 Cal. 221 .)
The other objections taken by the appellants to the judgment,
though not pressed in argument, have been fully considered by us,
and they are all overruled .
Judgment affirmed .9
9 Accord : White Water Val. Canal Co . v. Vallette , 21 How . (U . S.)
414 (stipulation in bonds that “ the faith of the company and their effects
real and personal are pledged ,” held to create equitable lien ) ; Peckham
v. Haddock , 36 I1
1
. 38 ( a legal mortgage having been paid and discharged
the owner o
f
the land undertook to revive the same by a written but un
sealed agreement - held not effective as a revivor at law for want of seal ,
but created equitable mortgage . " The surrounding circumstances ren
der it evident that they intended to give Thompson a security upon the
land ; and the language employed by them should be construed , if it con
sistently can be , so as to effectuate that intention ” ) ; Pinch v . Anthony ,
8 Allen (Mass . ) 536 (agreement in writing to pay " out of the proceeds
of the sale of said lands , if sold , or if lands shall not be sold , and a
company is formed to work the mines , then to convey stock to that
amount , it being understood that the foregoing amount is to be a charge
on the estate of the owners , " held to create equitable lien ) ; Wayt v . Car
withen , 21 W . Va . 516 ( M . having sold land to C . and subsequently recov
ered a judgment for the purchase -money , W . paid said judgment and C . ,
by a writing reciting these facts , agreed that " Said W . shall be subro
gated to the rights o
f
said M . in reference to the lands aforesaid , and
that he may retain the lien which said M . holds as vendor , " held to cre
ate an equitable mortgage ) .
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JOHNSON v. JOHNSON .
COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND, 1874 .











, and als tar
m in reshnson
, he see











of June , 1859 , conveyed all his real and personal estate in Frederick
county to the defendant in this cause , Thomas Johnson ; the real
estate consisting o
f
a farm called " Harmony Grove . " William Cost
Johnson died in 1860 ; and for several years prior to his death , and
u
p
to April , 1868 , the plaintiff , Edwin M . Johnson , occupied the
farm ; and after the death o
f
his uncle , William Cost Johnson , he set
u
p
claim to the right o
f possession o
f
the farm in respect o
f
some
pecuniary claims against his uncle , and also against his father , the
defendant , who demanded possession o
f
the farm by virtue o
f
his
title under the deed o
f
the 14th of June , 1859 . The defendant had
advertised the farm fo
r
sale on the 21st o
f
March , 1868 , and the
plaintiff filed his bill in equity in the circuit court for
Frederick county , for an injunction to restrain such sale ,
and for a decree that the land be sold under the direction o
f
the
court for the satisfaction o
f
his claims . In this state o
f
contention
in regard to the farm , the plaintiff and defendant entered into the
agreement of th 6th of April , 1868 , under their respective hands
and seals . By this agreement the defendant promised and obligated
himself to pay to the plaintiff the sum o
f
two thousand five hundred





him , the defendant ; such sum to be paid in a specified manner ,
namely : Five hundred dollars on o
r
before the expiration o
f thirty
days from the date o
f
the agreement ; one thousand dollars out of
the first payment made on the sale o
f
the farm , “Harmony Grove ; "
and the other thousand dollars out o
f
the second payment o
n
said
farm . The plaintiff , on his part , promised to give u
p
and surrender
to the defendant the immediate possession o
f
the farm , and also
all the personal property held b
y
him which had belonged to the
late William Cost Johnson , with certain specified exceptions . This
covenant on the part o
f
the plaintiff has been performed but the
defendant has only paid the first instalment o
f
five hundred dollars ,
o
f
the sum agreed to be paid b
y
him , and has wholly neglected
o
r
failed to pay the other two thousand dollars and has neglected o
r
refused to sell the farm to raise the fund with which to discharge
his obligation . It is on these facts that the plaintiff has filed his





lien on the land , and , in that view , praying that the
farm be decreed to be sold to raise the fund to pay off the amount
due from the defendant on his covenant . The court below decreed
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in favor of the plaintiff ; and the first and most material question
on this appeal is, whether the covenant creates a charge or lien , in
the sense of a court of equity , that can be enforced in the manner
contemplated by the plaintiff 's bill ?
It is objected that the covenant creates only a personal obligation
on the defendant , and that, consequently , there is no jurisdiction in
a court of equity to take cognizance of the case . If this were a mere
personal covenant , and nothing more , the objection just stated would
certainly be well founded .
But that is not our conclusion as to the nature of the covenant.
That the covenant does create a personal obligation on the defend
ant is doubtless true, and one that could be sued on at law ; but it
does not necessarily follow from that being so , that there may not
be also an equitable lien or charge created at the same time. The
covenant does not , as may be observed , stipulate in express terms
that the land shall be sold and the proceeds of sale applied to the
discharge of this particular debt. But we think that is the fair and
reasonable implication from the terms employed . In a case like the
present , the question whether there has been a charge created de
pends in a great measure upon the intention of the contracting par
ties ; and here we think it manifest , as well from the language of the
covenant itself as from the circumstances leading to it and under
which it was made , that the parties contemplated the sale of the
farm , and the proceeds of sale as the fund from which the debt was
to be paid . In other words, the farm was to be sold , and a sufficient
amount of the purchase -money specifically appropriated to the pay
ment of the debt due the plaintiff . If such be the fair construction
of the agreement , it created a charge on the land as a security to the
plaintiff ; for , as was said by Chancellor Sugden , in Rolleston v .
Morton , 1 Dr. & W ., 195 , if a man has power to charge his lands,
and agrees to charge them , in equity he has actually charged them ;
and a court of equity will execute the charge . Here, as we have
seen , there are no express words creating the lien or charge upon
the land ; but there is no doubt of the proposition , that a charge may
be created by fair and reasonable implication as well as where
express words of trust or charge are employed in the covenant or
agreement of the parties . Perry on Trusts , sec . 122 , and authorities
there cited ; and 2 Story 's Eq . Jur., se
c
. 1246 .
This case in principle does not differ from that of Legard v .
Hodges , 1 Ves . , Jr . , 477 , and same case on rehearing , 4 Bro . C . C .
421 . There , a party having obligated himself to pay a certain sum
for a particular purpose , as means o
f raising that sum , covenanted
with trustees that he would set apart and pay to such trustees one
third part o
f
the annual profits o
f
h
is particular estates ; and failing
to make the application o
f
the profits according to the covenant , and
















and although it was there contended , as it has been contended here ,
that there was no lien upon the land , but a mere personal covenant
only , it was held , that the covenant created in equity a lien on the
land against the covenantor , and those claiming under him with
notice . And in deciding the case , the Lord Chancellor said that
there was a maxim which he took to be universal , and that was ,
wherever persons agreed concerning any particular subject , that in
a court of equity , as against the party himself , any claiming
under him voluntarily o
r
with notice , raised a trust . To the same
effect is the doctrine fully stated b
y Mr . Justice Story , Eq . Juris . ,
sec . 1231 . He there says : " Indeed , there is generally no difficulty
in equity in establishing a lien , not only on real estate but on personal
property or on money in the hands o
f
a third person , wherever that
is matter o
f agreement , at least against the party himself , and third
persons , who are volunteers , o
r
have notice . For it is a general
principle in equity , that , as against the party himself , and any claim
ing under him , voluntarily , o
r
with notice , such an agreement raises
a trust . " See also Power v . Bailey , 1 Ball & Beat . 52 . And such
being the well established principle upon the subject , the agreement
in this case must be taken a
s having created a charge upon the land ,
and raised a trust in respect thereto , as security for the payment o
f
the plaintiff ' s debt ; and hence it is the right of the latter , upon
failure of the defendant to perform the trust , to have that trust






f Berrington v . Evans , 3 Y . & Coll . 384 , relied on by
the defendant is not an authority to affect this case . There the
covenant was that if the covenantor did not pay certain debts by a




necessary for that purpose . The learned Baron o
f
the Exchequer ,
who decided the case , said that it did not appear to him that the
covenant was anything more than a personal undertaking ; but if it
were , the case of Williams v . Lucas , 1 P . Wms . 430 , n . , shewed
that the words o
f
it were too general to create a specific lien upon
the lands of the covenantor . This latter reason was all sufficient
for the case , for it was expressly decided in the case referred to in
P . Wms . , and also in the case o
f
Freemoult v . Dedire , 1 P . Wms .
429 , that a covenant to mortgage o
r
settle lands to secure sums o
f
money , without mentioning o
r referring to any certain lands , was
not sufficient to create any specific lien ; and a
s
the covenant in the
case o
f Berrington v . Evans , according to the construction o
f
the
learned judge , referred to no particular lands or estates ,
it created n
o specific lien , and hence it could be nothing
more than a mere personal undertaking . That case , there
fore , can have no application to this , even conceding it to have been







n ; and an
y
certain
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ion , in view of what was held in the case of Wellesley v . Wellesley,
4 My. & Cr. 561. See Mornington v . Keane, 2 De G . & J. 293.10
It is thought that , as the covenant fails to fix any definite time
for the payment of the money , or to designate any time within
which the farm should be sold , or how to be sold , the defendant was
left free to exercise his discretion a
s
to the time and mode o
f
sale ,
and that a court o
f equity cannot enforce the sale to be made , as by





which he was not deprived by the agreement .
But , in reply to this suggestion , it is sufficient to say , that there
is no such want o
f certainty and definiteness in the agreement as to
prevent it
s
execution by the court ; and as it is alleged and proved
that the defendant , although repeatedly requested , has utterly neg
lected and refused to sell the farm , but retains it for his own profit ,
and as a reasonable time had elapsed before filing the bill , a court
of equity under such circumstances , will not permit him , under the
pretense o
f exercising a discretion as to the time and manner o
f
sale ,
to evade the performance o
f
his contract . Wellesley v . Wellesley ,
4 My . & Cr . 579 .




sale of the farm became due and payable after the lapse of a reason





the defendant on the usual and ordinary
terms o
f
sale ; Farrel v . Bean , 10 Md . 233 ; Triebert v . Burgess , 11
Md . 452 ; and this time having expired , and the defendant failing to
show any good reason why he has not performed his contract , the
land has become liable to be proceeded against for the enforcement
o
f
the charge on it .
Another objection to the decree of the court below is , that , instead
of appointing a trustee to make the sale , it should have required the
defendant , himself , to make the sale in execution o
f
the contract .
This objection we do not regard as well founded . The defendant ,
by his own neglect o
r
refusal to perform his contract , has occasioned
the present application for relief , and as the court proceeds with the
matter upon the footing o
f
a trust , it is quite competent to it , in
order to make its relief effectual , to appoint an officer of its own to
execute it
s





the payment of the money due the plaintiff ;
and if he does not desire the farm to be sold , he may still avoid that
alternative by payment of themoney without further delay .
1
0 That the agreement must specify the property seems uncontro
vertible . Langley v . Vaughn , 10 Heisk . (Tenn . ) 553 . But in the case o
f
fungible property it may be sufficient specification to name a quantity to
be taken from a larger mass . Thus in Dunman v . Coleman , 59 Tex . 199 ,
a
n agreement charging 1 ,000 cattle in a herd of a larger number was en
forced . So in Payne v . Wilson , 74 N . Y . 348 , an agreement to mortgage
one o
f
several houses was enforced . Cf . Williston , Sales , § 159 .
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The decree appealed from will be affirmed , and the cause remanded
that the decree may be executed .
Decree affirmed , and cause remanded .11
VANIMAN v . GARDNER
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS , 1901 .
99 Ill . App . 345 .
On April 11 , 1895 , Anthony Robrts and his wife entered into the
following written agreement with their son , Moss Roberts :
“ Agreement between Anthony Roberts and Sarah J . , his wife , of
first part , and Moss Roberts , their son , second part . Witnesseth ,
that said Anthony Roberts is the owner o
f
the N . W . 14 , section 24 ,
township No . 12 , range No . 6 , west of the 3rd P . M . , in Macoupin
county , Illinois , on which a
ll o
f
said parties reside and occupy a
s





said tract of land for the comfort and use of al
l
said
parties so long a
s they shall live upon said tract of land . It is
therefore agreed b
y
the said parties that said Moss Roberts shall
erect on said premises a house which shall b
e
convenient and suit
able for the use o
f
said parties , including the family o
f
Moss Roberts .
That Moss Roberts shall have the right to pull down the old house
now o
n
said premises and use the material thereon fi
t
to be used in
building the new house , and said new house shall be built and com
pleted within the next ninety days after the date o
f
this agreement .
And in consideration of the said building , the said parties o
f
the
first part agree that in case they shall sell the said tract o
f
land , then
there shall be due and payable to said Moss Roberts out o
f
the
money arising from such sale the sum o
f
$ 500 , together with interest









six per cent . per annum , and in case of the death of
the said Anthony Roberts leaving no will by virtue of which said
Moss Roberts shall become devisee and owner o
f
said tract of land ,





said Anthony Roberts , the said sum o
f
$ 500 , together
with six per cent . interest thereon from the completion of said house
until paid . (Signed ) ANTHONY ROBERTS , (Seal )
SARAH J . ROBERTS , (Seal )
Moss ROBERTS . " (Seal )
1
1 Brown v . Brown . 103 Ind . 23 , and Blackburn v . Tweedie , 60 Mo . 505 ,
are substantially like the principal case except that possession of the
land was given to the creditor to be retained until the land was sold and
it was held that an equitable mortgage was created .
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The instrument was filed for record and recorded in the recorder's
office of Macoupin county , July 12 , 1895 .
The house was built by Moss Roberts with money obtained from
a bank at Virden , Illinois , on notes executed by him and George
Vaniman as security . The written agreement was delivered to Van
iman and afterward indorsed as follows :




the within contract to George Vaniman as
security to him for signing notes .
(Signed ) Moss Roberts . "
In 1898 Anthony Roberts and wife conveyed the land to Martha
J . Roberts , wife o
f
Moss Roberts , who on August 18 , 1900 , executed
note and mortgage on the land to Alva L . Gardner , to secure an in
debtedness o
f
$ 500 , due ten days after date . Gardner filed a bill
to foreclose . Appellants , the administrators o
f George Vaniman ,
who were made defendants , together with others , answered and
filed a cross -bill , in which they set u
p
that there was a lien in favor
o
f




the above quoted agreement , and its







man , of the notes on which he was surety for Moss Roberts . The





the land , and rendered a foreclosure decree in favor
of Gardner .
Mr . PRESIDING JUSTICE HARKER delivered the opinion of the court .
It is contended by appellant , first that under the written agree
ment o
f April 11 , 1895 , an equitable lien or mortgage was given
Moss Roberts upon the land in question , whereby equity will enforce
the payment o
f
the $ 500 specified in the agreement , as a first lien
upon the land ; second , that appellants are subrogated to all rights o
f
Moss Roberts under the agreement b
y
virtue of his assignment
thereof to George Vaniman .
While a
s
a general rule , any written contract entered into for the
purpose o
f pledging property o
r
some interest therein as security




a common law or
statutory mortgage , but which shows that it was the intention o
f
the
parties that it should operate as a charge upon the property , will




f equity , yet a mere promise to pay out o
f
the proceeds of the
sale o
f
the property is not sufficient to create an equitable mortgage
upon the property itself .
“ The intention must be to create a lien upon the property , as dis





to the payment of a debt . ” Jones on Liens , sec . 32 ; Gibson v .
Decius , 82 Ill . 304 ; Hamilton v . Downer , 46 Ill . App . 541 .
We are unable to see in the written contract involved in this case
a
n
intention on the part o
f Anthony Roberts to create a lien or
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charge upon the land . It di
d
not obligate him to sell th
e
land and
clearly contemplated that he might or might not sell it as he saw fit .
It only provided two events in which there should be due his son the
$ 500 ; one in case he should sell the land and the other in case
h
e
should die leaving no will under which his son should become
owner o
f





sale , and in the latter he should be paid out
of the estate of Anthony Roberts . As we view it the import of the
contract wasmore to fix events for the maturity of an obligation than
to pledge the land for its payment .
It is evident that there was no intention that Moss Roberts should
have a lien on the land for the money in the event o
f
his father
dying intestate because the language of the contract is , that in that
event , he should be paid out o
f
his father ' s estate . Again , the
provision that in the event o
f
sale b
y Anthony Roberts , the money




the sale , fully
recognizes the right o
f
the former to sell , and that right carried
with it the power to invest his purchaser with the title free from
any lien arising out of the contract . If the contract created no
equitable lien in favor o
f
Moss Roberts , none , of course , can be held
to exist in favor o
f
his assignee .
The evidence shows that the $500 note to Gardner represented a
bona fide debt , and there is nothing in the record to warrant a sus
picion , even , that the giving o
f
the mortgage to him had any other
than a
n
honest purpose to secure the debt .
Decree affirmed . 12





MARYLAND , 1892 .
2
4 Atl . 151 .
BRYAN , J . Albert Carry filed a bill in equity against Stegmaier
and the Washington Brewery Company , a body corporate . It was
alleged in the bill that Stegmaier purchased at trustee ' s sale a certain
tract of land in Prince George ' s county , and that after the sale was
ratified h
e
borrowed from the complainant $ 3 , 000 to make the cash
1
2 Accord : Finn v . Donahoe , 83 Mich . 165 ; Britt v . Harrell , 105 N . Car .
1
0 ; Hossack v . Graham , 20 Wash , 184 . See also Clement , Bane & Co .
v . Swanson , 110 Iowa 106 .
In Knott v . Manufacturing Co . , 30 W . Va . 790 , an agreement to in
sure buildings and transfer the policies to a creditor “as additional se
curity " was held to create no lien on the buildings , it being too explicit
to b
e open to implication . The word "additional ” was held to mean ad
ditional to the security , in the general sense of that term , which was con
stituted by the personal obligation o
f
the debtor .
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payment , and at the same time promised to secure the repayment of
the money by a mortgage on the land , and that he has failed and re
fused to do so ; that afterwards Stegmaier conveyed his interest
in the land to the brewery company , and that said conveyance was
made for simulated and pretended considerations , and was intended
to delay , hinder, and defraud the complainant and other creditors of
Stegmaier. The prayer of the bill was that the deed might be de
clared void ; that the agreement to execute the mortgage might be
specifically enforced , or , if it could not be enforced , that compensa
tion might be decreed ; and that Stegmaier 's interest in the land
might be sold for the purpose of paying the debt and interest . The
answers of the defendant denied the fraud , and pleaded the statute
of frauds to the alleged agreement to make a mortgage ; not admit
ting , however , the existence of said agreement . The circuit court
passed a decree ordering a sale of the land , and the defendants
appealed .
At the time the money was loaned to Stegmaier he executed and
delivered to Carry his promissory note for the amount, but the
promise to make the mortgage was entirely by parol . The fourth
section of the statute forbids any action on a contract or sale of
lands , or any interest in or concerning them , unless the contract is
in writing. It ought never to have been doubted that a contract
to make a mortgage of land was within the terms and meaning of the
statute . But, as almost every description of question has been made
the subject of controversy , it is not surprising that we find this one
adjudicated . Clabaugh v . Byerly , 7 Gill 362 ; Albert v . Winn , 5
Md. 77 ; Browne, St. Frauds, 267. The appellee contends that
by reason of the payment of the money the contract has been per
formed in part, and that he is therefore entitled to a decree for
specific performance ; and he places great reliance on certain ex
pressions in the opinion of the court in Cole v . Cole , 41 Md. 302.
In that case the complainant had loaned one of the defendants a sum
ofmoney , with which he purchased a tract of land , and the borrower
verbally agreed that he would secure the repayment of the money
to the lender by a mortgage on the land , but afterwards refused to
do so . The lender filed a bill in equity , praying for a sale of the
land to satisfy the debt, or that the borrower might be decreed to
execute a mortgage on it to secure the payment of the money loaned ,
and for general relief. The defendants did not deny the agreement
to execute a mortgage, nor did they set up the statute of frauds as
a defense . In deciding the case this court used this language :
“ Cole , having obtained the said advance upon the agreement to exe
cute a mortgage upon the land to secure the repayment , is bound , in
equity and good conscience , to performance on his part ; and his in
terest in the property must be held answerable for the same, to the
same extent as if themortgage had been given according to the agree
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ment. A court of equity will hold him liable , and consider that as
done which ought to have been done . There is nothing in the stat
ute of frauds , if it had been pleaded , in conflict with this equitable
principle . That statute was enacted to provide as far as possible
against the perpetration of frauds, and courts of equity never allow
it
s provisions to be perverted and made instrumental in the accom
plishment o
f
fraud . They decree the specific execution o
f agree
ments where there has been a performance on one side , because
the refusal to perform on the other side is a fraud , and they will
not permit the statute designed to prevent fraud to be made an
engine of fraud . ” 13 General expressions like these are frequently
found in the reports o
f
decided cases , and in the text -books . Their
extreme generality ought to suggest that there must be a great
many cases to which they could not be applied . If adopted as rules
o
f
decision , they would operate a
s





frauds . The language o
f




s application to the case which they are considering ,
and not a
s establishing a rule for different cases , which are not
a
t
the time under discussion . A very eminent judge has put on
record his estimate o
f
these generalities . I allude to the opinion
o
f
Lord Chancellor Selborne in Maddison v . Alderson , L . R . 8
App . Cas . 474 . Speaking o
f
the equity o
f part performance o
f parol
contracts , his lordship said : “ That equity has been stated b
y
high
authority to rest upon the principle o
f
fraud . ‘Courts o
f equity will
not permit the statute to be made an instrument o
f
fraud . ' B
y
this it can not be meant that equity will relieve against a public
statute o
f general policy in cases admitted to fall within it , and I
agree with an observation made b
y
Lord Justice Cotton in Britain
v . Rossiter [ 11 Q . B . Div . 131 ] that this summary way o
f stating
the principle (however true it may be when properly understood )
is not an adequate explanation either o
f




the established limits o
f
the equitable doctrine o
f part perform
ance . ” In like manner this court has had occasion to express its
opinion o
n
the other general rule quoted in Cole v . Cole , that " equity
will consider that as done which ought to have been done . " In
1
3 Accord : King v . Williams , 66 Ark . 333 ; Dean v . Anderson , 34 N . J .
Eq . 496 ; Sprague v . Cochran , 144 N . Y . 104 ; and see Baker v . Baker , 2 S .
Dak . 261 , which also rests on subrogation .
Compare with the foregoing cases , the following from the same juris
dictions , which hold that on a parol contract o
f
sale of land , payment of
the consideration is not such part performance as takes the case out of
the statute . Keatts v . Rector , 1 Ark . 391 ; Underhill v . Allen , 18 Ark .
466 ; Cole v . Potts , 10 N . J . Eq . 67 ; Nibert v . Baghurst , 47 N . J . Eq . 201 ;
Miller v . Ball , 64 N . Y . 286 ; Cooley v . Lobdell , 153 N . Y . 596 . In Martin
v . Nixon , 92 Mo . 26 , it was held equity would reform a mortgage by in
serting the description of a parcel omitted by mistake and that the omis
sion of the mortgagor ' s signature could also be corrected ; contra , Good
man v . Randall , 44 Conn . 321 .
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Clabaugh v . Byerly , 7 Gill 354 , the court were considering an
alleged parol promise to make a mortgage of land . They say :
“ By the appellee it is insisted that he is to be preferred because of
an agreement which themortgagor made with him before the date
of the deed to the appellants , and upon the principle that equity
will consider that as done which ought to be done. No doubt
this , when correctly understood , is an established maxim in equity .
But there are many things which a man ought to feel himself
bound to do , many promises which the party promising ought
to feel himself bound to fulfill , and yet which the chancery court
can not compel hi
m
to perform . The court , then , in order to be
justified in regarding an act a
s
done , must have jurisdiction o
f
the case , and to be able to insist that it shall be done . ” On a little
reflection , many exceptions will be perceived to nearly al
l
general
rules , however great may be the latitude o
f
the terms in which
they are laid down .
It becomes necessary to consider some of the leading cases in
which the general expressions used in Cole v . Cole were applied
to existing facts , so that we may see the practical limits o
f
the
doctrine which they state . In Clinan v . Cooke , 1 Schoales & L . 22 ,
Lord Redesdale considered very fully the doctrine o
f part per
formance o
f parol contracts . Since his time it can not be said that
much has been added to his exposition o
f
the subject . On this
account , as well as on account o
f
his very great ability and repu
tation as an equity judge , I will make a considerable extract from
his opinion : “ But I think this is not a case in which part per
formance appears . The only circumstance that can be considered
a
s amounting to part performance is the payment of the sum of
fifty guineas to Mr . Cooke . Now , it has always been considered
that the payment o
f
money is not to b
e
deemed part performance
to take a case out o
f
the statute . Seagood v . Meale , Finch , Prec .
560 , is the leading case on that subject . There a guinea was paid
b
y
way of earnest , and it was agreed clearly that that was of no
consequence , in case o
f
a
n agreement touching lands . Now , if pay
ment o
f fifty guineas would take a case out o
f
the statute , pay
ment o
f
one guinea would do so equally ; fo
r
it is paid in both cases
a
s part payment , and no distinction can be drawn . But the great
reason , as I think , why part payment does not take such agree
ment out o
f
the statute , is that the statute has said ( § 13 ) that in
another case , viz . , with respect to goods , it shall operate as part
performance . And the courts have therefore considered this as
excluding agreements for land , because it is inferred that when
the legislature said it should bind in the case o
f goods , and were
silent as to the case o
f
lands , they meant that it should not bind
in the case o
f
lands . But I take another reason also to prevail on
the subject . I take it that nothing is considered as a part per
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formance which does not put the party into a situation that is a
fraud upon hi
m , unless the agreement is performed ; for instance ,
if upon a parol agreement a man is admitted into possession , he is
made a trespasser , and is liable to answer a
s
a trespasser , if there
be no agreement . This is put strongly in the case o
f
Foxcroft v .
Lester (Coll . P . C . 108 , 2 Vern . 456 ) . There the party was le
t
into possession on a parol agreement , and it was said that he
ought not to be liable a
s
a wrongdoer , and to account for the rents




agreement . Then , for the purpose o
f defending himself against
a charge which might otherwise be made against him , such evi
dence was admissible ; and , if it was admissible for such purpose ,
there is no reason why it should not be admissible throughout .
That , I apprehend , is the ground on which courts o
f
equity have
proceeded in permitting part performance o
f
a
n agreement to b
e
a ground for avoiding the statute ; and I take it , therefore , that
nothing is to be considered a
s part performance which is not o
f
that nature . Payment o
f money is not part performance ; for it
may be repaid , and then the parties will be just as they were
before , especially if repaid with interest . It does not put a man
who has parted with his money into the situation o
f
a man against .
whom a
n
action may be brought ; for in the case o
f
Foxcroft v .
Lester , which first led the way , if the party could not have produced
in evidence the parol agreement , hemight have been liable in dam
ages to an immense extent . ” It might , perhaps , be thought that
there was some subtlety in his lordship ’ s reasoning ; but neverthe
less his opinion is received without dissent , and is regarded as an
authoritative declaration of the fundamental doctrine o
f equity on
this subject . In Hughes v . Morris , 2 De Gex , M . & G . 356 , Lord
Justice Knight Bruce said : “ A parol contract for the sale of land ,
though all the money be paid , without part performance - for the
payment o
f
the money is no part performance - can not be carried
into effect if the person sued chooses to avail himself of the defect . ”
In Britain v . Rossiter , 11 Q . B . Div . 131 , it was said b
y
Lord
Justice Cotton : “ But it is well established , and can not be denied ,
that the receipt o
f
any sum , however large , b
y
one party under the
contract , will not entitle the other to enforce a contract which
comes within the fourth section . ” In Maddison v . Alderson , L .
R . 8 App . Cas . 479 , the lord chancellor said : “ It may be taken
a
s
now settled that part payment o
f purchase money is not enough ,
and judges of high authority have said the same even of payment
in full . ” And he quoted Clinan v . Cooke , Hughes v . Morris , Brit
a
in
v . Rossiter . In Purcell v . Miner , 4 Wall . 513 , the Supreme
Court o
f
the United States said : “ But the mere payment o
f
the
price in part or in whole will not , o
f





equity ; the party having a sufficient
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remedy at law to recover back the money ." In Story , Eq. Jur., $ 760 ,
the learned author's conclusions are thus stated : “ It seems for
merly to have been thought that a deposit or security or payment
of the purchase money , or a part of it , or at least of a considerable
part of it, was such a part performance as took the case out of the
statute . But that doctrine was open to much controversy , and is
now finally overthrown . Indeed , the distinction taken in some
cases between the payment of a small part and the payment of a
considerable part of the purchase money seems quite too refined
and subtle ; for, independently of the difficulty of saying what
shall be deemed a small and what a considerable part of the pur
chase money, each must , upon principle , stand upon the same rea
son , namely , that it is a part performance in both cases or not in
either .” In 4 Kent Comm . ( 12th ed . ) * 451, we read : “ It was
formerly held that payment was part performance , but the more
modern doctrine now is that payment of part, or even of the whole ,
of the purchase money, is not of itself , and without something
more , a performance that will take the case out of the statute ; for
the money may be repaid .” In Fry , Spec . Perf., in a note on page
301 , it is said : “ The rule is now well settled , and all the best au
•thorities agree , that the vendee will not be entitled to the specific
performance of a parol contract for the purchase of real property ,
or an interest therein , merely upon the payment of money , where
nothing else is done ; and a large number of authorities are cited .
In Artz v . Grove , 21 Md. 471, the court , in speaking of certain
sums of money paid by the complainant , said that they “ were not
like part payment of purchase money , which the courts have de
cided , as between vendor and vendee, do not constitute part per
formance , because they may be recovered back at law if the con
tract be vacated or annulled .” And the same thing was said in
Hopkins v . Roberts , 54 Md. 316 . In Green v . Drummond , 31 Md .
71 , there was an agreement which was invalid under the fourth
section of the statute of frauds, and a sum of money , more than
$ 3, 000 , had been advanced in pursuance of it, yet it was held that
a decree for specific performance of the agreement could not be
passed in the case . The decision in Girault v . Adams, 61 Md. 1 ,
has been cited by the appellee 's counsel . But in that case specific
performance was not decreed . The contract was within the statute
of fraud , and, because of the inadequacy of the remedy at law ,
compensation was decreed , to the extent of the money paid on the
alleged contract ; and , as the separate estate of a married woman
was charged with the payment of the money, it was held that a
decree ought to be passed for the sale . It is seen that at one time
it was held that payment of purchase money , in whole or in part ,
was a sufficient part performance ; but the contrary doctrine is,
THE FORM . 61
however , now . established by a vast preponderance of authority. 14
When Stegmaier borrowed the money from Carry , it became his
own, and anything which he might purchase with it would like
wise become his own property . There could be no lien on the pur
chased property , arising from the fact that Carry had loaned the
money . A lien might exist for money loaned where there was a
valid contract for it ; but I have shown that the contract in this
case is within the prohibitory clauses of the statute of frauds.
When a man borrows money, it is generally for the purpose of
using it according to his own wishes ; and his right to do so is ab
solute , and not qualified by any claim of the lender on purchases
made with it, unless there are restrictions imposed by valid and
binding contract . We can not decree compensation on the prin
ciples declared in Green v . Drummond , because , as a promissory
note was given for the money borrowed , there is a complete and
adequate remedy at law for its recovery .
I do not find that the brewery company had notice of the agree
ment to make a mortgage ; but it will be seen from what I have
said that I regard this circumstance as immaterial . The decree
ought to be reversed , and the bill dismissed . 15
EDITORIAL Note . - - DEPOSIT O
F
TITLE DEEDS . In England it is well
settled that if an owner of land deposits his title deeds with a creditor
a
s security , this creates an equitable lien on the land . Russel v .
Russel , 1 Bro . C . C . 269 ; Ex parte Kensington , 2 V . & B . 79 ; Ex
parte Haigh , 14 Ves . 402 . This doctrine , though much criticised
there , is better suited to the English practice in conveyancing , of





estate is derived , than to our system o
f recording conveyances .
In this country the doctrine has usually been repudiated as in
conflict with the statute o
f
frauds and out o
f harmony with our
1
4
“ There is a
n
evident distinction between the cases o
f
loan and pur
chase ; and without expressing any opinion on the question , whether in
the former ( latter ] case , payment o
f
the whole , or of part of the purchase
money , is , o
r
is not , a part performance to take it out of the statute , it is
enough to say that the advance of money upon a contract for loan af
fords , of necessity , no evidence of any intention but that of creating the
relation o
f
debtor and creditor . ” Ld . Elden , in Ex parte Hooper , 1
Meriv . 7 .
In the following cases the statute was held to defeat a claim o
f equi
table mortgage , but the doctrine o
f part performance was not discussed .
Goodman v . Randall , 44 Conn . 321 ; Pierce v . Parrish , 111 Ga . 725 ; Hack
ett v . Watts , 138 Mo . 502 ; Bower v . Oyster , 3 P . & W . ( Pa . ) 239 ; Boehl
v . Wadgymar , 54 Tex . 589 .
1
5 The other members o
f
the court reached the same conclusion as
Bryan , J . , but upon the ground that the record showed the defendant
Brewery Company to be a bona fide purchaser , so that , whether com
plainant was entitled to specific performance as against defendant Steg
maier , it was not as against the former .
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system of conveyancing . Pierce v. Parrish , 111 Ga. 725 ; Van Meter
v . McFadden , 8 B . Mon . (Ky.) 435 ; Gardner v . McClure , 6 Minn .
250 ; Gerhard v . Flynn , 25 Miss. 58 ; Bloom v . Nogle , 4 Ohio St.
45 ; Meador v . Meador , 3 Heisk . ( Tenn .) 562 ; Bickness v . Bicknell ,
31 Vt. 498 . .
Contra , Hall v . McDuff , 24 Maine 311 ( semble ) ; Rockwell v .
Hoby, 2 Sandf . Ch . ( N . Y .) 9 ; Chase v . Peck , 21 N . Y . 584 ( sem
ble ) ; Hackett v . Reynolds, 4 R . I. 512 . See Jarvis v . Dutcher, 16
Wis . 307 ( deposit of school land certificates which pass title by as
signment ) .
Of course if the deposit of deeds is accompanied by a written
contract the statute is satisfied ; and a reference in the contract to
the deeds is sufficient description of the land . Hackett v . Watts,
138 Mo. 502 ; English v. McElroy , 62 Ga. 413, explained in Pierce
v . Parrish , 111 Ga. 725 ; Martin v . Bowen , 51 N . J . Eq. 452 . And
see, Bank v . Caldwell , 4 Dillon ( U . S .) 314 .
Even where our courts recognize an equitable mortgage by de
posit of title deeds, it does not give the creditor the same prac
tical hold on the land which it does in England , where the owner
finds great difficulty in disposing of his land without production
of his title deeds.
BURNETT , J ., in LEE v . EVANS , 8 Cal. 424 ( 1857 ) . There are two
questions arising upon the record in this case :
1. Whether the grantee in a deed , absolute upon its face , can be
permitted to show , by parol proof , that it was only intended as a
mortgage , without alleging and proving fraud , accident , or mis
take , in the creation o
f
the instrument ?
2 . If not , whether the answer substantially admits the allega
tions o
f
the complaint , so as to dispense with proof .
The question is one solely relating to evidence . What shall be
competent evidence to prove certain facts ? The statute says none
but written testimony will do , and the courts say oral testimony is
sufficient . Is not this a plain contradiction o
f
the statute ?
The general rule , that parol shall not be received to contradict
written evidence , is founded in true policy , and in good sense .
Why should parties state , in solemn instruments , that which is not
true ? These instruments assume to state the truth , and the whole
truth ; and if parties will state that which is untrue , should they
not justly suffer the consequences ? Is not the rule , that parties
must be held to mean what they say , the plain , honest , simple , and
correct rule at last ? It is intelligible , certain , and practical ; and
if always fairly carried out , will , in the end , be most useful . If not ,
the legislature should correct it . Where exceptions are intended , they
should b
e specified . And if the legislature intended none , then the
courts should not create them .
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Many of the learned judges who have sustained the doctrine
that a deed , absolute upon its face , may be shown b
y parol proof
to be only intended a
s
a mortgage , have endeavored to reconcile
the rule with the statute .
Thus Mr . Justice McLean says , in the case already referred to :
" In cases of trust , equity will sometimes treat a deed , absolute upon
it
s
face , as a mortgage , but in doing this , parol proof is not heard
in contradiction o
f
the instrument , but in explanation o
f
the trans




the mortgagee . ”
Now , I confess , I can not understand the force o
f
this explanation .
The rule that “ treats a deed absolute upon it
s
face , as a mortgage , ”
certainly contradicts the instrument . A written instrument speaks
for itself , and if you make it mean contrary to what it says , there
must be a contradiction .
Nor can I understand how the parol evidence can be received ,
" in explanation o
f
the transaction , " without contradicting the in
strument , for the reason that the instrument and the parol testi
mony both assume to state the transaction ; and as they differ , they
must naturally be in contradiction . They both historically relate
the same transaction , and the one says it was an absolute sale
the other , it was not such , but a mere mortgage , and is not this a
plain contradiction ? If A , gives his note to B , for five hundred
dollars , and A seeks to prove , b
y parol evidence , that it was only
intended a
s
a note for three hundred dollars , is not this a contra
diction ? And if the instrument ( the very end and purpose o
f
which is to state the contract as it was ) says the sale was absolute ,
and the parol evidence says it was no sale , but only a mortgage ,
there must b
e
a clear conflict between the two classes o
f testimony .
And Chief Justice Gibson , in the case already referred to , says :
“ A formal conveyance may certainly be shown to be a mortgage
b
y
extrinsic proof , while a formal mortgage may not be shown to
b
e
a conditional sale b
y
the same means . In the one case , the
proof raises an equity consistent with the writing , and in the other
would contradict it . ” But here , again , I must confess I can not
see the reason of the distinction . To say that a deed absolute is a
mere mortgage , is no contradiction — while , to say a mortgage can
not be made a conditional sale , without a contradiction , is making
a distinction without a difference . If two different witnesses should
testify in relation to a transaction concerning personal property ,
and the one should say it was an absolute sale , and the other that
it was only a pledge , I suppose there could be no doubt as to there
being a contradiction in the evidence . And if we put in the place
of one witness an instrument in writing it can not be said that this
circumstance would remove the contradiction in the testimony .
The same conflict would still exist .
These attempted explanations only g
o
to prove the difficulties o
f
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the rule allowing these exceptions, in certain cases , and refusing
them in others , when the statute has in terms excluded them in
both . The object of the statute was to make written evidence the
only testimony to prove certain contracts . And if the courts , con
trary to the words of the statute , can change the rule in one case ,
they can in all , and every written contract might be contradicted
by parol proof.
In the case of Stevens v . Cooper , 1 Johns . Ch. R . 429, Chan
cellor Kent says :
“ The plaintiffs in the original suit seek to avail themselves of a
parol agreement alleged to have been made between the parties to
the mortgage at the time it was executed , by which each lot was
to be bound only for a ratable proportion of the mortgage -debt .
The mortgage in this , as in ordinary cases, bound every part and
parcel of the mortgaged premises for the entire debt , and if such
a parol agreement , as is charged , can be proved and set up , it goes
to vary, essentially , the operation of the mortgage -deed .” .
The parol evidence was not admitted , and the learned Chancellor
makes these forcible remarks :
" The general rule is certainly not to be questioned or disturbed .
It ought not to be a subject of discussion . It is as well grounded
in reason and policy as it is in authority . Nor does this case
come within any exception , admitted here, to the operation of the
rule ; for there is no allegation of fraud , mistake, or surprise , in
making or executing the mortgage ; and those , I believe , are the
only cases in which parol evidence is admissible in this court against
a contract in writing .”
In the case of Webb v . Rice , 1 Hill 608, Mr. Justice Bronson , in
his able dissenting opinion , remarks :
“ Although I may yield to the opinion of others , I never shall be
reconciled to the doctrine that an absolute deed can , at law , be
turned into a mortgage by parol evidence , nor that it can be done
in a court of equity , except on the ground of fraud or mistake .
It is contrary to a first principle in the law of evidence to allow a
deed , or other written instrument , to be contradicted by parol
proof.”
The learned judge quotes a passage from the opinion of Mr.
Justice Cowen , in the case of Swart v . Service , 21 Wend . 36 , where
the latter says :
“ For one , I was always at a loss to see on what principle the
doctrine could be rested , either at law or in equity, unless fraud or
mistake was shown in obtaining an absolute deed , when it should
have been a mortgage . In either case the deed might be rectified
in equity , and perhaps even at law , in this state , where mortgages
stand on the same footing in both courts . Short of that ( fraud or
mistake ), the evidence is a direct contradiction of the deed .”
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ng th
e
stal of it is
abhorre th
e
The general doctrine laid down b
y
this court , in the case of
Abell v . Calderwood , 4 Cal . R . 90 , would seem to support the view
we have taken . The learned judge who delivered the opinion of
the court said :




Frauds , courts o
f
equity heretofore have , notwithstanding the statute , granted the re
lief sought in certain cases , where the refusal o
f
it might enable
one party to commit a fraud upon the other . In their abhorrence
of fraud , these courts have , in a material degree , abrogated the
letter and spirit and intention o
f
the written law . In the effort to
escape from an evil they have unavoidably fallen into another , and
for many years past the best judicial minds o
f
common law coun
tries have conceded that the one they have fallen into is the greater
evil of the two . "
We think the strict rule the true one , and that in no case can
parol evidence be introduced to vary or contradict the deed , except
in cases o
f
fraud , accident , o
r
mistake , and then only upon a direct
allegation of the defect in the creation of the instrument . In this
case the parties understood distinctly what was in the writing . They
made it contain just what they intended it should contain .
Evans executed just such an instrument as he intended to exe
cute , and no other . There was no mistake , fraud , or accident , in
the creation of the instrument .
If the view we have taken be correct the plaintiff must rely solely
upon the admissions in the answer . And this brings us to the sec
ond question . 16
[ The learned justice proceeded to examine the pleadings and
found an admission b
y
the defendant that the conveyance was a




FIELD , J . , in PIERCE v . ROBINSON , 13 Cal . 116 (1859 ) . I place
the question whether the conveyance is to be deemed a mortgage ,
entirely upon the admissibility of parol evidence to establish the
fact . The evidence in the record , if admitted , clearly establishes
it . The question a
s
to the admissibility o
f
such evidence came be
fore this court in Lee v . Evans ( 8 Cal . 424 ) and it was there held
that it was inadmissible except in cases o
f
fraud , accident , o
r mis
take , in the creation o
f
the instrument , and the doctrine there as
serted was affirmed by Mr . Justice Burnett in Low v . Henry ( 9
Cal . 538 ) . At the time I took my seat on the bench there were
several cases pending before the court in which I had appeared as
counsel , and , o
f
course , I was precluded from participating in their
decision o
r expressing any dissent therefrom . Lee v . Evans and
1
6 Accord : Brainerd v . Brainerd , 15 Conn . 575 (semble ) ; McClane v .
White , 5 Minn , 178 (semble ) ; Frazier v . Frazier , 129 N . Car . 30 .
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Low v . Henry were among the number . Both of these cases were
decided in favor of the parties I represented , but upon other
grounds than those arising from the adınissibility of parol evidence .
In Johnson v . Sherman , decided at the July term , 1858 , the same
question was again presented , and I took the occasion to give , in
a separate opinion , the reasons of my dissent from the doctrine an
nounced in Lee v . Evans . A rehearing having been granted , and
a change on the bench having since taken place , and Mr. Justice
Baldwin concurring with me, I avail myself of this opportunity to
reaffirm the views I then expressed , using substantially the lan
guage of my dissenting opinion in Johnson v . Sherman , trusting
thereby to place the doctrine of this court in harmony with the re
ceived doctrine of courts of equity, on this subject, everywhere else .
I consider parol evidence admissible in equity , to show that a
deed absolute upon it
s
face was intended as a mortgage , and that
the restriction of the evidence to cases of fraud , accident , or mis
take , in the creation o
f




The entire doctrine o
f equity , in respect to mortgages , has its
origin in considerations independent o
f
the terms in which the
instruments are drawn . In form , a mortgage in fee is a convey
ance o
f
a conditional estate , which , by the strict rules o
f
the com
mon law , became absolute upon breach o
f
its conditions . But , from
a
n early period in the history o
f English jurisprudence , courts of
equity interposed to prevent a forfeiture o
f
the estate and gave to
the mortgagor a right to redeem , upon payment within a reason
able time , o
f
the principal sum secured , interest and costs . As
the right to thus recover the estate forfeited arose not from the
terms o
f
the instrument , but from a consideration of the real char
acter o
f
the transaction , as one o
f security and not o
f purchase ,
it could be enforced only in equity , and was hence termed an equity
o
f redemption . And when the right to redeem had been once es
tablished , to prevent its evasion , the rule was laid down and has
ever since been inflexibly adhered to , that the right is inseparably
connected with the mortgage , and can not be abandoned or waived
by any stipulations entered into between the parties a
t
the time ,
whether inserted in the instrument or not . (Vernon v . Bethell , 2
Eden 113 ; Butler ' s Note to Coke on Litt . 2046 ; 4 Kent 142 -144 ;
Story ' s Equity , § 1019 . )
As the equity upon which the courts act arises from the real
character of the transaction , it is of no consequence in what man






r by parol . Whether the instrument , it not being apparent on its
face , is to be regarded as a mortgage , depends upon the circum
stances under which it was made , and the relations subsisting be
tween the parties . Evidence o
f
these circumstances and relations
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is admitted , not fo
r
the purpose o
f contradicting or varying
the deed , but to establish an equity superior to its terms .
It is against the policy of the law to allow irredeemable mortgages ,
just a
s
it is against the policy of the law to allow the creation o
f
inalienable estates . Under no circumstances will equity permit this
end to be effected , either b
y
express stipulation , or the absolute form
of the instrument . The rule which refuses the admission of parol
evidence to contradictor vary written instruments is directed to
the language employed b
y
the parties . That language ca
n
not be
qualified , but must be left to speak for itself . The rule does not
exclude an inquiry into the objects and purposes o
f
the parties in
executing the instruments . It may be shown , for instance , that a
deed was made to defraud creditors , o
r
a release given to render
a witness competent . The purposes and objects of the parties are
considered by a Court o
f Chancery , and constitute a large ground
o
f
its jurisdiction , which will be exercised to restrain or to effectu
ate them , a
s may best promote justice . Thus , a deed executed for
a fraudulent purpose will be set aside ; and as it is the settled policy
o
f




any contemporaneous agreement into a sale ,
the purposes o
f
the parties in giving and taking an absolute con
veyance will be inquired into ; and when the rights o
f
third per
sons have not intervened , a Court o
f Chancery will control the use
o
f






s object . Unless parol evidence can be ad
mitted , the policy of the law will be constantly evaded . Debtors ,
under the force o
f pressing necessities , will submit to almost any
exactions for loans of a trilling amount , compared with the value of
the property , and the equity o
f redemption will elude the grasp
o
f
the court and rest in the simple good faith o
f
the creditor . A
mortgage , as I have observed , is , in form , a conveyance of a con
ditional estate , and the assertion o
f
a right to redeem from a for
feiture involves the same departure from the terms o
f
the instru
ment , as in the case o
f
a
n absolute conveyance executed a
s se
curity . The conveyance upon condition , by its terms , purports to
vest the entire estate upon the breach o
f
the condition , just as
the absolute conveyance does in the first instance . The equity
arises and is asserted , in both cases , upon exactly the same prin
ciples , and is enforced without reference to the agreement of the
parties , but from the nature of the transaction to which the right
attaches , from the policy o
f
the law , as an inseparable incident .
In Lee v . Evans , the majority o
f
the court appear to have over
looked , in their anxiety to preserve the integrity of conveyances
from attacks o
f parol , the distinction between evidence o
f
facts
raising an equity which will control the operation o
f
the instru
ment in the hands of the grantee , and evidence to contradictor








































vary the legal effect o
f
it
s terms , and yet that distinction is the
foundation o
f
the entire equitable doctrine of mortgages .
Fraud , accident , and mistake are special grounds of equity juris
diction , and may be shown by any satisfactory evidence , written
o
r
verbal , with reference not merely to mortgages , but to a
ll writ
ten instruments . From their nature they must generally be estab
lished by parol evidence . And the evidence is admissible , not for
the purpose o
f contradicting or varying the terms o
f
the instru
ment — not to make its language mean one thing , when it speaks
another , but to show a state o
f
facts dehors the instrument , raising
a
n equity , which a Court of Chancery will enforce by annulling or
reforming the instrument , o
r limiting its operation , o
r enjoining
its use . And the doctrine is both novel and startling which re
stricts , in matters o
f
fraud , its jurisdiction over the operation o
f
written instruments to those cases where the fraud has been com
mitted in their creation . If maintained , it will sweep away its
heretofore admitted jurisdiction in an infinite variety o
f
cases , of
almost daily occurrence , where the fraud alleged consists in the
use o
f
instruments entered into upon mutual confidence between
the parties . Fraud in their use is as much a ground for the inter
position o
f equity , as fraud in their creation . There is no distinc
tion in the principle upon which the jurisdiction is asserted in the
two cases . In both there is the same abuse o
f
confidence , and from
both the same injury results .
In Hultz v . Wright , the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania said :
“ As to fraud , it is not supposed to be necessary to have proof
express that a writing has been obtained fraudulently , in order to
admit parol evidence against it on that score ; but parol evidence
may be admitted to resist the fraudulent use o
f
a writing in the
obtaining o
f
which no fraud can be made to appear . ” ( 16 Seargt .
& Rawle 346 . ) And in Oliver v . Oliver ( 4 Rawle 144 ) the same
court said : “ When the fairness of the transaction is impeached , it





whether the fraud consists in the fraudulent use of
the instrument . * * * It is no answer to say that the parol
evidence is in opposition to the deed ; for where there is fraud , o
r
the party attempts to make a fraudulent use of an instrument con
trary to his contract , parol evidence is admitted to prevent injus
tice . ”
“ A deed , ” says Kent , " absolute upon the face o
f
it , and though
registered a
s
a deed , will be valid and effectual as a mortgage as
between the parties , if it was intended by them to be merely a se
curity for a debt . And this would be the case , though the de
feasance was by agreement resting in parol , for parol evidence is
admissible in equity to show that an absolute deed was intended
a
s
a mortgage , and that the defeasance has been omitted , o
r de
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stroyed by fraud , surprise , or mistake ." (4 Com . 143.) And Mr.
Justice Story , after quoting this passage , adds: “ It is the same if
it be omitted by design , upon mutual confidence between the parties ,
for the violation of such an agreement would be a fraud of the
most flagrant kind , originating in an open breach of trust against
conscience and justice . I do not comment upon this subject at
large because it seems to me wholly unnecessary , in the present
state of the law , to do more than enunciate the principles which
govern cases of this nature , and which are as well established as
any which govern any branch of our jurisprudence ." (Taylor v .
Luther , 2 Sumner 233 .) 17
CULLEN v. CAREY.
SUPREME COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS , 1888 .
146 Mass . 50 .
Bill in equity to compel the reconveyance of land on the ground
that the transaction by which the defendant's testator gained title
was in substance a mortgage. Writ dated December 24 , 1885 .
17 Accord : Blakemore v . Byrnside , 7 Ark . 505 (semble ) ; Ruckman v.
Alwood , 71 11
1
. 155 (semble ) ; Brown v . Follette , 155 Ind , 316 ; McDonald
v . Kellogg , 30 Kans . 170 ; Oberdorfer v . White , 25 Ky . L . 1629 ; Stinch
field v . Milliken , 71 Maine 567 ; Campbell v . Dearborn , 109 Mass . 130 ;
McMillan v . Bissell , 63 Mich . 66 ; O 'Neill v . Capelle , 62 Mo . 202 ; Strong
v . Stewart , 4 Johns Ch . ( N . Y . ) 167 ; Wallace v . Smith , 155 Pa . St . 78 ;
Loving v . Milliken , 59 Tex . 423 ; Wright v . Bates , 13 Vt . 341 ; Russell
v . Southard , 12 How . ( U . S . ) 139 .
In Campbell v . Dearborn , supra , the court , while sustaining the
broad rule o
f
the principal case , say , by Welles , J . , “We can not concur
in the doctrine advanced in some of the cases , that the subsequent at
tempt to retain the property , and refusal to permit it to be redeemed ,
constitute a fraud and breach o
f
trust , which affords ground o
f juris
diction and judicial interference . There can be no fraud o
r legal wrong
in the breach o
f
a trust from which the statute withholds the right o
f
judicial recognition . Such conduct may sometimes appear to relate
back , and give character to the original transaction , by showing , in that ,
a
n express intent to deceive and defraud . But ordinarily it will not be
connected with the original transaction otherwise than constructively , or
a
s involved in it as its legitimate consequence and natural fruit . In
this aspect only can we regard it in the present case . "
By the great weight of authority , when land is conveyed by absolute
deed upon an oral trust for the grantor equity will not enforce the oral
trust , nor will it create a resulting or constructive trust to prevent the
wrong thereby inflicted upon the grantor .
The argument that there is fraud in the use o
f
the deed , o
r
a breach
of confidence , which justifies relief , is usually rejected as an evasion of
the statute , “ because the fraud consists only in the refusal to execute
the trust . The court , therefore , can not say that there is a fraud , without
first saying that there is a trust . And the parol evidence , if admitted ,
must be admitted to establish the trust , in order that the court may

















In the superior court the case was referred to a master , who
found the following facts :
In 1869 the plaintiff bought the land in question , subject to a
mortgage , and proceeded to erect a tenement house . Leonard
Carey , the husband of the defendant , who was a carpenter and
indebted to the plaintiff for money lent , built the house for the
plaintiff , supplying nearly all the materials and labor under an oral
agreement whereby his indebtedness to the plaintiff was to be ap
plied in payment of the cost of construction . When the house was
completed the balance due Carey , after paying his t to the plain
tiff , was $ 1 ,106 , and the value o
f
the house and land above the
existing mortgage was $ 3 ,300 . The plaintiff moved into the house
and occupied it about six months .
On o
r
about June 1 , 1870 , the plaintiff and Carey made an oral
agreement that Carey should gain title to the premises by levy on
execution , and b
y
a sale under the power in the mortgage , and
hold them a
s security for the plaintiff ' s debt to him , and , after pay
ment o
f
the debt and expenses out of the rents , should reconvey
to the plaintiff . In pursuance o
f
this agreement , the plaintiff , on
June 1 , 1870 , gave to Carey a note for $ 4 ,000 , upon which an
action was brought and judgment obtained b
y
default against the
plaintiff as agreed . An execution was issued and levied by a sale
to Carey o
f
the plaintiff ' s equity of redemption in the premises
for $ 4 ,317 . 39 , and a conveyance in due form was made to him on
May 29 , 1871 . On July 6 , 1871 , Carey , by the payment o
f
$ 583 . 17 ,
procured the assignment o
f
the mortgage to a third person , who
proceeded in due form to sell the premises under the power therein
to Carey for $ 950 , and a deed was given to him and duly recorded .
Prior to the sale on execution and under the mortgage , Carey




the plaintiff , and so
continued until his death , on October 25 , 1885 . At various times
the plaintiff demanded of Carey a settlement and reconveyance o
f
the premises , his last demand being made a few days before Carey ' s
death , in the presence and hearing o
f
the defendant . Carey made
a will , b
y
which his real estate was devised to the defendant , who
took possession of the premises and continued to receive the rents
and profits . The defendant declined to file an account , but it was
agreed b
y
both parties that the receipts by Carey and the defendant
had been sufficient to pay the plaintiff ' s debt to Carey , including
interest and expenses . The master also found that there had been
n
o
laches on the part o
f
the plaintiff .
The case was then heard on the report of the master , and a
charge the party with fraud in setting up his claim against it . " Paine ,
J . , in Rasdall v . Rasdall , 9 Wis . 379 . See Article by J . B . Ames , in 20
Harv . L . Rev . 549 .
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decree was entered that the defendant convey the premises to the
plaintiff . The defendant appealed to this court .
MORTON , C . J. It was held in Campbell v . Dearborn , 109 Mass .
130 , that , although a deed be given which is absolute in form , yet
the grantor may prove by parol testimony that it was understood
and agreed by both parties to be given as security for a debt ; and
that upon such proof a court of equity will treat the deed as a
mortgage . This is decisive of the case at bar .
For some reason , which does not appear to be fraudulent, the
plaintiff did not directly convey the estate in question to the de
fendant 's testator ; he permitted the latter to obtain a judgment
upon a debt in part fictitious, and thus to get a title by a levy upon
the execution , and also to foreclose by a sale under an existing
mortgage . But the substance of the transaction was the same as
if a deed had been directly given by the plaintiff. Both parties
agreed that the title thus obtained was to be held solely as security
for the debt of the plaintiff to the defendant's testator , and a court
of equity will treat the transaction according to its real nature as
a mortgage .







she contends . She took a
s
a general devisee under the
will o
f




Decree affirmed . 18
EDITORIAL NOTE . When land is conveyed b
y
absolute deed , either
upon a present consideration or upon a pre -existing indebtedness ,





a certain time , he will reconvey the premises to the grantor , it
1
8
" It is frequently the case that parties desire to give security upon
lands the title to which is not in them , but is subject to their control .
It is also frequently true that they desire to give it upon lands owned
by them , but liable to be sold on judicial proceedings against them . The
rule itself being once established , that parol evidence may be admitted
to show an absolute deed a mortgage , when such an agreement is clearly
established , we do not think it material whether a judicial sale was adopted
merely as a means of conveying the title to the mortgagee , or whether it
was conveyed to him by some third party for and on account of the
mortgagor . These circumstances furnish no substantial grounds for dis
tinguishing the case from a direct conveyance from the mortgagor , and
the cases which have established the rule do not make any distinction . "
Paine , J . , in Sweet v . Mitchell , 15 Wis . 641 , 664 .
See also , Smith v . Cremer , 71 Ill . 185 ; Beatty v . Brummett , 94 Ind .
7
6 ; Fisk v . Stewart , 24 Minn . 97 ; Niggeler v . Maurin , 34 Minn . 118 ; Stod
dard v . Whiting , 46 N . Y . 627 .
Cases o
f
this sort are sometimes disposed o
f
under the theory o
f
resulting trust . McDonough v . O 'Niel , 113 Mass . 92 ; Hidden v . Jordan ,
21 Cal . 92 . Pomeroy Equity , § 1038 .
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is often a very difficult problem to determine whether this trans
action amounts in law to a mortgage, or simply to what is called
a " conditional sale," meaning thereby a conveyance with contract
for repurchase . The latter is, of course , what the transaction , upon
it
s
face , appears to be ; but , under the equitable doctrine of mort
gages , if the parties have used this form o
f
transaction to secure
a debt to the grantee , equity will treat it as a mortgage , and
parol evidence is admissible to determine what the real purpose o
f
the transaction was .
The question , then , becomes one o
f
intention — whether the in
tention o
f
the parties was to effect a sale or a security ; and this ,
in turn , depends chiefly upon the question whether there was a
debt to secure . Authorities on this subject are therefore placed in
section 2 of this chapter , entitled The Debt , 9 . v .
SECTION 2 . — THE SUBJECT MATTER .
TIFFANY , REAL PROPERTY , § 509 . Any interest in land which may
b
e the subject o
f
sale , grant , or assignment may be mortgaged .
Accordingly , there may be a mortgage o
f
a rent , an estate in ex
pectancy , an estate tail , an estate for life , including a widow ' s
dower estate , and an estate for years . A mortgagee ' s interest
may itself be mortgaged , whatever theory be held as to the char
acter o
f
such interest . An heir or devisee may mortgage his
interest in the estate o
f
the deceased , subject to the payment o
f
the
latter ' s debts .
A mortgage may be made o
f improvements on land apart from
the land itself , and growing crops may be mortgaged b
y
the owner
of the land .
Equitable interests , a
s
well a
s legal , may be mortgaged ; a usual in
stance o
f





vendee under a contract of sale . The mortgage of an equitable inter
est in land cannot , it would seem , in states in which the legal theory
o
f mortgages is recognized , have the effect o
f
passing the legal title to
the mortgagee , since themortgagor has no such title to pass . 19 And
1
9 Nor can it , in states in which the lien theory of mortgages is
recognized , have the effect of creating a legal lien , since no legal interest
can be raised out o
f
a
n equitable interest . In short it is an equitable
mortgage , though it be perfectly regular in form . Brockway v . Wells ,
1 Paige ( N . Y . ) 617 . If the mortgagee afterward gets in the legal
title from the trustee or vendor , either with the consent o
f
the mortgagor ,
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so in England it is recognized that a second mortgage — that is, a
mortgage of the mortgagor 's interest - passes no legal title to the
mortgagee . In this country , however , no such distinction between
the positions of first and second mortgagees seems to be recog
nized .20
SEYMOUR v . THE CANANDAIGUA RAILROAD CO .,
SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK , 1857 .
25 Barb . ( N . Y .) 284 .
This action was commenced for the foreclosure of a mortgage ,
given by the Canandaigua and Niagara Falls Railroad Company
upon it
s
railroad , track and franchises , and appurtenances , to
secure the payment o
f





issued to , and held by different persons . The mortgage was exe
cuted in due form , and bore date March 17 , 1852 .
Niggeler v . Maurin , 34 Minn . 118 , o
r
without his consent , Meigs v . Mc
Farlan , 72 Mich . 194 , we then have an equitable mortgage of the sort
presented in the preceding chapter , the legal title being acquired by
absolute deed but for the purpose of security . Cf . Cullen v . Carey , supra .
2
0 The English doctrine regarding junior mortgages is the logical
result of the English theory that the first mortgage passes the whole
legal estate leaving only an equity in the mortgagor . In this country
the status o
f junior mortgages has not been frequently passed upon , due
to the fact that our recording system has largely eliminated the practical
significance o
f
the distinction between legal and equitable mortgages .
The logic o
f
our lien theory leads irresistibly to the conclusion that senior
and junior mortgages are technically alike , except for priority , for the
legal title , remaining always in the mortgagor , is capable of raising an
indefinite number of legal liens . This seems never to have been ques
tioned . Under the title theory , while the logic o
f
the case is not so
simple , the same result would flow from the accepted , though para
doxical position , that , while the mortgage passes a legal title to the
mortgagee , for the purpose o
f security , the general ownership , at law as
well as in equity , remains in the mortgagor . If the general legal owner
ship remains in the mortgagor , it is capable of raising more " legal titles
for the purpose o
f security . ” That a second mortgagee has a legal title
was held in Gooding v . Shea , post ; and see Sanders v . Reed , ante . But
see Jackson v . Turrell , 39 N . J . L . 329 , “ A second mortgagee is , at law as
well as in equity , a mere lien holder . * * * The reasons which sup
port the claim o
f
the first mortgagee defeat the claim of every other one ,
to be regarded as the legal owner of the fee . ” And see Goodman V .
White , ante , accepting the English doctrine without qualification .
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The defendants were duly organized as a corporation , under
the general railroad act of this state , passed April 2 , 1850 , for the
purpose of constructing a railroad between the village of Canan
daigua in the county of Ontario , and the suspension bridge over
the Niagara river , near the village of Niagara Falls . It did not
appear at what precise date the company were organized ; but from
the proceedings of the company , produced in evidence , it must have
been in or before the year 1851. And from like proceedings it
appeared that the route of the said road was surveyed in or before
the termination of the said year 1851 . From proceedings of the
board of directors of March 18 , 1852 , in evidence , it appeared that
they claimed or asserted that the route of the said road , from
the Genesee river west to the Tonawanda creek , had been located
before that time ; that on the 16th of April , 1852 , the directors al
tered the route ; and that the route from Tonawanda to Niagara
Falls was also altered July 16 , 1852 .
It was in proof that a certificate of location in Erie county ,
according to the statute, with a map or profile annexed , was filed
in Erie county clerk 's office on the 4th day of April, 1852 . This
location of the road crossed the Tonawanda creek at a considerable
distance east of Tonawanda village, and laid down no branch track
to the river .
On the 22d of December , 1852 , the company changed , in due
form , the location of their road for a considerable distance in
Erie and Niagara counties , and laid down a branch or side track
in the village of Tonawanda, from such altered line to the Niagara
river , a distance of 7 ,132 feet ; and filed a map and certificate of such
change in the clerk 's office of Erie county , December 30 , 1852 , and
in the Niagara county clerk 's office December 31, 1852 .
It did not appear when the work of constructing the railroad
was actually commenced ; or when the company commenced ac
quiring the title to lands needed for it, or what lands , if any , were
actually acquired before the date or giving of the mortgage in ques
tion . It appeared that the road was open for travel from Canan
daigua to Batavia , in January , 1853 , and thence west to the sus
pension bridge , in July 1853 ; thus completing the line of railway
from New York to the suspension bridge vi
a
the New York &
Erie railroad .
The mortgage was recorded in the counties o
f
Ontario , May 3 ,
1852 , Monroe , May 4 , Erie and Niagara , May 5 , Livingston , May
6 , and Genesee , June 10 ; the railroad being situated in parts of
said counties . The mortgage , after reciting that the said railroad
company , in pursuance o
f





the legislature of the state o
f
New York , entitled “ An act
to authorize the formation o
f
railroad corporations , and to regu
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late the same," passed April 2, 1850 , were then engaged in con
structing a railroad from Canandaigua to the suspension bridge
in the village of Niagara Falls ; and that the said company , for
the purpose of completing and operating the said railroad , had
deemed it necessary to borrow money , and had resolved to borrow
$ 1,000,000, to be applied to the construction and completion of the
said railroad , and to issue bonds in the sum of $ 1,000 each , to be
secured by a mortgage, did for that purpose “ grant, convey , trans
fer and set over ” to the plaintiff and one George S . Coe , in trust
for said bond holders, “ the said railroad constructed and to be
constructed , together with all and singular the railways, rails,
bridges, fences , privileges, rights and real estate now owned by
said company , or which shall hereafter be owned by them , and all
the tolls, incomes , issues and profits (whenever the said party of the
first part shall be in default of making payment ) to be had from
the same, and all the franchises , of the said company , and all lands
used and occupied , or which may hereafter be used and occupied
for railways , depots or stations , with all buildings erected or which
may hereafter be erected thereon .” The company covenanted , in
said mortgage , to use the money borrowed in the construction of
the railroad , and to make, execute and deliver all and singular and
further assurances and instruments as should from time to time be
necessary and as the counsel of the trustees should advise or re
quire — so as to embrace said railroad when complete , and all its
property intended to be conveyed or acquired , and to be thereafter
acquired .
On the 16th of April, 1853 , the company executed a second like
mortgage , to secure another loan of $750 ,000 , which contained the
following clause : “ Subject to a previous mortgage, of sterling
bonds equivalent to $ 1,000 ,000 .” Also , on the 20th of December ,
1853 , a third mortgage was executed by the company to secure an
other loan of $600 ,000 , subject to the two mortgages above men
tioned , in the same manner .
The defendant Hines , on the 10th of June, 1854 , recovered a
judgment against the railroad company for $ 12 ,227 , of which a
transcript was duly filed in the counties of Erie and Genesee July
11 , and Niagara July 12 , and were duly docketed . The defend
ants Otis and Worthington , on the 30th day of June, 1854 , recov
ered a judgment against the railroad company for $698 . 34 , of
which transcripts were duly filed and judgment docketed July 5
and 6 thereafter , in Niagara , Genesee , Ontario , Monroe and Liv
ingston counties , and on the 23d in Erie county .
The premises whereon the branch track was built , at Tonawanda ,
as soon as located from the present main track to Niagara river ,
and the lands occupied by the dock and warehouses of the com
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pany on the river , were conveyed to the company subsequent to
the recording of the plaintiff 's mortgage , and on or about the first
day of March , 1853. The judgment of the defendant Hinds was
recovered for work done and materials furnished in constructing
such docks . The title to the lands occupied by the branch track
and dock was purchased by the company as above stated , and paid
for in the stock of the company . An association was formed at
Tonawanda , in 1852 , of which Hinds was a member , to secure and
divert a portion of the business from Lake Erie to Tonawanda ;
and the railroad company , in December , altered the line of their




It was proved , also , that many pieces of land , taken and used
for the said railroad , were purchased and the title thereto actually
received , in Genesee county , after the plaintiff ' s mortgage was






Batavia , in that county , were never used or occupied
for railroad purposes .
The defendants Hinds , Otis and Worthington , claimed that their
respective judgments were liens upon all the lands o
f
the railroad
company acquired after the plaintiff ' s mortgage was recorded , and




Tonawanda , and upon the lands not taken , acquired or used for
railroad purposes at Batavia and other places , contiguous to said
railroad , within said counties , through which the same passes . To
show that the branch road or track aforesaid was contemplated b
y
the company before the giving of the first mortgage , the plain
tiff ' s counsel presented a report , made by the president of the said
company , printed in 1851 , but otherwise without date . This report
contained a general description o
f
the corporation and it
s fran
chises ; the project for the road ; the supposed cost ; the length of
road ; the cost of depots and machinery ; its relation to other rail
roads ; and its prospects o
f
business and income , were given . In
this report it was stated that the road would be “ the shortest route
between New York City and Tonawanda , the best harbor on Lake
Erie . ” In another part of the report was the following statement :
“ The harbor of Tona wanda is probably the best on Lake Erie ,
and is far safer and more capacious than that o
f
Buffalo . A thriv









day , to become a place o
f great importance , if not , indeed , the center
o
f
the lake trade . The imports of Tonawanda , in the year 1851 ,
amounted in value to nearly $ 100 ,000 , and its progress o
f
late has
been more rapid than that of any town on the lake . At this point
the Canandaigua and Niagara Falls road will receive the traffic o
f
the lake , while a
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Smith , J. * * * At the time when the mortgage was thus
put upon record , it doubtless took effect as a valid mortgage , at
law , in behalf of all persons who then had made advances , or
should thereafter make advances upon these bonds or any of them .
As a legal instrument of conveyance it was then notice to al
l
the
world , and was valid and operative to bind all the property and
franchises then owned b
y
the corporation embraced within it
s terms
and description . So far as relates to property then acquired , this
is not disputed and is indisputable .
The chief question in controversy relates to the property o
f
the
railroad company not then owned o
r acquired by it . When the
mortgage was first put on record , May 3d , 1852 , it does not appear
how far , or to what extent , the railroad company had acquired the
right o
f way for the railroad . They obviously commenced the work
of constructing the road at Canandaigua , its eastern terminus , and
worked westward , for it appears it was completed and put in op
eration from Canandaigua to Batavia b
y
the 1st o
f January , 1853 ,
and from that point to the suspension bridge , at Niagara , on the
1st o





acquired up to the east line o
f
Genesee county , at the
time o
f recording the mortgage . In Genesee , Erie and Niagara
counties , confessedly , much o
f
the right o
f way was acquired after
the mortgage was recorded in those counties respectively . Upon
all such lands clearly the plaintiffs ' mortgage was not and is not a
valid lien at law . It is a fundamental maxim o
f
the common law
that a man can not grant o
r convey what he does not own . (Per
kins , tit . Grant No . 65 Noy ' s Maxims 62 . Bacon ' s Maxims reg .
1
4 . ) In giving the mortgage , the railroad company did not pro
fess to own or to mortgage the whole right of way for the railroad .
They granted “ a
ll
and singular the railways , rails , bridges , fences ,
privileges , rights and real estate now owned by the said company ,
o
r
which shall hereafter be owned b
y
them , and al
l
lands used and
occupied , or which may hereafter be used and occupied for rail
ways , depots o
r
stations , with al
l
buildings erected , o
r
which may
be hereafter erected thereon . ” Here was a distinct notice that
there were lands yet to b
e acquired , and buildings yet to be erected .
The mortgage contains a covenant that the money loaned shall be
used in constructing the railroad . The railroad company , there
fore , did not profess to mortgage the road as complete , o
r
with a
title to the lands required for its use a
s acquired . There is there
fore n
o question o
f estoppel in the case , as law , as against the


























" Recitals , it is true , and covenants , may conclude parties and privies ,
and estop them from denying that the operation o
f
the deed is what it
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gage is a valid lien , in equity , upon the subsequently acquired
property. It is not denied by the learned counsel for the defend
ants that such a lien may exist which courts of equity may sustain
and enforce in many cases where there is no relief at law , but it
is insisted that this is not a case of equitable mortgage , and that
the rights of the defendants as judgment creditors are superior
to any equities of the plaintiffs in respect to these subsequently
acquired lands .
Courts of equity , though unembarrassed by the strict and tech
nical rules of the common law , do not administer justice except
in conformity with settled principles. It is the province and duty
of, such courts to relieve against defects and imperfections at law
in the making of contracts . Regarding all just and honest con
tracts as binding in conscience and equity , they seek to give to them
full effect and operation , according to the real intention of the con
tracting parties . Upon this principle they enforce the specific exe
cution of contracts and give relief in numerous cases of agree
ments relating to lands, and things in action , and contingent inter
ests or expectancies , upon the maxim that equity considers that
done which , being distinctly agreed to be done , ought to have been
done . (Grounds and Rudiments of Law and Equity 75.) Upon
this principle , when it is expressly agreed to give a lien upon lands ,
courts of equity have long held that such agreement was to be
treated and considered as giving a specific lien upon the land . The
learned counsel for the defendants concede this to be so , and con
tend that the rule was rightly stated in Fonblanque, b . 1, ch . 5 ,
$ 8 , and in the cases reported in 1 Peere Williams, pp . 282 , 429 .
Fonblanque states the rule thus : " A covenant to settle or convey
particular lands will not, at law , create a lien upon the lands, but
in equity such a covenant , if for a valuable consideration , will be
deemed a specific lien on the lands , and decreed against all persons
claiming under the covenanter except purchasers for a valuable
consideration , and without notice of such covenant," and refers to
professes to be. And when a deed purports to pass a present interest ,
recitals and covenants have, in many cases, been held efficacious to pass
to the grantee an interest subsequently acquired by the grantor . But
when the deed does not undertake to convey any existing estate , when the
subject of the grant is only an expectancy , it is difficult to conceive of it
as anything more than a covenant for a future conveyance . In the very
nature of things it must be executory . The case in hand is an apt illus
tration . The intention of the parties was not to convey any immediate
interest, for it was known Mrs. Jay had none . The grant and the cove
nants alike contemplated an assurance to the mortgagee of an estate
which might possibly thereafter be acquired either by descent or will, an
assurance necessarily future .” Strong , J., in Baylor v. Commonwealth ,
40 Pa . St. 37 . See on Estoppel , Tefft v. Munson , post.
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Coventry v . Coventry , reported at the end of Francis ' Maxims.
Fonblanque also says ( b . 1, ch . 4 , § 2 ) : “ So, although a grant of
a possibility is not good at law , yet a possibility , or a trust in equity
may be assigned . So a covenant to settle lands, of which he has
only a possibility of descent , shall be carried into execution in
equity , for the court does not bind the interest , but instead of dam
ages , enforces the performance in specie ." Chancellor Walworth ,
in the Matter of Howe ( 1 Paige 129 ) , and in White v . Carpenter
( 2 id . 266 ) affirms this principle, and in Howe's case he refers to
most of the English cases holding this doctrine, with approval , and
cites quite a number of American cases , from other states , to the
same effect .
The counsel for the defendant Hinds , however , among other
cases cited and commended to my particular attention on this point,
the case of Otis v . Sill ( 8 Barb . 102 ) . This was a case at law .
The only question raised and decided was whether at law a chattel
mortgage bound property not in esse at the time of it
s
execution .
The mortgagor professed to sell and assign to the plaintiff not only
all the scythes , iron , steel and coal then owned and possessed by
him , but also all scythes , iron and coal which might be purchased
in lieu o
f
the aforesaid property . The court , in that case , held
that a chattel mortgage could not operate at law on property not









the proposition that a prior general mortgage , which in terms
covered after acquired property , attached to rolling stock as soon as ac
quired , to the displacement o
f
a contractual lien on it , the Supreme Court
of the United States , by Justice Bradley , said , ' The doctrine is intended
to subserve the purposes o
f justice and not injustice . A mortgage in
tended to cover after acquired property can only attach itself to such
property , in the condition in which it comes to the mortgagor ' s hands .
If that property is already subject to mortgages or other liens , the gen
eral mortgage does not displace them , though they may be junior to it
in point of time . ' U . S . v . New Orleans Railroad Co . , 12 Wall . ( U . S . )
362 . And it was added , that such a prior lien or equity does not come
within the reason o
f
the registry laws , which are intended for the protec
tion o
f subsequent , not prior , purchasers and creditors .
" This court , touching the same matter , in Shorter v . Frazer , 64 Ala . 74 ,
quotes approvingly the language o
f
C . J . Marshall in Vattier v . Hind , 7
Pet . ( U . S . ) 272 , that , “The rules respecting a purchaser without notice ,
are framed for the protection of him who purchases a legal estate , and
pays the purchase money without knowledge o
f
a
n outstanding equity .




n equity is bound to take notice o
f any prior equity . '
And in the same case , the court hold , that if the purchase is o
f
a mere




f equity , there is no reason for a departure from the general prin
ciple , that priority in point o
f
time creates priority in point of right , and
that the transfer or conveyance must be limited to the interest of the
grantor . " Haralson , J . , in Wood v . Holly Mfg . Co . , 100 Ala . 326 , 351 .
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was clearly right. ( 1 Man . Gran . & Scott 379 .) The learned
judge who gave the opinion of the court, it is true, in the course
of hi
s
opinion , discussed at some length the question whether the
mortgage was valid in equity , but concluded that the pleadings did
not raise that question so that relief could be given in equity , and
the case was decided as purely one of law ; and although the learned
judge doubted whether the rule in equity in respect to mortgages
o
r
contracts for a lien upon subsequently acquired property applied
to that case , and considered that Judge Story had carried the doc
trine too far in the case of Mitchell v . Winslow ( 2 Story 630 ) ,
yet he assents to the rule so stated above in Fonblanque , and by
the Chancellor . He says , page 129 , “ The agreement to execute a
mortgage on particular lands described in the agreement is doubt
less , in equity , a specific lien on the land , and will be preferred to
subsequent judgment creditors . ”
The rule as here stated , that the mortgage o
r agreement must
refer to particular lands , is doubtless the true one . It was so laid
down in the leading case o
f
Fremoult v . Dedire ( 1 Peere Wil
liams 430 ) . In this case , Dedire had covenanted to settle his lands





£60 , upon his wife for her life . The lord chancellor held , that
with regard to the lands in Rumney Marsh , the marriage articles






0 per annum , did not specifically bind any
lands . The same obvious distinction runs through all the cases .
When the agreement would be void , for uncertainty , in not describ
ing , o
r designating plainly , any lands o
r property , no lien can at
tach . A lien must have a specific reference . It must necessarily
apply to some designated property , either in esse o
r expectancy ,
and this clearly and unmistakably . Unless the agreement , o
r mort
gage plainly describes o
r designates particular lands , it must be re
garded as a mere executory contract , and enforceable only as such .
(Winslow v . Merchants ' Insurance Co . , 4 Met . 306 . ) And it must
clearly appear too , that it was the intention o
f
the parties , in any
covenant o
r agreement , to give a lien upon the property . (Rogers
v . Hosack ' s Executors , 18 Wend . 319 . ) In this last case , referred
to by Judge Paige in Otis v . Sill , the covenant was to pay the bal
ance o
f
a debt from a certain fund . This was held to create no lien
upon the fund , and to be a mere executory agreement . Judge
Cowen ( p . 334 ) says : " Here is no assignment , no mortgage , o
r
pledge , no order , o
r any other specific appropriation o
f
the French
funds , but a mere covenant to pay them over on their being ob
tained by the covenantee . " Senator Dickinson , also speaking of
another fund , says : “ The English claim is disposed o
f by words of
assignment and transfer . Can it be possible then , that with an in
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tention to create a specific lien or equitable mortgage upon the
French fund , the parties should have left this large fund to the
caprice of implications ? " In both these opinions the rule is clearly
recognized that an agreement for a lien is a lien in equity , when
it is clear that it was the intention to give or create such lien .
In the case of Otis v . Sill, however , the learned judge says of these
cases of assignments or mortgages of property, to be acquired in
futuro , “ If such an assignment of property , to be acquired , is valid
in equity , it is only valid as a contract to assign , when the property
shall be acquired , not as an assignment of a present interest in
the property ; and if it is enforced in equity , it can only be enforced
as a right under the contract , and not as a trust attached to the
property .” If the learned judgemeans by this , that a sale , assignment
or mortgage of property not in esse , or of contingent interests , or
expectancies , confers no title or interest in the thing, in presenti ,
that is self -evident. But if it is meant that the sale or assignment
of such property , to be acquired in futuro , or of contingent inter
ests , or expectancies , rests in contract merely till some new assur
ance , and does not attach , as a lien , or charge , as soon as the prop
erty is acquired , or has a substantial existence , I can not agree
with him . As soon as the property is acquired , or comes into ex
istence , the lien in or upon it attaches . They come into being
together and coexist . Equity executes the contract by holding that
what is agreed to be done is done. That the right to the lien
creates the lien . (Wright v . Wright , 1 Vesey 409 , 410 .)
Judge Story , in Mitchell v . Winslow ( 2 Story 644 ) , states the
rule with great clearness , as follows : It seems to me a clear result
of all the authorities , that whenever the parties , by their contract ,
intend to create a positive lien or charge , either upon real or per
sonal property , whether then owned by the assignor or contractor,
or not, or if personal property , whether it is then in being or not,
it attaches in equity as a lien or charge upon the particular prop
erty , as soon as the assignor or contractor acquires a title thereto
against the latter , and a
ll persons asserting a claim thereto under




in bankruptcy . ” The
same doctrine is also asserted , in substance , b
y
Vice Chancellor
Wigram , in Langton v . Horton ( 1 Hare 549 ) , in an opinion of
great clearness and ability ; and in 1 Jac . & W . 526 ; 4 Simons 624 .
An assignment o
f
that which is expected to be the fruit of an un





a thing which , in the ordinary course o
f
events , will
exist at a future time , is valid in equity ( 1 Myl . & K . 488 , 6 Simons
414 , 224 ; 8 Price 269 ) , but not a mere naked possibility , and not an
interest incapable o
f being made the subject o
f
a contract . ( 4
Kent 144 . ) These cases , and this view o
f
the rule in equity , in
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respect to the assignments of future interests or possibilities , is
clearly sustained and affirmed in the opinion of Judge Wells , in
Field v . The Mayor of New York ( 2 Selden 186 ) .23
Considering , therefore , the rule in equity to be that a grant of
particular lands, to be acquired in futuro , is valid , and takes effect
as a specific lien upon the lands as soon as they are acquired , it
remains to apply the principle to the facts of this case . Upon
the evidence , I think that I am to assume that the line of this rail
way, from Canandaigua to Suspension Bridge , was located before
the mortgage was put on record in any county . It is true that it
was afterwards altered in Erie and Niagara counties , but that , I
think , does not affect the question I am now considering . The
railroad company , by the 28th section of the general railroad act ,
which must be deemed a part of its charter , and to be part o
f
the
contract with the plaintiffs , (whose rights may be considered as
acquired under it and governed by it ) , was authorized to enter
upon the lands and waters o
f any person , for the purpose o
f mak
ing examination and survey o
f
it










its intended road , duly certified , in every county named in its
articles o
f








4 , required to file a certificate o
f
location in conformity
with such map , signed by a majority o
f
the directors , in and b
y
which map and certificate , the line of the said railroad is to be
designated and located . Upon the line thus fixed or located , the





8 , “ To
lay out its road , not exceeding six rods in width , and for the pur
pose o
f cuttings and embankments , to take as much more land as
may be necessary for the proper construction and security o
f
the
road . ” On the route o
f
the proposed railroad o
f
the company from
Canandaigua to Niagara Falls , immediately upon the location of
2
3 See also , Frost v . Galesburg , E . & E . R . Co . , 167 11
1
. 161 ; Beach v .
Wakefield , 107 Iowa 567 ; Omaha & S
t
. L . R . Co . v . Wabash , St . L . & P .
R . Co . , 108 Mo . 298 ; Hamlin v . European Ry . , 72 Maine 83 ; Barnard v .
Norwich & W . R . Co . , 4 Cliff . ( U . S . ) 351 ; Central Trust Co . v . Kneeland ,
138 U . S . 414 .
" The ground o
f
the doctrine is , that the mortgage , though inoperative
a
s
a conveyance , is operative as an executory agreement , which attaches
to the property when acquired , and in equity transfers the beneficial
interest to the mortgagee , the mortgagor being regarded as a trustee for
him , in accordance with the familiar maxim , that equity considers that as
done which ought to be done . " Bailey , J . , in Borden v . Croak , 138 Ill .
68 , 75 , involving a mortgage o
f
future chattels .
The chief controversy in cases o
f
this class is upon the question
whether particular property comes within the description in the mort
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such road , in manner aforesaid , a strip of land six rods in width
was laid out and designated for the road of this company , of which
it was entitled to take so much as it required for the use of the
railroad , on making due compensation therefor . The company had ,
in effect , by its charter , a patent from the state to enter upon and




own use so soon as it had
made due compensation therefor . Its right was absolute , subject
only to that single reservation or condition , and the strip o
f
land
is clearly defined and designated b
y
law . This strip of land is
the land referred to in the plaintiff ' s mortgage , with sufficient par
ticularity and definiteness to answer the rule in equity . This strip
o
f
land is particular land , in the language and sense o
f
the rule in
equity , as laid down in the case in Peere Williams and by Fon
blanque . The description in the mortgage o
f
the land acquired ,
and to be acquired , must be deemed to refer to the charter , and the
law defines the land which the mortgage is designed to cover ,
and the lien o
f
the mortgage clearly attached to such unacquired
land so soon as the title thereto passed to the corporation . But




the cases hold , that a disposition by deed ,
o
r mortgage , o
r assignment , o
f





the title , may be considered a
s
a
declaration precedent , which will derive its effects from some new
act o
f
the party after the property is acquired . ( Bacon ' s Max .
Reg . 14 . Sumner v . Thurston , 1 Man . , Gran . & Scott 379 ) . Then
certainly the two subsequent mortgages executed by the railroad
company , one September 16 , 1853 , and the other December , 1853 ,
both after the road had been constructed and was in operation , and
both containing a
n express reference to the plaintiff ' s mortgage ,
and both expressly covering all this property , and subjecting it in
terms to the prior lien o
f







ratification to satisfy the
rule in question .
But I think this mortgage covers and embraces the subsequently
acquired lands upon another and distinct ground , independent o
f
the rule in equity above referred to . The statute (Gen . Rail Road
Act , Subd . 10 , Š 28 ) authorizes a railroad corporation , organized
under such act , “ from time to time , to borrow such sums o
f money
a
s may be necessary for completing o
r finishing o
r operating their
railroad , and to issue and dispose o
f
their bonds for an amount
so borrowed , and to mortgage their corporate property and fran
chises to secure the payment o
f any debt contracted by the company
for the purpose aforesaid . ” The mortgage in this case was made




this statute , and is clearly authorized
b
y
it . The charter of the Niagara Falls Rail Road Company was
itself a franchise , and it included a right to enter upon and take
lands for this railroad , and to construct and operate the road . The
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right to enter upon and take the particular lands required for the
purpose of the railroad , was included and embraced in the mort
gage , and is clearly conveyed and bound by it. The legislature au
thorized the corporation to mortgage their “ franchises, together
with their corporate property .” All the rights and interests of the
corporation were included in these words . I think the legislature
intended to give authority , by this statute, to railroad corporations
to mortgage a
ll
and singular the property o
f
the corporation , with




n entirety , and that the mortgage in this case is o
f
the whole
railroad , and o
f
all the real property o
f
the corporation , and its
entire franchises , in as full and complete a manner as the corpora
tion could possess , exercise and enjoy such rights and franchises .
In this aspect o
f
the question it is therefore entirely immaterial
whether the right of way for the railroad was all acquired or not ,
a
t
the time the mortgage was put on record ; and it is equally im





the location thereof , if previously made , was afterwards
changed . The right to change it
s










franchises . So also was the right to take such lands as might
be requisite to complete the road upon its original , o
r upon any
altered line . This point was so held b
y my brother Johnson in the
case of John A . Stevens and others vs . The Buffalo , Corning and
New York Rail Road Company , tried before him at special term
a
t Corning , in November , 1856 , as appears from notes o
f
his deci
sion furnished me b
y
counsel , no opinion having been written b
y
the judge . The question has been decided in the same way by the
supreme judicial court of New Hampshire , in the case of Pierce
and others v . Emery and others . In that case the Portsmouth and
Concord Rail Road Company , under an act of the legislature , had
mortgaged it
s
road to secure bonds to the amount o
f
$ 350 ,000 . The




ll rights , franchises , powers and privileges . It was held that the
all rights , franchises , powers and privileges . It was held that the
mortgage covered the whole railroad , with all its corporate rights
and franchises , as an entire thing , including subsequently acquired
property . In the case o
f
Willinck v . The Morris Canal and Bank
ing C
o . ( 3 Green ' s Ch . Rep . 402 ) , in the court of chancery of New
Jersey , the chancellor asserts the same doctrine . In that case , un




New Jersey , the Morris Canal Com
pany had mortgaged it
s
canal , then in course of completion from
the Delaware to the Hudson river , with all and singular its prop
erty and franchises . The question was whether the mortgage cov
ered the canal between Newark and Jersey City . The route had
been surveyed , but the canal had not been excavated , or any o
f
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the lands purchased , til
l
after the mortgage was given . The chan
cellor held that the mortgage embraced the entire canal and every
thing connected with it , including feeders , wharves , docks and
piers , and all other appendages . 24
The only remaining question to b
e now considered , relates to the
branch track from the main track at Tonawanda to the Niagara
river , o
r




the river . This branch was
2
4
“ This doctrine , that the mortgage o
f
a railroad as an entire thing
covers parts o
f
the thing which have been acquired o
r
constructed after
its execution , so far as it relates to such after -acquired property as ac
tually becomes a part o
f
the original thing mortgaged , rests upon the doc
trine o
f
accession , which prevails in ordinary mortgages where improve
ments are made upon real estate mortgaged , which become a part of the
realty , o
r where repairs are made on an article o
f personal property .
" The doctrine is not generally supported that after -acquired property
of a railroad company passes , as incident to the franchise to acquire prop
erty , by a mortgage o
f
the franchises and property o
f
the company exe
cuted by lawful authority . This view was strongly urged upon the court
in the case o
f
Dinsmore v . Racine & Mississippi Railroad Company , 12
Wis . 649 , but the court , after examining the grounds o
f
the doctrine and
some of the cases supporting it , declined to adopt it , and stated the ob
jection to it . It is true that at that time there was no statute in force in
Wisconsin authorizing a railroad company to mortgage its franchises , and
it is admitted that a corporation would have no power to make a mort
gage by which property after acquired would pass as incident to the
franchise to acquire property , except by virtue of express legislative au
thority to convey the franchises o
f
the corporation . None o
f
the cases
which support this doctrine do so upon the general principle that a rail
road , with its franchises and property is an indivisible , entire thing , ex
cept a
s it becomes so by virtue of some special or general legislative au
thority . On general principles of law , a railroad corporation , with its
franchises and property , though undoubtedly having many things pecu
liar to itself , can not be regarded as one entire and indivisible thing .
It can not be likened to a machine , or to a vessel . If a mortgage which
does not in terms include after -acquired property can be held to embrace
property which is personal in its nature , and is not attached to the realty
as fixtures , without a special statute manifesting an intention on the part
of the legislature that such mortgage should pass the entire franchises
and property of the company , and without any general law giving to a
mortgage made by a railroad company greater effect than is given to a
mortgage by a natural person , a revolution would be worked in the regis
try laws . " Jones , Corporate Bonds & Mortgages , $ $ 95 , 97 .
The principle o
f
accession , while it may have been erroneously ap
plied in the principal case , has an important place in mortgage law , giv
ing rise to a class of cases which must be carefully distinguished from
simple cases of after -acquired property . Such is the case of fixtures , an
nexed to mortgaged land ; so the case of natural products o
f
the soil ; so
that of the increase of mortgaged animals .
Another case which must be distinguished from the simple mortgage
of future property , and which is related to the doctrine of accession , is
that of the mortgage of property having a potential existence by reason
of being the fruit of a thing owned by the mortgagor at the date of the
mortgage , e . g . , a mortgage of crops to be grown on the mortgagor ' s land ,
unconnected with any mortgage of the land .
The principal case is cited in Fisk v . Potter , 2 Keyes ( N . Y . ) 64 , as

















not laid out at the time o
f
the original location o
f
the road , and
obviously was not then projected o





place where it is now located . But I think it is covered by the
mortgage , as an incident to the principal subject o
f
the grant , upon
the maxim " that whoev r grants a thing is supposed tacitly to grant
thatwithout which the grant itself would be o
f
no effect . ” (Broom ' s
Legal Maxims 198 , 11 Rep . 52 . ) When a thing is granted , all
the means to attain it and a
ll
the fruits and effects of it , are granted
also . (Shep . Touch . 89 . ) It is a rule o
f
law that the incident
passes by the grant of the principal ( Broom 205 ) whatever is es
sential to the use and enjoyment o
f
the principal thing . ( 4 Kent ,
467 ) .
Now the railroad company , most obviously , contemplated meet
ing the business o
f
Lake Erie at Tonawanda , and expected to de









the best harbor on Lake Erie , and goes into a calculation in respect
to the amount o
f
business that will come to the railroad a
t
that
point . In another place in the report , speaking o
f
Tonawanda , it
states that “ a
t
this point the road will receive the traffic of the
lake , ” and adds , that the imports o
f
that harbor had amounted to
nearly $ 100 ,000 in the year 1851 , and describes the thriving village
o
f
Tonawanda in language well adapted , and doubtless designed ,
for a foreign market . But independently o
f







r expectation on the part o
f
the com
pany to connect it
s
road by a branch with the Niagara river a
t
this point , the company had the undoubted right to do so , and what
was so obviously for their interests the law will not presume that
they would be likely to overlook . Tonawanda was an important
point on the line o
f
their railroad , doubtless the most important
point between Canandaigua and the suspension bridge at Niagara .





bridge . At such a point it is not to be intended or supposed that
the railroad company would not construct a branch to meet the
business designed for the railroad on the bank o
f
the river , and
make such erections and connections b
y
branch and side tracks a
s
should b
e adapted to facilitate and promote their convenience and
interest in receiving freight from and delivering it to lake vessels
in the harbor . The branch road is , therefore , in my opinion , a
legitimate incident o
f
the main road , as necessary o
r
convenient
for its use and enjoyment as sidetracks , turnouts , woodyards , shops
authority for the position that “ The legal title o
f
the land in question ,
upon which plaintiff ' s conveyance was made to the railroad company ,
vested in the latter . At the same instant , the lien of the mortgage which
had before that been given by the railroad company , and which , before
that time , remained but an equitable claim upon ‘rights to be acquired , '
became a vested legal right upon the premises in question . ”
















and engine houses , and it therefore passed with the grant o
f
the
railroad and its franchises , a
s
a
n appurtenance — a
s
a legitimate
prospective incident to such road . But the railroad company , be
ing bound to make further assurance , and this branch having been
constructed before the second and third mortgages were given ,
and before any o
f
the judgments of the defendants were recovered ,




the new declaration o
r
assurance contained in these mortgages ,
as they may hold upon the same principle , the lands purchased for




o equity that attaches to the right o
f
way . The railroad
company paid for the land on which the branch track is located ,
in it
s
stock . The consideration for the judgment o
f
the defendant
Hinds is for labor , services and materials found in constructing
such branch . He has no equity which can take priority over the
plaintiffs ' mortgage . As the plaintiffs have an equitable lien upon
the railroad , it
s
tracks and appurtenances , upon well settled prin
ciples , such lien must prevail over the lien o
f
the judgment cred
itors . Courts o
f equity control judgments and enforce and pro
tect the prior equitable title in preference to the judgment . ( 23
Eng . Ch . Rep . 561 , 1 Paige 284 , 3 Comstock 187 , 3 Kernan 188 . )
But the equitable rights o
f
the plaintiffs only extend to the par
ticular lands designated by statute , and which the company was
authorized to take , and did take , for the use of its road . The
railroad company , in addition to the right to lay out its road not




rods , and to take the land therefor ,
and as much more as should be necessary for cuttings and em








hold and use all such real estate , and other property , a
s may be
necessary for the construction and maintenance o
f
its railroad and




s incorporation . ” Under this provision the company
was authorized to purchase and hold such lands a
s
were necessary
for depots , stations , warehouses , woodyards , shops and other legiti
mate railroad purposes . All such lands , with the erections thereon ,
would pass to the complainants , under their mortgage , as part of






use and enjoyment . But lands
acquired b
y
the railroad company and not thus used or employed
for railroad purposes , would not come within the description of
the mortgage .
The particular lands which were to be acquired after the mort
gage was put on record in the several counties through which the
railroad passed , within the rule above stated , must necessarily be
the lands designated b
y
the statute for the railroad , and such as
the company was authorized to acquire and take for its track and
legitimate use , as above stated . These are embraced within the
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purview of the mortgage and nothing beyond . It is in proof that
some of the lands purchased in Batavia have never been used for
railroad purposes . That in some instances whole lots were pur
chased to secure a right of way across them . If the railroad com
pany for this purpose had purchased a lot of ten or one hundred
acres , it can not be that any more of such lots would be embraced
in this mortgage to the plaintiffs than was actually taken and re
quired for the road . In respect to all such lands outside of the
legal limits of their railroad track and branches , and excepting
land used for shops , depots , stations , turnouts for wood or water ,
or other legitimate purposes , the lien of the defendants ' judgments
must prevail. The plaintiffs have no legal or equitable lien upon
such lands, and the lands are liable therefor to the legal claims of
the other creditors of the corporation . It is not in proof with
sufficient distinctness what lands were acquired by the company
which , within the principle above stated , will not be covered by
the plaintiffs' mortgage. It will , therefore , be necessary , in such
decree as shall be made, to direct a reference , to ascertain what
lands were owned by the railroad company which are subject to
the lien of the judgments of the defendants , Hinds , Otis and
Worthington , and to determine the relative rights of the defend
ants in respect to such lands , as among themselves ; or to the pro
ceeds of the lands, if the same or any part thereof shall have been
sold .
The plaintiffs are entitled to a decree for a foreclosure of their
mortgage for the amount due them , with costs, upon the whole rail





appurtenances , upon the principles above stated .
SECTION 3 . — The DEBT .
HOFFMAN v . MACKALL .
SUPREME COURT OF OH10 , 1855 .
5 Ohio St . 124 .




s judgment creditors o
f Benjamin Mackall , to set
aside a deed o
f
conveyance , made by him to trustees , in contempla
tion o
f insolvency . The terms of the conveyance , the object of




the grantor ' s
creditors , are expressed in the following language , to wit : " And
to that full and complete extent the said trustees are hereby author
ized and empowered to sell , either at public or private sale , and
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with such notice of sale , and in such manner , as they shall think
most expedient and beneficial to my creditors , the above -described
tracts of land . And out of the proceeds of said sales to pay as
fast as they may be realized : 1 . The costs of this assignment , and
the reasonable costs , expenses, and compensation to the said trus
tees , of the execution and carrying into effect the trust aforesaid ;
2 . That they pay out the balance of said fund equally and pro rata ,
to all my creditors, in proportion to the amount of their respective
demands, hoping and expecting that the trust fund hereby created
will satisfy all my debts , leaving a balance , which said balance ,
should it arise , the said trustees are to pay over to the undersigned ,
B . Mackall , or his personal representatives .” It appears that at
the time of the execution of the deed , judgments were about to
be taken against the grantor, one of which was for a security debt ;
and that he declared that he intended the conveyance to be security
for his own debts , and not for his surety debts ; and also that he
desired by the conveyance to prevent a sacrifice , thinking that in
the hands of trustees the property could be made to go further , etc .
The grounds upon which the complainants seek to set aside the
conveyance are the following :118 .
2 . That the deed is a deed of trust , in the nature of a mortgage ,
which could not take effect until entered for record ; that it was
not entered for record until after the recovery of the judgments ;
and, therefore, that the judgments have the first lien .
2 . There is a manifest and well-settled distinction between an
unconditional deed of trust and a mortgage , or deed of trust in the
nature of a mortgage . The former is an absolute and indefeasible
conveyance of the subject -matter thereof, for the purpose ex
pressed ; whereas the latter is conditional and defeasible . A mort
gage is the conveyance of an estate , or pledge of property , as
security for the payment of money, or the performance of some
other act , and conditioned to become void upon such payment or
performance . A deed of trust in the nature of a mortgage is a
conveyance in trust by way of security , subject to a condition of
defeasance , or redeemable at any time before the sale of the prop
erty. A deed conveying land to a trustee as mere collateral security
for the payment of a debt, with the condition that it shall become
void on the payment of the debt when due , and with power to the
trustee to sell the land and pay the debt in case of default on the
part of the debtor , is a deed of trust in the nature of a mortgage .
By an absolute deed of trust the grantor parts absolutely with the
title , which rests in the grantee unconditionally , for the purpose
of the trust . The latter is a conveyance to a trustee for the pur
pose of raising a fund to pay debts ; while the former is a convey
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ance in trust for the purpose of securing a debt , subject to a con
dition of defeasance . (Woodruff v . Robb et al., 19 Ohio 216 , 1
Hilliard on Mort. 359.) It is manifest from this distinction that
the conveyance in controversy , in this case was not a mortgage or
deed of trust in the nature of a mortgage, but an absolute deed of
trust ; and therefore , that it took effect from the time of its deliv
ery , on the 15th day o
f May , and prior to the recovery o
f
the judg
ments by the complainants .
But even had it been a deed of trust in the nature of a mort
gage , it would have taken effect on the 15th of May , for it was
delivered for record on that day . The neglect o
f
the recorder to
mark the time o
f
the delivery , because he did not know who would
pay his fees , can not be allowed to defeat the delivery , for he ought
to have made that objection when the deed was delivered to him ;
and not having made it then , it was too late to make it afterwards .
The maxim o
f
the law , that he who does not speak when he ought
to speak shall not b
e permitted to speak when he would speak ,
would seem to be applicable in the case before us .
The deed became effectual the moment it was delivered , what
ever may have been afterward done o
r
left undone . It is imma
terial , in this case , whether the deed was recorded in the proper
book o
r
not . An unrecorded deed is , of course , good , except as
against subsequent bona fide purchasers . Itmay be added here that
this deed , being an absolute and indefeasible conveyance in trust ,
and not in the nature o
f
a mortgage , should have been recorded in
the book denominated “ record o
f
deeds . " ' 25
* *
HENLEY v . HOTALING .
SUPREME COURT O
F
CALIFORNIA , 1871 .
4
1 Cal . 22 .




f public land at Round Valley , Mendocino county , and gave to
S . P . Storms a power of attorney , of which the following is a
copy :





these presents , that I , Wm . R . Storms , of
Boston , County o
f
Suffolk , State o
f
Massachusetts , have made ,
constituted , and appointed and by these presents do make , consti
2
5 Compare Cadwell ' s Bank v . Crittenden , 66 Iowa 237 ; Comstock v .
Stewart , Walker Ch . (Mich . ) 110 ; Hart v . Blum , 76 Tex . 113 ; Grimes v .
Malcolm , 164 U . S . 483 . See also 5 Enc . L . & P . (New Am . & Eng . ) 1009 .
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tute , and appoint S . P . Storms, of Round Valley , County of Men
docino , State of California , my true and lawful attorney , for me,
and in my name, place , and stead , to buy and sell al
l
kinds of
stock that is on my ranch in said Round Valley , or in the State o
f
California ; to buy and sell any claims o
f
land in said valley o
r
State ; to buy o
r
sell all kinds o
f
merchandise , and to make con
tracts in any business that may occur to carry o
n my business in
the State o
f
California , giving and granting unto my said attorney
full power and authority to do and perform al
l
and every act and
thing whatsoever requisite and necessary to be done in the whole
State o
f
California , as fully to all intents and purposes as I might
or could do if personally present , with full power of substitution





his substitute shall lawfully do or cause to be done b
y vir
tue hereof . "
On the 13th o
f
December , 1860 , the attorney in fact called upon
defendant , Hotaling , and solicited a loan o
f
five thousand dollars ,
and offered as security a mortgage on said land . Hotaling agreed
to make the loan on the security , if his counsel approved of it ;
and Storms and Hotaling went to the office o
f
his attorney , who
advised that the power of attorney did not authorize S . P . Storms
to negotiate a loan o
r
execute a mortgage . Hotaling then declined
to make the loan . S . P . Storms then offered to sell the land to
Hotaling for five thousand dollars , and Hotaling accepted the
proposition . S . P . Storms , as attorney in fact , then , on the 13th
of December , 1860 , executed to Hotaling a deed of the land , abso
lute on its face , and Hotaling paid him the five thousand dollars .
Hotaling then executed to William R . Storms a bond , conditioned
that if said Storms paid him five thousand dollars , with interest
a
t
three per cent . per month one year from date , he would convey
the land to him . The bond provided , that until the payment o
f
the money , it should remain in the custody o









to Hotaling to be canceled . Hotaling , at
the same time , gave S . P . Storms a lease o
f
the land for one year .
At the end of the year Storms refused to deliver up possession ,
and Hotaling recovered possession in an action for holding over
contrary to the terms o
f
the lease . In 1862 , Wm . R . Storms , being
indebted to the plaintiffs , executed to defendant Tevis a deed of
the land in trust for the plaintiffs . The plaintiffs brought this ac
tion to have the deed to Hotaling canceled , and to obtain possession
of the land , and a conveyance from Tevis , their trustee . Storms
did not pay the five thousand dollars mentioned in the bond . De
fendant , Hotaling , recovered judgment , and the plaintiffs appealed .
By the court , RHODES , C . J . :
Was th
e
instrument which was executed b
y
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by hi
s
attorney in fact , S . P . Storms , to Hotaling ,what it purported
to b
e , an absolute conveyance o
f
the premises in controversy , o
r
was it a mortgage ? The court below found it to be the former , and
the evidence was amply sufficient to justify the finding . The parties
consulted the legal adviser o
f Hotaling , and by him they were in
formed that the letter o
f attorney did not empower the attorney in
fact to execute a mortgage . Thereupon a proposition was made
b
y
one party , and accepted b
y
the other , for a sale o
f
the premises ,
and the deed and the other papers relating to the transaction be
tween the parties were prepared and executed under the supervision
o
f
the same counsel ; and in giving his testimony he says : “ The
parties gave me positive instructions to have it a sale , and not a
mortgage , and if those papers make it anything else , then the papers
did not perform the object o
f
the parties and their transaction . "
The attorney in fact manifested some annoyance when informed
that the power o
f
attorney did not authorize him to execute a
mortgage , and he suggested a sale , and the papers were drawn
with that object . There can be no question , from the evidence ,
that the counsel who prepared the deed and the other papers re
lating to the transaction , understood from the parties that they
desired a sale o
f
the premises , and that they were prepared and
executed under his direction , in the manner stated in the evidence ,
with the intent that the transaction should not , b
y
construction , be
held to amount to a mortgage .
When the intention o
f
the parties to a deed , absolute in form , is
sought to be ascertained , not in the usual way , by reading and
construing the instrument , in connection with evidence to identify
the subject -matter , the parties , et
c
. , but by evidence to establish an
equity beyond and outside o
f
the deed , and thus to convert the
deed into a mortgage , the evidence ought to be so clear as to leave no
doubt that the real intention o
f
the parties was to execute a mort
gage , otherwise the intention appearing on the face of the deed
ought to prevail . There can be no question that a party may make
a purchase o
f
lands either in satisfaction o
f
a precedent debt or
for a consideration then paid , and may at the same time contract
to reconvey the lands upon the payment of a certain sum , without
any intention on the part o
f
either party that the transaction should
be , in effect , a mortgage . There is no absolute rule that the cove
nant to reconvey shall be regarded , either in law o
r equity , as a
defeasance . The covenant to reconvey , it is true ,may be one fact ,
taken in connection with other facts , going to show that the parties
really intended the deed to operate as a mortgage , but standing
alone , it is not sufficient to work that result . The owner o
f
the
lands may be willing to sell at the price agreed upon , and the
purchaser may also be willing to give his vendor the right to re
purchase upon specified terms ; and if such appears to be the in
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tention of the parties, it is not the duty of the court to attribute to
them a different intention . Such a contract is not opposed to public
policy , nor is it in any sense illegal ; and courts would depart from
the line of their duties should they , in disregard of the real inten
tion of the parties , declare it to be a mortgage . “ To deny the power
of two individuals," says Chief Justice Marshall, “ capable of act
ing for themselves , to make a contract for the purchase and sale
of lands defeasible by the payment of money at a future day ; or,
in other words , to make a sale with a reservation to the vendor , of
the right to repurchase the same land, at a fixed price and at a
specified time, would be to transfer to the Court of Chancery , in
a considerable degree , the guardianship of adults as well as infants .”
(Conway 's Executors v . Alexander , 7 Cranch 237 ) .
Conceding to parties the right to contract in that manner , it
necessarily follows that something more than a reservation of the
right to repurchase , or a covenant to reconvey , must be shown in
order to convert an absolute deed into a mortgage . There is one
fact which is indispensable for this purpose . A mortgage is a se
curity for the performance of an agreement , which is usually to pay
a sum of money . Leaving out of view other agreements than those
for the payment of money , it is essential that there be an agree
ment, either express or implied , on the part of the mortgagor , or
some one in whose behalf he executes the mortgage , to pay to the
mortgagee a sum of money . If there is no debt there is no mort
gage . We look in vain , in this case, to find any evidence of a
promise on the part of Storms to repay the purchase money , or of
the existence of a debt of any kind from him to Hotaling . The
arrangement was , that Hotaling should execute a bond to reconvey
the premises ; but Storms did not agree to repurchase , and the bond
was delivered as an escrow , and it remained an escrow until after
the time therein mentioned for the execution of the deed , and was
then canceled. If the deed was intended as a mortgage, the mort
gagee would have a right of action to foreclose the mortgage ; but
if he had brought such an action , the answer that there was no





gagor , to repay the purchase money , would have been a complete
bar . This case differs from Sears v . Dixon , 33 Cal . 326 , in the im
portant particular , that in that case the mortgagor covenanted to
repay the purchase money a
t
a fixed time , and , under the name o
f
rent , to pay interest thereon a
t
a stipulated rate . And the court
also found that the parties intended to execute a mortgage ; but
in this case the court found that the parties intended the deed to be ,
in fact , as it was in form , an absolute conveyance .
* * *




the same effect , Goodman v . Grierson , 2 Ball . & B . ( Ireland )
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Mr. Justice Temple dissented ; Mr. Justice Sprague did not ex
press an opinion .
STORY , J., in Flagg V . MANN , 2 Sumner 486 ( U . S . C . C ., 1837 ) :
Did , then , the transaction between the Richardsons and Walker and
Fisher create mortgage in the premises ? Some things are, to my
mind , exceedingly clear . In the first place , the deed to Walker and
Fisher , and the bond by them to Luther Richardson , are to be
treated as part of one and the same transaction . They were, in
my judgment, executed at the same time; and if not, at all events
they were intended to be contemporaneous in their object and opera
tion . Neither was to be of any force or validity without the other.
The bond must have the same precise effect and construction , as
if it were inserted in the body of the deed. If, by being so in
serted , a mortgage could be created , it was equally created by its
being in a separate instrument . In the next place , no consideration
whatsoever was paid by Walker and Fisher to Luther or Prentiss
Richardson , on account o
f
the deed , at the time o
f
the execution
of it , or has been at any time since . It is true , that there is the
consideration of the thousand dollars stated in the deed ; but it
was purely nominal . No person pretends , that that sum , or any
other sum was in fact paid , o
r
intended to be paid . If this were
the whole case , the deed would be merely voluntary ; and the
question o
f
a conditional purchase could never arise ; for to con
stitute a conditional purchase , there must be a sale for a valuable
consideration between the parties , with a right o
f repurchase . A
mere gift would not raise the question ; and , indeed , there is no
pretense in the present case to say , that any gift was intended .
What , then , was the real consideration between the parties ? To





the request and for the benefit o
f
Luther Richardson , to
pay off forthwith the incumbrance o
f
Bennett on the premises , and
thereby to save the equity o
f redemption from being totally extin
guished . On the part o
f
Richardson , there was an agreement to
convey the premises to Walker and Fisher , to secure the payment
of this advance and all other advances made by them towards the
extinguishment o
f
the antecedent mortgages and a
ll expenditures in
improvements with a right reserved to Richardson o
f reconveyance
upon his repayment thereof within five years . This was the basis
o
f
the papers actually executed ; and the whole transaction would
274 ; Hawke v . Milliken , 12 Grant Ch . (Canada ) 236 ; Conway v . Alexan
der , 7 Cranch ( U . S . ) 218 ; Burgett v . Osborne , 172 11
1
. 227 . And see Page
v . Foster , 7 N . H . 392 , where the court stated a like doctrine upon a case
where the transaction was in the form of a legal mortgage .
A mortgage may be made by A to B to secure a debt of C to B with
out any personal liability on the part o
f
A . Spear v . Ward , 20 Cal . 659 ;
Bartlett v . Bartlett , 4 Allen (Mass . ) 440 ; Metz v . Todd , 36 Mich . 473 ;







otherwise be without any just aim or object . Bennett ' s title to the
premises would become in a few days absolute , unless he was re
deemed . Richardson was , notoriously , unable to redeem from his
own funds , and that inability constituted the ground o
f
the appli
cation to Walker and Fisher . It would have been the idlest o
f
forms , and the most useless o
f
contrivances , to shift the title from
Prentiss Richardson to Walker and Fisher , if it was the design o
f
all parties , that it should perish in the space o
f
twelve days , without
any attempt o
f
redemption . The very nature o
f
the transaction





and Fisher was the sine qua non o
f
the whole arrangement . If
there could be the slightest doubt upon this head from reading the
testimony o
f
Walker and Fisher , it would be entirely removed b
y
the other evidence , and b
y
admitted facts . Bemis says , that about
the time the papers were finished , Bennett passed in the street , and
was called in ; and Walker and Fisher requested Bemis to ask
Bennett to appoint a time , when they should meet him at Billerica ,
and pay him the money . He did so ; and Bennett appointed the
time . And on the day so appointed , Walker and Fisher , and Rich
ardson , and Bemis met at Billerica , and the money was paid b
y
Walker and Fisher , and the deed was accordingly executed to them
by Bennett . This is as pregnant and conclusive a proof of the
real nature of the transaction , as can be desired .
Upon this posture o
f
the case , what ground is there to say that
there was a conditional sale of the premises to Walker and Fisher ?
They paid nothing to Luther Richardson for any transfer o
f
his
right to them . They simply paid , a
t
his request , a subsisting debt
due from him to Bennett , and took a transfer from Bennett o
f
his
interest in the premises . Beyond this they paid nothing ; and upon
the reimbursement o
f
this and all other advances , on account o
f
the
premises , within five years , the premises were to be restored to
Richardson . It was in truth but the transfer of a debt from one
creditor to another , with the assent o
f
the debtor , expanding the
equity to redeem the estate pledged for it from a few days to five
years .
It has been said , that the true test , whether the conveyance in
this case was a mortgage o
r
not , is to ascertain , whether it was a
security for the payment of any money or not . I agree to that ; and
indeed , in all cases the true test , whether a mortgage or not , is , to
ascertain , whether the conveyance is a security for the performance
or non -performance of any act or thing . If the transaction re
solve itself into a security , whatever may be its form , it is in
equity a mortgage . If it be not a security then it may be a con
ditional or an absolute purchase .
It is said , that here there was no loan made , or intended to be
made , b
y
Walker and Fisher to Richardson ; and that they refused
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to make any loan . There is no magic in words. It is true, that
they refused to make a loan to him in money . But they did not
refuse to pay for him the amount due to Bennett , and to take the
premises as their security for reimbursement within five years .
It is said , that there is no covenant on the part of Richardson
to repay the money paid , which should be paid by Walker and
Fisher to discharge the incumbrances on the premises . But that
is by no means necessary in order to constitute a mortgage , or
to make the grantor liable for the money . The absence of such a
covenant may, in some cases , where the transaction assumes the
form of a conditional sale , be important to ascertain , whether the
transaction be a mortgage or not ; but of itself it is not decisive .
The true question is , whether there is still a debt subsisting be
tween the parties capable of being enforced in any way , in rem or
in personam .27 The doctrine is entirely well settled ; and for this
purpose it is sufficient to refer to Floyer v . Lavington ( 1 P . Will.
R . 270 , 271,) King v . King ( 3 P . Will . R . 360 ,) Longuet v . Scawen
( 1 Ves . R . 406 ,) Mellor v . Lees ( 2 Atk . R . 496 ,) Goodman v .
Grierson ( 2 Ball & Beat . R . 278 ,) and Conway's Ex'rs . v . Alex
ander ( 7 Cranch R . 237 ,) out of many cases . Now , it seems to
me clear , upon admitted principles of law , that, upon the pay
ment of the money due to Bennett by Walker and Fisher , Rich
ardson became their debtor for that amount, as it was paid at his
request , and for his benefit . It is a common principle, that if A ,
at the request of B , pays a debt due by him to C , A may recover
the amount in assumpsit for money paid to his use , or for money
lent and accommodated . In my judgment, that is the very case at
bar.28
27 “ I do not appreciate the force of the argument , that because the
notes were given up , the debt was extinguished . For the purpose of regu
lating the amount to be paid on the redemption the debt was to be kept
on foot, and the amount is specified in the agreement . It is not essential
that the personal remedy against the mortgagor should be preserved .
There is a debt quoad the redemption , but not in respect to the personal
remedy ." Denio , V . C., in Holmes v. Grant, 8 Paige ( N . Y .) 243 , 251.
The decision of the Vice - Chancellor that the transactions in that case
amounted to a mortgage was reversed by the Chancellor , who said , inter
alia , “ If the consideration paid is about the fair cash value of the property ,
the fact that there was no contract for the re-payment of the purchase
money and interest which was binding upon the person making the con
veyance , so as to make his general right to redeem as a mortgagor , and
the corresponding right of the grantee to recover back his money instead
of keeping the land , mutual and reciprocal , is a strong circumstance in
favor of construing the contract to be a conditional sale and not a
mortgage .”
28 Cf. Campbell v. Dearborn , 109 Mass . 130 , holding that an advance
of money by the grantee to the grantor created a debt upon an implied
assumpsit .
In King v . King , 3 P . Wms. 358 , it was said , " Every mortgage implies
a loan , and every loan implies a debt; and though there were no covenant
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If it should be asked , why no personal obligation was given by
Richardson , on this occasion , to pay the money , itmight be answered ,
that the whole circumstances of the present case show an extreme
looseness in the transaction of business between the parties ; and
considering , that much of it was done by the advice and with the
assistance of counsel , it is not very creditable to the skill and dili
gence of the profession . The negotiations between Flagg and
Mann and Richardson evince a most obstinate carelessness in the
draft and execution of important instruments , leaving much to
personal confidence , and the imperfect recollections of the parties,
as well as that of the witnesses . And there is no ground for sur
prise in finding the same laxity pervade the arrangements of Rich
ardson with Walker and Fisher. But the satisfactory answer is ,
that Richardson was poor and embarrassed , and Walker and Fisher
relied on the premises for a full indemnity and satisfaction of all
their advances , believing that Richardson would never be able to
or bond , yet the personal estate of the borrower of course remains liable
to pay off the mortgage .” See also , Brown v. Dewey , 1 Sandf . Ch . ( N .
Y .) 56, 73.
" A mortgage of real property does not imply a covenant for the pay
ment of the sum intended to be secured ; and where such covenant is not
expressed in the mortgage , or a bond or other separate instrument to
secure such payment has not been given , the remedies of the mortgagee
are confined to the property mentioned in the mortgage .” 4 Consol . Laws
of N . Y . ( 1909) Chap . 50 % 249 . This statute is copied in several states .
" The counsel for plaintiff urges that the statute only applies to cases
where the action is based upon the mortgage , but has no bearing where
it is prosecuted upon the original undertaking . If this rule is allowed to
obtain , it is difficult to see what point is gained by the statute . In every
case where a mortgage is given to secure a loan or other debt, if the
mortgage does not become the sole security , and the mortgagee may have
a personal judgment , as well as the mortgage security , he gains precisely
the same end that he would if permitted to recover upon an implied cove
nant in the mortgage . * * * It is hardly necessary to enumerate the
many instances in which statutes have been passed avoiding the assump
tion of liabilities by parol , where they formerly existed , as they are fa
miliar . We think this act is of the same character , and that when a party
takes security upon land by mortgage for a debt or other liability , without
a covenant to pay, and takes no bond or other separate instrument to se
cure such payment, he is confined to the land mentioned in the mortgage ."
Flandrau , J ., in Van Brunt v . Mismer , 8 Minn . 232 (Gil. 202 ) .
“ The statute seems to be aimed against sustaining an action for a debt
secured by mortgage merely by the production of the mortgage , when it
contains no express covenant to pay the debt . It sets out with the dec
laration that no mortgage shall be construed as implying a covenant, etc.,
and what follows seems to be intended to carry out that principle . That
a personal action can be maintained for a mortgage debt when proved by
competent evidence , whether in writing or by parol , can not be ques
tioned .” Wheeler , J ., in Demond v. Crary , 9 Fed . 750 , 752 .
See also , Gaylord v. Knapp , 15 Hun ( N . Y .) 87 .
It is common practice , even when the mortgage is collateral to a note
or bond , to insert in the mortgage a covenant to pay the debt.
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redeem . They were indifferent about the personal obligation , as
they possessed an adequate fund in their own hands.
MATTHEWS v . SHEEHAN .
COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK , 1877 .
69 N . Y . 585 .
EARL , J. In December , 1869, an arrangement was made between
the plaintiff 's testator , O 'Keefe , and the defendant , whereby
O 'Keefe was to procure a policy of insurance on his life from the
Phoenix Life Insurance Company , and assign it to the defendant,
who was to pay the premiums and have the benefit of the policy ,
with the understanding that, if at any time O 'Keefe desired to re
deem the policy, he could do so by paying the premiums advanced
by defendant, with the interest thereon . In pursuance of this ar
rangement , O 'Keefe procured the company to issue a policy on
his life, which was immediately assigned to the defendant by an
assignment absolute in form , and he paid all the premiums to the
time of O 'Keefe 's death in 1874 . Before that time, O 'Keefe , for
the purpose of redeeming the policy , offered to pay the defendant
the amount advanced by him for premiums, and defendant refused
to take the money . After the death of O 'Keefe , the defendant re
ceived from the issurance company the amount insured , and re
tained the same, refusing , upon plaintiff 's demand , to pay any
portion thereof to her . This action was brought to recover the
sum received by the defendant , less the amount for which he held
the policy as security . Upon the trial, the facts above stated ap
pearing , and there being no conflicting evidence , the court directed
a verdict for the plaintiff .
The verdict was properly directed . Upon the undisputed evi
dence , O 'Keefe had the option to treat the policy as a security for
the premiums paid by the defendant, and to redeem the same. While
O 'Keefe was not bound to redeem , or personally liable for the
money advanced by the defendant , there was sufficient considera
tion for the arrangement made. O 'Keefe submitted to examina
tion , procured his life to be insured , and assigned the policy to the
defendant in consideration that the defendant would pay the prem
iums, and give him the option to redeem . The substance and legal
effect of the transaction was to make the defendant a mortgagee
of the policy to secure him for the premiums paid , and he could
not claim an absolute title thereto , except upon O 'Keefe 's failure
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to exercise his option to redeem . This was not simply an agree
ment by the defendant to sell to O 'Keefe , upon payment by him of
the amount of the premiums advanced with interest , a policy ab
solutely belonging to the defendant, an agreement void under the
statute of frauds ; because there was no writing or part payment .
It was an agreement that the defendant might take and hold the
policy as security and the right to redeem attended the policy into
the defendant 's hands , and at al
l
times affected his title . Such an
agreement may be shown b
y parol , although the assignment be
absolute in form . (Hodge v . The T . M . and T . Fire Ins . Co . , 8
N . Y . , 416 ; Despard v . Walbridge , 15 N . Y . , 374 ; Horn y . Keteltas ,
4
6
N . Y . , 605 ; Hope v . Balou , 58 N . Y . , 380 . )
It matters not that O 'Keefe did not absolutely promise to pay the
amount which defendant should advance for the premiums . To
constitute a valid mortgage , it is not essential that the mortgagee
should have any other remedy but that upon his mortgage . This
is recognized b
y
the Revised Statutes in reference to real estate
mortgages ( 1 R . S . 739 ) , which provide that when there shall
be no express covenant in the mortgage for the payment o
f
the
money received , and no bond o
r
other separate instrument to se
cure such payment , the remedies of the mortgagee shall be con
fined to the lands mentioned in the mortgage . In a
ll
cases the
remedy of the mortgagee may by the agreement of the parties be
confined to the mortgage .
It is sometimes difficult to determine whether a transaction con




absolute sale and a conditional resale ;
and whether it shall be construed to be one o
r
the other depends
upon the intention of the parties as evidenced by the instrument
executed , and all the circumstances of the case . No general rule
upon the subject can be laid down which will govern all cases , al
though it is said that the fact that there was no debt which could
be personally enforced is a strong , but not an absolute controlling
circumstance , that the transaction was not a mortgage , but a sale
and a conditional resale . In all doubtful cases a contract will be
construed to be a mortgage rather than a conditional sale , because
in the case o
f
a mortgage the mortgagor , although he has not
strictly complied with the terms o
f
the mortgage , still has his right
o
f redemption ; while in the case o
f
a conditional sale , without
strict compliance , the rights o
f
the conditional purchaser are for
feited . (Longuet v . Scawen , 1 Ves . Sen . , 402 ; Glover v . Payn , 19
Wend . , 578 ; Conway ' s Exrs . v . Alexander , 7 Cranch , 218 ; Edring
ton v . Harper , 3 J . J . Marshall , 354 ; Floyer v . Lavington , 1 P .
Wms . , 268 ; Chapman ' s Admin ’ x . v . Turner , 1 Colls . R . , 280 ;
Wharf v . Howell , 5 Binney , 499 . ) In Floyer v . Lavington , it is
said : “ As to the objection that here was no covenant for the













the principal or interest , that was not material ; the
same not being necessary for the making o
f
a mortgage , nor yet
necessary , that the right should be mutual , viz : for the mortgagee
to compel the payment as well as for the mortgagor to compel a
redemption ; since such conveyance as in the present case , though
without any covenant o
r
bond for the payment o
f
the money , would
yet b
e plainly a mortgage . ” In Brown v . Dewey ( 1 Sandf . Chy .
R . , 56 ) , it was held that “ the absence o
f
the personal liability o
f
the
grantor to re y the money is not a conclusive test in deciding




a security . ”
In Holmes v . Grant ( 8 Paige , 243 , 257 ) , Denio , V . C . , says :
" It is not essential that the personal remedy against the mortgagor
should b
e preserved . There is a debt quoad the redemption , but
not in respect to the personal remedy . ” In Flagg v . Mann ( 14
Pick . , 467 ) , Putnam , J . , says : “ There was no collateral undertak
ing on the part o
f
Luther (the grantor ) to pay the money which
Walker and Fisher ( grantees ) should advance in the five years ;
so there was n
o mutuality . And this fact , though not conclusive ,
is to be taken into consideration in ascertaining whether the trans
action was a mortgage o
r
a sale , with a contract for a repurchase
upon strict terms . " (See also Rice v . Rice , 4 Pick . , 349 . ) In
Kerr v . Gilmore ( 6 Watts , 405 ) , Kennedy , J . , says : “ The want o
f
a personal security for the repayment o
f
the money has , taken in
connection with other circumstances , been regarded as tending to
show that a defeasible purchase and not a mortgage was intended ,
but this circumstance alone has never been held sufficient to pre
vent a redemption . ” Again , " that the mortgagee should have a
remedy against the person o
f
the mortgagor also , in order to make
the conveyance a mortgage , is more than I can assent to . ”
In Brown v . Dewey , ( 2 Barb . , 28 ) , the Supreme Court had under
review the decision o
f
the Vice Chancellor , whose opinion is re
ported 1 Sandf . Chy . R . , 56 , and his decree was reversed , not upon
the law but upon the facts . The court was very much influenced
b
y
the consideration that to hold the contract there to be a mort
gage , would render it void for usury . Harris , J . , says : “ Although
it is true that courts o




f redemption , and for this reason in doubtful cases contracts of
this description have frequently been construed as mortgages rather
than conditional sales , yet when the aid o
f
the court is sought , not
to establish a right o
f redemption , but to have a conveyance de
clared a mortgage for the purpose o
f avoiding it on the ground of
usury , the reason why in doubtful cases the court should incline to
hold the conveyance to be a mortgage seems to fail . On the con
trary , it seems to me that before giving to a transaction a construc
tion which should have the effect to create a forfeiture o
f
the se
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curity , a court of equity ought to be well satisfied that such con
struction does no violence to the intention of the parties themselves .
It is the right of redemption in favor of which the court leans in
doubtful cases , and not the right to have the security avoided on
the ground of usury .” He further says : “ I do not say that either
of these circumstances (among them being the one that the grantee
could not enforce payment of the money against the grantor per
sonally ) is to be regarded as a decisive test upon the question
whether a transaction , doubtful in its character , is to be regarded
as a mortgage or a conditional sale . On the contrary , I admit that
neither adequacy of price nor the want of an obligation to repay the
money , nor even both circumstances combined , are to be held as
conclusive evidence that a conditional sale and not a mortgage was
intended . Both , however , are important circumstances in determin
ing the question . ” In Horn v . Ketaltas ( supra ) , Allen , J . , says
that the circumstances that there was no agreement to pay the
money secured , is one entitled to considerable weight in determin
ing whether a conveyance was intended as a mortgage , but that
it is only one o
f
the circumstances to be considered and not conclu
sive ; and Ch . J . Marshall , in Conway ' s Exrs . , V . Alexander ( 7
Cranch , 218 ) , says : “ The want o
f
a covenant to repay the money
is not complete evidence that a conditional sale was intended , but




inconsiderable importance . ”
It is clear therefore both upon principal and authority that the
circumstances that O 'Keefe was not personally obligated to pay to
the defendant the amount of the premiums which he should ad
vance is not absolutely controlling upon the question whether here
was a mortgage o
r
a sale and a conditional resale . It is an im
portant circumstance in such cases and in the conflict o
f
evidence
not unfrequently a controlling one . There are many cases , some
o
f
which are cited b
y
the learned counsel for the appellant , in





fact decisive . If we should hold this to be a case o
f
conditional resale , and that the consequence follows which has
been so learnedly argued on behalf of the defendant that the
agreement is void under the statute o
f
frauds , the intention o
f
the
parties would be defeated . ' This is therefore a case where the court
should learn to hold the transaction to constitute a mortgage , thus
giving what was clearly intended , the right of redemption .
There was nothing said about a re -purchase o
r
a re -sale , or a re
assignment , but the right to redeem was expressly stipulated . The
language used shows that the parties intended that the policy should
be held a





admissible as any other , and hence the court did not err
in directing a verdict for the plaintiff .
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I have treated the transaction as a mortgage, but it is unimportant
to determine whether it was a mortgage or a pledge , as the same
course of reasoning would apply and the same consequences would
follow , whether it was one or the other .
The judgment must therefore be affirmed .
All concur .
Judgment affirmed .29
ROBINSON v . WILLIAMS .
COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK , 1860.
22 N . Y . 380 .
Action by the receiver of the Hollister Bank , against Williams,
the receiver of the Reciprocity Bank , and other defendants , for
the foreclosure of a mortgage. Prior to September , 1857, both
banks were doing business in the city of Buffalo .
Upon the trial these facts were proved : On the 24th of October,
1854 , the defendants Gibson and his wife executed and delivered a
mortgage to the Hollister Bank , which recited that in consideration
of the sum of $ 1 to them in hand paid , and for the purposes therein
after declared and stated , they granted and conveyed to said bank
certain premises therein particularly described . The mortgage con
29 See also , Hickox v. Lowe, 10 Cal . 197 ; Mills v. Darling , 43 Maine
565 ; Campbell v. Dearborn , 109 Mass. 130 ; Cook v. Johnson , 165 Mass .
245 ; Fisk v . Stewart , 24 Minn . 97 ; Niggeler v. Maurin , 34 Minn , 118 ; Brant
v. Robertson , 16 Mo. 129 ; Mooney v. Byrne , 163 N . Y . 86 ; Russell v.
Southard , 12 How . ( U . S.) 139 .
Cf. cases in which the personal remedy is barred by bankruptcy or the
statute of limitations , post , Chap . VII .
Where there is an absolute conveyance and contract for reconveyance ,
the existence or non -existence of a personal obligation on the part of the
grantor to repurchase is the most important of the several circumstances
which fix the legal nature o
f
the transaction as a mortgage o
r
a condi
tional sale . Conway v . Alexander , 7 Cranch ( U . S . ) 218 ; Campbell v .
Dearborn , supra ; Brant v . Robertson , supra ; Holmes v . Grant , 8 Paige
( N . Y . ) 243 ; Glover v . Payn , 19 Wend . ( N . Y . ) 518 .
Other circumstances bearing upon the question are , ( 1 ) the character
o
f
the negotiations leading up to the transaction ; ( 2 ) the adequacy o
f
the
consideration , as a fair purchase price ; ( 3 ) the possession following the
transaction . See Jones , 88 256 - 281 .
It has been frequently said that equity leans toward the mortgage
construction , as that least likely to work injustice , but on the other hand
it has been said that , the transaction appearing upon its face to be a con
ditional sale , very clear evidence is necessary to convert it into a mort
gage . Jones $ 8 260 , 279 .
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tained a further recital as follows : " Whereas , it is contemplated
that the said party of the second part will hereafter from time
to timemake loans or advances , by way of discount or otherwise ,
to the said Charles D . Gibson , upon drafts, bills of exchange ,
promissory notes and commercial paper , either made and drawn ,
or accepted or indorsed by said Gibson , and it has been agreed
that these presents shall be executed to indemnify and secure the
said party of the second part on account of any such loans , ad
vances or discounts . Now therefore the condition of these presents
is expressly this : that if the said Charles D . Gibson , his heirs , etc.,
shall and do well and truly pay , retire and take up at maturity any
and a
ll
such drafts , bills o
f exchange , promissory notes o
r
com
mercial paper , a
s may be discounted o
r
advanced upon by the said
party o
f
the second part , for or to the said Gibson , and shall well
and truly pay at maturity al
l





above recited , and shall well and truly indemnify pay
and save harmless the said party o
f
the second part from and
against all loss , costs , damages , expenses and interests b
y
reason
thereof , then these presents shall cease and be null and void . ” But
in case o
f
the non - fulfillment of the above conditions , then the
party o
f
the second part was authorized to sell the mortgaged
premises and to make and execute to the purchaser a deed there
for .
The mortgage was duly acknowledged on the 25th o
f
October ,
1854 , and recorded on that day in the clerk ' s office of Erie county .
On the 1st o
f
December , 1855 , the defendant Gibson drew his bill
o
f exchange on one Greenleaf , a
t
Boston , whereby he requested
said Greenleaf to pay to his own order the sum of $ 2 ,500 , sixty
days from the date thereof ; and before said bill became due and
payable Gibson indorsed the same to the Hollister Bank , which , on
the faith and security o
f
said bill and said mortgage , discounted
the same and advanced to said Gibson the amount thereof . This
bill was protested a
t maturity , and no part thereof has ever been
paid . On the 29th of December , 1855 , Gibson drew another bill
o
f
exchange on Greenleaf a
t sixty days from date , whereby he re
quested him to pay to his (Gibson ' s ) order , the sum of $ 1 ,800 .
Before this bill became due , Gibson indorsed it to the Hollister





said bill and the mortgage . This bill was also pro
tested a
t maturity , and no part thereof has been paid .
The complaint set u
p
that the defendant Williams , among others ,
claimed some interest in the mortgaged premises , and prayed the
usual judgment of foreclosure and sale , and that said defendant , and
all others claiming interest therein subsequent to that of the Hol
lister Bank , might be barred and foreclosed . The defendant Will





and proved that , on the 29th o
f
January , 1856 , the
Sackett ' s Harbor Bank (whose name was subsequently changed ,
by an act o
f
the legislature , to that of the Reciprocity Bank ) ,
recovered a judgment against said Gibson to the amount o
f
$ 2 ,798 . 29 ; that a transcript thereof was duly docketed in the
clerk ' s office of Erie county on that day ; that said Gibson was
then the owner o
f
said mortgaged premises ; and Williams insisted
that said judgment was a lien on said premises , and prior to that





said judgment . The Superior Court
o
f
Buffalo , at special term , gave judgment in favor o
f
the plaintiff ,
and declared said mortgage to be a prior lien to said judgment .
On appeal , the same was affirmed at general term , and from that















DAVIES , J . There can be no doubt that , as between the original
parties to this mortgage , the validity of it , as a pledge of the mort
gaged premises to secure the amount o
f
these two drafts , could not
be questioned . It was clearly the intent of the parties that the land
described should stand a
s security for all advances and discounts
made b
y
the Hollister Bank to Gibson . If , therefore , there were no
legal mortgage , there was , undeniably , an equitable one , which a
court o
f equity would enforce against the original parties to it , and
all others not in the condition o
f
bona fide purchasers o
r subsequent
incumbrancers without notice . The advances made to Gibson were
before the recovery of the Reciprocity Bank ' s judgment . As soon
a
s the advances were made , they were embraced in and secured b
y
the mortgage . That judgments and mortgages may be taken to







rendition , has long been
well settled . (Conrad v . The Atlantic Ins . Co . , 1 Peters , 386 ;
Leeds v . Cameron , 3 Sumn . , 488 ; Hubbard v . Savage , 8 Conn . ,
215 ; Walker v . Snediker , 1 Hoff . Ch . , 145 ; Com . Bank v . Cunning
ham , 24 Pick . , 270 ; Monell v . Smith & Jenkins , 5 Cow . , 441 ; Lyle
v . Ducomb , 5 Bin . , 585 ; 4 Kent ' s Com . , 175 ; Lansing v . Wood
worth , 1 Sand . Ch . , 43 ; Barry v . Merchants ’ Ex . Co . , 1 id . , 314 ;
United States v . Hooe , 3 Cranch , 73 ; Livingston & Tracy v . Mc
Inlay , 16 Johns . 165 ; Truscott v . King , 2 Seld . , 147 . )
In Conrad v . The Atlantic Insurance Company ( supra ) , a mort
gage was given to secure a debt upon a respondentia bond , and it
was said that the debt was o
f
too contingent a nature to uphold
a mortgage as collateral security for the payment of it . Story , J . ,
a
t page 448 , says : “ We know of no principle or decision that
justifies such a conclusion . Mortgages may as well be given to
secure future advances and contingent debts a
s
those which already
exist and are certain and due . ”
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The case of Hooe v . United States ( supra ) , is, in some respects ,
not unlike the present . There , one Fitzgerald conveyed property
in trust to W . & J . C . Herbert , to indemnify Hooe for all indorse
ments or liabilities he might incur on behalf of Fitzgerald ; and if
Fitzgerald should pay and discharge a
ll
such liabilities , the trustees
were to reconvey the property to him ; but if Hooe should pay any
such liabilities on account o
f Fitzgerald , then , on demand o
f
Hooe ,
the trustees were to sell the trust property , and pay and satisfy
the amount demanded by Hooe . Hooe became liable to pay sev
eral notes o
f Fitzgerald , indorsed by him , and on Fitzgerald ' s death
he was largely in arrears to the United States , and they claimed a
preference over a
ll
other creditors , under the laws thereof , and that
such lien was superior to that created by the trust deed for the
benefit o
f
Hooe , and that it was fraudulent as to the United States .
It will be observed that , in this case , no sum certain , for which
the property was held in trust , was mentioned in the deed . Mar
shall , Ch . J . , in delivering the opinion of the court , says ( p . 88 ) :
“ That the property stood bound for future advances is , in itself ,
unexceptionable . It may , indeed , be converted to improper pur
poses , but it is not positively inadmissible . It is frequent for a
person who expects to become more considerably indebted to mort
gage property to his creditors as a security for debts to be con
tracted , as well as that which is already due . All the covenants in
this deed appear to the court to b
e
fair , legitimate , and consistent
with common usage . ”
It is pressed upon us that this mortgage is invalid , because no
sum certain is mentioned therein . There might be some force in
the argument if the Reciprocity Bank stood in the position of a
subsequent purchaser o
r
incumbrancer in good faith , although it
will be attempted to be shown that the mortgage would be good
a
s against the bank , even if such were its position . That question
will be considered hereafter . The Supreme Court of this state ,
in the case o
f
Monell v . Smith ( supra ) , held that a surety , who
held a bond and warrant of attorney , conditioned to pay all notes
theretofore or thereafter to be indorsed , and to indemnify him
against such indorsements , might enter up judgment and issue exe
cution thereon for the sum for which he was actually liable , a
l
though the bond was not for a specified sum . That a bond and
warrant of attorney might be taken b
y
a surety , to secure him
against future liabilities to be incurred by him , the court say , is
warranted by the cases cited and considered by the late Chancellor
in Roosevelt v . Mack ( 6 Johns . Ch . , 266 , 279 -285 ) . The court
adds , “ the only question is , whether the same course may be pursued
where the bond relates in general terms to liabilities a
s surety o
r in
dorser , past and prospective , without mentioning a sum certain ;
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and we think it may . It is true , the sum does not appear on the
face of the bond ; and there is no doubt that, in an action on such
bond , breaches must be assigned . It would be the same, however ,
we think , as to a bond conditioned to pay specified sums to third
persons . The certainty is the same in both cases . In both , we may
be obliged to look beyond the face of the bond to see what is due.
In a technical sense that is certain which may be made certain .
We all know the objects of the parties to these instruments . It is ,
to afford themost prompt indemnity . ”
In Shiras v . Craig ( 7 Cranch , 34 ) , the subjejct under considera
tion seems to have elicited a very full examination ; and it was there
held , that it was not necessary to the validity o
f
a mortgage that it
should truly state the debt it is intended to secure , but it shall stand
a
s
a security for the real , equitable claims o
f
the mortgagees ,







wards upon the faith of the mortgage , before notice o
f
the de
fendant ' s equity . Chief Justice Marshall , in delivering the opinion
o
f
the court , at page 50 , says : “ It is true that the real transaction




the mortgage . The deed purports
to secure a debt o
f
£30 ,000 , due to all the mortgagees . It was
really intended to secure different sums , due at the time to particular
mortgagees , advances afterwards to be made and liabilities to be
incurred to a
n
uncertain amount . It is not denied that a deed which
misrepresents the transaction it recites , and the consideration on
which it is executed , is liable to suspicion . It must sustain a rigor
ous examination . It is certainly always advisable fairly and plainly
to state the truth . But if , upon investigation , the real transaction
shall appear to be fair , though somewhat variant from that which
is described , it would seem to be unjust and unprecedented to de
prive the person claiming under the deed o
f
his real , equitable
rights , unless it be in favor o
f
a person who has been in fact in
jured and deceived by the misrepresentation . ” These principles ,
and the cases upon which they rest , have lately been emphatically
affirmed b
y
the Supreme Court o
f
the United States , in Lawrence
v . Tucker ( 23 How . , 14 ) .
I arrive , therefore , to the conclusion , that this is a valid mortgage
a
s between the parties to it , and that the mortgagee was secured
thereby the amount o
f
the advances upon the two drafts mentioned
in the complaint , although no sum certain was mentioned on the
face o
f





the Reciprocity Bank , and prior ,
therefore , to any equities o
f
that bank . It follows , therefore , they
were made prior to any notice to the Hollister Bank o
f any such
equities . No notice could be given o
f
that which had not an ex
istence . It is established then , it is submitted , that , at the date of
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the recovery of the judgment by th
e
Reciprocity Bank against Gib
son , the Hollister Bank had a good legal , and certainly equitable ,
mortgage upon the premises , to secure the amount o
f
the two
drafts already referred to . Was that judgment a prior lien to the
mortgage ? The judgment became a lien , at the time it was
docketed , upon the interest o
f
the defendant therein in all lands in
the county o
f
Erie . ( 2 R . S . , 359 . ) In equity , the land was un
deniably bound to pay off the amount o
f
these two drafts . The
law is well settled , that the equitable mortgage is entitled to a pref
erence over subsequent judgment creditors . (Matter o
f
Howe , 1
Paige , 129 , and the cases there cited ; Willard ' s Eq . Jur . , 441 , 442 ;
Rockwell v . Hobby , 2 Sand . Ch . , 9 ; Hilliard on Mortg . , vol . I , 451 . )
If this mortgage is to be regarded simply as an equitable mort
gage , there can be no question that , in accordance with well
settled rules o
f
law and a uniform current o
f
decision , it is a valid
security , and is entitled to priority over the subsequent judgment
of the Reciprocity Bank .




s judgment , or an incumbrancer by way o
f mort
gage for money then advanced , the mortgage o
f
the Hollister Bank
would equally have been entitled to priority . The recording of the
mortgage was notice that the Hollister Bank had a mortgage on
the premises for the purposes therein specified . There was enough
to have put a bona fide purchaser o
r
incumbrancer upon inquiry ;
and an application to the Hollister Bank would have disclosed the
sum certain for which the security was held . As was said by the
Supreme Court in Merrell v . Smith ( supra ) , " we may be obliged
to look beyond the face o
f
the bond to see what is due . In a techni
cal sense , that is certain which may be made certain . ” The precise
sum for which the mortgage was held as security might , at any
time , readily and with certainty , have been ascertained , and a bona
fide purchaser or incumbrancer , with the notice which the record
o
f
this mortgage furnished him , if he had omitted to make the in
quiry which it indicated , could hardly have claimed to have been a
bona fide purchaser o
r
incumbrancer . The authorities bearing on
this question of notice are fully reviewed in the case of Williamson




lows : “ The true doctrine on this subject is , that where a purchaser
has knowledge of any fact sufficient to put him on inquiry as to the
existence of some right or title in conflict with that he is about
to purchase , he is presumed either to have made the inquiry and
ascertained the extent o
f




f negligence equally fatal to his claim to be considered
a
s
a bona fide purchaser . ” But we are not without direct authority
o
n
the point now under consideration . The case of Kramer v . The
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Trustees , & c., of the Farmers ' Bank of Steubenville ( 15 Ohio ,
253 ), is of this character . The question there was , originally ,
whether mortgages given to one Doyle , in May , 1840 , were to have
priority over those given to one McDowell , which , though dated
prior to Doyle 's mortgage , were not recorded until 30th September ,
1842 . The mortgage to Doyle specified no sum in it, but the con
dition was, “ that, whereas the said Alexander Doyle had thereto
fore indorsed paper of the said Wells , Henry & Co . ( the mort
gagors ) , and had also promised to make further indorsements , it
was provided that if the said Wells , Henry & Co. should indemnify
and save harmless the said Doyle, then the said deed was to be
void ," & c . Doyle alleged that , relying on this indemnity , he had
continued to indorse for the mortgagors , and claimed that his
mortgage was a prior lien to that of McDowell and of the judg
ment creditors . The court sustained Doyle 's claim , and directed a
sale of the property mortgaged , and that he be paid the amount
of his liabilities . Kramer and others , judgment creditors , filed a
bill of review , claiming that the court had erred in giving validity
and priority to Doyle' s mortgage . Among other things , they al
leged that Doyle 's mortgages were not good and valid as against
the complainants , because they were void for uncertainty , and it
could not be ascertained how or when the same became forfeited ,
or how the same could or would be satisfied . In the opinion , at
page 260 , the court say , “ Doyle had a right to ask indemnity , and
the mortgagors had a right to give it. It was done by way ofmort
gage ; and although these mortgages were intended to cover sub
sequent as well as previous liabilities, they could not, on this ac
count , be objectionable as between the parties . If, during the ex
istence of these mortgages, a third person had recovered a judg
ment against the mortgagors , the lien of such judgment might, and
probably would , have been preferred to the lien of the mortgagees
for liabilities subsequently incurred by Doyle . But these complaints
are not in that situation . The liabilities of Doyle had been fixed
before the rendition of their judgment. It is not perceived that
there would be any difficulty in ascertaining when the condition of
the deeds was broken and the mortgage forfeited , nor as to the
manner in which they could be satisfied . A similar rule may be
deduced from the following cases in Connecticut : Merrill v .
Swift ( 18 Conn., 266 ) ; Lewis v . De Forest ( 20 id ., 442 ) ; Ketchum
v . Jauncey (23 id ., 127 ) .
In any aspect in which this case may be regarded , we think it
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free from doubt , and that the judgment appealed from should be
affirmed , with costs.
Ill the judges concurring .
Judgment affirmed . 30
GRIFFIN v . NEW JERSEY OIL CO .
COURT O
F CHANCERY OF NEW JERSEY , 1855 .
1
1
N . J . E
q
. 49 .
THE CHANCELLOR (WILLIAMSON ) . This bill is filed upon a mort
gage given by the New Jersey Oil Company to the complainant .




their claiming liens upon the mortgaged premises . The difficulties
all arise in reference to the validity of the complainant ' s mortgage ,
and as to it










execution the debt due was only $ 1 ,243 . 90 , and the
residue was for future advances ; that this does not appear upon the
face o
f
the mortgage , but on the contrary , the mortgage declares
that the debt then due was ten thousand dollars . It is insisted that
3
0
" It is the policy of our laws , and experience has demonstrated the
wisdom o
f
it , that the titles to real estate should be registered , for the
benefit , not o
f
the parties , but of creditors , and all others interested . “All
grants and mortgages o
f
houses and lands shall be recorded a
t length
by the town clerk ; and no deed shall be accounted good and effectual to
hold such houses and lands , against any other person or persons , but
the grantor or grantors , and their heirs only , unless recorded as afore
said . ' Stat . 302 , § 9 . It is the object of this law to prevent fraud and
give security and stability to title . It results , unquestionably , that the
condition o
f
a mortgage deed must give reasonable notice o
f
the incum
brances on the land mortgaged . A creditor is not obliged by law to make
inquiry in pais , concerning the liens on the property o
f
his debtor ; but on
application to the record , he may acquire all the information , which his
interest demands . At least , he must have the power of knowing from
this source , the subject matter o
f
the mortgage , that his investigation may
be guided by something which will terminate in a certain result . And
what is not of less importance , the incumbrance on the property must be
so defined , a
s
to prevent the substitution o
f everything , which a fraudu
lent grantor may devise , to shield himself from the demands of his cred
itors . ” Hosmer , Ch . J . , in Pettibone v . Griswold , 4 Conn . 161 , 162 .
Compare , Garber v . Henry , 6 Watts (Pa . ) 57 ; Brewster v . Clamfit , 33
Ark . 72 ; Joseph v . Lyon , 9 Ky . L . 324 ; Hyland v . Habich , 150 Mass . 112 ;
Michigan Ins . Co . v . Brown , 11 Mich . 265 ; Hyde v . Shank , 77 Mich . 517 ;
Witczinski v . Everman , 51 Miss . 841 ; Youngs v . Wilson , 27 N . Y . 351 ;
McDaniels v . Colvin , 16 Vt . 300 .
In some jurisdictions the question is affected b
y
statute . See Jones ,
§ 366 .
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a mortgage under such circumstances is not valid , because it is a
fraud upon creditors .
This is not a new question . It has been much discussed , and has
been frequently reviewed by the courts . Such a mortgage was sus
tained in the case of Craig v . Tappen , 2 Sand . Ch . Rep . 78. Numer
ous authorities are there cited and reviewed . The court said , “ it is
no longer a question that mortgages to secure future advances are
good to the extent secured thereby ;" and further declared , that it
is not necessary that the intention should be expressed in the mort
gage. The authorities settled the question , and I am not disposed
to disturb them . And yet it appears to me there are very weighty
objections to a mortgage to secure future advances , unless it is so
expressed on the face of the mortgage. The instrument declares ,
under the seal of the party , that the debt is actually due. It is
placed on the record as an encumbrance , for the whole amount , on
the debtor ' s property . Why should not the mortgage declare the
true consideration for which it has been executed ? It may operate
greatly to the prejudice of creditors. It does deceive and mislead
them when they apply to the records for the purpose of ascertaining
the condition of their debtor 's property . They find it encumbered
for more than its value , and the encumbrance stands there to enable
the debtor to obtain money which ought to g
o
to pay his debts a
l
ready contracted . It was said by the Assistant Vice Chancellor , in
the case o
f Craig v . Tappan , that the record would not in any case
afford the creditor any certainty , and that he may make application






money is due . But the mortgagee may not be easy o
f
access , and
the creditor not be able to avail himself of the necessary informa
tion . He finds an encumbrance on record for as much as the deb
tor ' s property is worth , and thinks it useless to take legal means
to secure his debt ; whereas , if the mortgage had truly expressed
the debt actually due , the creditor might have secured his debt . It is
calculated to put a creditor off his guard — it is calculated to mis
lead him , and is therefore objectionable . He is misled by the
party ' s executing a paper which is false upon its face , and plac




what is due . At all events , it
appears to me to be of doubtful policy to encourage such securi
ties . If the transaction is an honest one , let the parties place
the truth upon the record . It is unnecessary to speculate how it
may work mischief . It ought to be condemned , when it is ascer
tained that , instead o
f expressing the true , it gives a false considera
tion upon it
s
face . Notwithstanding all the arguments I have seen
advanced in support o
f
such a mortgage , I would not give it my
judicial sanction if the question were newly presented . But as I
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stated , the authorities are in favor of the validity of such mort
gages , and they are such as I feel bound to follow . 31
* * * * * * *
ORTON , J., IN SHORES V . DOHERTY , 65 Wis. 153 ( 1886 ) :
The learned counsel of the respondent contends that the mortgage
was given to secure $ 2 ,000 only of advances , and when such ad
vances amounted to that sum and were paid the mortgage was
satisfied . On the other hand , the learned counsel of the appellant
contends that the bond and mortgage were intended to be a con
tinuing security for al
l




the bond . * * * The condition o
f
the mortgage
is not only to pay $ 2 ,000 , but according to the conditions o
f
the
bond . The conditions of the bond must therefore be consulted , to
ascertain the limitations o
f
the mortgage security . The condition
o
f
the bond is “ to pay all the advances which may be made to them
under this agreement at the times , in the manner , and with the
interest agreed upon . ” This language is certainly explicit enough
to make the mortgage a continuing security fo
r
a
ll unpaid advances .
3
1 In Bell v . Fleming ' s Exrs . , 12 N . J . Eq . 11 , Chancellor Williamson ,
in sustaining a similar mortgage , said : “ Although the statute requires
that the registry must contain the amount of the mortgage , and when
payable , the registry is not intended as notice o
f
the amount which is
actually due upon the mortgage . A mortgage may be half paid a week
after it is executed , and so only half the amount be due upon it as it
stands upon the record . It may be a mortgage of long standing , with a
large accumulation of interest upon it , so that the amount due upon it is
very much larger than appears from the record . Neither the mortgagor
nor the mortgagee is bound to keep the record accurate as to the amount
due upon the mortgage . If it had been intended that the amount appear
ing upon the record should be conclusive between the parties , and if the
object of recording the amount was that purchasers and creditors might
rely upon the record as to the amount actually due between the parties ,
then the statute is very imperfect in its provisions for accomplishing such
an object . But this was not the object . It was simply to give to parties
interested such notice as would lead them to proper inquiries , and en
able them to protect their interest . " The decision was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals , 12 N . J . Eq . 490 .
See Hendon v . Morris , 110 Ala . 106 ; Tully v . Harloe , 35 Cal . 302 ; Col
lins v . Carlile , 13 Ill . 254 ; Johnson v . Bratton , 112 Mich . 319 ; Foster v .
Reynolds , 38 Mo . 553 ; Bank of Utica v . Finch , 3 Barb . Ch . ( X . Y . ) 293 ;
Hendricks v . Gore , 8 Ore . 406 ; Shiras v . Craig , 7 Cranch ( U . S . ) 34 .
In Johnson v . Bratton , supra , Moore , J . , says : “ The general rule is
that you can not import into a written agreement a parol agreement
which alters the terms or legal effect of the written agreement . An ex
ception to this rule , however , is made in relation to mortgages . * * *
Though the mortgage , on its face , is for the payment o
f
a specitic sum o
f
money , parol evidence is admissible to show that it was really intended
to secure future advances .
In Rhines v . Baird , 41 Pa . St . 256 , it was held that an absolute deed
may be shown by parol to have been executed to secure a future advance
and is valid for that purpose .
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The bond is like the penal official bond of an officer required to
keep , pay over , and account for a
ll moneys which come to his hands
in whatever amount and at whatever times . Such moneys may be
a
n
hundred fold greater than the penalty o
f
the bond , and when
all has been paid or accounted for except an amount equal to o
r
within the penalty o
f
the bond , the sureties , even , are held liable
o
n
such bond for such deficit .
It is very clear that from the object and purpose o
f giving the
bond and mortgage it was intended to be a continuing security for
the last balance o
f
advances on the contracts . The advancements




the timber and logs from time to
time , and others were being made to assist Hay & Stratton in
completing their contract and paying their men . The security
would have been very inadequate , and indeed o
f
little use , if not
continuous and to apply to any and a
ll
future advances after the















NEW YORK , 1881 .
8
5
N . Y . 43 .
ANDREWS , J . The mortgage from Levi , to the plaintiff , was
given to secure the mortgagee , for any indorsements he had made ,
o
r





& Miller , to the amount of $ 6 ,000 . It was dated May 2 , 1874 , and
was recorded May 3 , 1874 . The first indorsement was made May
7 , 1874 , and the last October 16 , 1874 . The plaintiff has been
compelled to pay the indorsed paper , and has advanced for that
purpose the sum o





the mortgagor . This action is brought to foreclose the
mortgage , and the only controversy relates to the priority o
f
lien
as between the mortgagee and judgment creditors of the mortgagor ,
whose judgments were obtained subsequent to the mortgage , but





which enter into and form a part o
f
the mortgage debt .
The question is whether the mortgage is a paramount lien to the
judgments , as to that part o
f
the mortgage debt , arising out of in
dorsements made after the judgments were docketed . It is not






the same effect , Lawrence v . Tucker , 23 How . ( U . S . ) 14 ; In re
York , Fed . Cas . 18138 ; Courier - Journal Co . v . Schaeffer -Meyer Co . , 101
Fed . 699 ; Hannum v . Wallace , 4 Humph . (Tenn . ) 143 . But see Truscott
v . King , 6 N . Y . 147 .
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he indorsed the paper , and it is found by the referee that he never
had personal notice or knowledge , or any notice of their existence ,
until after all the indorsements had been made. The judgments
were docketed in the county where the mortgaged premises were
situated . If the docketing of the judgments was constructive no
tice to the plaintiff of their existence , then he had notice of the
judgments ; otherwise he had none .
There is no question as to the validity of mortgages to secure fu
ture advances or liabilities. They have become a recognized form
of security . Their frequent use has grown out of the necessities
of trade , and their convenience in the transactions of business .
They enable parties to provide for continuous dealings , the nature
or extent of which may not be known or anticipated at the time,
and they avoid the expense and inconvenience of executing a new
security , on each new transaction . It is well known that such
mortgages are constantly taken by banks , and bankers , as security
for final balances , and banking facilities are extended and daily
credits given , in reliance upon them . Mortgages for future ad
vances have sometimes been regarded with jealousy , but their
validity is now fully recognized and established . ( Bank of Utica
v . Finch , 3 Barb . Ch . 294 ; Truscott v . King , 6 N . Y . 147 ; Robin
son v . Williams, 22 id . 380 ; Shirras v . Caig , 7 Cranch , 34 ; Law
rence v . Tucker , 23 How . [ U . S . ) 14 ; Leeds v . Cameron , 3 Sumn.
492 . )
There can be no doubt, therefore , that themortgage in this case ,
as between the parties to it, is a valid security for the plaintiff 's
debt. It is equally clear that to prefer an intervening incumbrance
over the claim of the plaintiff , would violate the understanding
of the parties to the mortgage , at the time it was executed , for the
plain intention was , that the interest of the mortgagor in the land ,
as it existed when the mortgage was given , should be bound as se
curity for all liabilities which the plaintiff might incur as indorser ,
upon the faith of the mortgage . It could not have been intended
that the plaintiff should be deprived of any part of the security of
the mortgage , for any part of the indorsed paper . It would have
been a clear breach of good faith on the part of the mortgagor , if
he had , without notice to the mortgagee , voluntarily incumbered
the land by liens having priority of the mortgage , and then ap
plied to the plaintiff for, and procured further indorsements .
If the judgments have a preference over the plaintiff 's mort
gage , as to indorsements made after the judgments were docketed ,
it must result from some superior equity of the judgment creditors ,
or from the effect of docketing the judgments , as constructive no
tice to the plaintiffs of their existence . The authorities are clear
to the point , that upon general principles of equity , no such pref
erence can be claimed . In Gordon v . Graham ( 2 Eq. Cas. Abr .
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598 ) Lord Chancellor Cowper is reported to have held that a first
mortgagee, in a mortgage covering future advances , has priority
not only for what may be due to him at the time of a second mort
gage , but also for advances made by him after notice of the second
mortgage . This case was doubted in England , as to the point re
ported to have been decided , that the first mortgagee was entitled
to a preference for advances made after notice of the second mort
gage , and in Hopkinson v . Rolt ( 9 H . L . Cas. 514 ) this doctrine
was overruled ;33 but the court distinctly recognized and affirmed
the doctrine , that the first mortgagee was protected as to advances
made after the second mortgage without notice . The case of
Shirras v . Caig (7 Cranch , 34 ) , is a leading case in this country
upon this point. The mortgage in that case was executed to se
cure existing debts and future advances . The mortgagors subse
quently conveyed the equity of redemption to the defendants , who
were bona fide purchasers without notice of the plaintiffs ' mort
gage , and one of the questions was, whether the mortgagees who had
made advances to the mortgagors on the faith of the mortgage,
after they had conveyed to the defendants , but without notice of
their title, could enforce the mortgage for such advances , and it
was held that they could , Marshall , Ch . J., saying , that the mort
gage stood as security for “ the payment of debts still remaining
due to them , which were either due at the date of the mortgage or
were afterward contracted upon its faith , either b
y
advances ac
tually made , o
r




the subsequent title o
f
the defendants . " The effect o
f
the registry
laws was not involved , and the case was decided upon the general
equities . The advances in Shirras v . Caig were optional ; that is ,
the mortgagees were not bound to make them ; and the same is true
o
f
the advances in Gordon v . Graham . Shirras v . Caig has been
frequently cited with approval by the courts in this state , and its
authority , so far as I know , has not been questioned . ( Brinkerhoff
v . Marwin , 5 Johns . Ch . 320 ; Griffin v . Burnett , 4 Edw . Ch . 673 ;
Truscott v . King , supra ; Robinson v . Williams , 22 N . Y . 380 . ) It
must , I think , be conceded that , according to general principles
of equity , the lien of the plaintiff ' s mortgage is superior to the lien
3
3
“ In this country there has been some leaning toward the early Eng
lish rule . See Witczinski v . Everman , 51 Miss . 841 ; 1 Jones Mortg . ,
§ 373 ; 3 Pom . Eq . Jur . , § 1199 ; Rowan v . Sharps ' Rifle Mfg . Co . , 29 Conn .
282 ; Brinkmeyer v . Helbling , 57 Ind . 435 ; Brinkmeyer v . Browneller , 55
Ind . 487 ; Wilson v . Russell , 13 Md . 494 . But the stronger array of au
thority is found on the side o
f
the doctrine established by the House o
f
Lords in the Hopkinson case . See Frye v . Bank , 11 I11 . 381 ; 1 Jones
Mortg . , $ $ 368 , 369 ; 3 Pom . Eq . Jur . , § 1199 , and cases in note 1 , p . 180 . "
Corliss , C . J . , in Union Nat . Bk . v . Moline , Milburn & Stoddard Co . , 7
N . Dak . 201 , 208 .
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of the judgments , as weil for indorsements made prior to their ren
dition , as for those subsequently made without notice .
It remains to consider whether , under the statutory system for
the registry of liens, the docketing of the judgments was construc
tive notice to the plaintiff . If the docketing of the judgments was
constructive notice to him , of their existence , then , unquestionably ,
the judgments have preference to the plaintiff 's mortgage as to al
l
advances subsequently made .




the registry laws upon
the point o
f
notice , is that the registration o
f
incumbrances is no
tice to subsequent incumbrancers only . They are prospective , and
not retrospective , in their operation . (Stuyvesant v . Hall , 2 Barb .
Ch . 151 ; King v . McVickar , 3 Sandf . Ch . 192 ; Howard Ins . Co .
v . Halsey , 8 N . Y . 271 . ) The plaintiff ' s mortgage was first made ,
and first recorded , and regarding these facts only , the mortgage
was the prior lien . It is claimed , however , that the mortgage did
not become an actual lien or incumbrance until the indorsements
were made , and that a
s
to each indorsement it became in effect a
new mortgage , a
s o
f
the time when such indorsement was made ,
and that as to indorsements made subsequent to the docketing o
f
the judgments , the mortgage must be deemed a subsequent lien . It
is manifestly true that the mortgage did not become an actual
charge on the land , so as to be enforceable b
y
the plaintiff , until
he had incurred liability as indorser . But the plaintiff ' s mortgage
was an instrument capable of being recorded under the statute , be
fore any liability had been incurred . It is the general practice to
record mortgaged , and docketed judgments , taken to secure future
advances and contemplated liabilities , before an actual indebtedness
arises . On being recorded , the record is notice to subsequent pur
chasers and incumbrancers , and they are put upon inquiry and have
the means o
f ascertaining to what extent advances have been made ,
and by notice , to prevent further advances to their prejudice . In
Truscott v . King ( 6 N . Y . 147 ) , judgment had been entered on a
bond and warrant o
f
attorney for $ 20 ,000 , to secure existing and
future liabilities , and Jewett , J . , said there could be no doubt that
the judgment in it
s inception was a valid security upon the land to
the full amount , whether a debt only in whole or part then existed ,
if it was agreed at the time that it should be given as an indemnity
for advances thereafter to be made , or such advances were there
after made . In Robinson v . Williams ( 22 N . Y . 386 ) , a mortgage
had been executed to secure future liabilities o
f
the mortgagor to
the Hollister Bank , on paper which might be discounted by the
bank for the mortgagor . The mortgage was recorded on the day
it was executed , and before any liabilities had been incurred . Davies ,
J . , in giving the opinion o
f
the court , said : “ The recording o
f
the
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mortgage was notice that the Hollister Bank had a mortgage on
the premises for the purpose therein specified .” It does not, I think ,
aid the argument for the judgment creditors, that the plaintiff had
no claim on the land for the indorsements in question , until after
the docketing of the judgments , or that by our law a mortgage is
a mere lien or security , and not a title . The mortgage when
executed was a conveyance within the recording act , and the plain
tiff was entitled to put it upon record . It was a potential lien for
it
s full amount , of which subsequent purchasers o
r
incumbrancers




a bond containing the condition upon which the mortgage was
given , and through that o
f
the agreement between the parties , that
the interest o
f
the mortgagor in the land , as it existed at the date
o
f
the mortgage , was pledged for any indorsements which the
plaintiff might make , u
p
to the limit fixed ; for this , as we have
said , was the plain reading o
f
the transaction . It would be in
equitable to permit third persons to deal with the mortgagee in
respect to the land , to the prejudice o
f
the plaintiff ' s security , with
out notice to him , o
r
to allow a subsequent purchaser o
r
incum
brancer , having notice b
y
the record , to acquire a preference over
the mortgage , for indorsements made upon the faith o
f
the mort






The question presented in this case has not been decided in this
state by the court of last resort . In Brinkerhoff v . Marvin ( 5
Johns . Ch . 320 ) , the chancellor , after referring to the observation
o
f
the court in Livingston v . McInlay ( 16 Johns . 165 ) , that if it
was a part o
f
the original agreement , a judgment might be entered
a
s
a security for future advances beyond the amount then actually
due , in like manner as a mortgage may be held as a security for fu
ture advances , said : “ The limitation to this doctrine I should think
would be , that when a subsequent judgment o
r mortgage intervened ,
further advances after that period could not be covered . ” The
remark of the chancellor has been repeated in subsequent cases .
(Lansing , Rec ' r . v . Woodworth , 1 Sandf . Ch . 43 ; Barry v . Mer . Ex .
Co . , id . 280 ; Goodhue v . Berrien , 2 id . 630 . ) What was said by
the chancellor in Brinkerhoff v . Marvin was unnecessary to the
decision o
f
the case , but with the qualification that the first in
cumbrancer had notice o
f
the intervening right when the subse
quent advances were made , the observation is not open to contro
versy . Neither in that , nor any o
f
the subsequent cases referred
to , was it material to decide , whether the record o
f
the subsequent
incumbrance , was notice to the party holding the prior lien , and in
none o
f
them was this question considered . In Craig v . Tappin
( 2 Sandf . Ch . 78 ) , it does not appear whether the first mortgagee
had notice o
f
the second mortgage when the subsequent advances













were made . He knew that the second mortgage was to be given ,






existence when the advances
were made , is not an unreasonable one . In Truscott v . King ( 6
Barb . 346 ) the Supreme Court expressly decided the point involved
in this case in accordance with the view I have expressed . The
judgment of the General Term was reversed in this court on
another point , but one o
f
the judges who wrote an opinion for
reversal , expressed his concurrence in the views expressed by Judge
Parker in the court below , upon the point now in controversy .
( See opinion o
f
Edwards , J . , 6 N . Y . 16
6
. ) The adjudications in
the courts o
f
other states upon the question are conflicting . It
would not be profitable to refer to them at length . They will be
found cited in Jones on Mortgages , § 364 et seq .
The doctrine that a party who takes a mortgage to secure further
optional advances , upon recording his mortgage is protected against
intervening liens , for advances made upon the faith and within the
limits o
f
the security , until he has notice of such intervening lien ,
and that the recording o
f
the subsequent lien is not constructive no
tice to him , has , we think , been generally accepted as the law o
f
the state , at least since the decision in Truscott v . King . It would
not be wise , under the circumstances , now to adopt the opposite
view , even though we should regard it as better supported b
y
rea
son . It seems to us , however , that the doctrine which we have
affirmed in this case is most consistent with equity , and establishes a
rule which is reasonable , and easy o
f application . The opposite
rule imposes the burden o
f
notice and vigilance upon the wrong
person . The party taking the subsequent security may protect him
self b
y
notice , and as is said b
y Mr . Jarman in his notes to Byther
wood ' s Conveyancing : “ No person ought to accept a security sub
ject to a mortgage authorizing future advances , without treating
it as a
n actual advancement to that extent . "
These views lead to a reversal o
f
the order of the General Term
and an affirmance o
f





Order reversed and judgment affirmed . 34
3
4 See Tapia v . Demartini , 77 Cal . 383 ; Schmidt v . Zahrndt , 148 Ind .
447 ; Nelson v . Boyce , 7 J . J . Marshall (Ky . ) 401 ; Ward v . Cook , 17 N . J .Eq . 93 ; Union Nat . Bk . v . Moline & c . Co . , 7 N . Dak . 201 ; McDaniels v .
Colvin , 16 Vt . 300 ; Wilson v . Russel , 13 Md . 494 ; Witczinski v . Everman ,
51 Miss . 841 .
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LADUE v . DETROIT & MILWAUKEE R . R . CO .
SUPREME COURT OF MICHIGAN , 1865 .
13 Mich . 380 .
CHRISTIANCY , J. : The mortgage which the bill in this case seeks
to foreclose , was executed by John Ladue to the complainant and
Francis E . Eldred , composing the firm of Ladue & Eldred , on the
fourth day of August , 1852 , to secure and indemnify the firm
against any indorsements which might be made, or liabilities to be
incurred by them as sureties for John Ladue , as well as for any
moneys they might advance for him , according to the condition of
a bond to which the mortgage was collateral, and which was of
like effect. There was nothing in the papers or in the arrangement
between parties which bound Ladue & Eldred to make any ad
vances , or indorse any paper for John Ladue, or to incur any lia
bility for him , nor was the latter bound to accept any such accomo
dation . The effect of the arrangement was that such advances and
liabilities , if made or incurred , would be purely optional on the part
of the mortgagees. This mortgage was duly recorded on the day
of its date . On the ninth day of May , 1853 , John Ladue , the
mortgagor , sold and conveyed the mortgaged premises to Charles
Howard ( through whom the railroad company derive their title ) ,
b
y warranty deed , which was duly recorded on the ninth day of
July , 1853 . John Ladue , however , remained in possession , using
the premises a
s
before , until his death , December 4 , 1854 .
No claim is made for any advances made b
y
Ladue & Eldred to
John Ladue , but the whole claim under the mortgage is based upon
indorsements made for him b
y
the mortgagees , which have been
paid b
y
Andrew Ladue , one o
f
the complainants , and al
l
these
indorsements , as shown b
y
the proofs , were made some time after




deed . Whatever in
dorsements were made prior to that time , seem to have been taken
up by John Ladue ; and it does not satisfactorily appear b
y
the
evidence that any of these indorsements , made since the recording
o
f
Howard ' s deed , were made in renewal of paper indorsed by
them previous to that time . No indorsements made prior to the
recording o
f
Howard ' s deed are in any way involved , and the case
may , therefore , be considered in all respects in the same light as if no
such previous indorsements had ever been made , especially as it




the sale to Howard , or the re
cording o
f
his deed , there was any existing unsatisfied indorse
ment , o
r any subsisting liability , inchoate or otherwise , incurred b
y
the mortgagees for the mortgagor .
The mortgagees , at the time o
f
the indorsements in question , had
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no notice of the deed to Howard , unless the record of that deed is
to be considered such notice , the deed having been some months
previously recorded . The validity of the mortgage, as between the
parties , for any amount of advances which might be made , or lia
bilities incurred under it, after they should have been thus made or
incurred , is not questioned by the defendants ; nor is it denied that
the record of it would be sufficient notice to subsequent purchasers
and incumbrancers , of the amount which the mortgagees might ac
tually have advanced or indorsed for the mortgager ; or, in other
words , the amount for which it had become an actual or subsisting
security , at the time when the question of notice of the mortgage
became material — which , for the purposes of this case , is admitted
to cover the period from the purchase by Howard down to the time
of the recording of his deed , the record of which is claimed to be
notice to the mortgagees as regards any advances made to , or
liabilities incurred by them for the mortgagor after the recording
of the deed . Nor is it denied , that if the mortgagees , by the con
tracts or arrangements between them and the mortgagor ( to secure
which , on the part of the latter , was the object of the mortgage ) ,
had been bound to make advances or to indorse for themortgagor ,
the record of the mortgage would have been full notice to Howard ,
and the mortgage would have been good against him , though the
advances were not in fact made or the paper indorsed until after
the deed to him and actual notice of that deed to the mortgagees .
The defendants also admit that the result would be the same un
der this mortgage , as to any advances made or paper indorsed by
the mortgagees for the mortgagor , before they had actual or con
structive notice of the sale and deed to Howard ; but they insist
that, as there was not at the time of Howard 's purchase or the re
cording of hi
s
deed any debt o
f
the mortgagor , or any liability in
curred for him b
y
the mortgagees , absolute o
r
inchoate , nor any
obligation on their part to incur such liability , the mortgage was
not then an incumbrance in fact or in legal effect ; that it could
only become such from the time when the advances o
r
indorsements
were actually made ; and it being optional with the mortgagees
whether they would make any such advances o
r
indorsements ; and
the indorsements being made subsequent to the recording o
f How
ard ' s deed , the mortgage is , in legal effect , subsequent to the deed ,
and the record o
f
the deed was notice to the mortgagees o
f How
ard ' s rights .
The first question , therefore , for our determination is , what was
the legal effect o
f







the mortgagor ' s deed to Howard ?
That a mortgage in this state , both a
t
law and in equity , even







the land to the mortgagee ( especially since the
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statute of 1843 , taking away ejectment by the mortgagee ) ; that
the title remains in the mortgagor until foreclosure and sale , and
that the mortgage is but a security , in the nature of a specific lien ,
for the debt has been already settled by the decisions of this court:
Dougherty v . Randall , 3 Mich ., 581 ; Caruthers v . Humphrey , 12
Mich ., 270 ; and Crippen v . Morrison , to be reported in 13 Mich .
This is in accordance with the well settled law of the state of New
York , from which our system of law in regard to mortgages has
been , in a great measure , derived : Jackson v . Willard et al., 4
Johns ., 41 ; Collins v . Torrey, 7 Johns., 278 ; Runyan v . Mersereau ,
11 Johns ., 534 ; Gardner y . Heart, 3 Denio , 232 ; Edwards v . Ins .
Co., 21 Wend ., 467 ; Waring v . Smyth , 2 Barb . Ch ., 119 ; Bryan v.
Butts , 27 Barb ., 504 ; The Syracuse City Bank v . Tallman , 31 Barb.,
201 ; Cortwright v . Cady, 21 N . Y ., 343.
This view of a mortgage is also sustained by several of the
English decisions , and substantially this is the more generally re
ceived American doctrine , as will sufficiently appear by reference
to the decisions , most of which have been carefully collected in
the elaborate brief of the defendant's counsel , but which are too
numerous to be cited here . There are exceptions and peculiarities
in particular states in some of which , as in some of the New Eng
land states and Kentucky , the old idea of an estate upon a condi
tion continues to rankle in the law of mortgages , like a foreign sub
stance in the living organism , but is rapidly being eliminated and
thrown off by the healthy action of the courts under a more vigor
ous application of plain common sense . But few of the incidents
of this antiquated doctrine are now recognized in most of the states
of this Union . The title , for nearly al
l
practical purposes , being
now recognized , both at law and in equity , as continuing in the
mortgagor , and the mortgage as a mere lien for the security o
f
the debt . But wherever any vestige of this now nearly exploded
idea continues to prevail , in connection with the more liberal doc
trines o
f
modern times which the courts have been compelled , from
time to time to adopt , it serves only to confuse and deform the
law o
f mortgages by various anomalies and inconsistencies , making
it a chaos o
f arbitrary and discordant rules resting upon no broad
o
r just principle ; while , b
y
recognizing the mortgage as a mere
lien for the security o
f
the debt , at law as well as in equity , and
thus giving it effect according to the real understanding and in
tention o
f
the parties , the law o




f homogeneous principles , easily understood and applied , and
just in their operation .




it , it necessarily results , 1st , That the debt o
r liability
secured is the principal , and the mortgage but an incident or ac
cessory . See cases above cited ; also Richards v . Synes , Barnadis
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ton 's Ch . R ., 90 ; Roath v . Smith , 5 Conn ., 133; Lucas v. Harris ,
20 I1
1 . , 165 ; Vansant v . Allmon , 23 11
1
. 30 ; Ord v . McKee , 5 Cal . ,
515 ; Ellison v . Daniels , 11 N . H . , 274 ; Hughes v . Edwards , 9
Wheat . , 489 ; Green v . Hart , 1 Johns . , 580 ; McGan v . Marshall ,
7 Humph . , 121 ; 4 Kent ' s Com . , 193 ; McMillan v . Richards , 9
Cal . 365 .
2nd . That anything which transfers the debt ( though by parol or
mere delivery ) , transfers the mortgage with it , see cases above
cited , especially Vansant v . Allmon , 23 Ill . , 30 ; Ord v . McKee , 5
Cal . , 515 ; Ellison v . Daniels , 11 N . H . 274 . See also , Martin v .
Mowlin , 2 Burr . , 978 ; Clark v . Beach , 6 Conn . , 164 ; Southern v .
Mendurn , 5 N . H . , 420 ; Wilson v . Kimball , 27 id . , 300 ; 36 N . H . ,
3
9 ; Crowl v . Vance , 4 Iowa , 434 ; 1 Blackf . , 137 ; 5 Cow . , 202 ; 9
Wend . , 410 ; 1 Johns . , 580 .
3rd . That an assignment o
f
the mortgage without the debt is a
mere nullity . Ellison v . Daniels , 11 N . H . 274 ; Jackson v . Bronson ,
1
9 Johns . 325 ; Wilson v . Throop , 2 Cow . 195 ; Weeks v . Eaton , 15
N . H . 145 ; Peters v . Jamestown Bridge Co . , 5 Cal . 334 ; Webb v .
Flanders , 32 Me . 175 ; Kent ' s Com . , ubi supra ; Thayer et al . v .
Campbell et a
l . , 9 Mo . 277 .
4th . That payment , release , or anything which extinguishes the
debt , ipso facto extinguishes the mortgage : Lane v . Shears , 1 Wend .
433 ; Sherman v . Sherman , 3 Ind . 337 ; Ryan v . Dunlap , 17 Ill . 40 ;
Armitage v . Wickliffe , 12 B . Mon . 496 ; Paxton v . Paul , 3 Harris
& Mc . H . 399 ; Perkins v . Dibble , 10 Ohio 434 ; Breckenridge v .
Ormsby , 1 J . J . Marsh . 257 ; Cameron v . Irwin , 5 Hill 272 . ( It will





characteristics of a mortgage are recognized by some of the courts
which still hold the mortgage to be a conveyance o
f
the estate — a
n
idea , however , with which they are utterly inconsistent , as such inci
dents can only logically flow from the doctrine that the estate still
remains in the mortgagor , and that the mortgage is but a ' lien for
security o
f
a debt . )
These propositions , being established , the necessary result is that
the mortgage instrument , without any debt , liability or obligation
secured b
y
it , can have no present legal effect as a mortgage or in
cumbrance upon the land . It is but a shadow without a substance ,
a
n incident without a principal ; and it can make no difference in the
result whether there has once been a debt o
r liability which has been
satisfied , or whether the debt o
r liability to be secured has not yet
been created , and it requires , as in this case , some future agreement
of the parties to give it existence . At most , the difference is only
between the nonentity which follows annihilation , and that which
precedes existence .





from the time when some debt o
r liability shall be created , or some
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binding contract is made which is to be secured by it. Until this
takes place , neither the land nor the parties , nor third persons , are
bound by it . It constitutes , of itself , no binding contract. Either
party may disregard or repudiate it at his pleasure . It is but a part
of an arrangement, merely contemplated as probable , and which
can only be rendered effectual by the future consent and further acts
of the parties . It is but a kind of conditional proposition , neither
binding , nor intended to bind , either of the parties , till subsequently
assented to or adopted by both .
Though the question does not properly arise here, we take it for
granted , for the purposes of this case , that the mortgage instrument
may, if properly executed , go upon the record , and become effectual
between the parties when the debt or liability contemplated shall
have been created , unless the mortgagor has , in themeantime - as he
had a clear right to do - parted with the title and deprived himself
of the power of creating an incumbrance upon it. But the mere re
cording of the instrument would not make it a mortgage or incum
brance in legal effect , if it were not so before , nor give it a greater
effect , as to third persons than it had between the parties . The rec
ord of such an instrumentmight be an intimation that advances and
indorsements were contemplated as probable , and that they might ,
therefore , have been already made ; and for this reason might, to this
extent properly put a purchaser or incumbrancer upon inquiry . But,
unless it is to have a greater effect than the record of other mort
gages , it could be notice only of such facts as might have been ascer
tained by inspection of the instrument and papers referred to , and
by inquiry ; in other words , by a knowledge of the rights of the par
ties in respect to the land at the time notice became material , which ,
for the purposes of this case , as already explained , we shall assume
to be from the time of Howard 's purchase down to the time when
he recorded his deed . The result must , therefore, be the same here
as if there had been no record . Had Howard made the most dili
gent inquiry in connection with the inspection of the papers , what
facts could he have ascertained ? Nothing material to the rights of
the parties or to his own rights beyond the facts already stated
nothing which , in any manner , interfered with the mortgagor 's ab
solute right of sale . He would have learned , in fact, that the instru
ment recorded as a mortgage was not, in legal effect, a mortgage ,
nor upon any principle of justice or equity an incumbrance upon the
land ; that either party had a perfect right to refuse to give that
future assent or to enter into that future contract or arrangement,
by which alone it could acquire validity or force . He had , there
fore, a just right to conclude that the record of his deed would be
fair notice to the persons mentioned as mortgagees , as the instru
ment could only become a mortgage subsequent to that time, and
then only by reason of some future debt or liability which it required
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the further assent and agreement of the parties to create . He had a
right to conclude that, upon every sound principle, Ladue and Eldred
would , as prudent men , be as likely , and ought to be as much bound ,
to look to the record before making any such advances , or indors
ing paper for the mortgagor , as if a new mortgage for the purpose
were to be taken at the time, since they had the same option to make
the advances or not , as any new mortgagee would have had and
ought, therefore , to be governed by the same prudential considera
tions . And they must be presumed to have known that John Ladue ,
until such advances or indorsements were made by them , had full
power to sell the land free from any incumbrance of the mortgage
instrument , which had not as yet become a mortgage .
But it is urged on the part of the complainant , that it was the duty
of Howard , on making the purchase , to give actual notice of the
fact to the mortgagees, so that they might not afterwards be led to
incur further liabilities on the faith of the mortgage. In England ,
where there is no general registry law by which the record of deeds
and mortgages is made notice to all the world , and the state of the
title can not therefore be always ascertained in this way as with us,
and where parties , therefore, can only rely upon actual notice , there
may be good reason for requiring actual notice in such a case . But
upon no principle which I have been able to comprehend , do I
think such actual notice should be required in a case like the present .
Nor have I been able to see any just or substantial reason why the
record of Howard 's deed (which was long before this mortgage in
strument took effect as an incumbrance , and therefore prior in fact
and law ) should not be deemed notice to the mortgagees in the same
manner , and to the same extent, as if their mortgage had not been
executed or recorded until the time when it became effectual as a
mortgage by their indorsements . Within the very spirit and pur
pose of the registry law , it seems to me, the record of the deed must
be held notice in the one case as well as in the other . The opposite
view , it seems to me, rests upon the erroneous idea that the recording
of a mortgage adds something to its validity as between the parties ,
and that , even as between them , an instrument may be made a mort
gage by recording it , which would not have that operation without
the record . This certainly is not the effect o
f
our registry laws . If
Howard could not rely upon the record o
f
his deed for giving notice
to these mortgagees , as to future advances o
r
indorsements , without
which their mortgage instrument could never become effectual , even
a
s
between theparties , then it is difficult to see why he should be a
l
lowed to rely upon it a
s against any person who he might know had
contemplated purchasing o
r taking a mortgage upon the property ,
and whose efforts o
r
conversations had gone so far as to render it
probable to themind o
f
such person that his preliminary negotiations
o
r
conversations might , a
t
some future period , have resulted in a pur
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chase or a mortgage ; though at the time of the record of Howard 's
deed they had not resulted in any binding contract whatever, and
both parties were at liberty to disregard them , without any breach
of faith . As to all such persons , it has, I think , been generally con
ceded that the record of a deed is sufficient notice . In Craig v .
Tappan ( 2 Sandf . Ch . 78 ) , a case cited by complainant 's counsel , it
was held that notice that a mortgage was about to be made, is not
enough to bind a party with notice of the mortgage. And see Cush
ing v . Hurd , 4 Pick . 253 ; Warden v . Adams , 15 Mass . 232 .
I have thus far endeavored to show that upon principles resulting
from the nature of a mortgage, as recognized here , this mortgage
should be considered , in fact and in legal effect , subsequent to the
deed , and that the registry of the deed should , therefore , be consid
ered notice to the mortgagees. The authorities upon this question
are not so numerous as one would be led to expect ; but the few
which are to be found are conflicting . I shall first notice those
which are claimed to be opposed to the conclusion at which I have
arrived . The English authorities upon this question I consider of
very little , if any, weight, for the reason already stated , and for the
further reason that , for several purposes a mortgage is there still
held to be a conveyance of the estate upon condition , and the mort
gagee as having the legal title — a doctrine upon which the right of
tacking ( never recognized in this state ) to some extent depends ;
the legal title coupled with an equity being held to prevail over an
equity : 4 Kent's Com ., 117 ; Coote on Mortg ., 410 , et seq . ; Opinion
of Lord Cranworth in Hopkinson v . Ralt, 7 Jurist , N . S ., 1209 . The
latter remark applies also with equal force to the decisions cited from
Kentucky : Nelson 's Heirs v . Boyce , 7 J . J . Marshall, 401, goes upon
the express ground that the mortgage conveys the legal title , and
that the mortgagee , therefore, is not bound to notice the record of a
mortgage subsequently made by the mortgagor , who has only the
equity of redemption . It cites Bank, et
c
. , v . Vance , 4 Littell , 173 ,
a
s supporting the doctrine o
f
tacking upon this ground . Nelson v .
Boyce also assigns , as another reason , why the record should not be
notice , a provision o
f
their statute allowing sixty days in which to





first mortgagee might therefore be o
f
no use . Now , it is clear that
neither o
f
these reasons for refusing to the record the effect o
f
notice
exists here . Of the case of Burdett v . Clay , 8 B . Monroe , 287 (be
sides the fact that the mortgagee there holds the legal estate ) , it
may further be noticed that , though the previously recorded mort
gage was in part to secure future liabilities , yet all the liabilities were
incurred before the subsequent mortgage . There are some few




Gordon v . Graham ( 7 Viner ' s Abr . , p . 52 , 2 Eq . Cases
Abridged , 598 ) , which can have little influence here , not only for
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the reason above stated , but because the case itself is no longer law
even in England . This case decided that a mortgagee to secure
money lent, and future advances (which he was not bound to make ) ,
was entitled to preference over a subsequent mortgagee , even foi
advances made after notice of the second mortgage . But so far as
relates to advances made after such notice, this case was expressly
overruled by the house of lords in Hopkinson v . Ralt, 7 Jurist,
N . S ., 1209 ; Law Time, N . S ., 90 .
Most of the cases cited by complainant's counsel against the
proposition I have endeavored to establish , have no bearing upon the
particular question we are now discussing .
Having examined the cases relied upon by the complainant 's coun
se
l
, as tending to controvert the conclusions at which I have arrived ,
I will now refer to those of an opposite tendency , some of which ex
pressly hold the record to be notice o
f
the intervening conveyance o
r
incumbrance .
In Collins v . Carlisle , 13 Ill . 254 , there was a mortgage to secure
future advances , and a contract subsequent in date and time o
f
rec
ord for the sale o
f
the land by the mortgagor , both recorded . It was
held , the mortgage was valid , for those advances only which were
made prior to the recording of the contract . The principle is not
discussed , but it seems to be taken for granted that the record of the
contract was notice as to advances afterward made .
In Kramer v . Farmers and Mechanics ' Bank , 15 Ohio , 253 , it was
held that a mortgage to indemnify against indorsements to be made
for the mortgagor is valid and constitutes a lien , which takes prece
dence of the lien of a judgment rendered after such indorsements
have been made . But , it is said , the lien of a judgment would prob
ably be preferred to the lien o
f
the mortgage for advances made
subsequent to the recovery o
f
the judgment . The liability o
f
the
mortgagee had attached before the subsequent judgment , and , there
fore , the point was not involved . But in the subsequent case o
f
Spader v . Lawler , 17 Ohio , 371 , which was also the case o
f
a mort
gage to secure future advances , it was held , that the mortgage must
b
e postponed to a mortgage subsequently recorded , but before the
future advances were made , thus directly holding the record notice a
s
to advances thereafter made under the first recorded mortgage ; in
other words , treating the first as a subsequent mortgage in refer
ence to advances made after the record o
f
the second . It is true
that one o
f
the grounds upon which the decision seems to b
e placed ,
is that the record o
f






The first case , so far as I have been able to discover , which fully
meets and discusses the question upon principle , is that o
f
Terhoven
v . Kerns , 2 Barr , 96 . It was the case o
f
a judgment to secure fu
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ture advances , which were optional ; and it was held that such judg
ment, as to advances made after the rendition of a subsequent judg
ment was not a lien asagainst the latter . The judgments are treated
by the court as standing upon the same grounds as mortgages, and
the question is discussed generally . It is held that a mortgage to
secure future advances , which are optional , does not take effect be
tween the parties as a mortgage or incumbrance until some advance
has been made — that, if not made until after another mortgage or
incumbrance has been recorded , it is , in fact, as to such after ad
vances, a subsequent and not a prior incumbrance ; and that the
record of the subsequently recorded mortgage is notice as to such
after advances , as much as if the mortgage first recorded had not
been executed until after such advances were made . The doctrines
of this case were fully as strongly re -affirmed in Bank of Mont
gomery 's Appeal , 36 Penn ., 170 . (See, also , Parmenter v. Gillespie ,
9 Barr , 86 , and note “ a ," as to distinction between cases when the
mortgagee is bound to make the advances , and when they are op
tional.) The doctrine of these cases is pronounced reasonable by
Sanford , judge , delivering the opinion of the court in Boswell v .
Goodwin , 31 Conn ., 74 , and he pointedly asks why such mortgage
should not be treated “ in all respects as if executed at the time when
the advances are made .” But one of the judges dissented as to this
point, and the case was decided upon other grounds .
Judge Redfield, late chief justice of Vermont , ably discusses this
question in a note to the case of Boswell v . Goodwin , Amer. Law
Reg., vol. 12 , p . 92 , arriving substantially at the same conclusion as
that at which I have arrived. And Mr. Washburn ( in 1 Wash . on
Real Property , p. 542 ) , says it seems now to be the general rule .
The counsel for the complainant have strongly urged the incon
venience which must result, especially to banks and bankers (who
are accustomed to take such mortgages ) , by requiring an examina
tion of the record every time they are called upon to make such ad
vances under such a mortgage. Like Judge Redfield ( in the note
above cited ) , I have not " been able to comprehend ” this hardship .
It is , atmost , but the same inconvenience to which al
l
other parties
are compelled to submit when they lend money on the security o
f
real estate — the trouble o
f looking to the value o
f
the security . But ,
in truth , the inconvenience is very slight . Under any rule o
f
deci
sion they would be compelled to look to the record title when the
mortgage is originally taken . At the next advance they have only
to look back to this period , and for any future advance only back to
the last ; which would generally be but the work o
f
a few minutes ,
and much less inconvenience than they have to submit to in their
ordinary daily business in making inquiries as to the responsibility ,
the signatures and identity o
f
the parties to commercial paper . But
if there be any hardship , it is one which they can readily overcome ,
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by agreeing to make the advances ; in other words, by entering into
some contract , for the performance of which , by the other party , the
mortgage may operate as a security . They can hardly be heard to
complain of it as a hardship that the courts refuse to give them the
benefits of a contract which , from prudential or other considerations ,
they were unwilling to make, and did not make until after the rights
of other parties have intervened . Courts can give effect only to the
contracts the parties have made, and from the time they took effect .
The decree must be reversed , and the bill dismissed ; and the ap
pellants must recover their costs in both courts .35
Martin , Ch . J ., and Cooley , J., concurred .
Campbell, J., did not sit in this case .
BRINKMEYER v . BROWNELLER .
SUPREME COURT O
F
INDIANA , 1876 .
5












WORDEN , C . J . : * * * On December 29th , 1868 , Emanuel Gray
ville , Frederick Browneller and Anton Helbling , who then owned the
property a
s partners , executed a mortgage on certain r al and per





follows , themortgagors being named as the parties o
f




the second part , viz . :
“ The conditions o
f
this mortgage are such , that whereas the said
party o
f





the said Anton Helbling , on a certain promissory note exe
cuted by Helbling , on the 15th day o
f September , 1866 , due twelve
months after date , and made payable to the order of Maria Brink
meyer , for the sum o
f twenty - four hundred dollars , ( $ 2 ,400 ) with
ten per cent . interest from date thereof ; and whereas the party o
f
the second part is also endorser and surety for the said Anton Helb




Evansville , which note will mature on the 2d day of January , 1869 ,
for the sum o
f
seven hundred and twenty dollars ( $ 720 ) ; and
whereas the firm of A . Helbling & Co . , composed of the said Anton
Helbling , F . Browneller and E . K . Grayville , desire the said party o
f
the second part to endorse and become liable upon their paper , notes ,
bills and acceptances to bank , and individuals , to an amount not to
exceed eight thousand dollars ( $ 8 ,000 ) ; and whereas the said Anton
Helbling desires the said party o
f
the second part to endorse and
become liable upon his paper , notes , bills and acceptances to banks
and individuals , for an amount not to exceed four thousand dollars
3
5 See also Nicklin v . Betts Spring Co . , 11 Ore . 406 .
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heir paper ..of thismorts the party
( $ 4 ,000 ) ; and the said party of the second part having agreed to
hecome the endorser for said A . Helbling & Co., and the said Anton
Helbling , upon their paper , notes , bills and acceptances , for sums of
money not to exceed the amounts aforesaid ; and whereas it may be
necessary for the said party of the second part to become the en
dorser and surety of the aforesaid parties of the first part, in the re
newal of t ir paper, notes , bills and acceptances aforesaid :
“ Now , the purpose f t is mortgage is to secure , save harmless
and indemnify the said Brink eyer , party of the second part ,
against all loss and damage , as the surety and endorser of said An
ton Helbling , upon the note of Maria Brinkmeyer, for twenty -four
hundred dollars, as aforesaid ; and , also , to secure , save harmless
and indemnify the said Brinkmeyer , the party of the second part,
against all loss and damage as endorser and surety upon the paper ,
notes , bills and acceptances of the said A . Helbling & Co., and upon
all renewals of any such notes , bills and acceptances , to either banks
or individuals, to an amount not to exceed eight thousand dollars,
as aforesaid ; and , also , to secure , save harmless and indemnify the
said party of the second part against all loss or damage , as the en
dorser and surety upon notes , bills and acceptances of the said
Anton Helbling, and all renewals of the same to banks or individu
als , to an amount not to exceed four thousand dollars , as aforesaid .
And for the better securing of the party of the second part, against
all loss , the said parties of the first part bind themselves to keep al
l
the property herein specified , which may be liable to be destroyed by
fire , fully insured in good and solvent insurance companies , and this
is made an express condition of this mortgage ; and it is further
agreed , that said parties o
f
the first part have possession o
f
all said
property , and continue to carry on the foundry business , in manu





lowing contingencies , the said Brinkmeyer , the party o
f
the second
part , may , a
t
his option , institute legal proceedings , to foreclose this
mortgage , - - o
r , without legal proceedings , may enter in and take
possession of so much of said mortgaged personal property as he
may consider necessary to indemnify and save himself harmless , as
endorser and surety upon the notes , bills and acceptances o
f
either
the said A . Helbling & Co . , or the said Anton Helbling , or both ,
which the said party o
f
the second part has , or may hereafter , be
come liable for ; that is to say , in case any of the notes , bills or ac
ceptances o
n
which the said party o
f
the second part is now , o
r may
hereafter become liable , are not paid or renewed at maturity , or , in
case the said parties of the first part shall fail to keep said property
insured a
s
aforesaid , then a right o
f
action , or a right to take pos
session , immediately shall accrue to the said party o
f
the second part .
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such foreclosure . "
Afterwards , Helbling conveyed his interest in the mortgaged
premises , to Grayville and Browneller , of which Brinkmeyer had
notice . After this , Brinkmeyer , in pursuance o
f
the original agree
ment , and upon the demand of Helbling , endorsed for the latter to
the amount o
f
four thousand dollars , themost o
f
which he has been
compelled to pay , and the residue o
f
which is still outstanding .
The question arising is , whether Brinkmeyer has a lien upon the
mortgaged premises , by virtue o
f
the mortgage , as an indemnity
against loss and liability incurred b
y
endorsing for Helbling , after
the latter had transferred his interest in the mortgaged premises to
Grayville and Browneller .
We shall not enter upon any lengthy discussion of the general doc
trine applicable to mortgages given to secure future advances . The




First . Where the mortgagee has bound himself to make advances
o
r
incur liabilities , such advances , when made , shall relate back , and
the mortgage will be a valid lien for advances made or liabilities
incurred , against subsequent purchasers o
r
encumbrancers with no





Second . Where there is no obligation on the mortgagee , and
such advances o
r
liabilities are merely optional with him , and he has
actual notice o
f




mortgaged premises , before making advances o
r incurring liabili
ties , his lien is not good , as against the subsequent purchaser o
r
en




Ladue v . The Detroit & c . R . R . Co . , 13 Mich . 380 , is
a
n
exhaustive one , in which the authorities are extensively examined ,
both b
y
the counsel and the court . Chancellor Kent ( 4 Kent Com .
175 ) says :
“ So , a mortgage o
r judgment may be taken , and held as a secur
it
y
for future advances and responsibilities to the extent o
f
it , when
this is a constituent part o
f
the original agreement ; and the future
advances will be covered b
y
the lien , in preference to the claim under
a junior intervening incumbrance , with notice o
f
the agreement . "
But the appellees insist that there was no valid consideration for
Brinkmeyer ' s agreement to endorse for Helbling , and that it was en
tirely optional with him to do so or not , and , therefore , that the case
falls within the second proposition above stated . The case must turn
upon this question .
Wethink , however , there was an ample and valid consideration for
Brinkmeyer ' s promise , appearing on the face of the transaction ,
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which was the indemnity he acquired by the mortgage, against his
liability on the note to Maria Brinkmeyer and the note to Archer &
Co . Brinkmeyer , by his promise to endorse , in the future , for the
firm of A . Helbling & Co ., and for A . Helbling , as stipulated for ,
obtained an indemnity against an existing liability , which he did not
otherwise possess. By the mortgage , he obtained , not only “ security
for the future ," but, " indemnity for the past ." Without the mort
gage , if Brinkmeyer , had been compelled to pay the notes to Maria
Brinkmeyer and Archer & Co., he could only have looked to Helb
ling for repayment ; but, by the mortgage , he obtained a lien , as an
indemnity , upon the property mortgaged , belonging to the entire
firm . The security which he obtained in respect to his previous lia
bility was an ample consideration for his agreement to endorse in
the future for both the firm and for Helbling .
We have considered the case as if the firm had conveyed the prop
erty to a third person , having notice , actual or constructive, of the
mortgage , before Brinkmeyer had endorsed for Helbling . We need
not, therefore , determine whether Grayville and Browneller occupy
the same position in respect to the property, that a third person
would , if he had bought it from the firm , with notice of the mort
gage. They occupy no better position , to say the least . In respect
to notice , they , having with Helbling made themortgage , must be
taken to have had notice of it, as well as of its terms and contents .
Weare of opinion , on the case made , that the appellant has a lien
on the property , as against the appellees , by virtue of the mortgage ,
as an indemnity or security for whatever he may have paid , or for
whatever he may be liable , on his endorsements for Helbling , as set
up in the answer, and that the court erred in sustaining the demurrer
to the answer .
The judgment below is reversed , with costs, and the cause re
manded for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion .
Petition for a rehearing overruled at the May term , 1877 .36
EDITORIAL NOTE . — OBLIGATIONS OTHER THAN FOR PAYMENT OF
MONEY . “ It is not every conveyance of land upon a condition which
36 This case was again before the Supreme Court in 57 Ind. 435 , where
Howk , J ., says : “Under our construction of the appellant 's mortgage , in
the case of Brinkmeyer v. Browneller , supra , and we still adhere to that
construction , the appellant was bound , and could be compelled to endorse
for , or become the surety of, the appellee Anton Helbling , ' for an amount
not to exceed four thousand dollars . The fact that judgments had been
rendered against said Anton Helbling would not absolve the appellant
from this obligation ; and , therefore , his knowledge of such fact, before
he made advancements to , or incurred liabilities for, said Anton Helbling,
could not and would not, under the law , affect his rights under his mort
gage .”
See also , Rowan v . Sharp 's Rifle Co., 29 Conn . 282 ; Wilson v . Rus
sell , 13 Md. 494 .
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is in equity regarded as a mortgage . Early definitions of mortgages
are found , where no other conditional conveyances are regarded as
mortgages , but such as are made for the security of a loan of money .
At another date we find the equitable doctrines as to mortgages ex
tended to all cases where the conveyance is a security for any debt ;
and the most modern notion is to apply the same doctrines to cases
generally , where conditional deeds are made as a security for the
performance of a contract .
“ But upon consideration it will be seen that this principle , though
generally true , can have no application to any other contracts than
such as by their non -performance create a debt , or a demand in na
ture of a debt , against the delinquent party . Wherever the condi
tion , when broken , gives rise to no claim for damages whatever , or
to a claim for unliquidated damages , the deed is not to be regarded
as a mortgage in equity , but as a conditional deed at common law .
It has the incidents of a mortgage only to a limited extent , and the
party , if relieved by a court of equity from the forfeiture resulting
from the non -performance of the condition , will not be relieved as
in cases of a mortgage . It is not , however , intended to say that the
same principle of justice which has led courts of equity to establish
the system of relief from forfeitures in the case of mortgages, will
not entitle a party to analogous relief in cases where the design of
the parties is to make a conveyance by way of security . * * * ”
Bell, J ., in Bethlehem v . Annis , 40 N . H . 34 , 39 .
Mass.) 10




e parties . Bu
NECESSITY O
F
CONSIDERATION . A mortgage executed and delivered
as a gift is enforcible as between the parties . Bucklin v . Bucklin ,
1 Abb . App . Dec . ( N . Y . ) 242 ; Brooks v . Dalrymple , 12 Allen
(Mass . ) 102 ; ampbell v . Tompkins , 32 N . J . Eq . 170 ; Brigham v .
Brown , 44 Mich . 59 . In the case first cited , Denio , J . , says : “ The
plaintiff brings her suit in equity , not for the purpose o
f being aided
in establishing her mortgage under the notion of remedying a de
fective conveyance , or obtaining a specific performance , but to fore
close and extinguish the defendants ' equity of redemption , which
a court o
f
law is not competent to deal with . She does not come to
establish a voluntary equitable agreement , but to enforce a legal title
under an executed conveyance , and to cut off an equity attached to
that legal title and vested in the defendants . "
Of course , if the mortgage was not intended as a gift , want of
consideration or failure of consideration raises a different question .
A mortgage executed to secure a pre -existing indebtedness is en
forcible against themortgagor and a
ll
who acquire the property from
him subsequent to the mortgage and is not impeachable a
s
a fraud
upon creditors . But such a mortgage does not constitute the mort
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v . Stearns , 51 Ala . 434 ; Withers v. Little , 56 Cal. 370 ; Busenbark v .
Ramey , 53 Ind . 499 ; Gilchrist v . Gough , 63 Ind . 576 ; Boxheimer
v . Gunn , 24 Mich . 372 ; De Mey v . Defer , 103 Mich . 239 ; Schumpert
v. Dillard , 55 Miss . 348 ; Mingus v. Condit , 23 N . J . Eq. 31
3 ; De
lancey v . Stearns , 66 N . Y . 157 . Contra , Haynes v . Eberhardt , 37
Kans . 308 ; Brem v . Lockhart , 93 N . C . 191 . See also Manning v .
McClure , 36 Ill . 490 . See also Jones , $ $ 460 , 461 . Such a mort
gage is also liable to attack a
s




CONSIDERATION . If themortgage secures a debt the
consideration for which is illegal , it is usually held that neither
party can maintain any action thereon , neither the mortgagee to
foreclose o
r
to obtain possession , nor the mortgagor to redeem or
have the instrument cancelled . W — v . B - , 32 Beav . 574 ; Gilbert
v . Holmes , 64 Ill . 548 ; Hyatt v . James , 2 Bush (Ky . ) 463 ; Atwood
v . Fisk , 101 Mass . 363 ; McQuade v . Rosecrans , 36 Ohio S
t
. 442 ;
Pearce v . Wilson , 111 Pa . St . 14 . It has , however , been held that
in spite o
f illegality the mortgagee can maintain ejectment upon the
executed conveyance . Raguet v . Roll , 7 Ohio R . ( part 2 ) 70 . This
holding obviously leads to injustice unless the mortgagor is per
mitted to redeem and , accordingly , in Cowles v . Raguet , 14 Ohio
3
8 , another case growing out o
f
the same mortgage , it was said that
this was permissible . The result was , of course , to make the mort
gage substantially enforcible .
The effect o





INCIDENTS OF THE MORTGAGE RELATION .
SECTION 1. — Possession .
ROCKWELL v. BRADLEY.
SUPREME COURT OF CONNECTICUT , 1816 .
2 Conn . 1 .
SWIFT, C . J. : The question is, whether an action of disseisin can
be maintained , by the mortgagee , against the mortgagor, who con
tinued in possession , without notice to quit .
The mortgagee , on the execution of the deed , is vested with the
fee of the land , and is entitled to the immediate possession , though
the law day has not elapsed . It is, however , the understanding of
the parties , that the mortgagor shall retain the possession .
The principle contended for, on the part of the defendant , is , that
the mortgagor continues in possession by the license , consent , and
agreement of themortgagee ; that the possession is lawful ; and that
he can not become a disseisor , unless a surrender of possession be
demanded , or a notice to quit be given . Of course , to maintain this
action , we must treat as a disseisor a man who has lawful posses
sion ; which is repugnant to acknowledged principles .
To decide this question , we must consider the nature of the right
of a mortgagor in possession . He has been likened to a tenant at
will ; but the resemblance is very remote ; for, it is agreed , he would
not be entitled to emblements , or accountable for rent. The truth
is , such an estate is of a peculiar nature, precisely resembling no
other. Lord Mansfield says , in Keech v . Hall , Dougl. 22 , he is a
tenant at will in the strictest sense . Though the inference from the
fact that the mortgagor is left in possession , is an agreement that
he shall continue it, yet this is under this condition , that he is so
entirely subject to the will of the mortgagee , that he ( the mort
gagee ) may consider his possession to be lawful , or treat him as a
disseisor, without notice to quit . This results from the nature of an
estate in mortgage , where the object is to give themortgagee an ab
1 Gilman v. Wills , 66 Maine 273 . .
2 See Morse v. Merritt , 110 Mass . 458 .
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solute power over the pledge to enable him to secure or enforce the
payment of the debt.3
Accord : Trumbull , Edmund , Smith and Brainard , JJ.
Contra : Baldwin , Hosner and Gould , JJ. [Maintaining that no
tice to quit was necessary . ]
No action of ejectment shall hereafter be maintained by a mort
gagee , or his assigns or representatives , for the recovery of the pos
session of the mortgaged premises . 2 Revised Statutes of New
York ( 1828 ) , p . 312 , $ 57 .
Unless a mortgage specially provide , that the mortgagee shall have
possession of the mortgaged premises , he shall not be entitled to
the same. 2 Revised Statutes of Indiana (1852 ) , p . 239 , § 1.4
PHYFE v . RILEY .
SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK , 1836 .
15 Wend . ( N . Y .) 248 .
[ This was an action of ejectment . The plaintiff claimed title
through one Joseph Burke . The third point of defense was that the
3 Accord : Carroll v . Ballance , 26 Ill . 9 ; Pettengill v . Evans , 5 N . H .
5
4 . That the mortgagee may enter without legal proceedings , being lia
ble , however , for any breach o
f
the peace in so doing . Lackey v . Hol
brook , 11 Metc . (Mass . ) 458 ; Brown v . Cram , 1 N . H . 169 ; Tryon v .
Munson , 77 Pa . S
t
. 250 .
In a few states it is held that the mortgagee can recover possession
after default , but not before . Hill v . Robertson , 24 Miss . 368 ; Bailey v .
Winn , 101 Mo . 649 ; Sanderson v . Price , 21 N . J . L . 637 , note ; Martin v .
Alter , 42 Ohio S
t
. 94 .
When the mortgagee is a
t
law entitled to possession , equity will not
enjoin him from proceeding to enforce that right - Schwartz v . Sears ,
Walk . Ch . (Mich . ) 170 .
A stipulation reserving to the mortgagor the right of possession until
default is in common use . As to it
s
effect , see Gooding v . Shea , post .
For cases of implied conditions to the same effect see , McMillan v . Otis ,
74 Ala . 560 ; Flagg v . Flagg , 11 Pick . (Mass . ) 475 .
4 One of the foregoing statutes or a similar one is in force in almost
every lien state .
In several states this statute is the basis o
f
the lien theory . Thus in
Michigan the Supreme Court originally held the title theory (Stevens v .
Brown , Walk . Ch . (Mich . ) 41 ) but upon the enactment of a statute in
1843 , similar to that o
f
New York , supra , the court construed it broadly
as changing the substantive nature o
f
the mortgage . Crippen v . Morri
son , 13 Mich . 23 . See also Cullen v . Minnesota Loan & Trust Co . , 60
Minn , 6 .
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defendant was assignee of a mortgagee executed by the said Joseph
Burke and was therefore a mortgagee in possession .]
By the Court , SAVAGE , C . J . : * * *
Previous to the adoption of the revised statutes , it was well set
tled that a mortgagee in possession of the mortgaged premises might
protect his possession by force of his mortgage . 10 Johns . R . 480 .
7 Cowen , 13 . The revised statutes have not altered the law in this
respect , unless it is by way of inference from the provision that no
action of ejectment shall hereafter be maintained by a mortgagee , or
his assigns or representatives , for the recovery of the possession of
the mortgaged premises . 2 R . S . 312 , Par. 57 . The cases deciding
that a mortgagee might protect his possession by means of his mort
gage, do not give as a reason for that decision that the mortgagee
might recover possession in an action of ejectment ; nor do the re
vised statutes necessarily alter the law as to the interest vested in the
parties to the mortgage ; they merely affect the remedy . Formerly ,
a mortgagee after forfeiture might pursue several remedies at the
same time, and by so doing subject the mortgagor to unnecessary
costs . The legislature may have intended merely to prevent oppres
sion ; they certainly did not intend to give an exposition of the rights
of the mortgagor and mortgagee any farther than as to the par
ticular remedy . Much of the difficulty in establishing an uniform
rule in relation to mortgages grows out of the fact, that a mortgage
has been differently considered in courts of equity and courts of
law . In the former it is merely a security for money , in the latter
it has been understood sometimes as a conveyance upon condition .
In courts of law , in this state particularly , the mortgagor is consid
ered the true owner against all the world except the mortgagee ; and
even the mortgagee has been considered merely an encumbrancer
until forfeiture of the condition by non -payment of the money . Then
and not till then is he considered as having an interest in the land ;
then , formerly , he might claim the possession by an action of eject
ment , and upon the trial prove the condition broken , and thus show
a complete title . Now , by the revised statutes , the mortgagee must
complete his title by other proceedings before he brings his suit ;
but if the mortgagee , after forfeiture , obtains possession in some
legal mode other than by an action , why should the mortgagor or
those claiming under him recover the possession from the mortgagee
without paying the money secured by it ? He is still considered as
having the legal estate after condition broken ;' having that estate
and being in possession , what reason can be given why he should be
turned out of possession ? Is it that he may be put to the trouble and
expense of foreclosing his mortgage , and then bringing his eject
ment ? Such , surely , can not be the policy of the law ; on the con
trary , litigation and expense to parties will be saved by permitting
5 Compare Runyon v. Messereau , supra.
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the mortgagee to retain possession , until the mortgagor or those
claiming under him shall institute proceedings in a court of equity
for the purpose of redemption . It has been decided that the estate
of the mortgagor , before foreclosure , is a legal estate which may be
sold on execution . Waters v . Stewart , 1 Caines ' C . in Err. 66 , 70.
In Jackson v . Willard , 4 Johns . R . 41, it was decided that the inter
est of a mortgagee , after forfeiture and before foreclosure , can not
be sold on execution while the mortgagor is in possession . Kent ,
Ch . Justice , says, “ Until foreclosure , or at least until possession
taken , the mortgage remains in the light of a chose in action ."
" When the mortgagee has taken possession of the land, the rents
and profits may, perhaps , then become the subject of computation
and sale .” It can not be denied that the mortgagee has an interest
in the mortgaged premises , and that interest after forfeiture is a
legal interest ; it is indeed inchoate until foreclosure , but it has here
tofore been considered sufficient to protect him in the possession of
the mortgaged premises when legally obtained . Being unable to
see in the revised statutes anything which changes this rule of law ,
I am unwilling to depart from previous adjudications , unless I can
perceive a clear intention of the legislature to change the rule . On
the whole case , therefore , it seems to me that the defendant is en
titled to judgment.6
WALTERS v . CHANCE .
SUPREME COURT OF KANSAS , 1906 .
73 Kans. 680 .
(Ejectment. Answer , and demurrer thereto sustained . ]
GREENE , J. : The material allegations of this answer were that on
April 1 , 1886 , William T . Tartar, being the owner of the land in
controversy , executed a mortgage thereon for $250 , payable to Lew
E . Darrow , due April 1, 1891 ; that the defendant was the owner of
that mortgage ; that it had not been paid ; that on May 3, 1886 , Tar
tar and wife conveyed the land to Alexander McCollum by war
ranty deed , and on September 3 , 1887 , McCollum conveyed the land
by warranty deed to William Chance , who by a condition in the deed
assumed and agreed to pay the mortgage ; that on April 1, 1891 ,
William Chance secured an extension of five years from that date
for its payment ; that for a long time prior to February 11, 1901,
William Chance and his heirs had abandoned the land ; that on the
date last named the land was unoccupied ; and that on that date de
6 Compare the remarks of Comstock , J ., in Kortwright v . Cady , supra .
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fendant went into possession thereof under his mortgage , and has
continued in the exclusive occupancy thereof ever since , claiming to
be a mortgagee in possession .
fendants in error cenof a mortgagee
inossession under1
The defendants in error contend that before the holder of a mort
gage can invoke the defense a “mortgagee in possession ,” in an
action of ejectment , he must show that he took possession under his
mortgage with the consent of the owner of the land. They also con
tend that the answer shows that no such consent was obtained ; that,
therefore , the entry was unlawful ; and that an equitable defense
can not be predicated upon an unlawful act. The decisions of this
court , where the defense of a mortgagee in possession has been
made, do not sustain the contention that the possession must have
been acquired with the consent of the owner. In Kelso v . Norton ,
65 Kan . 778 , the mortgagee got possession under a void foreclosure
sale , and it was held that he was a mortgagee in possession . The
facts in the case of Stouffer v . Harlan , 68 Kan . 135, were substan
tially the same, and it was again held that the mortgagee was entitled
to the rights of a mortgagee in possession . In Rogers v . Benton ,
39 Minn . 39 , it was said that where the mortgaged land had been
abandoned and the mortgagee had gone peaceably and quietly into
possession , the owner could not maintain ejectment until he paid the
mortgage lien , and that abandonment is an implied assent that the
mortgagee may take possession under his mortgage . In Cooke v .
Cooper et al., 18 Ore . 142 , it was said :
“ If he (the mortgagee ) can make a peaceable entry upon the
mortgaged premises after condition broken , he may do so , and may
maintain such possession against the mortgagor and every person
claiming under him subsequent to the mortgage, subject to be de
feated only by the payment of his debt." ( Page 148.)
Whether the holder of a mortgage who is in possession is entitled
to make the defense of a “mortgagee in possession ,” after condition
broken , depends upon the equities of each case . No general rule
applicable alike to all cases can be stated , except where the mort
gagee enters under an express agreement with the owner. Of course ,
if he obtain possession by force, intimidation , deceit or fraud ,s
a court of equity will not permit him to profit thereby . But where,
7 Accord : Miner v. Beekman , 50 N . Y . 337 ; Cook v. Cooper, 18 Ore .
142 ; Tallman v. Ely , 6 Wis . 244 .
If the purchaser is a third person , the invalid foreclosure has the ef
fect of an equitable assignment of the mortgage and if the purchaser
takes possession peaceably he has the rights of a mortgagee in posses
sion . Townshend v. Thompson , 139 N . Y . 152 .
& Under the lien theory if the mortgagor 's tenant without the mort
gagor ' s consent surrenders possession to the mortgagee , the latter can
not claim the rights of a mortgagee lawfully in possession . Russell v .
Ely , 2 Black . ( U . S.) 575 . Compare Kimball v. Lockwood , 6 R . I. 138 .
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after condition broken , the land is unoccupied , and he enters peace
ably , a court of equity will not eject him at the suit of the owner
until his lien upon the land shall have been satisfied . Such a rule
does equity between the parties , and deprives the owner of the land
of no rights. Mr. Justice Mason , speaking for the court in Stouffer
v . Harlan , 68 Kan . 135, said :
“ The expression frequently used , that the entry must be lawful,
we interpret to mean not that it must have been effected under a
formal right capable of enforcement by legal proceedings , but that
it must not be through any unlawful or wrongful act , upon which
the mortgagee would be estopped to found a right . ( Page 145.)
If, after condition broken , the premises are unoccupied , the mort
gagee may , if he can do so peaceably , enter into possession under
his mortgage ; and he can not be ejected therefrom by the owner un
ti
l
his mortgage lien has been fully satisfied . The land in question
had been sold and deeded for the taxes o
f
1893 . The owners had
paid no subsequent taxes . No interest had been paid on the mort
gage debt after 1895 . In February , 1901 , the land was unoccupied
and " abandoned , ” as stated by defendant in his answer . The mort
gagee went quietly and peaceably into possession , under his mort .
gage , and continued therein without objection until this action was
commenced September , 1903 . The facts pleaded are ample to sus
tain the defense o
f
a mortgagee in possession . It was error there
fore to sustain the demurrer .
The judgment is reversed , and the cause remanded , with instruc
tions to overrule the demurrer .
All the Justices concurring .
Porter , J . , not sitting .
NEWTON v . McKAY .
SUPREME COURT O
F MichIGAN , 1874 .
3
0 Mich . 380 .
CAMPBEELL , J . : This was ejectmentbrought b
y







lands , against McKay , who holds as
assignee o
f
a mortgage not in a shape to be foreclosed by advertise
ment , but which had been proceeded on b
y
statutory foreclosure .
The facts appear substantially as follows : Newton holds b
y
deed
from the estate o
f
one Belote , given b
y
his administrator in August ,
1869 , under a probate decree enforcing a contract made by Belote
for the sale o
f
the land in 1868 . McKay holds by assignment a
mortgage made by Belote in 1866 , irregualarly foreclosed in 1869 ,
and b
y
a deed from Belote ' s administrator , given in June , 1871 . For
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someunexplained reason McKay went into possession in the summer
of 1871. The court below sustained the legality of his possession as
a mortgagee.
The first question to be considered is the character of this entry .
It is claimed to have been with the mortgagor 's consent . But when
the entry was made, and when the deed was given by Belote 's ad




the estate had been divested
b
y
the previous conveyance under the probate decree . Thereafter
Belote ' s estate had no further concern with the land , and permission
from the administrator was no better than if Belote had never owned
it . The question then arises , whether a mortgagee who goes into
possession without the permission o
f
the mortgagor , has a right to
hold possession against him . It is claimed that such possession ,
peaceably obtained ,may be upheld .
It was held in Mundy v . Monroe , I Mich . 68 , that if the statute
o
f
1843 , forbidding ejectment suits by mortgagees before foreclos
ure , applied to existing mortgages , it was invalid , because impairing
the obligation o
f
contracts . In other words , it was held that this
law was inconsistent with a contract which authorized the mortgagee
to take possession , a
s
he always could at common law . The court ,
in further declaring the object o
f
the act to be to take away the right
of possession from the mortgagee , merely expressed the same idea .
It would be absurd to hold there could be a right of possession which
could not lawfully be enforced . This holding was in no sense
obiter dictum , but was the very thing decided .
In a
ll
the decisions and rulings made by this court since , this idea
has been adhered to , and the right o
f possession has been denied .
In Crippen v . Morrison , 13 Mich . 23 , and Hogsett v . Ellis , 17 Mich .
351 , the questions involved bore directly on the existence o
f any right
of possession .
Where the mortgagee has no authority not derived from the
mortgage itself , there is no middle ground between a right to sue
for possession and no possessory right . The form o
f
the mortgage
remains as before . The right o
f possession , if it exists at all , exists
because the legal title passes , and can be enforced b
y legal remedies .
There can be no such things in existence at the same time as a mort
gagor ' s right to hold possession and a mortgagee ' s right to hold it .
One must be entitled , to the exclusion o
f
the other .
If a mortgagor puts a mortgagee in possession , or gives him per
mission to enter , there may arise an inference that the license is
given with a view o
f making the possession subservient to the pur
poses o
f
the mortgage ; and there may be convincing reasons for re
garding such a possession a
s
not subject to disturbance b
y
the mort
gagor without redemption . That question is not now before us .
But whatever authority exists in such a case originates in the license
and not in the mortgage , and forms no part of the original contract .
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When the law of 1843 was passed , the common - law doctrine of
mortgages had become so far modified by the rules of equity that the
last innovation was almost a corollary of former ones . Where a
mortgagee's estate had been moulded into a mere security for a per
sonal claim , and the estate in land passed by a parol transfer, and
became personalty , the remedy by ejectment became incongruous.
It must in many cases be brought in the name of a party having no
interest of his own, or by one who traced his title without conform
ing to the rules of the statute of frauds, which requires estates to be
transferred more formally . Where the estate in fee was regarded
as belonging to the mortgagee , the possession belonged with it.
When the fee was no longer regarded as passing , the possessory
right became anomalous . It was an incident which had become
severed from it
s principal , and which le
d
to serious complications in
settling the equities o
f
foreclosure and redemption . The act o
f
1843
was the last thing needed to harmonize the law , and to place mort
gages in fact , as they had long been in theory , in the condition of
mere securities and chattel interests .
Weare aware that in some states the courts have given a similar
statute a construction which is absolutely literal , and maintains the
right o
f possession , while forbidding its legal enforcement . We can
not regard this as in harmony with the general rules o
f
law . If the
mortgagee in possession can insist on retaining it , his right must de
pend upon his contract , and , as already suggested , should be capable
o
f
enforcement . There can be no interest in lands which can not be
enforced somewhere . And we can not imagine that the legislature
would have taken pains to introduce , as a new and radical change ,
a measure that could a
t any timebe rendered nugatory by an entry
without force .
The decision in Mundy v . Monroe is not only to be respected as
a precedent , but is in our view in full accordance with the purposes
of the statute .
We think the court erred in rendering judgment for defendant
o
n the finding .
The judgment must be reversed , and judgment entered for plain
tiff , that he recover possession , with costs of both courts , and that
the record be remanded , that defendantmay have the benefit o
f any
statutory application for a new trial to which he may become en
titled .
The other Justices concurred . ?
CAMPBELL , J . , in HAZELTINE V . GRANGER , 44 Mich . 503 (1880 ) .
The statute (denying ejectment to the mortgagee ) does not say
9 See also , Johnson v . Sherman , 15 Cal . 287 ; Lewis v . Hamilton , 26
Colo . 263 ; Rogers v . Benton , 39 Minn . 39 ; Russell v . Akeley Lumber Co . ,
4
5 Minn . 376 . See also , 8 Col . L . Rev . 486 .





the fee chooses to put him in , the tenancy is at least
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that no ejectment shall lie unless there is an agreement to that ef
fect, but that it shall not lie at al
l
. Every mortgage made in com
mon law form contains words whereby , if applied as they read , pos
session would belong to the mortgagee and his title would become
absolute b
y
default . The whole aim o
f equity was to arrest this
forfeiture and not to allow the language o
f
a mortgage to have any
force against the equity o
f redemption . The statute is a further step
in the same direction for the protection o
fmortgagors against agree
ments which , as literally drawn and as theretofore expounded , were
deemed dangerous , and against public policy . The language o
f
this
mortgage expressly granting rents and profits on default is no
stronger than the previous words o
f
grant , and is really narrowed .
It was no doubt intended to go further and to evade the statute . If
it had contained an agreement that ejectment should lie , it could
not very well be enforced against the clause o
f
the statute prohibit
ing it . It can have no greater force in enlarging the jurisdiction o
f
equity to appoint receivers , which we held in Wagar v . Stone , had





t will , and can not be destroyed without notice . "
In California it seems settled that under such circumstances the mort
gagee may retain possession until he is paid . Spect v . Spect , 88 Cal . 437 .
1
0 Cf . Michigan Trust Co . v . Lansing Lumber Co . , 103 Mich . 392 ; Guy
v . Ide , 6 Cal . 99 ; American Investment Co . v . Farrar , 87 Iowa 437 ; Seck
ler v . Delfs , 25 Kans . 159 .
" Our statute declares that ' a mortgage of real property is not to be
deemed a conveyance , so as to enable the owner of the mortgage to re
cover possession o
f
the real property without a foreclosure . Gen . Stat .
1878 , chap . 75 , § 29 . In numerous decisions o
f
this court , this statute has
been recognized as changing the common - law relations and rights of
mortgagors and mortgagees . The mortgagee is no longer entitled to the
possession o
f
the mortgaged premises before foreclosure by reason o
f
his having any title or estate in the land . The mortgagor , having the
legal title , may without doubt remain in possession until his title is d
i
vested , unless , in the application o
f
the established principles o
f equity ,
and consistently with the legal title remaining in the mortgagor , the court
shall find it necessary to lay its hand upon the property for the protec
tion of the equitable rights of the mortgagee . The exercise of this power
by courts of equity in the past was not based upon the ground that the
legal title had passed from the mortgagor to the mortgagee ; but upon the
equitable rights o
f
the mortgagee to have his security preserved so that
it should be adequate for the satisfaction of the mortgage debt . Indeed ,
this power was exercised in favor of those who had no legal title , as in
the case o
f junior mortgagees , and o
f
securities given by the deposit o
f
title -deeds . Berney v . Sewell , 1 Jac . & W . 647 ; Bryan v . Cormick , 1 Cox
422 ; Meaden v . Sealey , 6 Hare 620 ; Holmes v . Bell , 2 Beav . 298 ; High ,
Rec . , $ 8 640 , 658 , 682 ; Adams , Eq . 125 . The jurisdiction of equity in the
appointment o
f
receivers , long exercised upon grounds peculiar to courts
o
f equity , is not to be deemed to have been taken away by the statute un
less that is its necessary effect , or at least its obvious purpose . Such is
not the obvious purpose or necessary effect o
f
this statute . ” Dickinson ,
J . , in Lowell v . Doe , 44 Minn . 144 , 146 .
* “ We are aware that the Supreme Court o
f
California , in the case
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ALBERT , C . J ., in FELINO V. NEWCOMB LUMBER Co ., 64 Neb . 335
( 1902 ) . The only statutory regulation on the subject in this state
is that to be found in section 55 , chapter 73, Compiled Statutes ,
which is as follows : " In the absence of stipulations to the contrary ,
the mortgagor of real estate retains the legal title and right of pos
session thereof ." This provision leaves it competent for the parties
to a mortgage to stipulate for the investiture of the mortgagee with
the legal title and right of possession , which carries with it the right
to the rents and profits .
EDITORIAL NOTE - RIGHTS OF THE MORTGAGEE AGAINST A TENANT
OF THE MORTGAGOR .
If the mortgagee has the right to recover the possession from the
mortgagor , he has the same right as against a tenant of the mort
gagor holding under a lease executed subsequent to the execution
of the mortgage , though the mortgagor was in possession when he
made the lease . Keech v. Hall , 1 Doug. 21 ; American Freehold
Land Mortgage Co. v . Turner , 95 Ala . 272 ; Russum v . Wanser , 53
Md. 92 . But, as against a tenant whose lease antedates the mort
gage, he stands in the position of an assignee of the reversion and
can not evict the tenant . American Mortgage Co . v . Turner , supra .
On the other hand , in the latter case , the mortgagee , being an as
signee of the reversion , can compel the lessee to pay to him the rent
accruing since the date of the mortgage , which is due at the time of
the mortgagee 's demand and has not been already paid to the mort
gagor, and al
l
rent thereafter becoming due , unless , perhaps , it has
been paid to the mortgagor in advance before the mortgagee ' s de
o
f Guy v . Ide , 6 Cal . 99 , held that , under a statute precisely like ours , it was
not a proper practice to appoint receivers pending a foreclosure suit .
" The learned judge who rendered the opinion in that case says : “Our
statute forbids a mortgagee from recovering the mortgaged estate , and
confines his remedy to a foreclosure . The same reason does not , there
fore , exist , as by the English rule for appointing a receiver to collect the
rents and profits pending the litigation . This reasoning is , to our minds ,
incomprehensible . The argument is , 'Our law , having forbid the mort
gagee to bring ejectment for the property mortgaged , it therefore be
comes the duty o
f equity courts to deny him all security to be derived
from the rents and profits , and all opportunity of protecting the property
during litigation . If it be taken for granted that it was the object of our
legislature , in framing this part o
f
the practice act , to discourage mort
gages , and to render such securities uncertain and comparatively value
less , then we could understand this reasoning . But if the intention was
merely to simplify proceedings in courts o
f justice and prevent multi
plicity of suits , then we can not understand or appreciate the force of this
argument .
“ The legislature having forbid the mortgagee pursuing the common
law remedy o
f ejectment , would , it appears to us , be rather a reason for
a more liberal exercise o
f
the chancellor ' s powers to protect the security
he has for his debt . ” Batty , J . , in Hyman v . Kelly , 1 Nevada 179 .
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mand . Tiffany , Real Property , $ 521 ; Moss v . Gallimore , 1 Doug .
279 ; King v . Housatonic R . Co ., 45 Conn . 226 ; Teal v . Walker , 111
U . S . 242 ; De Nichols v . Saunders , L . R . 5 C . P . 589 ; Stone v . Pat
terson , 19 Pick . (Mass.) 476 . But, where the mortgage precedes the
lease , the mortgage can not be called an assignment of the reversion
and consequently , there being no privity of estate or contract
between them , the mortgagee can not compel the lessee to pay rent
to hi
m . Teal v . Walker , 111 U . S . 242 ; Kimball v . Lockwood , 6
R . I . 138 . Such a lessee may , however , in order to avoid eviction ,
u
t supra , attorn to the mortgagee and such attornment is a defense
to the mortgagor ' s claim for rent subsequently accruing . Kimball
v . Lockwood , supra ; Jones v . Clark , 20 Johns . ( N . Y . ) 51 . As to
whether such attornment creates a new tenancy between the lessee
and the mortgagee for the unexpired term o
f
the old lease , see
Gartside v . Outlay , 58 I11 . 210 .
As long as the mortgagor is permitted to remain in possession , he
receives the rents and profits o
f
the land as owner . Accordingly he
can not be made to account to the mortgagee for rent received b
y
him from a tenant o
f
the mortgaged land . Teal v . Walker , supra .
It has even been so held as to rent which , by reason of notice to the
tenant , was payable to the mortgagee . Ex parte Wilson , 2 Ves . &
B . 252 . In such a case the mortgagee ' s remedy is against the tenant ,
whose obligation to the mortgagee is not discharged by payment to
the mortgagor . Watford v . Oates , 57 Ala . 290 .
If the mortgagee has no right to recover possession from the
mortgagor , he , o
f
course , has no such right against any tenant o
f
the
mortgagor , nor can he compel the lessee to pay rent to him , whether
the lease was prior o
r subsequent to the mortgage . Teal v . Walker ,
supra ; Hogsett v . Ellis , 17 Mich . 351 . Nor is an attornment of the
tenant to the mortgagee valid . Hogsett v . Ellis , supra ; Mills v .
Heaton , 52 Iowa 215 ; Russell v . Ely , 2 Black ( U . S . ) 575 . After
foreclosure , however , the position o
f
the purchaser with reference
to a tenant of the mortgagor would seem to be substantially the same
as that o
f
a mortgagee who is entitled to possession as against the
mortgagor , u
t supra ; Simers v . Saltus , 3 Denio ( N . Y . ) 214 ; Bat
terman v . Albright , 122 N . Y . 484 .
In those states where there is a statutory right o
f
redemption
after foreclosure sale , it is usually held that the purchaser acquires
no title and no right o
f possession , until the expiration o
f
the period
allowed for such redemption . See Jones Mortgages , § 1661 . But
see Jones v . Thomas , 8 Blackf . ( Ind . ) 428 .
The mortgagee in possession is held to a
n accounting un
der rules so strict as to make the possession a doubtful advantage .
See post , Chap . VIII .
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SECTION 2. — THE MORTGAGEE 'S LEGAL REMEDIES FOR INJURY TO
THE MORTGAGED PREMISES .
GOODING v. SHEA .
SUPREME COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS , 1869 .
103 Mass . 360 .
Tort . The first count in the declaration alleged that the defendant
forcibly entered the plaintiff ' s close , being the dwelling house num
bered 8 on Brookline Street in Boston , tore out, took and carried
away certain fixtures in said dwelling -house, and converted them to
his own use . The second count alleged that Hiram Curtis was the
owner of said , dwelling-house , “ subject to two mortgages , one of
$ 5, 000 and the other of $ 1 ,000 , and interest on the same, and the said
Curtis conveyed the same to the plaintiff , subject to said mortgages,
to secure the payment of $ 3 ,000 and interest , before that time loaned
and advanced to said Curtis by the plaintiff , and the defendant aft
erwards forcibly entered said dwelling -house and tore out, took and
carried away ” certain fixtures “ in said dwelling -house and converted
the same to his own use , by means whereof the plaintiff 's said se
curity for his said loan was greatly lessened and destroyed .” The
third and fourth counts were like the first and second , except that
" dwelling -house numbered 9 ” was substituted for dwelling -house
numbered 8 .” Writ dated August 27 , 1868 .
At the trial in the superior court , before Morton, J., without a
jury , the following facts appeared : Curtis , being owner of both
said houses , on September 16 , 1867, mortgaged them to the Me
chanics ' Savings Bank of Lowell , each by a separate deed , and each
to secure the payment of $ 5000 in six months from date ; on Febru
ary 7 , 1868 , he mortgaged them to Mary A . Lewis , each by a sepa
rate deed , and each to secure the payment of $ 1000 in four months
from date ; and on April 18 , 1868 , he mortgaged them to the plain
tiff , each by a separate deed , and each to secure the payment o
f
$ 3000 . Each o
f
these si
x mortgages contained a provision that un
ti
l
breach of condition the mortgagee should have no right to take
possession . On June 20 , 1868 , the defendant entered the premises
and tore away and removed water pipes and other fixtures attached
to the realty ; at which time the premises were in the possession o
f
the mortgagor , and there had been no breach o
f
the condition in the
mortgages to the plaintiff . On July 11 , 1868 , the plaintiff took an
assignment from Mary A . Lewis o
f
the two mortgages to her ; on
July 30 , 1868 , entered to foreclose ; and on August 28 , 1868 , sold the
houses under powers of sale contained in the said two mortgages ,
bought them in himself for $ 2 ,000 each , and had subsequently con
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veyed one of them for $ 9 ,400 by a warranty deed , and still held the
other, which was of equal value. Since the alleged trespass , Curtis
had been adjudged a bankrupt, and his assignee had brought suit
against the defendant for the same trespass .
The defendant contended that, on these facts , the plaintiff could
not maintain this action , and , even if he could , still if, on the evidence ,
the houses were of sufficient value over and above all prior incum
brances to pay the plaintiff his whole debt , he could recover in this
suit only nominal damages , or only such sum as he had ,by reason of
the trespass , lost on his security . But the judge ruled that the plain
tiff might recover the full amount of the damages to the estate by





the trespass . The defendant alleged
exceptions .
WELLS , J . - There are two counts in the declaration relating to
each lot o
f
land and dwelling -house . The plaintiff is third mort
gagee o
f
each parcel , b
y
separate mortgages , containing a clause





the alleged tort .
The first count , relating to each parcel , is in the nature o
f trespass
quare clausum fregit , and can not be maintained because o
f
the want
of possession or right of possession at the time of the alleged tres
pass . Page v . Robinson , 10 Cush . 99 ; Woodman v . Francis , 14
Allen 198 .
The second count in each case sets forth the actual condition o
f
the title , and alleges that the defendant " forcibly entered said dwell
ing -house " and removed certain fixtures , “ b
y
means whereof the
plaintiff ' s said security for his said loan was greatly lessened and
destroyed . ” We do not think this count sets forth the entry as a
violation o
f
the plaintiff ' s possession , or possessory right ; but only as
the means b
y
which an injury was caused to his mortgage security .
No question is raised here in regard to the liability o
f
the defen
dant to some one for the fixtures so removed . The points of the de
fence are , that the mortgagee in possession can alone recover ; o
r ,
if either mortgagee may do so , it must be the first mortgagee only .
The mortgagor might undoubtedly maintain an action o
f trespass ;
and damages for the unlawful removal o
f
fixtures would be recover
able in such action b
y way o
f aggravation . Earle v . Hall , 2 Met .
353 . For the removal of crops , or other property connected with
the land , which the mortgagor himself might have removed , his
right o
f recovery would be exclusive . Woodward v . Pickett , 8
Gray 617 . But fixtures he could not himself remove , against the
right o
f
the mortgagee , nor permit to be removed ; nor can he have
any right to withhold the compensation o
r damages for them from
the mortgagee , in whom the legal title is . The mortgagee may re
cover their value against the mortgagor o
r any other party who may
1
0
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be responsible for their removal. Cole v . Stewart , 11 Cush . 181.
Such right to recover depends upon the title , and not upon posses
sion , or the right of present possession , of the land . The right of
present possession only affects the form of action in such case .
Although the mortgagor in possession may recover , in an action of
trespass , for the value of fixtures removed by a stranger to the title ,
his right to their value is subordinate to that of a mortgagee , and
therefore can not be set up by the defendant to defeat a recovery
for the same by such mortgagee. The mortgagor 's right of action ,
based upon his possession , does not depend upon , nor necessarily in
clude , the right to recover for the aggravation by removal of fixtures .
Phelps v . Morse , 9 Gray 207 . The right to recover the value of the
fixtures is separable from that to recover for " breach of the close."
Bickford v . Barnard , 8 Allen 314 . It is incidental only to the action
of trespass . But , as the injury affects the estate , it may be sued for
directly by any one in whom the legal interest is vested . A second
or third mortgagee , though not in possession ,has a sufficient interest
in the estate to maintain an action for such an injury . Although
it is true that a stranger may thus be liable to either of the several
mortgagees , as well as to themortgagor , it does not follow that he is
liable to a
ll successively . The superior right is in the party having
superiority o
f
title . But the defendant can resist neither , b
y
merely
showing that another may also sue , or has sued . If he would defeat
the claim o
f
either , he must show that another , having a superior
right , has appropriated the avails o
f
the claim to himself . The de
mand is not personal to either mortgagee , but arises out o
f
and per
tains to the estate ; and , when recovered , applies in payment , pro
tanto , o
f
the mortgage debt , and thus ultimately for the benefit o
f
the mortgagor , if he redeem . It differs in this respect from the
claim for insurance in King v . State Insurance Co . , 7 Cush . 1 , cited
b
y
the defendant . The defendant has the same means o
f protection
against four judgments that any one has who is liable , for the same
cause , to either o
f
several parties having different o
r
successive in
terests in the subject matter . Due satisfaction will discharge all the
claims , if made to a party having the prior right . But neither can
b
e
defeated without some appropriation o
f
the claim to the use o
f
him who holds a prior right . Thus it is no defence to this suit , that
the mortgagor has also a right o
f
action ; nor even that he has
brought such an action ; because the right o
f
the plaintiff is superior
to that o
f
the mortgagor . A superior right in Mary A . Lewis will
not avail , a
s
the plaintiff has since become the owner o
f
that title .
Nor is the existence o
f
a superior right in the savings bank , as first
mortgagee , a defence . The defendant shows no satisfaction o
f
that
claim , no demand made upon him b
y
the savings bank , and no
authority or right from the bank to resist the claim of the plaintiff




for the benefit o
f
the first mortgagee .
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nd
discharged




It is not contended that the plaintiff ' s mortgage has been satis
fied a d discharged by the proceeds o
f
the sale under the power o
f
sale in the Lewis mortgage . The correctness or fairness o
f
these
proceedings , and the responsibility of the plaintiff for the full value
o
f
the property , or the amount realized upon the second sale , may
be open to the representatives o
f
the mortgagor in a suit therefor ;
but this defendant is not in such privity as to be entitled to inquire








n equitable considerations , between the mortgagor and mortgagee .
The right of the plaintiff to recover in this action does not depend
upon the sufficiency or insufficiency o
f
his security . Until his whole
debt is paid , he can not be deprived o
f
any substantial part o
f
his
entire security without full redress therefor . Upon the facts re
ported , we are satisfied that the ruling o
f
the judge who heard the
case , allowing the plaintiff the full amount o
f
the damages to the es
tate caused b
y
removal of fixtures , was correct .
Exceptions overruled . 11
SEARLE v . SAWYER .
SUPREME COURT O
F
MASSACHUSETTS , 1879 .
127 Mass . 491 .
MORTON , J . - - This is an action of tort for the conversion of a
quantity o
f
wood and timber .
It appeared a
t
the trial that one Warren , being the owner o
f
a lot
of wood -land , mortgaged it to the plaintiff ' s testator ; and that , after
the condition of the mortgage was broken , but before the mortgagee
had taken possession , Warren cut the wood and timber in question
and sold it to the defendant . The presiding justice of the Superior
Court ruled that , “ if the defendant bought o
f
the mortgagor wood
and timber cut from the mortgaged premises , and exercised such
acts o
f ownership over the same as would amount to a conversion ,
then he would be liable to the mortgagee for the value o
f
the same ,
without any previous demand , and although he bought the same in
good faith and without any notice o
r knowledge o
f any claim upon
the same . ” To this ruling the defendant excepted .
Upon the question whether , if a mortgagor commits waste by
removing buildings , wood , timber , fixtures or other parts of the
realty , the mortgagee out o
f possession can follow the property after
1
1 Compare Sanders v . Reed , supra . In King v . Bangs , 120 Mass .
514 , it was held that the trespasser might show " in mitigation o
f damages
at least , " that after the trespass and before the action was brought the
mortgagee had exercised a power of sale , realizing enough to satisfy
his debt .
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it has been severed , and recover it or it
s
value , there have been con
flicting decisions in different jurisdictions . In New York and Con
necticut , it has been held that a mortgagee out o
f possession can not
maintain an action a
t
law for waste committee b
y
the mortgagor ;
and that he has no property in wood o
r
timber cut and removed ,
so a
s
to enable him to maintain trover for it
s
conversion . Peterson
v . Clark , 15 Johns . 205 ; Cooper v . Davis , 15 Conn . 556 . On the
other hand , it has been held in Maine , New Hampshire , Vermont
and Rhode Island , that timber , if wrongfully cut and removed by
themortgagor , remains the property o
f
themortgagee out of posses





from him . Gore ‘ v . Jenness , 12 19 Maine 53 ; Frothingham v . Mc
Kusick , 13 24 Maine 403 ; Smith v . Moore , 14 11 N . H . 55 ; Langdon
v . Paul , 15 22 Vt . 205 ; Waterman v . Matteson , 16 4 R . I . 539 .
We are not aware that this precise question has been adjudicated
in this state , but the previous decisions o
f
this court , in regard to
the rights o
f mortgagees and the nature o
f
their interest in the
mortgaged estate , are such as to lead to the conclusion that a mort
gagee out o
f possession is entitled to timber , fixtures and other
parts o
f
the realty wrongfully served , and may recover them , o
r
their value , if a conversion is proved . In Fay v . Brewer , 3 Pick . 203 ,
it was held that a mortgagee in possession , but before foreclosure ,
could maintain an action on the case in the nature of waste against
a tenant for life , for cutting down trees on the mortgaged land be
fore he took possession , and the court in the opinion comment on
the case o
f




here , “ since the law o
f mortgage in New York is so different from
our own . "
In Page v . Robinson , 17 10 Cush . 99 , it was held that a mortgagee ,
after condition broken , though not in actual possession , could main
tain trespass against the mortgagor , o
r
one acting under his author
it
y
, for cutting and carrying away timber -trees from the mortgaged
premises , without license express or implied , from the mortgagee .
In Cole v . Stewart , 11 Cush , 181 , it was held that an action a
t
law would lie b
y
a mortgagee not in possession against one who ,
under authority from the mortgagor , removed a building from the
mortgaged land .
In Butler v . Page , 7 Met . 40 , a second mortgagee sold to the de
fendant a building standing on the mortgaged land , who took it
down and removed the materials . It was held that the administrator
1




3 Trover and trespass de bonis against purchaser .
1
4 Trespass de bonis by purchaser against mortgagee who seized the
lumber manufactured from the timber .
1
5 Case for waste and trover against mortgagor .
1
6 Replevin against mortgagor .
1
7 Trespass quare clausum .
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of the mortgagor could not maintain trover fo
r
the materials , as
the fee o
f
the mortgaged premises was in the mortgagees , and the
removal o
f
the building vested no property in the materials in the
inortgagor ' s representative .
In Wilmarth v . Bancroft , 10 Allen 348 , a house standing on mort
gaged land was partially destroyed by fire . The mortgagor sold to
the defendant such materials , a
s
were saved , and brought this action
to recover the price agreed to b
e paid . It was held that the fact
that the mortgagee had claimed the agreed price , and forbidden the
defendant to pay it to the mortgagor , was a good defense . The
opinion is put upon the ground that the partial burning of the house ,
and the consequent severance o
f
the unburnt materials , " did not
terminate o
r
affect the mortgagee ' s interest in the fixtures . "
S
o it has been held in several cases that a mortgagee out o
f posses
sion may maintain an action at law against the mortgagor or a
stranger for removing fixtures and thus impairing the security .
Gooding v . Shea , 103 Mass . 360 ; Byrom v . Chapin , 113 Mass . 308 ;
King v . Bangs , 120 Mass . 514 .
The fair result o
f
these authorities is that , under our law , a mort
gagee , is so far the owner in fee o
f
the mortgaged estate , that , if any
part o
f it is wrongfully severed and converted into personalty b
y
the
mortgagor , his interest is not divested , but he remains the owner
of the personalty , and may follow it and recover it or its value of
any one who has converted it to his own use . Stanley v . Gaylord ,
1 Cush . 536 ; Riley v . Boston Water Power Co . , 11 Cush . 11 .
But the severance must be wrongful , and , where it is made by
the mortgagor o
r
one acting under his authority , whether it is
wrongful or not will depend upon the question whether a license to
d
o
the act has been expressly given , or is fairly to be implied from
the relations of the parties . The true rule is as stated in Smith v .
Moore , 11 N . H . 55 , and approved in Page v . Robinson , 10 Cush . 99 ,
that acts o
f





the realty , are not wrongful when from the cir
cumstances o
f
the case the assent of the mortgagee may be reason
ably presumed . The relation between the mortgagor and mort
gagee is a very peculiar one . The mortgagee takes an estate in fee ,
but the sole purpose of the mortgage is to secure his debt . Usually
in this state the mortgage contains a provision that the mortgagor
may retain possession until condition is broken . The object o
f
this
is that the mortgagor may have the use and enjoyment of his prop
erty , and it implies a license to use it in the same manner as such
property is ordinarily used , and a
s will not unreasonably impair the
adequacy o
f
the security . If a mortgage be of a dwelling -house , the
mortgagor may do many acts , such a
s
acts o
f repair or alteration ,
which may involve the removal o
f parts o
f 'the realty , which would
not be wrongful because within the license implied from the relations
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of the parties . If a farmer mortgages the whole or a part of his
farm , with a clause permitting him to retain possession , as was prob
ably the case at bar, it is within the contemplation of the parties that
he is to carry on hi
s
farm in the usual manner , and a license to do
so is implied . In such case , it is clear that he is entitled to take the
annual crops , and wood for fuel . Woodward v . Pickett , 8 Gray 617 .
And we do not think that the implied license is necessarily limited
to the annual crops , but that it extends to any acts o
f carrying on
the farm which are usual and proper in the course o
f good hus
bandry . If , in carrying on similar farms , it is usual and is good
husbandry to cut and carry to market wood and timber to a limited








with so meagre and imperfect
a history o
f
the case , that we are unable to say how far these con
siderations are applicable in the case a
t
bar . But the ruling of the
presiding justice seems to have been general , that the defendant
would b
e
liable if the wood and timber were cut from the mort
gaged premises , and to have excluded the question whether , under
the circumstances o
f
the case , the assent o
f
the mortgagee thereto
could fairly be presumed by the jury . We are of opinion that this
question should b
e
submitted to the jury , and , therefore , that a new
trialmust be ordered .
Exceptions sustained . 18
CLARK v . REYBURN .
SUPREME COURT O
F
KANSAS , 1863 .
1 Kans . 281 .
By the court , COBB , C . J . — The defendant in error brought his
action in the district court against the plaintiffs in error to recover
a dwelling house as personal property ; alleging in the petition that
he is the owner thereof and the defendant detains the same , and
recovered judgment .
The undisputed facts o
f
the case are these :
One Brown and his wife mortgaged a parcel o
f
land to Amos
Rees , and the plaintiffs below afterwards became the owners o
f
the
mortgage by assignment , and after the making of the mortgage ,
said Brown placed a house on the land , and after the money secured
by the mortgage became due , and before foreclosure , still being in
possession , he and his wife sold the house to one Mrs . Fritzlin ,
who sold it to the defendants below , and removed and delivered it
1
8 Compare Hoskin v . Woodward , 45 Pa . St . 42 .
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to them off the mortgaged premises . They held possession under
her title , and the mortgage had not been paid nor foreclosed when
the action was commenced . The judgment must be founded on the
hypothesis that the plaintiff below , by virtue of his mortgage, was
the owner of the freehold of which the house in question was a
part , and that the removal of the house converted it to a chattel
without divesting his title . Is that hypothesis correct ?
It has long been settled , both in this country and in England ,
that the mortgagor , both before and after breach of the condition
of the mortgagee , is , in equity , the owner of the estate , and the mort
gage a mere security for a debt. ( See Kent 's Com ., Vol. 4 , p . 158 ,
et seq . )
The rule at law has been the subject of much judicial discussion
and conflict of opinion . But it is believed to be the settled modern
doctrine that the mortgagor in possession is, at law , both before
and after breach of the condition of the mortgage, the legal owner ,
as to all persons except themortgagee and those claiming under him .
And in states where the common law on the subject has not been
changed by statute , the mortgagee , for the purpose of protecting
and enforcing the lien against the mortgagor , has the remedies of
an owner, he may enter into and hold possession and take the rents
and profits in payment of his mortgage debt , and may have his ac
tion of ejectment to recover such possession , and hence is some
times called the owner. But except as to such remedies , and as to
all persons except the mortgagee , the mortgagor in possession is to
be regarded and treated as the owner of the estate, subject to a mere
lien or charge. (4 Kent's Com ., p . 160 ; Perkins v . Dibble , 10 Ohio
438 ; Rallston v . Hughes , 13 Ill . 568 ; Howard v . Robinson , 5 Cush .
123 ; Norwich v . Hubbard , 22 Conn . 587 ; Astor v . Hoyt , 5 Wend .
615 . )
And in this state the legislature has not enlarged , but still further
restricted the rights of the mortgagee , by providing that “ in absence
o
f stipulations to the contrary , the mortgagor o
f
real estate may re
tain the right o
f possession thereof . " Com . Laws , p . 355 , par . 12 . )
According to the principles above laid down , it is manifest that
the allegation o
f
the petition below , that the plaintiff is the owner
o
f
the house , was entirely unsupported by the facts appearing on
the trial .
Nor is this objection to the judgment technical .
If such an action can be maintained , a mortgagee may recover
from the purchasers a
ll
the timber , stone o
r
other property severed
from the realty and sold by the mortgagor , though its value may
exceed the mortgage debt an hundred fold , and however ample the
security may remain ; although it is quite clear on principle and
authority that the purchaser of property so removed by the mort
gagor , can not be liable in an action for the waste beyond the actual
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loss the mortgagee thereby sustains . (Van Pelt v . McGraw , 4 N . Y .
110 ; Gardner v . Heartt, 3 Denio 232 ; Lane v . Hitchcock , 14 Johns .
213 , 15 Johns, 205 . )
The other points made in the case need not be examined .
The judgment of the district courtmust be reversed , and the cause
remanded to the court below , with directions to render judgment
for the plaintiffs in error for their costs in that court . 19
VAN PELT v . MCGRAW .
COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK , 1850 .
4 N . Y . 110 .
Van Pelt sued Southworth and McGraw in the court of common
pleas of Tompkins county , and declared in case for wrongfully and
fraudulently removing rails , timber , & c ., from certain lands on which
the plaintiff held a mortgage , thereby injuring his security , & c . It
was proved on the trial that in May , 1840 , Almeron Baily and Wil
liam E . Baily , being the owners of 119 acres of land in Dryden ,
Tompkins county , executed a bond and mortgage covering the same
to Harvey A . Rice , to secure the payment of $500 , one half payable
in May, 1841 , and one half in May, 1842 . In August, 1842 , Rice
sold and assigned the bond and mortgage to the plaintiff , who insti
tuted a foreclosure suit thereon , and obtained the usual decree for the
sale of the premises in August , 1844. The amount then due on the
mortgage including the costs of the foreclosure suit, was nearly $ 900 .
The mortgagors were insolvent, and the premises were inadequate
security for this sum . On the sale under the decree , which took
place in October , 1844 , the premises produced only the sum of $ 575.
Shortly before the sale and while the advertisement was running ,
the defendant McGraw , who had become the owner of the equity of
redemption by conveyance from the mortgagors , avowing that he
would “ strip the land ," proceeded to draw off rails, and to cut down
and draw off valuable timber , & c . The premises were thereby con
siderably lessened in value . These acts were done by McGraw , and
by Southworth aiding and assisting him , with full knowledge of the
plaintiff 's mortgage , and of the insolvency of the mortgagors .
The defendants ' counsel requested the court to charge the jury
that McGraw , having the fee of the land , and being in possession ,
had a right to take off the fences and timber, and that these acts be
ing lawful could not be deemed to have been done wrongfully or
fraudulently . The court charged that the acts were lawful if they
19 Compare Sands v. Pfeiffer , 10 Cal 258 ; Berthold v . Holman , 12 Minn.
335 ; Stout v . Keyes , 2 Doug . (Mich .) 184 .
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did not prejudice the plaintiff 's rights or impair his security , but if
the defendants had impaired that security with a knowledge of the
lien , then their acts were wrongful and fraudulent. The defendants '
counsel also requested the court to charge , that inasmuch as the
plaintiff had alledged in his declaration that the defendants did the
acts fraudulently and with a design to injure the plaintiff , he was .
bound to prove those allegations by other evidence than the mere
removal of the rails and timber for their own emolument . The court
refused so to charge . To the charge as delivered and to the refusal
to charge as requested , the defendants excepted . The jury found a
verdict of $150 in favor of the plaintiff . The judgment entered
thereon was affirmed in the Supreme Court on error brought. The
defendants appealed to this court .
PRATT , J. — There is no doubt but that an action on the case will
lie for an injury of the character complained of in this case . It
forms no objection to this action that the circumstances o
f
the case
are novel , and that no case precisely similar in a
ll respects has pre
viously arisen . The action is based upon very general principles ,
and is designed to afford relief in all cases where one man is injured
by the wrongful act of another , where no other remedy is provided .
This injury may result from some breach o






r duty growing out o
f
the relations existing
between the parties . ( 1 Cow . Treat . 3 . )
The defendant McGraw , in this case , came into the possession
of the land subject to the mortgage . The rights of the holder of
the mortgage were therefore paramount to his rights , and any at
tempt on his part to impair the mortgage as a security , was a viola
tion o
f
the plaintiff ' s rights . But the case is not new in its circum .
stances . The case o
f
Gates v . Joice , 11 John . 136 , was precisely like
the case a
t





a judgment against a person for taking down and removing a
building from the land upon which the judgment was a lien . The
plaintiff ' s security was thereby impaired . The court in that case
sustained the action . The decision in that case was referred to and
approved in Lane v . Hitchcock , ( 14 John . 213 ) , and in Gardner v .
Heartt , ( 3 Denio . 234 ) . Nor is there any thing in the case of
Peterson v . Clark , ( 15 John . 205 ) , which conflicts with the principle




n action for waste . The declaration alleged seisin in the
plaintiff , upon which the defendant took issue . There was no allega
tion that the mortgagor was insolvent , o
r
the judgment as a security
impaired . The only issue to be passed upon , was that in relation to
the seisin . It is quite clear that upon such an issue the mortgagee
must fail . Now this action is not based upon the assumption that
the plaintiff ' s land has been injured , but that his mortgage as a se
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curity has been impaired. His damages , therefore , would be limited
to the amount of injury to themortgage , however great the injury
to the land might be. It could , therefore , be of no consequence
whether the injury occurred before or after forfeiture of the mort
gage . The action is clearly maintainable.
It only remains, therefore , to be considered whether there was any
error in the charge of the court . In order to come to a correct con
clusion upon this point, it becomes necessary to examine the excep
tions to the charge in connection with the undisputed testimony in
the cause , and the propositions upon which the court were required
to charge . It had been proved that the defendants knew of the
mortgage , that the mortgagors were insolvent , and that the property
had been advertised for sale by virtue of the mortgage. They were
forbidden to remove the fences and timber , for the reason that the
security would thereby be impaired . It was also proved that the
value of the mortgage had been impaired by such removal. Under
this state of facts the defendants ' counsel asked the court to charge
the jury , that McGraw having the fee of the land , and being in pos
session , had a right to take off the fences and timber ; that the acts
being lawful , could not be deemed to have been done wrongfully or
fraudulently . The court charged that the acts were lawful if they
did not prejudice the plaintiff 's rights or impair his security , but that
if they had impaired the security , knowing the plaintiff 's lien , they
were liable . As an answer to the propositions of the defendants '
counsel , the charge was correct . Acts may be harmless in them
selves , so long as they injure no one, but the consequences of acts
often give character to the acts themselves . It is upon this distinc
tion that the maxim is based , sic utere tuo est alienum non laedas .
As I have before observed , the lien of the plaintiff upon the land was
paramount to any interest which the defendants possessed therein ,
and any wilful injury of that lien by them was a violation of the
plaintiff 's rights, for which an action would lie .
The defendants ' counsel also asked the court to charge that the
plaintiff having alleged in his declaration that the defendants did
the acts fraudulently and with design to injure the plaintiff , he was
bound to prove the allegations by evidence other than the mere act
of removing the timber for the emolument of the defendants . The
court refused so to charge, to which there was an exception . This
proposition is somewhat obscure , but I understand it to mean that
the plaintiff should prove that the primary motive of the defendants
was to cheat the plaintiff . If the defendants knew that by taking off
the timber the value of the plaintiff 's mortgage as a security would
be impaired , they would be legally chargeable with a design to effect
that object , although their leading motive may have been their own
gain . A man must be deemed to design the necessary consequences
of his acts. If, therefore, he does a wrongful act , knowing that his
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neighbor will be thereby injured , he is liable . It is upon this prin
ciple that persons are often chargeable with the intent to defraud
creditors, or to commit any other fraud . The immediate motive is
oftentimes self - interest , but if the necessary consequence is a fraud
upon his neighbor, the actor is legally chargeable with a design to
effect that result . Upon the whole, therefore , although the charge is
not quite so explicit as it should be, yet taken in connection with the
propositions presented to the court, I think it was substantially cor
rect. The judgment of the Supreme Court should be affirmed .
Judgment affirmed . 20
TOMLINSON v . THOMPSON .
SUPREME COURT OF Kansas , 1882 .
27 Kans. 70 .
The opinion of the court was delivered by
HORTON , C . J . — This action was tried by the court below without
the intervention of a jury , upon the following agreed statement of
facts :
" 1. That Mary A . Tinney and Truelove Tinney , on the first day
of July , 1878 , made and delivered to Howard M . Holden , their
promissory note for $ 1,932 , secured by a mortgage on the south half
of section two , township seven , range two , east, in Clay county ,
Kansas , as stated in this petition ; that said mortgage was duly
recorded in the office of the register of deeds, Clay county , Kansas ,
on the 18th of July , 1878 ; and that thereafter , said note and mort
gage were duly indorsed , signed , and delivered to said plaintiff , A . A .
Tomlinson .
“ 2 . That on the 20th day ofMarch , 1879 , the said A . A . Tomlin
son commenced a suit in the district court of Clay county , Kansas ,
against the said Mary A . Tinney and Truelove Tinney on the said
note and mortgage , and on the 9th of May , 1879 , recovered a judg
ment in said court against the said Mary A . and Truelove Tinney , on
said note for $ 1,981. 30 with interest from date of judgment, at 10
per cent. per annum , and costs of suit , amounting to $48 .05 and
also a decree foreclosing said mortgage , and an order to sell the
above -decribed lands and tenements to satisfy said judgment and
costs , and execution for any balance .
" 3. That pursuant to said judgment and decree , and on an order
of sale issued by the clerk of said district court, the sheriff of said
Clay county , after causing said lands to be duly appraised and adver
tised , on th
e
7th o
f July , 1879 , said sheriff publicly offered said
2
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lands and tenements for sale to the highest bidder , according to law ,
and at said last -named date sold the same to A . A . Tomlinson , plain
tiff , for the sum o
f
$ 1 ,400 , that sum being the highest bid offered ,
and over two -thirds o
f
the appraised valuation , which sale was after
ward , September 17 , 1879 , duly confirmed by said district court o
f
Clay county , and said sheriff ordered to make and deliver to said
Tomlinson , th
e
purchaser , a deed therefor , which deed was there
after so made and delivered .
“ 4 . That after the payment o
f
costs in said foreclosure suit , and
application o
f proceeds on the said judgment , there still remained
due said plaintiff on said judgment the sum o
f
$732 . 35 , which has
not been paid b
y
said Mary A . Tinney , Truelove Tinney , o
r any one
for them ; that after the sale of said lands and tenements aforesaid ,
the said A . A . Tomlinson caused an execution to issue against the
said Mary A . and Truelove Tinney , directed to the sheriff o
f
said
Clay county , for the balance due on said judgment , which execu
tion was returned by the sheriff , ‘ no goods , chattels , lands o
r
tene
ments ' upon which a levy could be made ; that said Mary A . Tinney
and Truelove Tinney are now , and have been since redition o
f
said
judgment , insolvent , and not possessed o
f any property out o
f
which
the balance of said judgment could be made .
“ 5 . In the month of April , 1879 , the house situated on the mort
gaged premises was sold by the said Mary A . and Truelove Tinney
to one C . W . Lindner , and while being moved off the mortgaged
land , and when on the land o
f
the said defendant , D . W . Thompson ,
adjoining the mortgaged lands o
f
said Tinney , was purchased from
said Lindner by the said defendant Thompson , in said month of
April , 1879 .
“ 6 . At the time of said purchases , both Lindner and Thompson
had actual knowledge o
f
the mortgage lien aforementioned o
n
said
lands and tenements , and that said house was removed off said
mortgaged premises .
" 7 . Both Lindner and Thompson paid full value for said house .
“ 8 . Said house , at the time it was moved off said mortgaged
lands , was worth $ 400 . ”
The district court rendered judgment for the defendant for costs ,
and the plaintiff brings the case here .
We think that the judgment must be affirmed , because the action
of the plaintiff is not maintainable . It appears from the record , that
while Thompson had actual knowledge o
f
the mortgage lien o
f
the
plaintiff on the lands of the Tinneys , he did not purchase the house
in controversy until it had been removed from the lands , and that he
paid full value therefore . The judgment in the foreclosure action
was not recovered until after the purchase ; and at the time o
f
the




the Tinneys , or that plaintiff would be defeated in
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the house . It does
not appear that Thompson acted fraudulently , or that he intended to
injure the plaintiff or anyone else . We do not see that he was guilty
o
f
either moral or legal fraud , and therefore the case o
f
Yates v .
Joyce , 11 Johns . 136 , is not applicable . While the decisions in Clark
v . Reyburn , 1 Kansas 281 , and Vanderslice v . Knapp , 20 Kans . 647 ,
are based upon facts somewhat different from those disclosed in the
record , the principles therein declared virtually control this case . We
have examined Van Pelt v . McGraw , 4 N . Y . 110 , and al
l
the other
cases cited by counsel for plaintiff , and notwithstanding the views
therein expressed , we think the rule here adopted the proper one .
In Cooper v . Davis , 15 Conn . 556 , it was held that where A executed
to B a mortgage o
f
certain real estate upon which there was a grist
mill , and B obtained against A a decree of foreclosure and a judy
ment in ejectment for the possession , but before the expiration o
f
the time limited for redemption , and before B had taken possession
under the judgment or otherwise , A severed the stones from the mill










trover against B for the mill -stones . See also Buck
out v . Swift , 27 Cal . 433 ; King v . Smith , 2 Hare 239 ; Pierce v .
Goddard , 22 Pick . 559 ; Citizens ' Bank v . Knapp , 22 La . An . 117 ;
Challis v . Stearns , 22 N . H . 312 . In Vanderslice v . Knapp , supra ,
Mr . Justice Valentine , speaking for the court , says :
" A mortgagor o
f
real estate has the right to possession of the
mortgaged property , and the right to sever and remove the timber ,
wood , sand , earth , stone , o
r anything else , therefrom , and sell the
same , unless it unreasonably impairs the mortgage security ; and
when it impairs the mortgage security , the remedy o
f
the mortgagee
is not at law , but in equity ; not in replevin , to recover the property
severed from the realty , but generally by injunction to restrain the
commission o
f
waste upon the realty . "
The judgment o
f
the district court will be affirmed .
VALENTINE , J . , concurring 21
2
1 Compare , Gardner v . Heartt , 3 Denio ( N . Y . ) 232 ; Wilson v . Maltby , 59 N . Y . 126 ; Webber v . Ramsey , 100 Mich . 58 .
On the right o
f
the mortgagee to enjoin waste , see post , Chap . VIII .
On the right of the mortgagee to foreclose on severed property , see post ,
Chap . IX
CHAPTER IV .
DISCHARGE OF MORTGAGES .
SECTION 1. — PAYMENT AND TENDER .
LITTLETON , TENURES , $ 332 . * * * And it seemeth that the
cause why it is called mortgage is , for that it is doubtful whether the
feoffor will pay at the day limited such sum or not: and if he doth
not pay , then the land which is put in pledge upon condition for the
payment of the money , is taken from him forever , and so dead to
him upon condition , & c . And if he doth pay the money , then the
pledge is dead as to the tenant .
§ 335 . And be it remembered that in such case , where such tender
of themoney is made, (at the day appointed ) and the feoffee refuse
to receive it, by which the feoffor or his heirs enter , & c ., then the
feoffee hath no remedy by the common law to have his money , be
cause it shall be counted his own folly that he refused the money ,
when a lawful tender of it was made unto him .
GROVER v . FLYE .
SUPREME COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS , 1863.
5 Allen (Mass .) 543.
Writof entry. The demandants claimed title under the levy of an
execution by selling the equity of redemption of the premises .
At the trial in the superior court ,before Lord , J., it appeared that
at the time the levy was made the premises appeared on record to
be subject to a mortgage to the Blackstone Loan and Fund Associa
tion , to secure certain sums of money a portion of which was not
then due ; that full payment of said sums had been made and a dis
charge of the mortgage and release of the premises by the said as
sociation executed before the levy ,but the discharge and release were
not recorded until afterwards ; and that neither the judgment credi
tor nor the officer had actual or constructive notice of such discharge
until the record thereof . The judge ruled that it was immaterial , for
the purposes of this action , whether the mortgage upon the premises
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had been discharged , unless the creditor or officer had actual or con
structive notice thereof before the seizure of the land on the execu
tion , and that a sale of the equity without such notice was regular
and proper .
The jury returned a verdict for the demandants , and the tenants
alleged exceptions .
BIGELOW , C . J. - It is admitted that the sums due on the mortgage
to the Loan Fund Association were paid before the sale of the right
in equity to redeem was made by the officer ; and that these payments
were made at or before the times when the several instalments be
came due according to the stipulation set forth in the condition of
the mortgage and the bond which accompanied it and formed part
of the transaction . By such payment , on familiar principles , the
condition was saved and the mortgagor , the tenant , was in of
his old estate . No conveyance or discharge of the mortgage was
necessary to revest the estate in themortgagor , or to defeat the title
of the mortgagee. Merrill v . Chase , 3 Allen 339 , and cases cited .
Joslyn v . Wyman , ante, 62. The argument , therefore , of the de
mandants, founded on the necessity of recording a release or dis
charge of a mortgage in order to defeat a title acquired by a judg
ment creditor by a sale or execution of a right in equity made after
such release or discharge but without actual notice thereof , falls to
the ground . The act of payment in the country ante vel apud diem
saves the forfeiture of an estate held by a conveyance defeasible on
a condition subsequent . No record of such an act is necessary to
make the estate a fee simple estate in the grantor or mortgagor , as
against all persons claiming by a subsequently acquired title . The
release of the Loan Fund Association to the mortgagor was a useless
and superfluous act, which added nothing to the strength of the
title which he had acquired by a performance of the condition of
the mortgage before a breach .
It follows, that the title of the demandants under the sale of the
right in equity to redeem the estate is invalid . The premises being
unincumbered and held by the judgment debtor as an estate in fee at
the time of the service of the execution , could be legally levied on
only by an appraisement , and set off in the mode prescribed by law .
Forster v . Mellen , 10 Mass. 421 ; Freeman v . McGaw , 15 Pick . 82 ;
Perry v . Hayward , 12 Cush . 344 .
Exceptions sustained .1
1 See also , Schearff v. Dodge, 33 Ark . 340 .
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WATSON v . WYMAN .
SUPREME COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS , 1894 .
161 Mass . 96 .
HOLMES , J. — This is a bill in equity for the cancellation of a mort
gage , but containing an offer to pay any sum that may be found due
upon it. The defendant Davis took an indorsement of the note and
an assignment of the mortgage for value before maturity , and with
out notice . Before he did so the mortgagor had given the mortgagee
a second mortgage for a sum including that due on the first mort
gage and in satisfaction of it , but had left the first mortgage in the
mortgagee 's hands. On the same day the plaintiff bought the second
mortgage .
Payment of the mortgage note on the day when it falls due is
performance of the promise , and very possibly would discharge the
note even as against one who took it for value and without notice
later on the same day . But payment before the day , or a satisfac
tion like that in the present case , is a defence which binds only the
party receiving payment and those who stand in hi
s
shoes . Bur
bridge v . Manners , 3 Camp . 193 , 194 ; Morley v . Culverwell , 7 M . &
W . 174 , 181 , 182 ; Kernohan v . Durham , 48 Ohio S
t
. 1 , 7 ; Head v .
Cole , 53 Ark . 523 , 524 ; Palmer v . Marshall , 60 Ill . 289 , 293 . See
Wheeler v . Guild , 20 Pick . 545 , 552 , 553 , 555 .
It commonly is assumed that the mortgage follows the note , and
that if the holder can recover on the note he may avail himself o
f
the
mortgage . Taylor v . Page , 6 Allen 86 ; Carpenter v . Longan , 16
Wall . 271 ; Jones , Mort . (4th ed . ) pars . 834 -840 . We are of opinion
that this is the law where the note has been paid in full in advance .
As is pointed out in Morley v . Culverwell , ubi supra , paymentbefore
the day is not performance o
f
the contract , and it follows , notwith
standing the language often used , that in a strict sense it does not
satisfy the condition o
f
the mortgage . If we are right in our con
cession as to the effect of a payment on the day , we have here tech
nical reason for the different effect o
f
a
n earlier payment . The note
still stands unperformed , and therefore secured , subject only to a
personal defence , as it is happily called b
y Mr . Ames . 2 Ames , Bills
& Notes , 811 . But the very meaning o
f
a personal defence is , that
it does not accompany the note into all hands , but only into those
which are in no better position than the person against whom it has
accrued . Like fraud or duress by threats , it leaves the legal trans
action still in full force , and only furnishes a reason why a particular




hominem . It is saying you have the title , but
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you shall not be heard in a court of justice to enforce it against good
faith and conscience .” Eyre , C . J ., in Collins v . Martin , 1 B . & P .
648 ,651 , cited by Shaw , C . J ., in Wheeler v . Guild , 20 Pick . 545 , 551 .
Another argument drawn from the registry laws deserves con
sideration . A mortgage can not be extinguished more effectually
than by a release. Yet we presume that it hardly would be argued
that an unrecorded release would be valid as against a purchaser
of the mortgage before maturity and without notice . As was said
in a case which settled the law for Massachusetts, “ a prior un
recorded deed has no effect except as between the parties to it , and
others having notice of it. It is the policy of our laws that a pur
chaser of land , by examining the registry of deeds, may ascertain
the title of his grantor . If there is no recorded deed , he has the
right to assume that the record title is the true title . The law has
established the rule , for the protection of creditors and purchasers ,
that an unrecorded deed , if unknown to them , is as to them a mere
nullity ." Dow v . Whitney , 147 Mass . 1, 6 . It might be thought that
the same considerations apply to a quasi discharge by payment of
the whole amount in advance . The mortgagor may have an entry
made on the margin of the record of the mortgage . Pub . Sts . c. 120 ,
pars. 24 , 25 . When no such entry is made , and the registry contains
no notice of payment of any kind , it would seem that one to whom
the mortgagee produces the note not yet due and the mortgage for
sale has the same right to assume that the record title is the lease .
If the note were overdue , that would be notice , or would put the
purchaser in the position of one having actual notice , and therefore
in that case the registry laws would not help him .
In Grover v . Flye, 5 Allen 543, the demandant claimed title under
a sale of an equity of redemption on execution . In fact, the mort
gage had been paid in full before it was due, but the record did not
disclose the payment , and neither the officer nor the demandant had
notice of it. The court held that the rule was the same that it would
have been between the original parties. In such a case the pur
chaser , of course , does not claim as indorsee or holder of the mort
gage note . We accept the authority of the decision so far as it goes .
But if it is not to be distinguished satisfactorily from one like the
present, so far as the argument from the registry laws is concerned ,
it has no bearing on the considerations first stated , and those are
sufficient to dispose of the case . It follows that the decree sustaining
the mortgage in the hands of the defendant Davis, and limiting the
plaintiff to a right to redeem , was correct .
Decree affirmed .
11
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BROWN v. COLE .
COURT OF CHANCERY OF ENGLAND , 1845 .
14 Simons 427 .
Bill to redeem a mortgage for a term of years , made on the 1st of
April , 1844 .
The proviso for redemption stipulated that the mortgagee should
reassign the mortgaged premises , on being repaid the money lent, on
the 1st of April, 1845 , with interest in the meantime, by quarterly
payments .
The mortgagor , having had an advantageous offer , for the pur
chase of the premises shortly after the mortgage was made , tendered
to the mortgagee the amount of the principal, and of the interest up
to the 1st of April, 1845 , together with a reassignment of the mort
gaged premises ; but the mortgagee would neither accept themoney
nor execute the deed ; in consequence ofwhich the bill was filed .
The defendant demurred to the bill for want of equity .
The vice -chancellor allowed the demurrer , on the ground that it
was contrary to the practice of the court to decree the redemption
of a mortgage before the day appointed for that purpose had
arrived .?
STEWART v . CROSBY .
SUPREME COURT OF MAINE , 1863.
50 Maine 130 .
Davis, J. — The defendant , having claims against one Charles
Hanson , commenced suits thereon , and caused his right of redeeming
certain real estate , previously mortgaged by him , to be attached , Sep
tember 15 , 1848 . Judgments were recovered February 17 , 1854 ;
executions were issued March 17 , and Hanson 's right of redemp
tion seized thereon the same day ; and , on April 22, of the same year ,
the officer duly sold to the defendant a
ll
o
f Hanson ' s right to redeem ,
which he had at the time o
f
the attachment .
October 23 , 1854 , the defendant sold to the plaintiff , by a quit
claim deed , “ a
ll
the right , title , and interest acquired by him by vir
tue o
f
his deed ” given to him b
y
the sheriff upon the sale referred to .
The plaintiff , upon inquiry , afterwards ascertained that Hanson ,




tion upon the executions , had fully paid the mortgage debt . But the











mortgage had not been discharged , either by an entry upon the
record , or in any other manner .
The plaintiff claims tha such payment was itself a discharge of
the mortgage, so that Hanson ' s title was no longer a right of re
demption , which could be sold by the sheriff , but a fee, upon which
the execution should have been extended . A he has brought this
suit to recover back the purchase -money, on account of the failure of
title .
The defendant does not concede that the plaintiff would be en
titled to recover , if there was a failure of title , as he has alleged ,
as he gave a mere release , with no covenants of title . But he con
tends that the mortgage was not discharged by payment , merely ;
and that, if the mortgage debt had been paid , it was a benefit , and
not an injury, to the plaintiff .
In the case of Martin v . Mowlin , 2 Burrow 978 , Lord Mansfield
is reported to have said , “ A mortgage is a charge upon the land ,
and whatever would give themoney will carry the land along with it,
to every purpose . The estate in the land is the same thing as the
money due upon it . It will be liable to debts . It will go to execu
tors. The assignment of the debt, or the forgiving it , will draw the
land after it, as a consequence , though the debt were forgiven only
by parol,” & c.
The case under consideration was a suit at law ; and the con
founding of principles of law with those which prevail in equity ,
only , is probably due to the reporter , whose language it is. For he
admits , in publishing his notes of cases , that he did not always take
down the restrictions with which a proposition was qualified , “ to
guard against it
s being understood universally , or in too large a
sense . " 1 Burr . 9 .
It is worthy o
f
notice that in that case , as generally in English
mortgages , the condition was , that , upon performance , the mort
gagee should reconvey the premises : — and not , as in this country ,
that the deed should be void . It would seem therefore to be certain
that payment on the law day would not have revested the title in the
mortgagor , without such reconveyance . Harrison v . Owen , 1 Atk .
520 ; 2 Cruise , (London ed . , ) 110 . Upon mortgages to be void upon
performance , such as are usually given in the United States , it is
everywhere conceded that payment before condition broken will di
vest the mortgagee o
f
his title , without reconveyance , o
r
other dis
charge . i Washburne on Real Prop . , 543 ; Whitcomb v . Simpson ,
3
9 Maine 21 ; Holman v . Bailey , 3 Met . 55 .
In this country there has been a constant tendency to apply the
views attributed to Lord Mansfield indiscriminately , a
t equity , and
in law . Sustained b
y
such jurists as Chancellor Kent , Judge Story
and Mr . Greenleaf , it is not strange that the weight of authority
should turn in that direction . But in Maine , Massachusetts , Con
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necticut and in several other states, the old doctrines of the common
law still prevail. Though in equity the mortgage is an incident , and
the debt the principal thing , at law the mortgage is a conveyance of
the title , to be defeated upon a condition subsequent . Unless thus
defeated , the legal title is in the mortgagee. He may assign the debt
without the mortgage , in which case he holds the mortgage in trust
for such assignee . Or,he may assign the mortgage without the debt,
or, the mortgage to one, and the debt to another , the owner of the
mortgage always holding in trust for the owner of the debt. So that
the assignment of the debt operates as the equitable , but not as the
legal assignment of the mortgage. And payment of the debt , after
condition broken , does not divest the mortgagee of his legal title ;
but the mortgagor must resort to equity for a release , or a recon
veyance . These principles, though extensively denied in this coun
try , are sustained by so many decisions in the states before referred
to, that it is unnecessary to cite them . 1 Washburne 553 ; 1 Hilliard
on Mort., 476 .
Mr. Greenleaf collects the authorities , in the first volume of his
edition of Cruise , and in support of the opposite doctrine suggests
that the acceptance of payment , after condition broken , is a waiver
of the condition , and has the same effect as a performance of it. 1
Greenl . Cruise 595. But this is more specious than sound .
A waiver of the condition may operate to confer the same rights
as a performance of it. This is the case in regard to bonds for the
conveyance of real estate . But it does not follow that such a waiver
can operate , by our laws, to convey or release a legal title to real
estate. It can not do so , in the case of a mortgage, any more than of
a bond. So that this theory , like all others in support of the doc
trine , rests upon a denial that the mortgagee has the legal title , until
after foreclosure .
But another answer to it is , that such an acceptance of payment is
not a waiver. A waiver is a voluntary relinquishment of some right.
But the mortgagee relinquishes nothing in such a case . The mort
gagor pays it as a matter of right ; and it is not at the option of the
mortgagee whether it shall be paid or not, until the right of re
demption expieres . A receipt of payment after that would be a
waiver of the forfeiture ; but before forfeiture , the mortgagor , by
payment , acquires a right to a release , or a reconveyance , not on the
ground of waiver, but of contract , and of law .
But though it is well settled in this state , that upon payment after
condition broken , the legal estate remains in the mortgagee , until
it is released , so that the mortgagor can not maintain a writ of entry
against him ; it is equally well settled that , in such case , the mort
gagee, not being in possession , can not maintain such an action
against the mortgagor . Hadlock v. Bulfinch , 31 Maine 247 ; Wil
liams v. Thurlow , 31 Maine 392 . The reason assigned fo
r
this is ,
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that by our statutes , in a
ll
actions upon mortgages , there must be a
conditional judgment ; and , if the debt has been paid , so that there
can not be such judgment , the demandant can not recover at all .
Wade v . Howard , 11 Pick . 289 ; Webb v . Flanders , 32 Maine 175 ;
Gray v . Jenks , 3 Mason 520 . Where there is no provision of statute
to prevent , as in an action of forcible entry and detainer , it has been
held that a suit for possession may be maintained b
y
the mortgagee ,
after payment . Howard v . Howard , 3 Met . 548 , 557 .
The mortgagee , after such payment , holds but a naked trust , with
out any interest . As in other like cases o
f holding in trust , he can
derive no benefit from it , and can convey no title except as subject
to it . And the estate can not be taken for his debts , though it can
be taken for the debts of the cestui que trust . As the mortgagee ' s
title in such case is o
f
n
o value , there can be no motive for trans
ferring it to a third party ; and therefore it is seldom done in this





Dudley v . Cadwell , 19 Conn . 218 . Such a deed , says Wilde , J . , in
Wade v . Howard , before cited , conveys “ the legal estate , or a satis
fied mortgage ; such an estate as is frequently purchased in England ,
to be tacked to a subsequent mortgage . ” Numerous cases of this
kind may be found cited in the English editions o
f
Cruise , vol . 2 , c .
5 , which Mr . Greenleaf has omitted , because the doctrine of tacking
mortgages does not prevail in the United States .
There is no difficulty in applying these principles to the case at
bar . When the executions against Hanson were issued , he had paid
the mortgage debt , but the mortgage itself had not been discharged .
If the payment had been before the condition had been broken , that
would have revested the estate without any discharge ; and there
would have been nothing to seize on the exception . Grover v . Flye ,
5 Allen 543 . But payment after breach of the condition had no
such effect . His interest in the premises was clearly liable to be
seized o
n
the executions ; and the only question is , how should the
levies have been made ; - b
y
a sale ? o
r by an extent ?
If , at the time of seizure upon the executions , there had been not
only a payment o
f
the mortgage debt , but a release of the mortgage ,
recorded in the registry o
f
deeds , then there could have been no sale
of an equity of redemption , though the mortgage was in force at the
time of the attachment upon the writs . Foster v . Mellen , 10 Mass .
421 . In Pillsbury v . Smyth , 25 Maine 427 , the report of the case
does not show whether the discharge o
f
the mortgage had been re
corded . And we need not determine whether , if there is a release ,
but not on record , the officer may not proceed as if none had been






the R . S . , c . 90 , sec . 14 , “ when the amount due on a mortgage
has been paid to the mortgagee , or person claiming under him , by
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th
e
mortgagor , or the person claiming under him , within three
years ” from proceedings for a foreclosure , “ he may have a bill in
equity for the redemption o
f
the mortgaged premises , and compel
the mortgagee , or person claiming under him , to release to him al
l
his right and title therein . ” And , b
y
c . 76 , sec . 29 , “ rights o
f re
deeming real estate mortgaged ,may be taken on execution and sold . ”
It was just such a right o
f
redeeming a paid mortgage which Hanson
owned , when it was seized on the executions . The same title passed
by the sale that would have passed b
y
a
n extent . The defendant
therefore conveyed a good title to the plaintiff ; and the latter , having
suffered no loss , is not entitled to recover .
Whether , if there had been no right of redemption in existence
when the plaintiff purchased o
f
the defendant , he could recover
back the consideration paid , on the ground of a mutual mistake o
f
fact , is a question which becomes immaterial . See the case o
f
Earle
v . DeWitt , with th
e
able dissenting opinion o
f
Merrick , J . , 6 Allen
520 .
Exceptions sustained . 3
Verdict set aside .
[Walton , Dickerson , Barrows and Danforth , JJ . , concurred .
Appleton , C . J . , and Cutting , J . , concurred in sustaining the ex
ceptions on the ground that " the law seems to be well settled in this
state , that a mere failure o
f
title furnishes n
o ground for recovering
back money paid a
s
the consideration of a quit -claim deed . ]
EDITORIAL Note . Since , in some states , payment o
f
a mort
gage after forfeiture does not discharge it a
t
law , and since , even
where payment discharges the mortgage a
t
law , such discharge rests
upon matter in pais , leaving the mortgage an encumbrance o
f
record ,
it is important to consider how the title can be cleared . Normally ,
the mortgagee is willing to accept payment and execute any dis
charge that may be demanded ; otherwise resort may be had to a
suit in equity to redeem . In either case a formal discharge is to
b
e




court , and the
question remains what form such discharge should take .
A deed of conveyance , by release , quit claim or otherwise , so
executed as to be entitled to record , is sufficient everywhere . In
those states where payment discharges themortgage at law , a written
3 Accord : Phelps v . Sage , 2 Day (Conn . ) 151 ; Holman v . Bailey , 3
Metc . (Mass . ) 55 (semble ) ;
Contra , Griffin v . Lovell , 42 Miss . 402 (statute ) ; McNair v . Picotte ,
3
3 Mo . 57 ; Swett v . Horn , 1 N . H . 332 . And see Shields v . Lozear , 34
N . J . L . 496 . See also , Ladue v . D . & M . R . Co . , ante .
Compare , Crain v . McGoon , 86 111 . 431 ; Maynard v . Hunt , 5 Pick .
(Mass . ) 240 ; Rowell v . Mitchell , 68 Maine 21 .
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acknowledgement of satisfaction , if entitled to record , would be
sufficient . In many of our states the statutes expressly provide for
the recording of such an instrument, and in others it might , if at
tested and acknowledged , be entitled to record as an “ instrument
affecting the title to real property .” Such an instrument would, of
course , be but imperfectly effective in those states where payment
does not discharge themortgage at law , unless by statute it is given
the effect of a discharge . In many of our states the statutes provide
for the discharge of mortgages by an entry of satisfaction in the
margin of the record of the mortgage. See further , Jones, $ $ 992
1037 . In many of the states a penalty is provided for refusal to
discharge a mortgage which has been satisfied .
If the mortgage has been assigned without a recorded assignment ,
or, if , for any reason , the owner of the mortgage is not the record
owner, a discharge should , of course , be obtained from the record
owner , or , by recorded assignment, the record title to the mortgage
should be perfected in the person who does execute the discharge .
KORTRIGHT v . CADY .
COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK , 1860 .
21 N . Y . 343 .
Appeal from the Supreme Court. Action to foreclose a mortgage.
The defendant Cady was a subsequent grantee of the equity of re
demption . He averred in his answer , and proved on the trial, that ,
after the money secured by the mortgage had become due and the
stipulated day for payment had passed , he tendered to the plaintiff
the amount due for principal and interest . The plaintiff refused
to receive it unless Cady would also pay certain taxes upon the
mortgaged premises , which the plaintiff had discharged . It was
held that Cady was, for reasons unnecessary to be stated , under no
obligation to pay the taxes , and the case stood upon the naked
tender . Cady did not, in his answer, allege a readiness still to pay
the mortgage debt, or that it was paid into court, nor did he offer to
bring it into court ; and it did not appear , from the finding of facts
or otherwise , that he in any way kept the tender good . The plaintiff
had the usual judgment of foreclosure , and for a sale of the mort
gaged premises . Upon appeal by the defendant Cady , this judg
ment was affirmed at general term in the first district ; whereupon
he appealed to this court .
DAVIES, J. [After examining the early English authorities .]
The only question presented for our consideration in this case is ,
whether a tender of the sum due on a mortgage, after the day ap
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n the land covered b
y
it . We have seen that by the common law
such tender and refusal upon the law day extinguishes the lien of the
mortgage , though the debt remains . In this state , the law is well
settled that a mortgage is a mere security or pledge o
f
the land cov
ered by it for the money borrowed o
r owing , and referred to in it ,
and that the mortgagor remains the owner o
f
the estate mortgaged ,
and may maintain trespass a
s against even the mortgagee . (Runyan
v . Mersereau , 11 John . , 534 . ) The debt , in the eye o
f
the law , thus
becomes the principal , and the landed security merely appurtenant
and secondary ; and the rights o
f
the parties must be governed by
these principles o
f




the amount due on a mortgage , at any time before
foreclosure , has always been held to discharge the incumbrance on
the land ; as acceptance o
f
the amount for which personal property
was held discharged it from the pledge . Tender and refusal are
equivalent to performance . (Kemble v . Wallis , 10 Wend . , 374 . )
This is to be taken with the reservation already stated , that the debt
o
r duty remained , and that the rejected tender , at or after the stipu
lated time o
f
payment or performance , has the effect only to dis
charge the party thus making it from all the contingent , consequen
tial or accessory responsibilities and incidents o
f
his contract , but
without releasing his prior debt . Coit v . Houston , 3 John . Ca . , 243 . )
In Hunter v . LeConte ( 6 Cow . , 728 ) , the Supreme Court held that
a tender o
f
rent takes away the right to distrain till a subsequent
demand and refusal ; but it does not take away the right to sue for
the rent as for a debt . It only saves the interest and costs . And that
a tender o
f
rent makes a distress wrongful , though the tender be
not made till after the rent day . It will readily be perceived that the
principle o
f
this case bears directly upon the question now under
consideration ; and it is not perceived , if it be sound , why a tender
and refusal of the amount due on a mortgage does not extinguish
it
s
lien , equally with a tender o
f
rent and refusal , which , as we have
seen , extinguishes the right of distress . But a still closer analogy to
the present question is presented by the law o
f
tender , as to the lien
o
n goods pledged . Lord Ch . J . Holt , in his opinion in the celebrated
case o
f Coggs v . Bernard ( 2 Lord Ray . , 909 ) , speaking o
f
the fourth
class of bailments , says : “ If the money for which the goods ' are
pawned be tendered to the pawnee before they are lost , then the
pawnee shall be answerable for them , because the pawnee , by detain
ing them after the tender o
f
the money , is a wrongdoer , and it is a
wrongful detainer o
f
the goods , and the special property o
f
the





the property in the goods is determined , and the pledge ought to be
returned . But if the pawnee refuse to restore the pledge upon ten
der , trover lies against him . ” (Comyn ' s Dig . , tit . Mortg . , A , and
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cases there cited . ) Holding , as we do , therefore, in this State , that
the land mortgaged is but a security for the debt due to the mort
gagee , in other words, a pledge to him to secure its payment , it is
difficult to see why the principles enunciated and well settled in ref
erence to the pledge of personal property do not apply , and why a
tender and refusal at any time of the full amount of the debt due
does not extinguish the lien of the mortgagee , or pledgee , in the one
case as it clearly does in the other. But I think we are not left at
liberty to settle this case on principle , but are to regard it as au
thoritatively disposed of by the courts of this State .
(His honor here reviewed the decisions in New York . ] We are
bound , therefore , I think , to regard this as the settled law in this
State , and are not at liberty to return to the old rule o
f
the common
law , which has been shown to be wholly inapplicable to the light in
which mortgages are regarded in this State .
It is not perceived how the mortgagee is to be embarrassed , or









the Chancellor in Edwards v . Farmers ' Loan Company
( 26 Wend . , 552 ) . If the mortgagor does not tender the full amount
due , the lien o
f
the mortgage is not extinguished . The mortgagee
runs no rise in accepting the tender . If it is the full amount due , his




has a right to demand or expect , and all he can in any contingency
obtain . His acceptance of themoney tendered , if inadequate and less
than the amount actually due , only extinguishes the lien pro tanto ,
and the mortgage remains intact for the residue . A much greater
hardship might be imposed , and serious injury be produced , by
holding that themortgagor can not extinguish the lien o
f
the mort
gage by a tender o
f
the full amount due . It has never occurred to
any judge to argue that a pawnee was in great peril , and in danger
of losing the benefit of his pawn , by the enforcement of the well
settled rule , that a tender of the amount of the loan and interest , and
refusal , extinguished the lien on the pawn . Littleton well says , that
it shall be accounted a man ' s own folly that he refused the money
when a lawful tender o
f
it was made to him . The only effect upon
the rights o
f
themortgagee is , that the land or thing pledged is re
leased from the lien , but the debt remaineth ,
The only remaining question to be considered is , whether the ten
der in this case was well made , it not being followed with the allega
tion o
f
touts temps prist , and the money not having been brought
into court . It will be seen , b
y
reference to the authorities , that these
are not required when the tender has only the effect o
f extinguishing
the lien , and does not operate to discharge the debt o
r
sum owing .
In the latter case , the averment o
f
touts tempt prist , followed up by
bringing the money into court , is essential to a good plea of tender .
(Hume v . Peploe , 8 East . , 168 ; Giles v . Hartis , 1 Lord Ray . , 254 . )
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But if a man make a bond for the payment of a loan ofmoney , and
afterwards make a defeasance for the payment of a lesser sum at a
day , if the obligor tender the lesser sum at the day , and the obligee
refuse it , he shall never have any remedy by law to recover it , be
cause it is no parcel of the sum contained in the obligation . And
in this case , in pleading of the tender and refusal, the party shall
not be driven to plead that he is yet ready to pay the same, or to
render it in court. (Co . Lit ., note to sec . 335 .) The same principle
was held by the Supreme Court of this State in Hunter v . LeConte
(6 Cow ., 728 ) , and cases there cited .
The judgment appealed from should be reversed , and a new trial
ordered , with costs to abide the event .
[Comstock , Ch . J . delivered a concurring opinion quoted from
ante , Chap . I. ]
Welles, J. : The only question involved in the case is , whether
the tender made by the defendant Cady, under the circumstances ,
was effectual to extricate the premises in question from the lien
created by the mortgage of Blunt to Miller. This tender was made
after the day provided in the bond and mortgage for the payment
of the money , which is called the law day . If the sum tendered was
sufficient in amount, and was made to the proper person , the ques
tion is reduced to the single point whether the lien of a mortgage is,
ipso facto , discharged by a tender of the amount due made after
the law day ; because , if it is , there is no necessity , in an answer
setting it up, of the allegation of tout temps prist , or of any evi
dence to show that the tender has been kept good , neither of which
is contained in the present case ; but the defendant relies solely upon
the fact of a tender and refusal as equivalent to payment , for the
purpose of extinguishing the lien of the mortgage.
[After examining the decisions in New York . ] My own opinion
is, after a careful examination of the cases , that the weight of au
thority is in favor of the rule as it existed at the common law . If
that rule has not been abrogated or modified, al
l
will admit that it
is the plain duty o
f
the courts to follow and enforce it . Clearly
there is n
o
stare decisis in our way . It is o
f importance that the rule
be definitely settled , and its boundaries defined . Before we hold a
rule different from what we find it settled b
y
the common law , we
should require evidence that the rule has been changed by competent
authority , either expressly o
r by necessary implication .
This evidence , the advocates of the change o
f
the rule claim , is
found in the changed character o
f
a mortgage upon land , in conse
quence o
f
various legislative enactments . We are told that when the
rule o
f
the common law in question was adopted , a mortgage con
veyed a conditional estate in the premises , which entitled the mort
gagee to possession , and upon which he could maintain ejectment ;
and that a mortgage does not now pass any estate in the land , but
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is merely the creation of a specific lien as security fo
r
the payment
of a debt or the performance of a duty ; and that the statute has
taken away the right o
f
the mortgagee to maintain ejectment . All
this is true ; and doubtless other shades o
f
difference may be found
between the legal effect of a mortgage at common law and as it now
exists . But they will be found to relate to the remedy , or to consist
in collateral or incidental circumstances . Mortgages are substan
tially what they always were . The fact that they are not now re
garded a
s transferring the freehold , but are merely specific liens ,
is altogether theoretical and ideal , so far as respects the question
under consideration . The great object o
f
these instruments is the
same now as it always was — that o





a duty . A mortgagee in possession is
now , a
s always heretofore , accountable for rents and profits , and he
may still defend his possession with the mortgage the same as ever .
I know of no difference between the right of the mortgagor , or the
person owning the equity o
f redemption , to redeem the premises
from the lien o
f
the mortgage , as that right now exists , and as it ex
isted in the time of Coke o
r
Littleton . That right is governed now
by substantially the same rules as then .
The rule contended for b
y
the plaintiff is reasonable , convenient
and just . In the first place , the parties to the mortgage have , b
y
agreement , fixed upon the time o
f payment and if the mortgagor ful
fills his agreement by paying on the day appointed , o
r tendering
payment on that day , the lien is discharged . The parties are then to
be ready , the mortgagor to pay , and the mortgagee to receive . If
the former performs his duty , or tenders performance , and the latter
refuses , his lien is gone forever ; he has no excuse for his folly , and
is entitled to n
o
consideration for the loss o
f
his lien . On the law
day , each party is presumed to know exactly what his duty is , and
the amount the mortgagor is bound to pay and the mortgagee en
titled to receive .
If the mortgagor allows the law day to pass without payment or
tender , he then is a defaulter . If he can discharge the lien by a
tender o
f
payment the next day , there is no reason why he may not
do the same b
y







Suppose the mortgagee goes into possession under the mortgage ,
by consent of the mortgagor , immediately upon default of payment ,
and the latter takes no steps towards payment for years after ; what
amount shall he tender when he gets ready for payment ? what
abatement from the principal and interest shall be made for mesne
profits ? Shall the defaulting mortgagor be permitted to select his




amount as he shall
deem proper , and themortgagee be bound to accept it in full , at the
peril o
f losing his lien forever ?
Suppose again the case o
f
a defaulting mortgagor , who claims to
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and the mortgagee in good faith differ : according to the




f losing his lien , provided , upon a litigation , it
shall be adjudged that the tender was sufficient in amount . It seems
to me that the old rule is the only just and wholesome one that can
be recognized . It is quite as favorable to the mortgagor as he can
in reason ask . If he makes a sufficient tender after the day and
before an action is brought to foreclose the mortgage , le
t
him keep





fense , bring the money into court and offer payment as in other
cases , and the court will , in such a case , decree the mortgage satis
fied and discharged , and adjudge costs against the plaintiff . Or if
for any reason the mortgagor , o
r
the person whose duty o
r
interest
it may be to have the lien discharged , does not wish to wait the
mortgagee ' s time for foreclosing , let him make his tender and keep
it good , and then bring his action to redeem , alleging the tender and
offering to pay ; and if , upon the trial , it is found that his tender
was sufficient and the plaintiff was ready to pay , the court would
give him all the relief which equity and justice required . In all
these cases , the mortgagee would have the right to have the disputed
questions adjudicated , without losing his lien for the amount in
equity and justice due to him .
The rule contended for b
y
the defendant would , in many cases ,
operate a
s
a bounty to negligent and defaulting debtors , and mort




n unjust sacrifice o
f
their rights .
For the foregoing reasons , I am o
f
the opinion that the rule o
f
Littleton , as expounded b
y
Coke , and as , a
ll
now admit , was the rule
of the common law in relation to the effect of a tender after the law
day , is still the law o
f
this State ; and a
s
the tender in this case has
not been kept good , and the defendant ' s answer contains no offer
o
f payment , and the facts found by the court before whom the cause
was tried do not show that the tender has in any sense been kept
good , o
r









it ; and that the judgment should
b
e
affirmed , with costs .
Judgment reversed . 4
4 Accord : Caruthers v . Humphrey , 12 Mich . 270 . But see , Renard v .
Clink , 91 Mich . 1 ; Proctor v . Robinson , 35 Mich . 284 .
Compare , Himmelmann V . Fitzpatrick , 50 Cal . 650 ; Matthews v .
Lindsay , 20 Fla . 962 ; Hudson Bros . Commission Co . v . Glencoe Sand
& c . Co . , 140 Mo . 103 ; Bailey v . Metcalf , 6 N . H . 156 ; Mankel v . Bels
camper , 84 Wis . 218 .
Even in New York and Michigan , if the mortgagor seeks affirmative
relief in equity to remove the cloud of the encumbrance from his title ,
he cannot rely upon a tender but must pay the debt . Tuthill v . Morris ,
8
1
N . Y . 94 ; Cowles v . Marble , 37 Mich . 158 .
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JOHNSON , J., in MATTHEWS V. AIKIN , 1 Comst. 595 (Court of
Appeals of New York , 1848 ) : It is a general and well established
principle of equity , that a surety , or a party who stands in the situa
tion of a surety , is entitled to be subrogated to al
l
the rights and
remedies of the creditor whose debt he is compelled to pay , as to any
fund , lien , o
r equity which the creditor had against any other per
son o
r property , on account o
f
such debt . The general doctrine , as
a rule o
f equity , is not controverted on the part o
f
the appellants ,
but is fully conceded . It is insisted , however , by their counsel , that




the debtor ; that as to the debtor , he was a mere volunteer , having
no remedy over against him , and never acquiring the character of
a surety so a
s
to be entitled to subrogation to the rights and remedies
of the creditor .
The objection seems somewhat narrow and technical when ad
dressed to a court o
f equity whose peculiar province is to mete out
substantial justice where the more restricted powers of the common
law fail in its administration . But it leads us to examine carefully
into the grounds and principles upon which the right o
f subrogation
rests . Does it rest upon the foundation o
f
a contract binding in a
court of law between the debtor and his surety ? In other words ;
does it turn substantially upon the question whether o
r
not the surety
who has paid the debt to the creditor has a remedy over , on his con
tract , against the principal debtor for money paid in an action at
law ? or does it not rest rather . upon the broader and deeper founda
tions o
f
natural justice and moral obligation ? Chancellor Kent
says , in Hays v . Ward , ( 4 Johns . Ch . 130 , ) “ This doctrine does not
belong merely to the civil law system . It is equally a well settled
principle in the English law that a surety will be entitled to every
remedy which the principal debtor has , to enforce every security , and
to stand in the place o
f
the creditor , and have those securities trans
ferred to him , and to avail himself o
f
those securities against the
debtor . This right stands not upon contract , but upon the same
principle o
f
natural justice upon which one surety is entitled to con
tribution against another . ” Lord Brougham , in Hodgson v . Shaw ,
( 3 Mylne & Keene , 183 , ) said : “ The rule here is undoubted , and is
founded on the plainest principles of natural reason and justice , that
the surety paying off a debt shall stand in the place o
f
the creditor ,
and have all the rights which he has for the purpose o
f obtaining
his reimbursement . It is scarcely possible to put this right of sub
stitution too high ; and the right results more from equity than from
contract o
r quasi contract unless in so far as the known equity may
be supposed to be imported into any transaction , and so to raise a
contract by implication . " Sir Samuel Romilly , in his argument in
Craythorne v . Swinburne , ( 14 Ves . 159 , ) stated the rule to be , that
" a surety will be entitled to every remedy which the creditor has
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against the principal debtor to enforce every security by all means
of payment, to stand in the place of the creditor not only through the
medium of contract but even by means of securities entered into
without the knowledge of the surety , having a right to have those
securities transferred to him , though there was no stipulation for
that, and to avail himself of al
l
those securities against the debtor . "
And this exposition o
f
the rule was fully sanctioned b
y
Lord Eldon
in giving judgment in that case .
The equity is certainly a
s strong , and it seems to me somewhat
stronger in favor o
f
substitution , as against the creditor at least ,
than it is between sureties for contribution where one has paid the
whole debt , and it has been likened to the case of contribution be
tween sureties . As between them the rule in equity is clear that the
ground o
f
relief does not stand upon any notion of mutual contract
express o
r implied , but arises from principles o
f
equity independent
of contract . Story ' s Eq . , sec . 493 , and notes , where the authorities
are all collected . This is also substantially the rule in courts o
f
law .
(Norton v . Coons , 3 Denio , 130 . ) In that case the circumstances
under which the defendant became co -surety were such a
s
to repel
the presumption ofany promise to make contribution . But the court
held that his being a surety on the same contract without qualifica
tion in terms was sufficient to fix his obligation to contribute , and
that for the purpose of giving the plaintiffs a remedy the court would
presume a promise . A promise was therefore imputed where none
confessedly existed , in order to provide a remedy for the party
where there was no doubt a
s
to the legal liability ; and the legal lia
bility in such cases springs from the equitable obligation ; the law
courts having borrowed their jurisdiction in these particular cases
from the courts o
f equity . In the present case it seems to me , if it
were necessary , a court o
f equity ought to imply a promise on the
part o
f
the creditor to subrogate the surety to all his rights and
remedies , in case he resorted to the latter for payment o
f
the debt
upon his guarantee . The equitable obligation resting upon him to
d
o
so seems to memost manifest .
(His honor then proceeded to show that , even if such a defense
was open to the original debtor , it was not open to the defendant . ]
HEISLER v . ALTMAN & CO .
SUPREME COURT O
F
MINNESOTA , 1894 .
5
6 Minn . 454 .
Collins , J . : Stated in chronological order , the controlling facts
in this case are as follows : July 28 , 1880 , defendant corporation
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duly recovered , and caused to be docketed in the office of the clerk
of the District Court for Blue Earth county , in this state , a judg
ment for the sum of $844 .09 against one John C . Heisler and an
other . In March , 1886 , said Heisler purchased , and there was duly
conveyed to him by warranty deed , a farm in said county , consist
ing of one hundred and ten acres, subject to a mortgage for the sum
of $ 900 ; and , for the vendor 's interest , Heisler agreed to pay the
sum of $ 1 ,450 , to be evidenced by two promissory notes, - one for
$ 550 , and the other for $ 900 . The plaintiff in this action , at the re
quest of said Heisler , who was her son , signed his said note for $ 550,
as a surety , and it was delivered to the vendor of the farm . Heisler
also made and delivered to said vendor his note for $ 900, and, to se
cure the payment of both notes , executed and delivered a second
mortgage on the farm , which was duly recorded . John C . Heisler
neglected to pay the note for $ 550 when it matured , and , upon the
commencement of legal proceedings against her to enforce its col
lection , the plaintiff paid the same . She then paid the note for $ 900
given to the vendor o
f
the farm , and soon afterwards , December 7 ,
1887 , said John C . , his wife joining , executed and delivered a war
ranty deed , whereby they conveyed the farm to the plaintiff , subject
to the mortgage first above mentioned . The deed to said John C .
Heisler , and the deed from him and his wife to the plaintiff herein ,
were recorded simultaneously , on January 3 , 1888 . The court found
that the deed last mentioned was accepted by plaintiff to secure and
indemnify her for the amounts so paid b
y
her on said notes , that
the value o
f
the farm had never exceeded $ 2 ,300 , and that no part o
f
the sums paid by plaintiff had been repaid to her . On January 21 ,
1888 , the vendor mortgagee executed and delivered a satisfaction of
his mortgage , which was duly recorded ; the effect on the title , as
shown by the record and docket entries , being to promote defend
ant ' s judgment , and to make it a second instead of a third lien on
the land . The only superior lien was that o
f
the first mortgage , and ,









the judgment , nor had she caused any
examination to be made in the clerk ' s office as to judgments against
her son . January 11 , 1890 , after this action had been commenced ,
and defendants had been informed o
f plaintiff ' s equities , the farm
was sold to one Lamb , b
y




execution duly issued upon the judgment , and to satisfy the same .
The sheriff ' s certificate of sale was delivered to Lamb , but defend
ant was the real purchaser , and shortly afterwards the certificate was
duly assigned to it . On these findings the court below ordered judg
ment canceling and annulling the satisfaction o
f
the mortgage and
the record of the same , and restoring and reinstating , o
f
record and




the record , and as
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prior and paramount to the lien or claim of defendant by virtue
of the judgment or sale on execution , or otherwise ; further , that
plaintiff was the equitable assignee and owner of said mortgage ,
and that as such she be subrogated to the rights of the original
mortgagee.
This appeal is from an order denying a new trial.
The doctrine of subrogation has recently been considered by this
court in two cases : Emmert v . Thompson , 49 Minn . 386 , and Went
worth v . Tubbs, 53 Minn . 388. It was said in the first -mentioned
case that this doctrine is enforced solely for the purpose of accom
plishing substantial justice , and , being administered upon equitable
principles, it is only when an applicant has an equity to invoke , and
when innocent persons will not be injured , that a court can inter
fere . That in this way a court , under a great variety of circum
stances , may relieve one who has acted under a justifiable or ex
cusable mistake of fact, is well settled , and that it is a common thing
for courts of equity to relieve parties who by mistake have dis
charged mortgages of record , and to fully protect them from the
consequences of their acts , where , as before stated , no injury to in
nocent parties will result . In the Wentworth Case it was said that
the doctrine could only be applied in favor of one who has bought a
debt , either expressly , or by paying it under circumstances which
render the payment equivalent to a purchase ; and this is solely a
question of intention , either expressed or presumed from the rela
tion of the party to the debt , or other circumstances under which pay
ment was made. These cases come very near sustaining the con
clusion reached by the court below .
The findings are silent as to any express intention of the plaintiff
when paying the $550 note . But she was a surety only , entitled ,
upon payment to the benefit of all securities held by the payee, and
under these circumstances the payment was simply equivalent to a
purchase . Because of the relations of the parties the presumption
arises that plaintiff did not intend to extinguish the debt , or to re
lease the security . Being , by reason of the payment , entitled to the
benefit of the mortgage , to the extent of her interest , but subject to
the claim of the holder of the second note , the plaintiff was not an
intermeddler or a volunteer , when , in order to fully protect and se
cure herself , she paid the note last mentioned . And under the cir
cumstances this payment must also be regarded equivalent to a pur
chase . That it was not intended by the parties to extinguish the
claim or to release the security is evidenced by the fact that, imme
diately after this last-mentioned transaction , plaintiff received a deed
of the premises from her son and his wife , which , as found by ilie
court, was taken and received for her indemnification and as security .
A party situated as was plaintiff , who has paid money due upon
a mortgage , is entitled , for the purpose of effecting substantial jus
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tice , to be substituted in place of the incumbrancer and to be treated
as assignee of the mortgage , and is enabled to hold the same as as
signee , notwithstanding the mortgage itself has been canceled . The
true principle is that where money due upon a mortgage is paid ,
it shall operate as a discharge of the mortgage , or in the nature of
an assignment of it, as may best serve the purposes of justice and
the just intent of the parties . One who has paid money due upon
a mortgage of lands to which he had a title that might have been
defeated thereby has the right to hold the lands as if the mortgage
subsisted , and had been assigned to him . The mortgage may , for his
benefit , be considered as still subsisting , though formally discharged
of record , in so far as he ought, in justice to hold the property .
Sheldon , Subr., $ $ 13, 14 , and cases cited ; Jones , Mortg ., $ $ 858 ,
859 , 881 , and cases .






the original mortgagee , and to an assignment o
f
the




the judgment lien . Having caused it to be satisfied
and discharged in ignorance o
f
the existence o
f the judgment lien ,
under circumstances authorizing an inference of a mistake o
f
fact ,
equity will presume such mistake , and give the party who made it
the benefit o
f
the equitable right o
f subrogation . To do so in this
case is to prevent manifest injustice and hardship , and no superior
intervening equities ar
e
interfered with . See Barnes v . Mott , 64 N .
Y . 397 ; Stanton v . Thompson , 49 N . H . 272 .
Of course , it has been observed that defendant obtained and dock .
eted the judgment several years before its debtor purchased the real
estate in question , and that the mortgage was a prior and paramount




satisfaction and discharge . Before the
sale this action had been commenced , and thereby defendant had been
informed o
f plaintiff ' s equities . It purchased with full notice . It
could not and did not acquire an intervening superior equity through
the sheriff ' s certificate . B
y
subrogating the plaintiff to the rights o
f
the mortgagee , it is not placed in a worse position than it held wlien
the mortgage was alive .
Order affirmed . 5





NEW YORK , 1889 .
116 N . Y . 566 .
This was an action to compel the specific performance o
f
a con
tract to convey land .
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On the 11th of July , 1879, the defendant entered into an agree
ment with Isabelle K . Arnold , one of the plaintiffs , whereby he
covenanted to convey to her one hundred and ninety acres of land ,
known as the Arnold homestead , in the town of Mt. Morris , Liv
ingstone county , “ subject to all existing liens now on said property ,"
upon the payment by her of the sum of $ 1,400 , with interest thereon
payable semi-annually , together with interest on the incumbrances
then existing on said farm and the taxes thereon , all of which she
duly agreed to pay on her part. The liens existing on the premises
at the date of said contract were ( 1 ) , a mortgage dated April 17 ,
1877, given by Russell G . Arnold to William A . Wadsworth to se
cure the payment of $6 ,000 , in three years with semi-annual interest ,
no part of which had been paid when this action was commenced ,
except the interest up to April 2 , 1883 ; and ( 2 ) , a decree in the Sur
rogate 's Court of said county for the payment of the debts of Ash
bel Arnold , deceased , a former owner of said land , amounting to
the sum of $527 . 47 with interest from February 21 , 1881. This de
cree was a charge upon the land subsequent to the Wadsworth
mortgage , but prior to the interest of the defendant , who at the
date of said contract was the owner of the equity of redemptio : .
An appeal had been taken from said decree and was pending at the
time of the trial . The plaintiff , Susie K . Arnold subsequently , by
assignment , acquired an interest in said land contract upon which
there is still unpaid the whole of the principal , besides interest from
May 10 , 1883. The plaintiffs have been in the possession of the
premises since the date of the contract . On Saturday, December 9 ,
1883 , the defendant demanded of the plaintiffs payment of the in
terest due on the contract , and was told that it would be paid by the
middle of the following week . He gave them until the next Satur
day . They also informed him that they would get the money and
pay him and that they should want a deed , to which he made no
reply . On Monday , December eleventh , they told him that they
would be ready at eleven o 'clock to pay him and take a deed , and he
said that he would be at home at that hour, but before it arrived he
left Mt. Morris , where he resided , and went to the residence of said
Wadsworth , at Geneseo , and proposed to pay said mortgage and take
an assignment of it . Mr. Wadsworth refused to assign , whereupon
the defendant paid him the amount of themortgage, $6 ,231.50 , and
received a discharge of the same which he placed upon record . In
the afternoon of the same day the plaintiffs offered to pay defendant
the sum unpaid on the contract and requested him to give them a
deed , but he refused . He, however , offered to sell the farm to the
plaintiff , Isabelle , for the amount of the incumbrances thereon , pro




seven thousand dollars , " and to
give a deed and take a mortgage payable in si
x years . Said Wads
worth held the mortgage as an investment and had not called for the
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principal , and did not wish that it should be paid , but he had stated
to the defendant that unless payments were promptly made he should
proceed to collection . On several occasions the defendant had
spoken to the agent of Mr. Wadsworth about unpaid interest , and
had informed him that he wanted it kept up because he had some
interest in it. On December 29 , 1883 , the plaintiffs made a formal
tender and demand , but the defendant again refused and thereupon
they brought this action to compel a specific performance .
The defendant by his answer claimed that he was the equitable
owner of the Wadsworth mortgage and asked that it be adjudged
a valid and subsisting lien upon the premises .
The trial court , after finding the facts substantially as stated ,
found as a conclusion of law that said facts constituted no defense
or counter -claim to the plaintiffs' cause of action , and ordered judg .
ment for specific performance and for conveyance by the defendant ,
“ subject to all liens existing upon said property on the eleventh of
July , 1879 , upon being paid the sum of $ 1,400 , and interest thereon
from May 10 , 1883 .” Judgment having been entered accordingly ,
the defendant appealed to the General Term , which modified the
decree by inserting therein , after “ July , 1879 ," the following pro
vision : “ And particularly to the lien of the Wadsworth mortgage
so -called , being a mortgage to secure the payment of the sum of
$6 ,000 , and interest thereon from April 21, 1883 ; that said George
A . Green be declared subrogated to the rights of the mortgagee in
said mortgage at the time of its payment and discharge , with the
right to enforce the payment o
f
the principal and interest due and
unpaid thereon ; and that the discharge o
f
said mortgage , made by
Wadsworth , the mortgagee , and recorded in the office of the clerk
of the county of Livingston , be by said clerk canceled of record ;
that the defendant , on the plaintiffs ' election at any time within three
months after entering this judgment , or the final determination of






said bond and mortgage a
s
reinstated , be required
to assign to such person o
r persons as the plaintiffs may direct al
l
rights and interests taken by him under said Wadsworth bond and
mortgage a
s
reinstated , and that the plaintiffs have the same time in
which to pay and satisfy said mortgage if they elect to pay the same . "
VANN , J . : This appeal presents the single question whether , un
der all the circumstances o
f
the case , the defendant should have
been substituted in the place o
fMr . Wadsworth as the owner of the
mortgage in question . Did he by the fact o
f
payment become the
equitable assignee of the security and entitle to enforce it for his own
reimbursement and the protection o
f
his interest in the land ? Under




lien , because equity regards the person making the
payment as the owner thereof for certain definite purposes and keep




it alive and preserves its lien fo
r
his benefit and security . According
to the well - established principles upon which the doctrine o
f
equitable
assignment by subrogation rests , if the person paying stands in
such a relation to the premises that his interest , whether legal o
r
equitable , can not otherwise be adequately protected , the transaction
will be treated in equity as an assignment . ( Sheldon on Subroga
tion , $ $ 1 , 3 , 14 , 16 ; 3 Pomeroy ' s Equity Jur . , § 1211 ; Jones on
Mortgages , $ 874 . ) The remedy o
f subrogation is no longer lim
ited to sureties and quasi sureties , but includes so wide a range o
f
subjects that it has been called the "mode which equity adopts to
compel the ultimate payment of a debt by one who in justice , equity
and good conscience ought to pay it . " (Harrison Subrogation ,
§ 1 ; Barnes v . Mott , 64 N . Y . 397 , 401 ; Stevens v . Goodenough , 26
Vt . 676 ; Harusberger v . Yancey , 33 Gratt . 527 ; Smith v . Cosam ,
4
2 Conn . 244 . ) While a mere volunteer , with no obligation to pay
o
r
interest to protect , is not entitled to its aid , it is frequently ap




encumbered real estate , who , although
not personally liable , has paid the debt o
f
another which is a charge
upon the land , and which , if not paid , might cause him to lose his
interest therein . Under such circumstances the debt , although paid
and satisfied in form , is regarded in equity as neither paid nor




law the former holder ceases to
be the creditor , while the person paying takes his place as owner
o
f
the debt and security unimpaired . Where , within the limitations
suggested , benefit may result to the person paying without injury to
the person who should pay , equity casts the burden upon the latter ,
who ought in fairness to bear it , provided it will not work injustice
or disturb the rights of other creditors of a common debtor . ( Id . ;
Johnson v . Zink , 51 N . Y . 333 ; Cole v . Malcolm , 66 id . 363 ; Twom
bly v . Cassidy , 82 id . 155 ; Gans v . Thieme , 93 Id . 225 , 232 ; Averill
v . Taylor , 8 id . 44 , 51 . )
These principles , when applied to the facts o
f





the General Term . The defendant was
the purchaser o
f
land subject to two incumbrances , the earlier of
which was a mortgage for a large sum past due , and the other a
decree in Surrogate ' s Court , the subject of which was still in liti
gation . He was the vendor of the same land , subject to the same in




the purchase -price had
been paid , and interest thereon was past due and unpaid . The land





which was the personal debt o
f
the defendant , but either
o
f
which , if enforced , would require him to raise the money and
pay it , o
r
else lose his interest in the premises . He held the legal
title to the land a
s security for the payment o
f
the purchase -price ,
and a
s
trustee for the plaintiffs , the equitable owners . It did not
appear that the land was adequate security for the amount there
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was against it, including the demand of the defendant. It is clear ,
therefore, that he was not a mere volunteer or stranger , because he
has an actual interest to protect against two prior liens, either of
which might be enforced at any time, involving trouble , expense
and the possible loss of his claim . The danger of interference may
have been remote, but there was nothing to protect him against a
change of mind on the part of the holder of themortgage or on the
part of the plaintiffs. Freedom from interference depended upon
moral assurance , not upon legal right . How can he be called a
stranger to a debt whose land is the primary fund for the payment
of such debt ? A stranger or volunteer , as those terms are used with
reference to the subject of subrogation , is one who , in no event re
sulting from the existing state of affairs, can become liable for the
debt , and whose property is not charged with the payment thereof
and can not be sold therefor . A payment made by one who was lia
ble to be compelled to make it, or lose his property , will not be re
garded as made by a stranger . Where the person paying has an
interest to protect he is not a stranger . Even if he holds the title to
land merely as security , still he has an interest that is insecure , in a
legal sense , as long as the prior lien is past due and held by another .
(Harrison Subrogation , $ $ 795 -798 ; Sheldon on Subrogation ,
$ $ 245 , 246 ; Jones on Mortgages , § 877.)
It is insisted , however , that the payment made by the defendant
was not a fair effort to protect his property , but that his method was
underhanded and his object uncertain . This is doubtless true , and
it gave the court jurisdiction to require the defendant to so handle
his security as not to injure the plaintiffs , and to place them as nearly
as possible in the same position as if he had not paid the mortgage .
Owing to his misconduct he was properly compelled not only to
defer the enforcement of his security until the plaintiffs had had a
reasonable time to find another holder fo
r
the mortgage , but also to
pay the entire costs o
f
the litigation . The plaintiffs can not , with




modified , because they lose
nothing by it . They are substantially situated as they were before
the payment was made . They should not , therefore , be permitted
to take advantage o
f
the defendant b
y insisting that an effect be
given to the payment which was not intended and which would be
inequitable . They come into a court o
f
equity seeking , among other
things , relief from their own default in not paying the interest upon
the law day . (Stevenson v . Maxwell , 2 N . Y . 40 . ) As they seek
equity from the defendant , they must do equity toward him ; and
when they receive a
ll
that they contracted fo
r , it would not be equi
table for them to avoid paying for it as they agreed . Equity will not
permit them to receive the equivalent o
f
$ 6 ,000 for nothing and a
t
the same time to demand its aid for further relief against the person
who parted with that sum for their benefit , even if his methods were
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indirect and his object questionable . On the other hand , it will give
to each party his own ; to the plaintiffs the land , and to the defend
ant the money and security , but, under the circumstances , will re
quire him to so use the latter as not to take any advantage of his
vendees .
If the plaintiffs had made a tender before the defendant made the
payment , or if they could not have been placed in the same situation ,
substantially , that they were in before the payment was made , dif
ferent questions would have arisen for consideration in relation to
which we express no opinion .
We think that the judgment should be affirmed , but , under the cir
cumstances , without costs .
Judgment affirmed .
GOODYEAR v . GOODYEAR .
SUPREME COURT OF IOWA , 1887 .
72 Iowa 329.
ROTHROCK , J. : The material facts in the case are as follows :
On the 19th day of June, 1882 , R . G . Barnes sold and conveyed the
land in controversy to E . C . Goodyear . The consideration for the
sale was $ 1 ,600 . On this sum $ 250 was paid in cash , and the bal
ance was secured by a mortgage on the premises , executed by E . C .
Goodyear. The deed and mortgage were filed for record and
recorded . On the 7th day of October , 1882 , the defendants Charles
P . Kellogg & Co. obtained a judgment against said E . C . Goodyear
and Henry Goodyear in the circuit court of Greene county for the
sum of $ 1,760 . This judgment was a lien on the land , but junior
and inferior to the purchase -money mortgage . On the 17th day of
November , 1882 , E . C . Goodyear and her said husband conveyed the
land to Martin Goodyear by a special warranty deed , and by the
terms of the deed Martin Goodyear assumed the payment of the
mortgage to Barnes , and agreed to pay the same when it became
due. About January 16 , 1884 , Martin Goodyear paid the Barnes
mortgage in full , and Barnes executed a release and satisfaction of
the mortgage , which was filed for record and recorded on the 30th
day of January , 1884 . On the 26th day of December , 1884 , Martin
Goodyear conveyed the land by general warranty deed to Elizabeth
Goodyear . Martin Goodyear is a son , and Elizabeth Goodyear a
daughter , of E . C . and Henry Goodyear . Martin Goodyear and
6 Compare, Downer v . Fox, 20 Vt. 388 ; Flachs v . Kelly , 30 11
1
. 462 ;
Weld v . Sabin , 20 N . H . 533 ; Aultman & Co . v . Seichting , 126 Ind .
137 ; Fiacre v . Chapman , 32 N . J . Eq . 463 .
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Elizabeth Goodyear, at the time the respective conveyances of the
land were made , had no actual knowledge of the judgment in favor
ofKellogg & Co.
The question in the case arising upon the foregoing facts is, has
Elizabeth Goodyear, the present owner of the land , the right to in
terpose the mortgage as a lien superior to the judgment ? It is
claimed that she has such a right, because her grantor assumed and
paid the mortgage as part of the purchase -price of the land , and
that he was entitled to be subrogated to the rights of Barnes , the
mortgagee. We think this is a misconception of the law of subro
gation , and a mistake as to the relations of the parties to the mort
gage in question . Martin Goodyear and Elizabeth Goodyear were,
at the time of their respective purchases of the land , charged with
constructive notice of the judgment. This notice was as effectual ,
as to them , as actual notice would have been . They can assert no
equity arising out of the fact that they had no actual knowledge
of the existence of the judgment . If they could do so , constructive
notice would be of little avail. When Martin Goodyear took liis
conveyance of the land , he agreed to pay the mortgage . He did not
become the surety of the mortgagor . He made the debt his own. In
other words , he stepped into the shoes of the grantor . He actually
paid the mortgage , and had ite released and satisfied o
f
record . In
our opinion , neither he nor his grantee has any greater right to
revive it and use it a
s
a lien superior to the judgment than his






once a mortgage always a mortgage has no appli
cation to the facts o
f
this case . If Barnes had taken a conveyance
of the land , and used his mortgage as payment in part of the pur
chase -money , it is well settled that he could have set up the mortgage
a
s against the judgment . But that is altogether a different question
from themortgagor o
r
his grantees attempting to do so . They have
n
o right in equity , because , they do not succeed to any o
f
the rights
of the mortgagee by equitable assignment or otherwise . What the
rights o
f
Martin Goodyear would have been if he had taken an as
signment of the mortgage , we need not determine . His obligation
was to pay it , and he performed that obligation , and the mortgage
was satisfied .
We think the decree of the district court must be reversed . ?
7 Accord : Birke v . Abbott , 103 Ind . 1 .
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WILKINS ET AL. v. GIBSON .
SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA , 1901.
113 Ga. 31.
[On October 30 , 1893 , Mrs. Wilhelmina I. Steiner executed and
delivered to John P . Gibson a security deed to a certain described
tract of land , to secure a debt of $6 ,000 due the grantee , who gave
to the grantor a bond conditioned to reconvey the property upon
payment of the debt. This deed was duly recorded on November
28 , 1893 . The debt became due on account of the same not having
been paid in accordance with the contract , and Gibson filed his peti
tion against R . C . Neely , administrator of the estate of Wilhelmina
I. Steiner , who had died since the execution of the deed , to recover
judgment on the notes which the deed was given to secure . Having
recovered such a judgment, which was declared to be a special lien
on the land , execution was issued thereon on May 28 , 1896 , and the
same having been levied on the land described in the security deed ,
a claim was interposed to the property by Wilkins, Neely & Jones.
Pending the trial of the claim case , on September 14 , 1897 , Gibson ,
the plaintiff in execution , filed an equitable petition against Wilkins ,
Neely & Jones, the claimants and R . C . Neely , as administrator of
the estate of W . I. Steiner , deceased , alleging that on February 23 ,
1889 , Wilhelmina I. Steiner executed and delivered to A . L . Rich
ardson a security deed , conveying a certain described tract of land ;
that on November 19 , 1890 , W . I. Steiner executed to Wilkins ,
Neely & Jones a mortgage deed covering the property described in
the deed to Richardson ; that subsequently , the notes given by W . I.
Steiner to A . L . Richardson having become due, she applied to
Lawson & Scales, loan brokers , and engaged said firm to negotiate
a new loan in order that she might pay up and discharge her in
debtedness to Richardson , who was urging a settlement of the
same ; that application was made for a loan of $6 , 000 , the samebeing
sufficient to pay the debt due Richardson , which amount was ad
vanced by petitioner to W . I. Steiner ; that of the sum of $6 ,000
loaned by petitioner to Mrs . Steiner in 1893 , $ 5 ,598 was paid by
petitioner to Richardson on the notes he held against Mrs . Steiner ;
that Richardson 's deed was canceled and satisfied on the record ; that
this payment was made at the request of Mrs . Steiner, and her pur
pose in procuring the loan was to pay the notes held by
Richardson ; that Wilkins , Neely & Jones did not furnish
any credit to Mrs . Steiner by reason of the fact that the
Richardson deed was cancelled of record ; that their status as cred
itors was not changed by reason of the cancellation ; that the debt
for which they claim to hold the deed as security was contracted
prior to the cancellation of the Richardson deed , for which reason
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they have in law and equity no right to the land as against peti
tioner 's judgment. Plaintiff prays, therefore , that the land be de
clared subject to his ti . fa . for the amount he paid to Richardson , in
the event it is not declared subject to the fi . fa . as it now stands,
which plaintiff claims as his legal right.
Defendants Wilkins , Neely and Jones demurred to the petition
for want of equity . The demurrer was overruled , to which defend
ants excepted pendente lite . Subject to their demurrer defendants
answered that they advanced various sums to Mrs. Steiner to be ap
plied upon the debt due Richardson , both before and after the date
of their security executed on November 19 , 1890 , and they pray
that they may be subrogated to the rights of Richardson to the ex
tent of the sums so advanced .
The claim case and the equitable proceeding were by direction
of the court consolidated and tried together . The trial resulted in
a verdict for the plaintiff against the land for $ 5 ,598 .00, with interest
at 7 per cent. from October 30 , 1893 . Three questions were sub
mitted to the jury by the court : * * * ( 3 ) Whether Gibson
was subrogated to the rights of Richardson , on the theory that he
had paid the money with the understanding that he was to have a
first lien on the property . The jury found in favor of Gibson on
his claim of subrogation . The defendants ' motion for a new trial
assigns error upon the admission of certain evidence , upon various
specified portions of the charge , and upon the failure of the court to
give in charge various requests . Themotion was overruled , and they
excepted , assigning as error the overruling of the motion and the
rulings complained of in their exceptions pendente lite .)
COBB , J . [After making a statement of facts which is condensed
above . ]
The doctrine of subrogation has for a long time been applied by
courts of equity . It was borrowed from the civil law , and was of
two kinds : the legal subrogation , which took place as a matter of
equity without any agreement to that effect made with the person
paying the debt ; and the " conventional subrogation ,” which was
applied where an agreement was made with the person paying the
debt that he would be subrogated to the rights and remedies of the
original creditor . See Howe's Studies in Civil Law , 155 . Courts
of equity in this country have applied the doctrine in favor of sure
ties who pay off the debts of their principals (24 Am . & Eng. Enc .
L . ( 1st ed. ) 194 ; Sheldon , Sub . (2d ed. ) , § 86 ; Harris , Sub ., § 162 ) ;
as well as in favor of any person having an interest in property upon
which there is a lien , and who , to protect that interest , pays off such
lien . 24 Am . & Eng. Enc . L . ( 1st ed .) 248 ; Sheldon , Sub . (2d ed . ) ,
§ 3 ; Harris , Sub ., § 795 . The extent to which the doctrine of sub
rogation has been expressly recognized by the lawmaking power
in this State may be seen by reference to the following sections of
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the Civil Code : 2986 , 2995 , 2996 , 5433 , 5471. The doctrine has also ,
from the very first , been applied in favor of a person who, though
having no interest in the property necessary to be protected , yet
pays o
ff
the lien upon an agreement that h
e
is to b
e subrogated to the
rights o
f
the lienholder . 24 Am . & Eng . Enc . L . ( 1s
t
e
d . ) 290 , and
cases cited ; Sheldon , Sub . ( 2d ed . ) , § 248 . According to these au
thorities , this agreement may be made with the person paying the
debt b
y
either the creditor o
r
the debtor . See also , in this connec
tion , Allen v . Caylor (Ala . ) , 24 So . 512 . The doctrine has been
recently applied by this court in such a case . Merchants Bank v .
Tillman , 106 Ga . 55 . It is , however , never applied for the benefit
o
f
a mere volunteer . “ The doctrine o
f subrogation is not applied for
the mere stranger or volunteer , who has paid the debt o
f
another ,
without any assignment or agreement for subrogation , being under
n
o legal obligation to make the payment , and not being compelled
to d
o
so for the preservation o
f any rights o
r property of his own . ”
Sheldon , Sub . , § 240 .
In a case where a stranger pays of
f




r mortgage , the parties have a right to agree that
the prayer will have the same priority as the holder o
f
the security ,
and be substituted for him . A court o
f equity will enforce this
agreement as made , and give the second creditor just such security
as he contracts for . If he is content to take an inferior lien and
rely on that to enforce payment o
f




n agreement for subrogation , come to his relief and




the original security .




the security , and without any agreement , either
actual o
r implied , that the security is to be kept alive for his benefit ,
and takes a new security , it will be subject to any valid intervening















tervening liens . If in such a case the lender desires to be subrogated
to the rights o
f
the original creditor , he must make a distinct agree
ment to that effect . The law will not imply an agreement from the
bare fact that the money was paid by request of the debtor . When
the first security is paid off its lien is discharged , and the equitable
doctrine o
f subrogation can not b
e
invoked to revive it in favor o
f
a
person who had no interest in paying the debt , and who did so
without any agreement that he would be substituted for the original
creditor . By operation o
f
law , as soon as this lien is discharged ,
the lien next in dignity takes its place , and for equity to give an
other creditor priority over such a lienholder , when perhaps the
debtor ' s purpose in discharging the first lien was to give him the
preference , would be manifestly unjust . In any case the burden is
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on the person paying off the lien to show an agreement , or a state
of facts from which an agreement would be implied , to substitute
him for the original creditor . * * *
But it must not be understood that an agreement for subrogation
will never be implied . In fact , there are loose expressions in some
of the cases to the effect that if the advance is made at the request of
on who has an interest in the lien to be discharged , an agreement
for subrogation will be implied . See 24 Am . & Eng . Enc . L . 295
296 . But in many of the cases where these expressions occur the facts
showed an actual agreement, and those few which can be properly
treated as deciding the question are out of harmony with the weight
of authority . As an instance of the former class , see Sutton v. Sut
ton, 26 S . C . 33 ; Home Savings Bank v . Bierstadt, 168 Ill . 618 .
In Railroad C
o . v . Wortendyke , 27 N . J . Eq . 658 , certain persons ,
who had advanced money to pay off a debt contracted b
y
the rail
road company for rolling -stock and locomotives , claimed to be sub
rogated to the rights of the vendors , to the extent of the advance
ments made . In dealing with this contention , Mr . Justice Green
said : “ The case as here presented does not entitle the petitioners
to a decree for subrogation . They do not , in their petition , claim to
stand as guarantors on the contract , o
r that they were in any way
held bound for it
s performance . They only allege that they made the
advances with the understanding that they should be subrogated
to the right of the owners of the rolling - stock , to the extent of such
advancements . I have been unable to find , either in the petition or
evidence , anything to show an agreement with the original debtor
o
r
creditor , that these parties should be entitled to subrogation o
r
to




the stock . It is not sufficient
that a person paying the debt o
f
another should do so merely with
the understanding on his part that he should be subrogated to the
rights o
f
the creditor . Conventional subrogation can only result
from a
n express agreement either with the debtor o
r
creditor . " Cit
ing Dixon , Sub . 1 , 10 , 167 ; Bouvier ' s Law Dict . , title Subrogation ;
Sandford v . McLean , 3 Paige , 116 ; Shinn v . Budd , 1 McCarter ,
234 . In Watson v . Wilcox , 39 Wis . 643 , it was held : One who ,
having no interest to protect , voluntarily loans money to a mort
gagor for the purpose of satisfying and cancelling the mortgage ,
taking a new mortgage for his own security , can not have the
former mortgage revived and himself subrogated to the rights o
f
the mortgagee therein . ” In Home Savings Bank v . Bierstadt , supra ,
notwithstanding it was ruled , a
s
stated above , that one who advanced
money at the request of the debtor was not to be regarded as a
volunteer , it appeared that there was an express agreement that the
lender was to have a first lien on the property ; and it was said in
the opinion that “ It is the agreement that the security shall be kept
alive for the benefit o
f
the person making the payment which gives
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the right of subrogation , because it takes away the character of a
mere volunteer . Here the agreement between the debtor and the
appellee , who advanced the money , was to the effect that appellee
was to advance sufficient money to discharge the seven Goudy deeds
of trust, and should receive from the debtor , by way of security for
the money so advanced , a first mortgage upon the seven lots . In
equity , that was an agreement that the Goudy deeds of trust should
become security for her loan. That was the substance of the trans
action , and equity will effectuate the real intention of the parties ,
where no injury is done to an innocent party , by applying the prin
ciple of conventional subrogation .” Probably , therefore , the lan
guage in another portion of the opinion with reference to money
advanced by request is to be treated as qualified by the first part
of the foregoing quotation . It was further ruled in that case , that
even where the security paid off was cancelled , equity would keep
it alive for the benefit of the person paying the debt , provided he
was not guilty of gross negligence , and where justice requires it.
The Supreme Court of Texas has held that while an agreement for
subrogation was necessary , it was sufficiently shown by a recital in
a deed to the lender that he retained a first lien on the property .
Mustain v . Stokes , 38 S . W . 758 .
A case which , perhaps , leans to
o
far the other way is that o
f
Bohn
Sash Co . v . Case , 60 N . W . 576 . There it appeared that the lender ,
b
y
express request and solicitation o
f
the debtor , advanced him the
money with which to pay off certain mortgages on his property ,
upon the assurance by the debtor that the lender was to have a first
mortgage thereon . There were other liens outstanding a
t
the time ,
junior to the mortgages , but the lender was assured that these
liens had been provided for . As a matter o
f
fact they had not ; and
the Supreme Court o
f
Nebraska held that the lender was not sub
rogated to the rights o
f
themortgagees in the discharged mortgages .
In Kocher v . Kocher ( N . J . ) , 39 Atl . 536 , it was held that , “ Where
a son loaned his father money with which to pay assessments which
were a lien on a lot , he was not entitled to be subrogated to such
lien . ” In the opinion the vice -chancellor said : “ The right of sub
rogation must either arise out of the circumstance that the party
paying or asking subrogation was interested in the property , and
entitled to pay the incumbrance in order to protect himself , or he




either the debtor o
r
the lienor , with the understanding that he should be subrogated . "
In Whiteselle v . Loan Agency ( Tex . ) , 27 S . W . 300 , it was held ,
in effect , that subrogation arose in favor o
f
a lender who advanced
money to pay off a security under an agreement with the debtor that
h
e was to have a first lien on the property pledged to secure the
original debt .
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It is true , as stated above, that some of the courts have extended
the doctrine farther than those above referred to . It has been said
that subrogation was a “ benevolent ” doctrine and equity would ap
ply it in any case in which justice required it ; and under sanction of
this elastic expression cases can be found where it was applied with
out the semblance of an agreement. We think the safer and better
rule to be, and we therefore hold , that subrogation will arise only
in those cases where the party claiming it, advanced the money to
pay a debt which , in the event of default by the debtor , he would
be bound to pay , or where he had some interest to protect, or where
he advanced the money under an agreement , express or implied ,
made either with the debtor or creditor , that he would be subrogated
to the rights and remedies of the creditor . See Aetna Insurance Co .
v . Middleport , 124 U . S . 534 .
* * * * * * *
Some of the extracts from the judge 's charge were not in harmony
with the rules above laid down, and consequently a reversal of the
judgment refusing a new trial is necessary . As the case goes back
for another hearing, it would not be profitable , if indeed it would be
proper , to express any opinion on the evidence found in the present
record , as facts may be adduced on another trial which will give the
case an entirely different aspect . Nor is it necessary to set out at
length the portions of the charge which contain erroneous statements
of the law . They will sufficiently appear from an application to the
charge of the principles above laid down . The judge instructed the
jury , in effect , that if the plaintiff advanced the money to pay off
the debt due Richardson , by request of Mrs. Steiner , and themoney
was used for that purpose , this , without more , would make a case
for the application of the doctrine of conventional subrogation . In
order to recover on this theory , the plaintiff must show a state of
facts from which either an express agreement or one arising by
necessary implication will appear to have been made between him
and Mrs. Steiner , or Richardson , or their respective agents under
authority from their principals , that the plaintiff was , so far as the
dignity of his lien was concerned , to stand in the place of Richard
son . It also results from the above that the amendment offered by
the plaintiff claiming subrogation was subject to the demurrer filed
thereto , for the reason that it is nowhere alleged therein that the
plaintiff had an agreement of any character with Mrs . Steiner , or
Richardson , whereby he was to be substituted to the latter 's rights.8
2. The defendants , however , contend that even if the evidence
justified a finding that an agreement was made between Mrs . Steiner
and Gibson that he was to be subrogated to the rights of Richard
8Compare , Receivers of New Jersey Midland R . Co. v . Wortendyke ,
27 N . J . Eq. 658 ; Tradesmen 's Building Assn v. Thompson , 32 N . J . Eq.
133 ; Bigelow v. Scott, 135 Ala . 236 ; Wooster v. Cavender, 54 Ark . 153 .
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son , it would be inequitable and unjust to apply the doctrine in favor
of Gibson , because he was guilty of inexcusable negligence ; and
the court was requested to charge that Gibson would not be entitled
to subrogation if he was guilty of " inexcusable negligence " in failing
to know or to act on his knowledge of the deed to Wilkins , Neely &
Jones. It is undoubtedly true that if, on account of the gross negli
gence of the lender , the rights of intervening lienholders are preju
diced , and they are placed in a worse position than they would have
been had the debt not been paid , the lender will not be entitled to
subrogation . When the defendants , the holders of the intervening
liens, took their mortgages , the lien of Richardson was in existence
and superior to theirs , and of this fact they had knowledge. To
substitute Gibson for Richardson would apparently place them in no
worse position than they were before. Wilkins ,Neely & Jones claim ,
however , as will hereafter appear , that they will be substantially and
seriously injured if Gibson is permitted to assert the lien of Rich
ardson against them . The fact that Gibson may have known of
the existence of the mortgages of defendants , which were executed
before the cancellation of the deed to Richardson , will not defeat
his right to subrogation , provided, of course , he had an agreement
for subrogation . If he had such an agreement , he simply stands in
equity in the place of Richardson , so far as the dignity of his debt
is concerned . On account of this agreement equity simply assigns
this security to him . See , in this connection , Home Savings Bank
v . Bierstadt , 168 11
1
. 618 ; Levy v . Martin , 48 Wis . 206 -207 ; Ham
mond v . Barker , 61 N . H . 53 ; Campbell v . Trotter , 100 Ill . 281 ;
Tryell v . Ward , 102 Ill . 29 . In Bruse v . Nelson , 35 Iowa , 157 , it
was held that subrogation would arise provided the lender had no
actual notice o
f
the intervening lien , though it was of record . In
Union Mortgage Co . v . Peters , 72 Miss . 1059 , it was held that a
second mortgagee , being placed in no worse position b
y
the trans
action , can not complain of the subrogation of the lender to the
rights of the first mortgagee . See , also , Draper v . Ashley , 104 Mich .
527 . The point urged b
y
the defendants against Gibson in this con
nection is , in its essence , that o
f equitable estoppel to claim subroga
tion , because the original lien was cancelled through the negligence
o
f
Gibson in failing to take an assignment when the defendants '





a party , whereby he is absolutely precluded , both
a
t
law and in equity , from asserting rights which might perhaps have






f remedy , as
against another person , who has in good faith relied upon such
conduct to change his position for the worse , and who , on his part ,
acquires some corresponding right , either o




r remedy . ” 2 Pom . Eq . Jur . , § 804 . See , also , Whiteselle v . Tex .
Loan Agency , 27 S . W . 309 , 315 , where estoppel was invoked and
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denied by the court in a case similar to the one now in hand. While
Wilkins , Neely & Jones do not claim to have advanced any money
relying upon the fact that the Richardson deed had been cancelled ,
nor that they have expressly released any security on this account ,
still they say that , treating the Richardson deed as having been can
celled , they did not press their claim against Mrs. Steiner with the
same vigor that they would have done if they had known their
claim was to be treated as inferior to Gibson 's , and that they would
not have granted Mrs. Steiner the indulgences which they did grant
if they had not felt confident of having a first lien on the property ;
and that these facts would work an estoppel against Gibson to as
sert the right of subrogation . When a prior incumbrance has been
cancelled of record , and , acting on the faith of this , an intervening
incumbrancer has delayed in prosecuting his legal remedies or has
granted indulgences the result of which is to make the exercise
of the right operate to his serious disadvantage , while there may be
no estoppel by reason of these facts against the right of a person
advancing money to pay off the prior incumbrance to claim subroga
tion , still if he delays for an unreasonable length of time to claim the
right and have the cancellation set aside , this will be a sufficient
reason for a court of equity to refuse the right of subrogation .”
3 . It appears from the record that Gibson , the plaintiff , did not
advance the entire amount necessary to satisfy the debt due Rich
ardson , but that the defendants , Wilkins , Neely & Jones, paid a por
tion of the same. A portion of the aggregate amount paid by them
was advanced after the date of their security deed of November 19 ,
1890 , and a portion before , which they claim was paid at the instance
and request of Mrs. Steiner . They claim , therefore , to be subro
gated to the rights of Richardson to the extent of the sum so ad
vanced . It is well settled that if a senior mortgage be paid off by
a junior mortgagee , he will, if the payment was necessary for his
protection be subrogated to the rights of the senior incumbrancer .
In such a case , however , it must appear that the discharged mort
gage was due and was about to be enforced against the property ,
and that its enforcement would prejudice the claims of the junior
lienholders. Sheldon , Sub . (2d ed . ) , SS 12 , 18 ; Harris , Sub ., $ $ 8 ,
94 ; 24 Am . & Eng . Enc. L . (1st ed. ) 269 et seq . In order , how
ever , to entitle the junior mortgagee to subrogation , the general
rule is that the whole debt must be paid and the senior creditor sat
isfied . Equity will not generally permit a junior incumbrancer to
interfere with a senior lien so long as the lien creditor remains un
satisfied . In Carter v . Neal, 24 Ga . 346 , it was held : “ To entitie
one creditor to be subrogated to the rights of another creditor , the
former must have satisfied the latter his demand so as to relieve him
9 Compare, Cobb v. Dyer, 69 Maine 494 ; Fort Dodge Bldg . & Loan
Assn . v. Scott , 86 lowa 431 .
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from trouble , expense and risk .” See , also , 24 Am . & Eng . Enc . L .
( 1st ed . ) 200, 255, ( 2 ) 273 ; Harris, Sub . $ $ 28 , 29 ; Sheldon , Sub .,
§ 70 . It seems, however , that if the debt be actually discharged ,
the junior incumbrancer would be entitled to subrogation to the ex
tent of the amount he contributed , though the balance of the debt
was paid by the debtor or by a third person . In Comins v . Culver,
35 N . J . Eq. 94 , it appeared that a judgment was recovered against
Hetfield & Culver . From this judgment an appeal was taken , and
one Pottle became surety on the appeal bond . The judgment was
affirmed . On it a portion of the debt was realized , and Pottle paid
the balance . It was held that he was subrogated pro tanto to the
right of the judgment creditor . See, also , Vert v . Voss , 74 Ind .
566 . In Magee v . Leggett , 48 Miss. 13
9 , 14
6 , it was said : “We
d
o
not understand the rule a
s requiring that the 'surety ' must make
entire payment ; it is enough if the creditor has been fully paid , part
b
y
the principal debtor , and part by the surety . In such a case , sub
rogation will accrue pro tanto to the extent of his payment . ” We
see no good reason why the same rule would not be applicable in
the case o
f
a junior mortgagee who , together with the debtor , pays
off a prior lien on the property . It results from this that if Wil
kins , Neely & Jones contributed a portion o
f
the amount which went
to discharge the debt due Richardson , and this amount was advanced
for the purpose o
f protecting their security and rendering it more
effectual , they would , after Richardson had ben paid in full , be
subrogated equally with Gibson , if it develops that he is in fact en
titled to subrogation , to the extent of the amount so advanced ; and
in case the full amount o
f
both claims is not realized upon an en
forcement o
f
the Richardson security , the defendants would be en
titled to prorate the sum actually realized with the claim o
f
Gibson .
As to the sums advanced prior to the date of their security , they of
course would have no claim for subrogation on the theory that they










ventional subrogation , above laid down . 10
* * * * * * *
Let the case be tried again in the light o
f
the views above ex
pressed .
Judgment reversed . All concurring .
EDITORAL NOTE .
CHANGES IN THE FORM OF THE DEBT . JUDGMENT ON THE DEBT .
When the holder o
f





indebtedness in place of that originally secured by the mort
1
0 Compare . Cason v . Connor , 83 Tex . 26 ; Magilton v . Holbert , 52
Hun ( N . Y . ) 444 .













gage , the question arises whether the mortgage is discharged or
stands a
s security for the new note , et
c
. The question is ultimately
one of payment . Although , for most purposes , a negotiable instru
ment , and , for many purposes , a common -law speci lty such as a








it , not as mere evidence of an intangible right , yet , in this
situation , it is said that equity , regarding the substance o
f things ,
considers the debt a
s the thing actually intended to be secured , and
the note , etc . , as mere evidence o
f
the debt . Accordingly , it is us
ually held that the substitution o
f





the debt , not a payment thereof , unless a
contrary intention appears ; Bonestell v . Bowie , 128 Cal . 511 ; Port
v . Robbins , 35 Iowa 208 ; Flower v . Elwood , 66 Ill . 438 ; Lippold v .
Held , 58 Mo . 213 ; Brinckerhoff v . Lansing , 4 Johns . Ch . 65 ; al
though in a few jurisdictions it is held that payment is presumed
prima facie from the acceptance o
f
a negotiable instrument . See
Fowler v . Bush , 21 Pick . (Mass . ) 230 . Not only is there this dis
agreement a
s
to the presumption which governs in the absence





such transactions , such as
a change in the parties to the note , in the amount payable , o
r
in
other terms thereof . See Jones , $ $ 924 -935 . While the intention
need not be expressed butmay be inferred from all the circumstances
of the case , an express agreement is of course controlling . It is
therefore best to incorporate in a renewal note a recital to the effect
that it is a renewal of the original note , describing it , and that the
mortgage securing the latter is to stand a
s security for the renewal .
Thus safeguarded , a renewal o
f
the note , under the original mort
gage , is preferable to the taking o
f
a new mortgage , as the latter
course is likely to let in intervening encumbrances . Under such
circumstances equity has sometimes kept alive the original mortgage ,
o
n principles analogous to those o
f subrogation , but such relief is by
no means assured as against the intervening encumbrancer , and is
impossible a
s against a subsequent purchaser under the intervening
encumbrance who has no notice o
f
the facts . New England Mort
gage Security Co . v . Hirsch , 96 Ala . 232 ; Dingman v . Randall , 13
Cal . 512 ;Walters v . Walters , 73 Ind . 425 ; Washington v . Slaughter ,
5
4 Iowa 265 ; Holt v . Baker , 58 N . H . 276 ; Atkinson v . Plum , 50 W .
Va . 104 . If the debt is secured b
y
negotiable paper and time is to





renewed to preserve the benefit o
f
it
s peculiar salability , derived
from the law merchant . See post , Chap . V .
A judgment a
t
law upon themortgage debt merges the debt but
does not merge the security nor amount to a payment o
f
the debt ,
but has the effect o
f
a change in the form o
f
the debt , leaving the
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114 ; Jewett v . Hamlin , 68 Maine 172 ; Torrey v . Cook , 11
6
Mass .
163 . The same result was reached in Butler v . Miller , 1 N . Y . 496 ,
where the judgment was taken b
y
consent , upon the theory that it
was a question whether the judgment was intended as a payment of
the debt .
SECTION 2 . - MERGER .
CAMPBELL v . CARTER .
SUPREME COURT O
F
ILLINOIS , 1853 .
1
4 Ill . 286 .
Treat , C . J . The principal facts in this case are these . In April ,
1841 , Brush gave Farwell three promissory notes , amounting in the
aggregate to $ 2 ,378 . 04 ; and he also executed a mortgage on lot
forty -five in the town o
f
Galena , to secure their payment . At the
October term , 1842 , o
f
the Jo Davies circuit court , Farwell re
covered a judgment against Brush for $ 2 , 104 . 17 , the amount then
due upon the notes ; and also a judgment o
f
foreclosure in a pro
ceeding b
y
scire facies upon the mortgage . An execution issued
o
n
the former judgment was returned " no property found , " in
March , 1843 ; and a special execution , issued on the latter judgment ,
was returned , in February , 1843 , “ not satisfied , ” by the order o
f
the
plaintiff . On the 18th o




general warranty , for the expressed consideration o
f
$ 2 ,150 , con
veyed lot forty - five to Farwell in fee ; and Farwell ' s attorney made
a
n entry in the judgment docket , opposite each of the judgments , in




real estate to the
plaintiff . ” On the 29th of June , 1846 , Farwell and wife , by deed
o
f
quitclaim , conveyed lot forty - five to Carter .
At the June term , 1842 , of the Jo Davies circuit court , the State
Bank o
f
Illinois obtained a judgment against Brush , Hathaway , and
Clark , for $ 436 . 42 ; and a
t
the succeeding October term , it obtained
a judgment against Brush and Miller , for $ 104 . 50 . By virtue o
f
a
n execution issued on the first o
f
these judgments , lot forty -five
was sold to Campbell , on the 16th o
f May , 1848 , for the sum o
f
$ 575 . 36 ; and it was sold to Campbell on the same day for one dollar ,
under the execution issued upon the last judgment . And on the 17th
o
f August , 1849 , Campbell received a sheriff ' s deed for the lot .
In November , 1848 , Carter filed a bill in chancery against Camp
bell and others , praying that the mortgage might be decreed to stand
as a subsisting security , to protect his title against the sale made
under the judgments in favor of the bank . The bill alleged that




those judgments when h
e
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accepted the deed from Brush . Campbell , in his answer , set up the
purchase made by him at the sheriff 's sale , and claimed title to the
lot under the same. The cause was submitted to the court on cer
tain documentary and record evidence, the substance of which has
already been set forth , and the oral testimony of a witness , who
stated that he was the attorney of Farwell in the original proceed
ings ; that Farwell came to Galena in 1841 , to obtain security for a
debt he held against Brush , and Brush gave the notes and mort
gage offered in evidence on lot forty - five ; the debt was over $ 2 ,000 ,
and the notes and mortgages were placed in witness ' s hands for col
lection in 1842 ; he instituted two suits , one in assumpsit , the other
by scire facias , to foreclose the mortgage ; judgments were recovered
in both cases , on the same day , and for the same cause of action ;
executions were issued on those judgments , and a levy was made on
the special fieri facias, and property advertised for sale ; after the
property was so advertised , Brush came to witness , and proposed to
relinquish lot forty -five for the debt , to save expense , as it was al
l
he had , giving as a reason it was all he had , and would save great
expense and cost in selling ; witness accepted the proposition , a
s Mrs .
Brush was not a party to the mortgage , and Brush proposed they
should both join in the deed to Farwell , which witness drew , and
they executed ; the entry o
f
satisfaction in the judgment docket was
made by witness about the time the deed was made b
y
Brush and
wife ; subsequently witness made this addition : “ The defendant
having transferred to the plaintiff the mortgaged premises ; " the
release o
f
the mortgaged premises by Brush and wife was all the
satisfaction had for the judgment , and there was no entry of satis
faction made on themargin o
f
the record ofmortgages ; the addition
on the judgment docket was made prior to the year 1848 , before any
proceedings were had ; there was no release given to Brush ; Brush
gave a deed , which is in evidence , releasing his equity o
f redemption ;
it was simply to take Brush ' s equity of redemption that this deed was







Brush and wife to Farwell , and then attorned to Farwell ,
and Farwell and his grantees and tenants have been in possession
ever since ; the lot was never sold on Farwell ' s special fieri facias
o
n
the scire facias judgment ; a
ll procedeings were suspended on
Brush and wife making the deed to Farwell ; witness thinks the
satisfaction on the docket was entered about the time of making the
deed by Brush and wife ; the addition was made some considerable
time afterwards ; cannot say how long ; witness made the addition
because the manner o
f
the entry was subject to somemisconsrtuc
tion , and there had been some talk about it ; witness thinks he has
Brush ' s notes yet , as it was his usual practice to keep them ; it was
understood when the deed was made by Brush and wife , that this
was a satisfaction and discharge of his debt . "
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The court decreed that the mortgage should be held to exist and
remain in full force , fo
r
the protection and security o
f
the complain
ant ' s title . Campbell prosecuted an appeal .
At law , the mortgage was clearly extinguished . The mortgagee
accepted an absolute deed o
f
the estate , and entered satisfaction o
f
the judgments obtained on the notes and mortgage . The debt was
thus fully paid , and the security discharged o
f
record . The question
now is , can a court of equity still regard the mortgage as an unsat
isfied and subsisting incumbrance ? The equitable doctrine on this
subject is thus stated by Sir William Grant in Forbes v . Moffat ,
1
8 Ves . 384 : “ It is very clear , that a person , becoming entitled
to an estate , subject to a charge for his own benefit , may , if he
chooses , at once take the estate , and keep u
p
the charge . Upon this
subject , a court o




law . It will
sometimes hold a charge extinguished where it would subsist a
t
law ;
and sometimes preserve it where at law it would be merged . The
question is upon the intention , actual or presumed , o
f
the person in
whom the interests are united . In most instances , it is , with refer
ence to the party himself , o
f
no sort of use to have a charge on his
own estate ; and , where that is the case , it will be held to sink , unless
something shall have been done b
y
him to keep it on foot . ” Again :




pressing any , I apprehend the court considers what is most advan
tageous for him . ” It is said b
y
the Chancellor , in Compton y . Oxen







law ; but this court will preserve them dis
tinct , if the intention to do so is either expressed or implied . ” Chan
cellor Kent remarks , in James v . Johnson , 5 Johns . C . R . 417 : “ If
a person takes the legal estate by mortgage , and then , b
y
his own
act , takes the equity o
f redemption , and vests it in himself ,
the estate is discharged from the incumbrance . It would be a bur
den to n
o purpose . This is the good sense and reason o
f
the thing .
Where debtor and creditor become the same person , there can be
no right put into execution ; it must , of course , be extinguished .
This is the general rule , both a
t
law and in equity ; the merger is
prevented , and the distinction o
f
the estates preserved , in special
cases only . It is where the intention o
f
the party is distinctly de
clared a
t
the time , or where something just and beneficial requires the
charge to b
e preserved , in a case in which the party has not declared ,
o
r
can not declare , his intention . " It is said , in Hatch v . Kimball ,
1
6 Maine , 146 : “ It is , in each case , a question of intention , whether
o
r
not there is an extinguishment of the charge upon the estate . If ,
a
t
the time the mortgage is taken in , the intention to extinguish it
appears , that is decisive . If it does not , equity presumes it to be out
standing , o
r extinguished , as the interests o
f
the party may require . "
The court say in Gibson v . Crehore , 3 Pick . 475 : “When the pur
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chaser of a right to redeem takes an assignment , this shall , or shall
not , operate as an extinguishment of the mortgage , according as
the interests of the party taking the assignment may be and accord
ing to the real intent of the parties.” The same doctrine is laid down
in the cases of Helmbold v . Man , 4 Wharton , 410 ; Moore v . Harris
burg Bank , 8 Watts , 138 ; Gardner v . Astor , 3 Johns. C . R . 53 ; and
Starr v . Ellis , 6 Johns. C . R . 393 . Indeed , there seem to be no con
flict of opinion upon the subject .
The conclusion from al
l
the authorities clearly is , that if a party
acquires an estate upon which h
e
has an incumbrance , the incum
brance is , in equity , considered as subsisting , o
r extinguished , accord
ing to his intentions , expressed o
r implied . The intention is the con




inferred from the acts and conduct of the party . And the court






the case , to ascertain his
real intention . If it appears , that he intended to discharge the in
cumbrance , and rely exclusively upon his newly acquired title , the
incumbrance is regarded as extinguished , and cannot afterwards be
set u
p
to strengthen and support that title . If no intention has
been manifested , equity will consider the incumbrance as subsisting ,
o
r extinguished , as may be most conducive to the interests o
f
the
party . If no evidence of his intention appears , and it is a matter
o
f
indifference to him whether the incumbrance b
e kept alive o
r
not ,
it is regarded as extinguished .
Applying these principles , there can be but little difficulty in com
ing to a correct conclusion respecting this case . Farwell held notes
against Brush , and a mortgage on the lot in question to secure their
payment . He recovered judgments on both the notes and mort
gage , and was endeavoring to enforce satisfaction . Brush then
proposed to make an absolute conveyance of the lot , with covenants
of warranty and a release of dower , in satisfaction and discharge
o
f
the debt . The proposition was accepted , and the deed executed ;
and thereupon Farwell entered satisfaction o
f
the judgments . The




the mortgage ; not a mere giving up o
f
the security in discharge o
f
the debt . It was something more . In addition to the equity of





dower , and the covenants of warranty of the mortgagor .
There can be no doubt as to his real intentions in the matter . They
were not left to inference o
r conjecture , but were manifested by
the most unequivocal acts . He accepted the lot in full satisfaction
of the indebtedness , and cancelled all existing evidence of that in
debtedness . He intended to discharge the incumbrance , and rely
exclusively upon the title acquired b
y
the deed . If he designed to
keep the incumbrance on foot , why did he discharge of record the
judgment rendered on the mortgage ? The debt was fully paid and
198 DISCHARGE OF MORTGAGES .
satisfied , and this discharge of the judgment shows, that he con
sidered the incumbrance as extinguished . It is not pretended that
there was any mistake in the entry of satisfaction . The act was
deliberately and intentionally done , and he, and those claiming under
him , must abide the consequences resulting from it . It would be in
clear violation of the real intention of the parties to resuscitate and
set up the incumbrance .
It may be that Farwell entered into the arrangement under the
belief and expectation , that he would acquire an unincumbered title
to the lot. But that would not change the legal aspect of the case .
It would only show that the arrangement was improvidently made .
A court of equity will not interfere to relieve a party from the effects
of an injudicious bargain . The fact that Farwell had no actual
knowledge of the bank judgments , forms no basis for equitable
relief. He had constructive notice of their existence , and that bound
him as effectually as would express notice . He must be deemed to
have acted upon full knowledge of those judgments . It was his
own fault if he did not obtain the information before concluding the
arrangement . He acted upon a misapprehension of his legal rights ,
and not upon a mistake of facts . The cases of Garwood v . Admin
istrators of Eldridge , 1 Green 's C . R . 145 , and Banth v . Garmo, 1
Sanford 's C . R . 383, are decisive on this point.
Not one of the numerous cases cited on the argument goes further
than to hold , where the mere equity of redemption is released and
the note is cancelled , that the mortgagee may still rely upon the mort
gage to protect his title . But this is a very different case . The debt
and the security were both cancelled . The release of the equity
of redemption was not the only consideration received by Farwell .
Besides the equity of redemption , he obtained the covenants of war
ranty of the mortgage , and the relinquishment of a dower interest
in the lot. Holman v . Bailey , 3 Met . 55 , is an authority very much
in point. In March , Temple gave Bailey a mortgage on real estate ,
to secure the payment of five promissory notes , for $ 100 each .
In April , Temple made a mortgage of the same premises to Holman .
In May , Bailey took from Temple an absolute deed of themortgaged
premises , with covenants of warranty , in satisfaction of the five
notes , and of another note for $ 300 ; and he gave up the six notes ;
but the mortgage was not formaly discharged . Holman filed a bill
in equity against Bailey , to redeem the estate from the first mortgage .
The court dismissed the bill on the ground , that Bailey 's mortgage
was extinguished . It said : “ We think it very clear , that the notes
then given , including the five secured by the mortgage , were in fact
paid and discharged , by Temple , by the agreement in May . It was
then agreed that the estate should be conveyed in fee , with war
ranty and without condition , in full satisfaction and discharge of
those notes and the note for $ 300 ; and the estate was conveyed pur
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suant to the agreement , and the notes were given up and cancelled .
These were then at an end ; they were effectually paid and extin
guished .”







judgments attached upon the lo
t
. He acquired the lot subject to
these judgment liens , and could transfer no greater interest to Car
ter . The latter should have paid off the judgments , or redeemed
from the sale to Campbell . These were the only modes o
f
protect
ing his title .
The decree is reversed , and the bill dismissed . Decree reversed . 11
SILLIMAN v . GAMMAGE .
SUPREME Court O
F
TEXAS , 1881 .
5
5
Tex . 365 .
:
GOULD , Associate Justice . This action o
f trespass to try title was
brought by Gammage to recover o
f
Silliman seven hundred and
seventy -nine and three -tenths acres of the John Parker headright
survey . The facts stated are in the special findings o
f
the district
judge , to whom the case was submitted , and are substantially as
follows :
On December 22 , 1874 , Ben Parker , being the owner o
f
the land ,
mortgaged one thousand acres of the John Parker survey , including
the land in the controversy , to secure his note for $ 500 to Silliman ,
due six months thereafter , drawing interest at the rate of five per
cent . a month , themortgage containing a power o
f
sale , and being
duly recorded . In July , 1876 , one Longeton recovered a judgment
1
1 Accord as to statement o
f principles : Welsh v . Phillips . 54 Ala .
309 ; Davis v . Randall , 117 Cal . 12 ; Smith v . Ostermeyer , 68 Ind . 432 ;
Beacham v . Gurney , 91 Iowa 621 ; Gardner v . Astor , 3 Johns . Ch . ( N . Y . )
53 ; James v . Morey , 2 Cow . ( N . Y . ) 246 ; Wilcox v . Davis , 4 Minn . 197 .







the estate by the plaintiff , because it was ex
tinguished by merger in the superior title acquired by John Harris
under the deed of Aldrich ; or because it had been previously satisfied .
As to the merger , it is clear , that there can be no such operation , as
the argument supposes . At law by the mortgage a conditional estate
in fee simple passed to the mortgagee ; and the only operation o
f
the
conveyance of Aldrich would be to extinguish the equity of redemption ,
and thus to remove the condition . If that conveyance was good , it had
the effect , not to enlarge the estate but to extinguish a right . It was
not the drowning a lesser in a greater estate , for the estate was already
a fee simple ; but it was an extinguishment o
f
the condition or equity . If
that conveyance was void o
r
voidable , it left the mortgaged estate
exactly where it found it . ” Story , J . , in Dexter v . Harris , 2 Mason ( U .
S . ) 531 . See also , Woodhull v . Reid , 16 N . J . L . 128 .




5acker , themonthacres of
against Ben Parker , under which the land in controversy was sold
a
s Parker ' s property , and was bought b
y Gammage August 7 , 1877 ,
for $ 25 . The additional findings are given in the language of the
presiding judge :
“ On the 17th o
f
June , 1879 , within less than four years from the
time the note for $500 was due , hence before the same was barred
by limitation , Ben Parker , the mortgagor , made a deed to Silliman ,
conveying to him the one thousand acres o
f





which the land sued for is a part , and also two hun
dred and fifty acres o
f
the Jesse Gibson league , situated in Anderson
county . This deed conveys the land mentioned with general war
ranty o
f
title , and the testimony shows that at the date o
f
this deed
the debt secured b
y
the mortgage amounted to $ 1 ,845 , and that the
land conveyed one thousand acres of the Parker headright and two
hundred and fifty acres o
f
the Jesse Gibson survey , making twelve
hundred and fifty acres , was worth at a fair value about $ 1 ,250 ; that
the land was taken by Silliman in full payment of his mortgage and
debt , to save expense in proceeding on the mortgage , or by suit in
court , and that Parker was unable to pay more than the land con
veyed , and Silliman surrendered his note , mortgage and the balance
o
f
his indebtedness over and above the value o
f
the land , to Parker
a
t
the time this deed was executed ; and this transaction was in good
faith and for a fair price . That Gammage was not a party to , o
r
consulted about this transaction between Parker and Silliman , and
Parker at the time had direct notice from Gammage o
f Gammage ' s






"Upon these facts the court finds the law to be , that the mortgage
of defendant was merged in the deed from Parker , and that the
plaintiff has the superior title , and renders judgment for the plain
tiff . ”
In his pleadings the defendant stated the facts , and claimed that
under them he had the better title and right o
f
possession , but , in
the event the court held otherwise , claimed a mortgage lien for the
note and interest , asked that " said lien be enforced , and that he
have judgment for said sum o
f money against said Ben Parker ,
and said land be ordered to be sold , and that said Ben Parker be
cited to appear in this case and answer , etc . , and for all proper
judgment . ”
As we have seen , the court disregarded this part o
f
the answer ,
holding that the mortgage was merged in the deed , and thereupon
gave judgment in favor o
f Gammage for the land sued for .
Counsel for appellant insist that ,under the facts , Silliman had the
superior title . In this state the mortgagor is regarded as the real
owner , and until foreclosure entitled to the possession o
f
the mort





x . 304 ,
possession vested in Gammage , subject to Silliman ' s mortgage .
Wright v . Henderson , 12 Tex . , 43 ; Duty v . Graham , 12 Tex . , 427 ;
Mann v . Falcon , 25 Tex . , 271 , Buchanan v . Monroe , 22 Tex . , 537 .
A foreclosure and sale , thereafter had , in a proceeding against
Parker , without making Gammage a party , would have left Gam
mage ' s title and right of possession unimpaired . Preston v . Breed
love , 45 Tex . 47 ; Morrow v . Morgan , 48 Tex . 304 , and numerous
subsequent cases .
S
o , the voluntary deed b
y
Parker to Silliman , made without Gam
mage ’ s assent , could not affect his title or right of possession ,what
ever may have been its effect a
s
between the parties thereto . As
against Sillliman , Gammage continued to hold the superior title and
right o
f
possession , but held subject to whatever rights asmortgagee
yet remained to Silliman , if any .
Strictly , the mortgage was not merged in the deed , a
s
in case
where a greater and less estate meet in the same person ; for , b
y
the
execution sale and sheriff ' s deed , Parker had been divested of his
entire interest ,and his deed to Silliman , although it might as against
himself have the same effect a
s
a foreclosure sale , conveyed no
greater estate in which the mortgage could merge . But we under
stand the court to find substantially , that under the facts Silliman ' s
rights as creditor and mortgagee were totally satisfied , extinguished
and lost ; and it is not to be denied that numerous authorities , in
cases strictly o
f merger , are supported on reasons which seem equal
ly applicable to cases where the debt and mortgage have been in any
way extinguished . Those authorities hold that the intention o
f
the
parties is the controlling consideration ; and in this case , because
Silliman had accepted the deed in full satisfaction of his debt and
had surrendered up the note and mortgage , would infer that he did
not intend for any purpose to keep the mortgage alive . See Camp
bell v . Carter , 14 Ill . , 286 , citing and discussing numerous cases ;
amongst others , Forbes v . Moffatt , 18 Ves . , 384 ; James v . Johnson ,
5 Johns . Ch . , 417 ; Hatch v . Kimball , 16 Me . 146 ; Gibson v . Crehore ,
3 Pick . , 475 . See also 1 Powel on Mortgages . But there are other
authorities supporting a different view o
f
the law , one which we
think more consistent with the principles o
f
equity , and more in ac
cord with the course o
f
decision in this state . In the case o
f
Stan
ton v . Thompson , 49 N . H . , 272 , the authorities were largely dis
cussed , and the court say :
" We think it may be deduced from the authorities quoted , that
when the estates o
f
the mortgagee and mortgagor are united in the
former , he has in equity an election to keep the mortgage title on
foot , and that whenever it is his interest , by reason of some interven
ing title o
r
other cause , that the mortgage should be upheld as a
source o
f
title , it will not at law be regarded as merged . This is




law , that the party must
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have intended to keep on foot his mortgage title , when it was es
sential to his security against an intervening title , or for other pur
poses of security ; and it is no matter whether the parties , through
ignorance of such intervening title or through inadvertence , actually
discharged the mortgage and cancelled the note , and really intended
to extinguish them ; still , on its being made to appear that such in
tervening title existed , the law would presume conclusively that the
mortgagee could not have intended to postpone his mortgage to the
subsequent title . ” In a recent treatise on mortgages the law is thus
summed u
p
: " Itmay therefore be deduced from the authorities , as
a general rule , that when themortgagee acquires the equity o
f
re
demption , in whatever way , and whatever he does with his mortgage ,
h
e will be regarded as holding the legal and equitable titles separ
ately , if his interest requires this severance . The law presumes the
intention to be in accordance with his real interest , whatever he may
a
t
the time have seemed to intend . ” 1 Jones on Mortg . , § 873 .
In the case o
f
Monroe v . Buchanan , where there had been an in
valid trust sale , a
t
which , however , the purchase money had been
paid and the note delivered u
p , this court says : “ The lot was still
chargeable with the debt ; the lien upon it was not extinguished ,
and equity required , if necessary that justice might be done al
l par
ties , that the note although lost or destroyed , and the mortgage ,
should be recognized as a subsisting and valid charge upon the lot .
It is a familiar maxim , that equity will hold that as having been done
which should have been done ; and it is equally true , that , in proper
cases for it
s application , the converse of this proposition is as well
established , and will hold that which should not have been done as
still unperformed . ” 27 Tex . , 246 .
A class o
f
cases , involving the same principle , that , to prevent
injustice , equity will keep alive a debt , mortgage or judgment , a
l
though in law it may have been satisfied and the parties a
t
the
time so intended , is where there have been sales under decrees fore
closing liens , without making a subsequent vendee o
r mortgagee a
party . This court has uniformly intimated its opinion that the pur
chaser , though he be himself the mortgagee o
r
lienholder , might
still , in a proceeding with proper parties , have the premises resold ,
the first sale and the satisfaction of the debt thereby being set aside
o
r disregarded ; the object being that equity might still be done
between a
ll parties . Pitman v . Henry , 50 Tex . , 364 - 5 ; Carter v .
Attoway , 46 Tex . , 111 ; Jemison v . Halbert , 47 Tex . , 190 .
T
o the same effect are Besser v . Hawthorne ( 7 Oregon , 131 ) ,
and Hollister v . Dillon , 7 Ohio St . , 197 . In the latter case the
mortgagee had obtained judgment for his debt without subjecting
the land , and at an execution sale under that judgment became
himself the purchaser . In consequence o
f intervening rights , no
title passed by this sale ; but the court denied that such a sale could
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operate as a payment of the debt for the benefit of those who
had purchased subject to the mortgage . It says : “ Such a sale of
mortgaged property to the mortgagee cannot operate to deprive him
of rights existing anterior to and independent of the judgment. That
if such a mistake does not on the one hand lay a foundation for
equitable relief, it does not, on the other, give any advantage to the
debtor , when set up as a defense in a suit brought upon the mort
gage , over which a court of equity has unquestioned jurisdiction .”
The case of Jemison v . Halbert is one much in point, and fully
supports the conclusion that the court erred in holding the mortgagee
extinguished as to Gammage . See also Robinson v . McWhirter ,
52 Tex ., 201.
In the present case Silliman acted in ignorance of the existence of
Gammage's title , and therefore labored under a mistake of fact, and
notwithstanding he for some purposes had constructive notice , our
opinion is that equity would give him relief.
For the purpose of protecting Silliman against the intervening
claim of Gammage , the court should have treated the mortgage as in
force , except so far as the secured debt had been paid by the con
veyance of lands not embraced in the mortgage . This question is
directly made in assignments of error, but can hardly be said to be
distinctly presented in the briefs of counsel for appellant . We have
regarded it, however , in view of its fundamental nature in reference
to the rights of the parties , as sufficiently before us. It was unnec
sary to make Parker a party . Monroe v . Buchanan , supra . No
judgment could be rendered against him .
The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded .12
12 See also , Brooks v. Rice , 56 Cal. 428 ; Hines v . Ward , 121 Cal. 115 ;
Lowman v. Lowman , 118 111. 582 ; Farrand v. Long , 184 111. 100 ; Hanlon
v . Doherty , 109 Ind . 37 ; Fort Scott Bldg . & Loan Assn . v. Palatine Ins.
Co ., 74 Kans. 272 (semble ) ; Cooper v. Bigly , 13 Mich . 463; Cook v.
Foster , 96 Mich , 610 (semble ) ; Miller v. Finn , 1 Nebr . 254 .
" It is said that mergers are odious in equity , and shall not be al
lowed , where the estates may well stand together. Here , we think ,
that both in law and equity , the estates may both stand together.
“ In order to effect a merger at law , the right previously existing
in an individual , and the right subsequently acquired , in order to coalesce
and merge, must be precisely co -extensive, must be acquired and held
in the same right , and there must be no right outstanding in a third
person, to intervene between the right held and the right acquired . If
any of these requisites are wanting , the two rights do not merge , but
both may well stand together . But the case we are considering sup
poses that a third person has , by operation of law , by purchase or by
attachment , acquired certain rights or claims to the equity of redemption ,
which do not extend to the mortgage . When , therefore , the equity of
redemption by purchase , and the mortgage by assignment , vest in the
same individual , they do not coalesce or merge , if there be in a third
person a right of dower , a right acquired by purchase , or a real lien by
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. CLAY v . BANKS.
SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA , 1883.
71 Ga. 363.
HALL , J. This immense record , covering one hundred and forty
eight printed pages, and out of which issued three separate bills of
exception , makes but one controlling question , viz : whether the
purchaser of land incumbered with a mortgage , which he agrees
to extinguish , in order that one which he executes in favor of the
vendor to secure the remainder of the purchas money may have
priority , can afterwards , instead of satisfying the first mortgage ,
take an assignment of it to himself , and by pledging it to a third
person , who had no notice of the contract with the vendor , as se
curity for a loan, displace and postpone the lien of the last mort
gage , in violation of the contract ; and whether this assignment is
not an extinguishment in favor of the last mortgage. We are of
opinion that this question must be answered in the affirmative ; and
further , that the question of notice , so far as respects of the vendor,
under this view of the case, becomes immaterial , as to any claim set
up by the present holder of the assigned mortgage, as against the
junior mortgage. It is familiar learning that the assignee of a chose
in action , other than promissory notes , bills of exchange , etc ., takes
it subject to the equities existing at the time of the transfer between
the original parties , and to such as subsequently arise , unless notice
be given to the party bound . Row vs . Dawson , Ryall vs. Rowles ,
2 W . & T . Lead . Cases , 1531 et seq . Clay , the assignee of the
older mortgage, already had the title to the land when he became
the owner of themortgage, the incumbrance was, eo instanti, merged
in the title . As a general rule , a party cannot be said to hold a lien
upon his own property . This is never allowed , except where equity
intervenes and keeps the lien outstanding to protect the title , and
thereby prevent a failure of justice . 94 U . S . R ., 413. The pur
attachment, intervening between the mortgage and the equity.” Shaw ,
C . J ., in Hunt v. Hunt , 14 Pick . (Mass .) 374.
" The tenant , by virtue of his prior attachment, goes behind the deed ,
given by the mortgagor to the demandant (the mortgagee ), and avoids
it . He is remitted to the state of the title , at the time of the attachment .
He can not be permitted to defeat the deed for one purpose, and to
set it up for another ." Weston , J ., in Crosby v. Chase , 17 Maine 369 .
“Where a mortgagee becomes the owner of the legal title * * *
if there are junior mortgages on the land, it will be necessary to keep
the titles separate , so as to protect the mortgagee from such inferior
liens. As between the mortgagor and mortgagee a merger would be
proper, but not as between the holders of the different mortgage liens.
Instances might be multiplied where merger would be unobjection
able as to some parties and injurious to others .” Graves , J ., in Fort
Scott Bldg . & Loan Assn . v. Palatine Ins. Co ., 74 Kans. 272 .
Compare , Matzen v . Shaeffer , 65 Cal . 81 .
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pose of this assignment accords with this principle. Clay took it
that the lien of the mortgage which had been foreclosed by a decree
might be kept " alive , for the protection or defence of any title ac
quired by him or his assigns to the lands covered by the same.”
This plainly appears from the terms of the assignment . Dickson vs.
Williams , 129 Mass., 182, is directly upon the question of merger ,
under circumstances similar to those made by this case . In Carlton
vs. Jackson , 121 Mass . R , 592 , 596 , it was distinctly laid down, as
a rule applicable to a transaction like this , “ that when the money is
paid by one whose duty it is , by contract or otherwise , to pay the
mortgage , it is a release , though in form it purports to be an assign
ment. Brown vs. Lapham , 3 Cush ., 551 ; Braman vs . Dowse , 12
Cush ., 227. “ The subsequent assignment of the mortgage ” by the
party whose duty it was to extinguish it, “ could give no title ” to the
assignee , " as against the plaintiff .”
The only difference between this case and ours is, that in that
there was a written obligation in the deed conveying the premises ,
binding the grantee to extinguish the mortgage ; in ours that obliga
tion rested in parol, and it is insisted here that the cases , as to notice ,
are , for this reason , clearly distinguishable . The record of the deed
was notice binding upon subsequent assignee ; in this case , there
could be no such notice . Even if notice were necessary , in order to
defeat a subsequent assignment and a sale made under a process that
was extinguished , there are circumstances quite sufficient here to
have put Mr. Mills, the ultimate assignee , upon inquiry and to affect
his conscience with direct , which is more effectual for this purpose
than constructive notice , implied from the record of an instrument .
Judgment reversed.13
HARTSHORNE v. HARTSHORNE .
COURT OF CHANCERY OF NEW JERSEY , 1840 .
| 2 N . J . Eq. 349.
The Chancellor (PENNINGTON ) . This is a bill for dower . The
complainant alleges , that her husband was seized in fee of certain
lands in the county of Monmouth , during their coverture , of which
she claims to have set off one-third part for her dower . It is stated
in the bill , that prior to the marriage , her husband gave a mortgage
on the property whereof dower is claimed , for three thousand dol
13 Compare Goodyear v . Goodyear , supra . See also , McCabe v.
Swap , 14 Allen (Mass. ) 188 ; Hatch v. Palmer , 58 Maine 271 ; Burnham
v. Dorr, 72 Maine 198 ; Kingsley v. Purdom , 53 Kans. 56 ; Probstfield v .
Czizek , 37 Minn . 420 .
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lars, on which payments had been made reducing it to eleven hun
dred dollars , and that such mortgage has been assigned to the de
fendant. The defendant purchased the equity of redemption at sher
iff 's sale , and afterwards procured the assignment of the aforesaid
mortgage . The bill further states , that during marriage , the com
plainant and her husband also executed a mortgage on the property
for two thousand two hundred dollars, which has been reduced by
payments to six hundred dollars, and is held by John W . Holmes .
Other mortgages are set out in the bill, but as they are said to be
paid off and discharged it is not material to state them here . To
this bill there is a demurrer for want of equity and for want of par
ties, which presents some questions important to be settled .
The defendant is a purchaser of the equity of redemption in the
premises whereof dower is demanded , and has by assignment be
come the owner of a mortgage made by the husband prior to his mar
riage with the complainant . On the one side , it is insisted , that by
this assignment the mortgage became merged or extinguished when
it came into the defendant's hands ; and on the other , that the de
fendant is a mortgagee in possession , and the complainant's rights
thereby barred . . A purchaser of the equity of redemption at a
sheriff ' s sale , takes the property cum onere , and acquires no rights
beyond what remain in the mortgagor after satisfying the incum
brance out of the land . If, by any device or circuity , such purchaser
should procure the payment of themortgage without a resort to the
land , as by suit against the mortgagor or his representatives on the
bond , manifest injustice would take place ; for he would then have
the property clear of the very debt subject to which it was sold . By
such a course a purchaser, for a nominal sum , might become pos
sessed of a valuable estate , and the mortgagor virtually twice dis
charge the same debt. This difficulty was presented to Chancellor
Kent and fully settled by him , in the case of Tice v . Annin , 2 Johns .
Ch. 125 . The rule he established in that case was this : If a credi
tor other than the mortgagee sells the equity of redemption by an
execution at law , the mortgage debt remains undisturbed , and the
rights of the mortgagor over and above the mortgage in the prop
erty are rightly disposed of to satisfy his creditors .
This case presents no embarrassment . But suppose , after the
equity of redemption is thus sold subject to the incumbrance , the
mortgagee should prosecute his bond at law , and undertake to sell
other property than that contained in the mortgage . Then the
chancellor held that a court of equity should either stay such pro
ceedings , or compel the creditor, upon payment , to assign over his
debt and security to the debtor , to enable him to indemnify himself
out of the mortgaged premises . But in the case referred to , there
existed a still greater difficulty . The mortgagee sold the equity of
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redemption in the mortgaged premises for a part of the debt, and
then put it out of his power to assign the securities to the mortgagor
by actually assigning them over to the purchaser of the equity of
redemption ; and to prevent gross injustice, the chancellor , as the
only alternative , held the debt extinguished in the hands of the pur
chaser . All this proceeds on the idea that the land discharged of
the incumbrance , and if he attempt to make the debt by buying up
the bond and mortgage and recovering the amount unjustly out of
the obligor , the debt shall in his hands be considered extinguished .
In a case so circumstanced , this result seems unavoidable , to pre
vent the grossest injustice and wrong. But I do not understand this
case as going the length of saying , that a purchaser of the equity
of redemption can be compelled , in all cases , to pay off the antece
dent incumbrances farther than the land itself will discharge them .
The purchaser placed himself in a peculiar position , and was attempt
ing thereby to do a wrong ; and the chancellor , to avoid such wrong ,
held the debt cancelled in his hands . There are cases , I am aware,
which look like holding the purchaser liable for the debt personally ,
but I cannot think that such is the true doctrine. It is not necessary
for me to decide this question here , but I desire to state my convic
tion , that the purchaser is liable to the extent of the land purchased ,
and no further , and that he will at al
l
times b
e discharged upon re
leasing the land . There is no privity between the mortgagee and
the purchaser , and I cannot see upon what principle he can be
reached , except it be through the land which he has purchased . I
speak not now o
f
a case where the purchaser enters into special
obligation to pay antecedent incumbrances ; a
ll
such cases will be
governed b
y
the terms and character o
f
the contract ; but o
f
the
ordinary purchaser without special agreement , depending on the
obligation which the law in such cases imposes . Indeed it is matter
o
f
doubt whether it is intended , from the cases , to go farther than
the principle as I have stated . The doctrine proceeds upon the idea
that a court o
f
equity , independent o
f
any express contract , will raise
upon the conscience o
f
the purchaser a
n obligation to indemnify the
mortgagor against his liability on the mortgage ; but to what extent ?
Certainly not beyond the land purchased . This subject will be
found discussed Waring v . Ward , 7 Vesey . Jr . 337 ; Cumberland
v . Coddington , 3 Johns . Ch . 261 ; Stevenson and Woodruff v . Black ,











other creditors . If a purchaser could be called
upon to discharge all incumbrances on his personal liability , it would
greatly embarrass these sales , and effectually prevent their being
made .





not , and recog
nizing the decision in 2 Johns . Chan , to which I have referred , in
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which the bond and mortgage assigned to the purchaser of the equity
of redemption was held to be an extinguishment of the debt , still ,
as it affects the right of dower of the widow in the lands , a new
and very different question is presented . It is agreed , that if the
husband before marriage , or in conjunction with his wife after mar
riage (the deed being acknowledged by the wife , in due form of
law ) , execute a mortgage , and it remains in the hands of the mort
gagee, the widow can only have her dower subject to such mortgage ;
and when this defendant purchased the equity of redemption , he
purchased with the widow 's right discharged to that extent on the
property . Had the mortgage remained as it then was, in the hands
of the mortgagee , the widow 's dower would have been subject to it,
and why should it be otherwise now that it is transferred to the
purchaser ? Had a foreclosure and sale taken place under the mort
gage, the widow would have been barred her rights, except as to
the surplus beyond satisfying the mortgage . At her husband 's
death the true claim this widow had was to one -third of the land after
the mortgages were satisfied , and nothing more. In the case in 5
Johns . Chan . before cited , it was held that the widow was bound
to contribute her ratable proportion towards a mortgage which she
had executed with her husband, and which the heir had been obliged
to pay off , before allowing her dower in the land . The chancellor
in that case says , “ To allow her the dower in the land without con
tribution , would be to give her the same right that she would have
been entitled to if there had been no mortgage , or as if she had not
duly joined in it. It would be to give her dower in the whole ab
solute interest and estate in the land , when she was entitled to dower
only in a part of that interest and estate .”
But the case of Russell v . Austin , in 1 Paige, 193, will be found
similar to the one we are now considering . That was a purchase of
the equity of redemption at a sheriff 's sale , and an assignment to
the purchaser of a bond and mortgage made by the husband and
wife . It was there argued, that the debt was extinguished and
merged by the assignment ; but the court held the widow entitled to
her dower in the equity of redemption only , subject to the mortgage .
In that case , as in this , the intention of the purchaser not to extin
guish the debt was manifest , for instead of cancelling the securities
he had them assigned to him .
From every view , therefore , which I have been able to give this
case , I cannot think this widow entitled to anything more than
her dower in the lands subject to the outstanding mortgages , in
cluding the one assigned to the defendant .14 She is entitled to her
14 See also , Watson v. Gardner , 119 Ill. 312 ; Simonton v. Gray, 34
Maine 50 ; Gibson v. Crehore , 3 Pick . (Mass .) 475 ; Snyder v. Snyder , 6
Mich . 470 ; Hinds v. Ballou , 44 N . H . 619 ; Everson v. McMullen , 113 N .
Y . 293 . In the last case the mortgage had been discharged but the payor
was held entitled to subrogation . See also , Ryer v. Gass , 130 Mass. 227 .
MERGER . 209
dower in the lands in the possession of the defendant, (upon the
case stated in the bill ) , upon keeping down one- third of the interest
on the amount due on the property .
While , therefore, my opinion is with the defendant on the main
question in the cause , yet , as his demurrer is to the whole bill, and
the complainant is entitled to her dower in the equity of redemption ,
and as there is no defect of the parties , the demurrer must be over
ruled with costs .
Demurrer overruled .
“ One who purchases property at an execution sale , is in the same po
sition in respect to previous encumbrances as one who takes a quitclaim
deed , or one who takes a deed expressly subject to encumbrances which
constitute a charge upon the land. Such persons do not become per
sonally liable to pay pre -existing encumbrances , but as in each case the
purchaser is deemed to have deducted the amount of the prior encum
brances from the purchase price, the land in his hands becomes the pri
mary fund out of which the encumbrances are to be paid . When the
purchaser pays them off, no matter by what method , they will be treated
as extinguished , unless there is some equitable purpose to be subserved
by keeping them alive . * * *
" There could be no just motive or equitable purpose which would
authorize Grave to keep his own mortgage alive against his own land .
* * * He knew when he purchased the land at the exceution sale
that, under the law of 1875 , he acquired a right, and could obtain title ,
as against the wife of the execution debtor to the undivided two- thirds
of the land and no more . He was bound to know that as to the prior
mortgages , executed by Mrs . Bunch and husband , for the latter ' s debts ,
she occupied a relation analogous to that of a surety . The two -thirds
as to her was, therefore, charged with the payment of the whole debt ,
provided the land was of sufficient value. * * * He was, in effect ,
the principal , because he was in possession of the fund out of which
the debts were to be paid , and which it is admitted, was sufficient to
*pay the debts . In effect, he had in his hands the money with which
to pay the encumbrances which rested upon the lands of both . When he
paid them , he simply discharged his own primary obligation , out of a
fund which he held for the benefit of himself and Mrs . Bunch ."
Mitchell, J ., in Bunch v. Grave , 111 Ind. 351. See also , Campbell v.
Knights, 24 Maine 332 ; Byington v. Fountain , 61 Iowa 512 . But see ,
Braden v. Graves , 85 Ind . 92 .
Compare Arnold v. Green , supra . It is commonly said that it is im
material whether , in such a case , the mortgage is discharged or as
signed , the idea being that , if the equities are not such as to warrant
relief by way of subrogation in the case of a discharge , there will be a
merger in the case of an assignment ; and, conversely , if the equities
are such as to prevent merger in the case of an assignment, relief may
be had , in the case of a discharge , by way of subrogation . See , how
ever , Eaton v. Simonds , 14 Pick . (Mass .) 98, and Gibson v. Crehore ,
post .
14
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DICKASON v. WILLIAMS.
SUPREME Court of MASSACHUSETTS , 1880 .
129 Mass . 182 .
Contract upon a promissory note for $ 3,000 , dated March 29 ,
1870 , payable to the plaintiff or order five years after date , and
signed by the defendant . Writ dated November 2 , 1878. The
answer admitted the making of the note , but averred that it was
a mortgage note , and that the mortgage had merged . At the trial
in the Superior Court , before WILKINSON , J ., the following facts
appeared in evidence : ,
The note sued on was secured by a mortgage deed , containing the
usual power of sale , of land on Henchman Street , in Boston , de
livered by the defendant to the plaintiff on March 29 , 1870 . The
defendant conveyed the land to John and Bridget Wills , by deed
dated February 5, 1874 , which contained these words :
" And I do hereby for myself and my heirs , executors , and ad
ministrators covenant with the said grantees and their heirs and
assigns that I am lawfully seised in fee simple of the granted prem
ises ; that they are free from al
l
incumbrances , excepting a mortgage
thereof for $ 3 ,000 , which , with the interest thereon , the grantee
assumes and agrees to pay . " John and Bridget Wills conveyed the
land to the plaintiff b
y
a deed dated September 30 , 1878 , in which
the consideration named was $ 3 ,500 , and which contained these
words : “ The above conveyance is made subject to a mortgage o
f
$ 3 ,000 , which mortgage forms part of the above consideration . "
After the date o
f
the writ in this action , the plaintiff conveyed the
land to Dennis Winterson . The plaintiff also introduced testimony
to prove that the market value o
f
the land when conveyed to her
by John and Bridget Wills was not over $ 2 ,500 , and it was admitted
that the plaintiff paid nothing to John and Bridget Wills for said
conveyance .
Upon these facts , the judge ruled that the plaintiff ' s claim against
the defendant for the balance of the note over and above the market
value o
f
the land on September 30 , 1878 , was not extinguished .
The jury returned a verdict fo
r





the defendant , the judge reported the case for determina
tion o
f
this court . If the ruling was right , judgment was to be en
tered o
n
the verdict ; otherwise , the verdict was to be set aside , and
a new trial ordered .
AMES , J . It appears from the report that the note in suit , which
was for $ 3 ,000 , was given by the defendant to the plaintiff , and was
secured by a mortgage upon certain premises in Henchman Street
in Boston . The note and the mortgage were of the same date , and
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there is no intimation of any other mortgage on the property . Some
years afterwards , and before the note became due, the defendant
conveyed the property to John and Bridget Wills , subject to the
mortgage , it being recited in the deed that the grantees assumed and
agreed to pay the mortgage. The effect of this transaction was to
impose upon grantees , by their acceptance of such a deed , a duty to
make the payment , upon which the law would imply a promise to do
so . Pike v . Brown , 7 Cush . 133 ; Braman v . Dowse, 12 Cush . 227 ;
Jewett v . Draper , 6 Allen , 434 . Subsequently , and after the matur
ity of the note , these grantees , in consideration of $ 3,500 , conveyed
the mortgaged property to the plaintiff subject to the mortgage of
$ 3,000, " which mortgage forms part of the above consideration .”
In other words , the plaintiff repurchased the property , or took it
back , and part of the price of this repurchase was the debt or claim
which she at the time held against the same property. The plain
tiff accepted a deed , which on its face imported that the amount
due to her upon this note , which John and Bridget Wills had become
liable to pay , was reckoned and included in the consideration for
that very deed . This mode of dealing operated as a payment o
f
the mortgage debt , by a party legally bound to pay it , to a party en
titled to receive it . Upon these facts , the same person who held






o intervening incumbrance o
r outstanding interest in
any other person , the mortgage is merged and the debt extinguished .
2 Wash . Real Prop (4th ed . ) , 193 , and cases here cited .
Verdict set aside , and new trial ordered . 15
SPENCER v .HARFORD .
SUPREME COURT O
F
NEW YORK , 1830 .
4 Wend . ( N . Y . ) 381 .
[Demurrer to pleas . The declaration is in debt on bond executed
by defendant ' s testator to plaintiff . ]
By the Court , SAVAGE , C . J . The defendants plead four pleas ,
the object o
f
which seems to be set up the same defence , to wit , a
satisfaction of the debt by an extinguishment of a mortgage which
was given as collateral security at the same time the bond was
executed .








5 Compare . Johnson v . Walter , 60 Iowa 315 ; Moore v . Olive , 114
lowa 650 ; Russell v . Pistor , 7 N . Y . 171 ; Kellogg v . Ames , 41 N . Y . 259 .
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plaintiff either to pay the debt due him or to assign to him the equity
of redemption in the mortgaged premises , Fellows conveyed for the
consideration of one dollar, whereby the plaintiff became seised
thereof, and the debt becamepaid and satisfied . The fourth plea is
like the third, except it contains the additional averment that the
plaintiff on the 17th November, 1825 , sold the premises in fee for
$650 to John Harford .
We thus learn in these pleas, by way of inference , that Fellows
purchased the equity of redemption in the mortgaged premises , and
that the plaintiff became assignee of the same for a nominal con
sideration ; and that he sold the premises in fee for $650 . Had the
third plea contained an averment that the value of the premises
when the equity of redemption was conveyed to the plaintiff was
equal to the amount due on the bond , or had the fourth plea con
tained an averment that the property was of the same value when
the equity of redemption was conveyed to the plaintiff as when he
sold to Harford , or was of value equal to the amount due on the
bond , I should think the pleas good in substance , though in some re
spects informal .
The only effect of the sheriff's sale was to substitute Fellows in
the place of the mortgagor ; when , therefore , the mortgagor re
leased his equity of redemption for a nominal consideration to the
mortgagee , the latter had the whole estate . Whether this effect is
produced by a technicalmerger of the equitable into the legal estate ,
according to 2 Cowen , 246 , or whether he holds the legal estate dis
charged of the condition , according to 2 Mason , 539 , it is not im
portant to inquire. The mortgagee becomes absolute owner , as he
would by a foreclosure ; and if the property when he thus receives
it is equal in value to the debt for which it was mortgaged , it is
payment in full ; otherwise , not: but, in any event , is payment , pro
tanto , acccording to its actual value .
The pleas d
o
not contain the necessary averments . It may be that
the property was well worth $650 o
r
more when sold to J . Harford ,
and not worth $ 100 when the title was vested in the plaintiff ; the
difference may have been caused by improvements or a rise in the
value o
f
the land . The value therefore should appear b
y proper
averments .
The pleas are a
ll
bad , and the plaintiff is entitled to judgment
upon them , with leave to the defendants to amend , on payment of
costs . 16
1
6 Compare , Lilly v . Palmer , 51 Ill . 331 ; Murphy v . Elliott , 6 Blackf .
( Ind . ) 482 ; Northwestern Nat . Bank v . Sloan , 97 Iowa 183 ; National
Investment Co . v . Nordin , 50 Minn . 336 ; Tucker v . Crowley , 127 Mass .
400 ( cf . Pratt v . Buckley , 175 Mass . 115 ) . See also , 15 Harv . L . Rev . 740 .
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EDITORIAL NOTE .
On discharge by alteration , see Kendall v . Kendall , 12 Allen
(Mass .) 92 ; Waring v . Smyth , 2 Barb . Ch . ( N . Y .) 119.
On discharge by foreclosure, on the effect of bankruptcy of the
mortgagor , and on the effect of the statute of limitations, see post ,
Chap . VII.
CHAPTER V .
ASSIGNMENT OF MORTGAGES .
YOUNG v . MILLER .
SUPREME COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS , 1856 .
6 Gray (Mass.) 152 .
SHAW , C . J . The plaintiff is indorsee of one of two negotiable
notes , one for $ 300 , the other for $750, secured by a mortgage.
The payee indorsed the $ 300 note to the plaintiff , but did not as
sign the mortgage or any part of it, but retained it and the other
note secured by it, and afterwards transferred them , and the as
signee discharged the mortgage.
The plaintiff now brings this writ of entry to foreclose the
mortgage, and claims that she had an interest in the mortgaged
premises pro tanto , and that the mortgage could not be discharged
in full , to her injury ; and that, although the present -defendant
came in by an apparently good title, yet that the estate was sub
ject to her lien .
A proposition of this sort, not only that the holder by indorse
ment of a negotiable note , originally secured by mortgage, has
some equitable interest in the mortgage under some circumstances ,
but that she may maintain a real action in her own name to recover
the land , is so contrary to settled notions here , that it seems
quite startling. It seems to be repugnant to what have long been
regarded in this state as first principles .
The true character of a mortgage is the pledge of real estate
to secure the payment of money , or the performance of some other
obligation . It
s object , from its creation to its redemption o
r
fore
closure , is that of a pledge for such debt or duty . It may , in
many aspects , be called a real lien , a chattel interest , a chose in
action , and quasi personal . But as it binds land , and may lay
the foundation o
f
a title to real estate , it assumes , in many re
spects , the character o
f
a land title . It is so in its origin , b
y
deed ;
in the mode o
f
giving it notoriety , b
y
registration ; in its transfer ,
by deed o
f assignment ; its discharge , b
y
deed of release ; and in
the mortgagee ' s remedy , by writ of entry against the mortgagor or
other person in possession under him .
It may be admitted that there are equitable and incidental inter
PCS .
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ests , which are recognized and enforced in a court of equity only .
Whatever may be the tendency to confound legal and equitable
rights , there is great convenience , if not safety , in keeping up
this distinction .
But whatever may be the equitable interest of a party situated
like the present plaintiff , it seems to us that she can stand in no
higher relation than that of a cestui que trust , having an equitable
interest in real estate , the legal title to which is in another ; such
interest being manifested by an actual or resulting trust . In this
case , it is difficult to perceive , without further evidence , that she
can establish any such trust. The original payee held two nego
tiable notes , both secured by one and the same mortgage. The
notes constituted personal contracts of the maker, independent of
the mortgage, both or either of which might be enforced as such ,
without reference to the mortgage. It was therefore competent
for such payee and mortgagee, if such was his real intention , to
indorse one of the notes and give his indorsee all the legal title
thereto , as a personal contract, and retain to his own use the en
tire mortgage interest , or pledge of the realty , as security for his
other note .
When a party holds a mortgage to secure the payment of a
single negotiable note only , and no formal assignment is made of
the mortgage , and nothing to indicate an intention of the parties
that it is not to be assigned ; as the mortgagee and indorser of the
note, after such indorsement, would hold only a barren fee, with
out beneficial interest , and as the mortgage accompanying the note
would be highly beneficial to the indorsee for the security of his
note , the law may well imply the intention of the parties that the
mortgage is thenceforth to be held by the mortgagee in trust for
the indorsee . In other words, such a transaction might manifest
a resulting trust . But when such mortgage is given for two such
negotiable notes , and the holder indorses one , without the expres
sion of any intent , either to retain the mortgage to his own use as
security for his remaining note , to the security of which alone per
haps it is adequate , or to hold it in trust for himself and his in
dorsee , and when therefore the mortgagee has a beneficial interest
in the mortgage, and there is nothing express in favor of the in
dorsee , it may perhaps be doubted whether any resulting trust
would be implied .1
1“ The principle that an assignment of the debt involves an assign
ment of the mortgage security applies in the case of an assignment of
a part only of the debt , which is usually effected by a transfer of one
of several notes evidencing the debt , and in such cases the assignee is
entitled to share in the benefit of the mortgage security . When the
various notes secured by the mortgage are transferred to different per
sons, a question arises as to the respective priorities of those persons
in case the mortgaged land is not sufficient to pay all the notes in




But supposing that such a trust would be implied , then the ques
tion is, whether such cestui que trust can maintain a real action .
The opinion of the court is that he cannot . And we think that no
case cited in the learned argument of the plaintiff 's counsel , rightly
understood , leads to any different result .
The case cited of Martin v . Mowlin , 2 Bur . 978 , contains some
very strong expressions of Lord Mansfield , to the effect , that what
ever transfers the money secured by mortgage, transfers the land .
Mr. Justice Wilde , in Parsons v . Welles , 17 Mass. 424 , following
Judge Trowbridge , thinks that there must have been some qualify
ing expressions , which the reporter omitted to state , in that case .
But with reasonable limitations, arising plainly from the subject
matter , it does not import anything contrary to the law , as
held in Massachusetts. The only point adjudged was , that when ,
by the terms of a will, real estate is given to one, and money and
personal property to another , a mortgage due to the testator , al
though it had become absolute at law by the nonpayment of the
debt at the day, being still redeemable in equity by the established
rules of chancery , should be considered personal property , and
pass to the legatee of the personal estate , and not land , to go to
the devisee of the realty . It was inferring the intent of the tes
tator from the nature of a mortgage, as a pledge and security for
money , and not as land, so long as it is redeemable .
Green v . Hart , 1 Johns . 580, was a case in the court of chancery ,
and the equitable rights and remedies only of the plaintiff were
drawn in question . But in that case the mortgage was given for
the security of one note only , and the mortgage deed was delivered
with the note to the indorsee , and this act was clearly an indica
tion of the intent of the mortgagee to give the indorsee the benefit
of the mortgage.
full . In some states the rule has been adopted that , if the notes in the
hands of different persons mature at different times , as is usually the
case , they are entitled to priority , as regards the benefit of the mort
gage , in the order of their maturity . In other states , the assignees of
the different notes are entitled to share in the proceeds of the mortgaged
land in proportion to the amounts of their respectve notes , without
reference to the time of their maturity . The rights of the assignees of
the notes in this respect may also be controlled by an express stipula
tion in the mortgage , or by an agreement made at the time of assign
ing a note , as to the order of priority :
" Occasionally , though not usually, the view has been taken that a
mortgagee who assigns one or more of the notes, retaining the balance ,
cannot claim to share in the benefit of the mortgage security as against
his assignee , since he is presumed to have been paid by the latter the
value of the notes assigned , and it seems to be agreed that a contract to
this effect is to be presumed from the fact that the mortgage is as
signed with the notes. Likewise , if the mortgagee is a surety for the
payment of the note , he cannot claim a part of the benefit of the mort
gage as against his assignee .” Tiffany, Real Property , $ 533 .
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Jackson v . Blodgett, 5 Cow . 203 , was the case of a mortgage
to secure one debt on a bond not negotiable ; the bond was as
signed without the mortgage, and the debtor had notice thereof .
Afterwards, acting under a supposed power of the mortgagee , with
out legal authority and by collusion with the debtor , an agent re
ceived payment of the debt and discharged the mortgage. It was
decided that the discharge was fraudulent ; the payment by the
debtor , after notice of the assignment of the bond , a payment in
his own wrong ; and that an action might be maintained by the
















Jackson v . Will r , 4 Johns . 41 , decided that the interest o
f
a
mortgagee in mortgaged premises could not be taken in execution
by the sheriff and sold to satisfy the debt o
f
the mortgagee , until
foreclosure , though the estate o
f
the mortgagee had become abso
lute a
t
law ; because , whilst redeemable in equity , it was but a
pledge for a debt ; which is quite consistent with our laws .
Our own authorities are numerous , and we think decisive . Read
ing of Judge Trowbridge , 8 Mass . 554 , and seq . ; Warden v . Adams ,
1
5 Mass . 233 ; Somes v . Skinner , 16 Mass . 348 . In that case , suit
was brought for several tracts o
f
land ; it turned out that , though
the plaintiff had a legal title to several , one was held by a trustee
for him ; and it was held , that he could not maintain a real action
for that ; and on motion he was allowed to discontinue as to that
parcel . Parson v . Welles , 17 Mass . 419 ; Crane v . March , 4 Pick .




several notes secured b
y
mortgage , without assignment , has any
right to the mortgaged estate in security , it is only in equity , as
cestui que trust , the legal estate being in the mortgagor . Of course
he could not maintain a real action .
In conclusion , the court are o
f
the opinion that , under the cir










ence to the mortgage , took it with any resulting trust in the mort
gaged premises — upon which it is unnecessary to express a
n opin
ion for the decision o
f
this cause — she took n
o legal interest in
the realty , and therefore that this action cannot be maintained .
Judgment for the defendant .
Kent , J . , in JOHNSON v . Hart , 3 Johns . Cas . 322 ( N . Y . Court
o
f
Errors , 1802 ) . Here was a note given to Green , which
was secured b
y
a mortgage . Wherever the note goes it will carry
the charge upon the land along with it . The estate in the land is
here the same thing a
s
the money due on the note . It will be
liable to debts ; it will go to executors . It will pass by a will not




frauds . The assign
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ment of the debt , or forgiving it even , by parol, draws the land
after it, as a consequence . The right to the land will follow , not
withstanding the statute of frauds . This doctrine was established
by the court of K . B . as early as the year 1760 ; ( 2 Burr . 978 , 979 ) ,
and according to this doctrine , when Green duly negotiated his
note to Hart , the interest in the mortgage , which was given for
no other purpose but to secure that note , passed of course . It re
quired no writing , no assignment on the back of the mortgage.
The assignment of the note applied equally to the note and the
pledge . The one was but appurtenant to the other . Whoever was
owner of the debt , was likewise owner of the security . There must
be something peculiar in the case , some very special provision of
the parties, to induce the court to separate the ownership of the
note from the ownership of the mortgage. In the eye of common
sense and of justice , they will generally be united .
By the transfer , then , of the note to Hart , the mortgage went with
it, and the same interest passed in the one as in the other . Had
this been an absolute transfer, there could have been no good rea
son for requiring Green to be a party to the suit , because he had
no further interest in the subject . He could not be considered as
having any longer even the estate at law in him . From the doc
trine to which I have referred, he would be considered at law , as
well as in equity , as having passed al
l
his interet in the mort
gage , by the assignment o
f
the note . The assignment o
f
the one
would be deemed an assignment o
f
the other . 2
BRICKELL , C . J . , in Welsh v . Phillips , 54 Ala . 309 (1875 ) .
Whether a mortgagee may b
y
a
n assignment to a stranger o
f
the









the mortgage debt , pass the legal estate , is a question
o
n which the authorities in this country are in irreconcilable conflict .
In New York , New Hampshire and some other states which have
followed their decisions , such a conveyance o
r assignment would
be void , and one entering under it would be a trespasser a
s against
the mortgagor . In other states , the assignment o
r conveyance , if
2 This was an equitable suit by the assignee to foreclose the mort
gage . The mortgagee -assignor was not made a party . It was held
that he was a necessary party and the decree o
f
foreclosure was re
versed . Kent , J . , gave as his reasons that , the assignment not being
absolute but by way o
f security only , the right of the assignee to the
mortgage depended upon there being something still due to him from
the assignor , and that , assuming a balance due , the assignor had a
right to redeem from the assignee . Radcliff , J . , concurred upon the
grounds stated by Kent , J . , and also upon the ground that " no such
assignment has been made to carry the estate at law ; that the fee is ,
therefore , still vested in Green , * * * All the parties before the
court are , therefore , possessed o
f equitable interests only , yet the chan
cellor has decreed the whole estate to be sold . It is certain that a
decree can never affect the interest o
f
a party not before the court . "





in proper form to pass an interest in real estate , is treated as a
conveyance o
f
the legal estate , passing to the assignee o
r grantee ,
the right of the mortgagee to enter . — 2 Wash . Real Prop . , § 4 , ch .
1
6 . The correctness o
f
the one decision o
r
the other , depends on
the theory of a mortgage which may prevail . If it is regarded as
a mere security for a debt , a chattel interest , until foreclosure ,
the mortgagor continuing the real owner o
f










ises , not intended , and incapable o
f operation as a transfer o
f
the debt , may be treated as void , not passing any estate o
r
interest
in land . That , however , notwithstanding what is said in Duval





our decisions has recognized , and by which they
have been controlled . A mortgage is ore than a mere security
for a debt - it creates a direct , immediate estate in land — a fee
simple , unless t rwise expressly limited . The estate is condi
tional - annexed to the fee is a condition which may defeat it . The
mortgage , if in the conveyance there is not a reservation o
f
the
possession to the mortgagor , until default in the performance o
f
the condition , has the immediate right of entry , and may eject the
mortgagor o
r
his tenants . — Duval v . McLoskey , supra . If the





the mortgagee . After the law day , and default
in the performance o
f
the condition , a
t
law the estate is absolutely
vested in the mortgagee — the fee is freed from the condition an





law take no notice . Paulling v .
Barron , 32 Ala . 11 ; Barker v . Bell , 37 Ala . 358 . Before default ,
all that remains in him , is the right to perform the condition and
thereby restore his original estate . An assignment o
f
the mort
gage debt , without an assignment o
f
the mortgage , will not pass
the legal estate , that remains in themortgagee in trust , an equitable
security for the payment o
f
the debt . In Center v . P . & M . Bank ,
2
2 Ala . 751 , it is said that the mortgage is but an incident and
passes in equity to the assignee o
f
the debt . But , the legal estate
resides in the mortgagee until the mortgage is assigned . In Gra
ham v . Newman , 21 Ala . 498 , it is said , the assignment o
f
a mort
gage debt operates in equity a
n assignment o
f
the mortgage , en
titling the assignee to use the name o
f
the mortgagce to enforce
the mortgage a
t
law . If not only the debt , but the mortgage also
is assigned , the legal title passes to the assignee , and he may at
law proceed in his own name . If the mortgage is of land , to pass
the legal estate there must be a deed from the mortgagee to the




deed , with suitable words to convey the thing itself . ” On a bill
to foreclose , the mortgagee in possession having died , the heir to
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whom the legal title has descended is an indispensable party , that .
the legal title may be bound by the decree. — Huggins v . Hall, 10
Ala . 283. In a court of law nothing less than payment , or some
thing equivalent to payment o
f
the mortgage debt , a release in
writing of the mortgage , or a reconveyance , operates a divestiture
of the legal estate of the mortgagee . - Barker v . Bell , supra ; Powell
v . Williams , 14 Ala . 476 . It is not settled in this state that pay
ment o
f
the debt after the law day , without reconveyance from
the mortgagee , will restore the fee to the mortgagor ; and in Col
lins v . Robbinson , 33 Ala . 91 , the court refrained from determin
ing whether after payment the mortgagee not having reconveyed ,




a dual character — a conveyance of an
estate in lands — and a security for a debt ; bearing one character





estate in lands , with a condition annexed which
may defeat it . It comprehends the entire fee , leaving the mort
gagor the right , on the performance o
f
the condition , to restore
himself to his original estate . This right , as between mortgagor
and mortgagee , is not property , but matter of jurisdiction , and if
it is not exercised to the day it is lost . In equity it is a security
for a debt , passing a
s
a




s any security for it
s payment would pass . The mortgagor has
a
n equity o
f redemption , a right to perform the condition , on mak





in lands , separate from the legal estate , alienable o
r
transmissible
by descent or devise . It would not comport with this theory , now
too firmly engrafted in our law to be controverted , to assert that
a conveyance b
y
the mortgagee , though not operating an assign
ment o
f
the mortgage debt , does not pass the legal estate .
However this may be , it can not be doubted that a mortgagee
in actual possession , as was John S . Welsh when he conveyed to
Nicholas Welsh , may convey to a stranger , and his conveyance ,
if expressed in proper terms , will pass the possession , enabling
the grantee to hold and defend against all who can not show a
superior title . - Smith v . Smith , 15 N . H . 55 ; Wallace v . Goodall ,
1
8
N . H . 439 ; Hinds v . Ballou , 44 N . H . 619 ; Givan v . Doe , 7
Blackf . 210 . The conveyance employs the statutory words , “ grant ,
bargain , sell , ” declared when it was made to import an express
covenant that the grantor was seized o
f
a
n indefeasible estate in
fee simple , freed from incumbrances done or suffered from the
grantor , and for quiet enjoyment against the grantor , his heirs
o
r assigns . — Clay ' s Dig . 156 , § 31 . The operation of this convey
ance was to pass not only the present interest o
f
John S . Welsh ,
the mortgagee , which was an estate in fee simple debased by the
quality annexed in it
s
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from the failure of the mortgagor to perform the conditions on
the day appointed . Such a conveyance by a mortgagee operates
not only a conveyance of the land , but an equitable assignment
of the debt , to which the interest of the grantor in the lands may
be said to be incidental . — Ruggles v . Barton , 13 Gray , 506 ; Hunt










the mortgagor to pay the debt , it would
have enured to his grantee , and he would have been estopped from
setting it u





veyance can be avoided only b
y
treating it , as it imports to be , a
transfer of the grantor ' s interest in the lands , and of all he had
necessary to render the conveyance operative and effectual .
ELLISON v . DANIELS .
SUPREME COURT O
F
NEW HAMPSHIRE , 1840 .
1
1
N . H . 274 .
Writ of Entry , to recover twenty -five acres of land in Barring
ton , in the county o
f
Strafford .
Plea , nul disseizin .
It appeared , that on August 5 , 1814 , the demandant was seized
o
f
the demanded premises in fee , and that on that day he con
veyed the same , together with eight acres o
f
other land , to Jo - .
seph Ellison , in mortgage , to secure the payment of the demand
ant ' s promissory note of even date with the deed of mortgage ,
and payable to the mortgagee on o
r
before August 1 , 1818 . Jo
seph Ellison , on November 30 , 1820 , executed a deed o
f
the prem
ises to Abraham Ellison , with covenants o
f warranty , and Abra
ham Ellison , on March 6 , 1826 , executed a similar deed of the
premises , to the tenant . The tenant offered evidence tending to
prove that Joseph Ellison took possession o
f
the twenty -five acres ,
for the purpose o
f foreclosing the mortgage . The note was not
produced a
t
the trial , and there was no evidence of any transfer ,
o
r assignment of it by Joseph Ellison .
The court ruled that whatever right Joseph Ellison acquired b
y
the mortgage , passed , in virtue o
f
said deeds , to the tenant .
A verdict was returned for the tenant , and the counsel for the
demandant moved to set the same aside , and for a new trial , for
alleged error in said ruling .
Woods , J . This action is brought by the demandant to recover
possession o
f
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Joseph Ellison , while the mortgage still continues outstanding and
in full force .
Upon the facts reported , there can be no pretense that themort
gage has been foreclosed as to the lands in question . Under our
statute , no possession , short of a peaceable and continued actual
possession , for one year after entry , can operate a foreclosure of
a mortgage . N . H . Laws 486 . It does not appear that Joseph
Ellison , the mortgagee, was ever in the actual possession of the
twenty - five acres of land claimed in this suit. The question of
actual possession by Joseph Ellison was not submitted to the jury ,
nor is the fact found by the case , upon the concession of the par
ties . That fact was controverted , but not determined .
Two questions properly arise upon the case .
1 . Can the demandant , who is the mortgagor of the premises
sought to be recovered , maintain the action while the mortgage
remains in force , against even a stranger to the title in possession ?
2 . Is the tenant a stranger to the mortgage title , or is he as
signee thereof ?
Upon the authorities cited , the doctrine would seem to be fully
established , that , as against a
ll strangers to the title o
f
the mort
gagee , the mortgagor is at law the owner , and is seized o
f
the
estate mortgaged , and may maintain a real action for the recovery
thereof , while the mortgage is still a subsisting mortgage ; and that
n
o stranger to the mortgage will be permitted to set up such out
standing mortgage , without entry o
r
foreclosure of the mortgage
by the mortgagee or his assigns , to defeat the seizin and recovery ,
o
n the part o
f
the mortgagor .
This brings us to the question , and makes it important to en
quire , whether the tenant is , upon the facts reported , a mere
stranger to the mortgage interest o
f Joseph Ellison , or was in fact
the assignee thereof ?
T
o
a proper solution o
f
this question , it is not unimportant to




son , the mortgagee , in virtue o
f
his mortgage .
At law , by the mortgage , a conditional estate in fee simple vests
in the mortgagee . Dexter v . Harris , 2 Mason 531 .
And a real action may be maintained by a mortgagee , to recover
possession o
f
the mortgaged premises . Estabrook v . Moulton , 9
Mass . 258 .
And in Southerin v . Mendum , 5 N . H . 420 , it is said , that a
mortgage in fee passes to the mortgagee , a
s
between him and the
mortgagor , all the estate in the land ; and he may maintain tres
pass , or a writ o
f
entry , against any one who may disturb his
possession , even against the mortgagor himself .
And so far a
s
it may be necessary , to enable the mortgagee to
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lation of hi
a ,












point to avail hims
prevent waste , and to keep the iand from being in any way dimin
ished in value , or to receive the rents and profits , and , in short , to
give him the full benefit of the security , and appropriate remedies
for any violation o
f
his rights , he is undoubtedly to be treated a
s
the owner of the land . Southerin v . Mendum , and authorities
there cited . Glass v . Ellison , 9 N . H . Rep . 69 . (Ante 55 , Smith
v . Moore . )
In all other respects , and for al
l
other purposes , the interest of




the mortgagee to have his interest treated as real
estate , extends to , and ceases at the point , where it ceases to be
necessary to enable him to protect and to avail himself o
f
his
just rights , intended to be secured to him b
y
the mortgage .
To enable the mortgagee to sell and convey his estate , is not
one of the purposes for which his interest is to be treated as real
estate . There is no necessity that it should be so treated for that
purpose . That can be equally well effected in the usual way o
f
assigning and transferring the debt secured b
y
the mortgage . The
mortgagee is secured , and fortified in all his rights , without the
adoption of any such principle , and the plain purposes of a mort
gagee forbid it . The object o
f
the mortgage is the security of
the debt ; and it is obvious reason , that he only who controls the
debt should control the mortgage interest .
The right o
f Joseph Ellison , then , in the premises in question ,
for the purpose of sale or transfer , was a mere personal chattel ,
incident to , inseparable from , and capable of being transferred





n assignment thereof .
And the question is , whether that right passed to the tenant ,
in virtue o
f
the conveyances from Joseph to Abraham Ellison , and






The deeds from Joseph to Abraham Ellison , and from Abraham
Ellison to the tenant , were deeds , with covenants o
f warranty , pur
porting to convey the lands described in the mortgage deed of the
demandant to Joseph Ellison . The deeds did not in terms import
a transfer of the note secured by the mortgage , nor from the deeds
alone could it be ascertained that the note described in the mort
gage ever had existence . If in terms , then , there was no assign
ment , or transfer o
f
the note , the further question arises , whether














h . J . Richardson , in delivering the judgment of the court in
Bell v . Morse , 6 N . H . Rep . 205 , holds this language : “ It ap
pears that the tenant is in possession under a title derived from
Thomas Morse . But Thomas Morse was only a mortgagee when
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he conveyed to the tenant . We have no doubt that, under certain
circumstances , a conveyance of the land by the mortgagee will pass
the debt secured by the mortgage . But there are certain cases in
which a deed of the land by the mortgagee will pass nothing .
Thus , where a note is secured by a mortgage, if the mortgagee has
transferred it he cannot afterwards convey the land . And we are
of opinion , that it is not enough to show a deed from a mort
gagee , in order to prove that the land passed , but it must be made
to appear that the debt passed to the grantee — at least , it must
appear that the mortgagee had a right to transfer the debt to the
grantee . As no account is given of the debt secured by the mort
gage in this case , we think that the tenant is not entitled to hold
the land against the demandant ."
This case is directly in point , and to the effect that nothing
passed by the deed of Joseph Ellison to Abraham , and conse
quently nothing to the tenant by Abraham ' s deed . In this case ,
as in Bell v . Morse , it did not appear that there had been a trans
fer of the note by the mortgagee prior to the date of the deed to
the grantee of the mortgagee . In fact , no account was given in
either case of any disposition made of the notes by the mortgagees .
The point of the decision in Bell v . Morse , is , that a deed alone
of the mortgagee , importing a conveyance of the land , does not
pass the debt secured by the mortgage. It would seem , however ,
fairly to be inferred from the language of the opinion , that if it
had appeared that Thomas Morse had had the control of the debt
at the date of his deed to the tenant , that the debt would have
passed by the deed ; that the control of the debt is one of the cir
cumstances under which it seemed to be the impression of the
court, that a deed of the land would also pass the debt.
*
Whether proof of the fact of the possession of the note by Jo
seph Ellison , at the date of his deed , to Abraham , would have
given effect to that deed , so as to pass the debt and the mortgage
interest , need not now be determined .
Upon the authorities cited, and the facts of this case , we think
it entirely clear , that nothing passed by the deed of Joseph to
Abraham Ellison , or by the deed of Abraham to the tenant . The
tenant, then , was a mere stranger to the mortgage title and had
no interest therein .
The instruction , therefore , to the jury , that the interest of Jo
seph Ellison did pass to the tenant , was incorrect .
New trial granted .
ASSIGNMENT OF MORTGAGES . 225
MERRITT V. BARTHOLICK .
Court of APPEALS OF NEW YORK , 1867 .
36 N . Y . 44.
PARKER , J. If the delivery of the mortgage , without the bond ,
to Wentworth , as collateral security for the debt which such de
livery was intended to secure , operated as a valid assignment of
the mortgage to Wentworth , the judgment below is wrong and can
not be sustained . On the other hand , if it conveyed no interest
in the mortgage to Wentworth , then the defendant, who claims his
title through Wentworth 's foreclosure of that mortgage has no
defense to the plaintiff ' s action to foreclosure, and no interest in
respect to it, which , under the facts found by the referee , can
avail him upon this appeal .
The single question for consideration then , is, did the delivery
of the mortgage by Merritt , the mortgagee, to Wentworth , under
the circumstances stated in the referee 's report , operate to invest
Wentworth with any interest in the mortgage ?
The referee finds that , “ On the 16th of July , 1853 , or shortly
thereafter, the bond and mortgage were assigned by the obligee
and mortgagee therein named , to John Campbell , by assignment
in writing , which was duly acknowledged and recorded on the
16th day of May, 1853. That prior to the assignment of said bond
and mortgage to said Campbell , the mortgagee was indebted to
Henry T . Wentworth in the sum of $ 200 , borrowed money ; that
Wentworth desired that said mortgage should be left with him as
collateral security for said debt , and that the said Merritt delivered
the said mortgage to said Wentworth , according to such request ,
and as collateral security for said debt of $ 200 ; that the said mort
gage was so delivered to the said Wentworth before the same was
assigned to said Campbell , but that the bond accompanying the
same was not delivered to the said Wentworth at the time, nor was
anything said about the same , nor is there any evidence that the
same was ever delivered to said Wentworth , nor was there any
writing executed in reference to such transfer ."
As a mortgage is but an incident to the debt which it is intended
to secure (Martin v . Mowlin , 2 Burr ., 969 ;Green v . Hart , 1 Johns.,
580 ; Jackson v . Blodget, 5 Cow . 202 ; Jackson v . Bronson , 19 Johns .
325 ; Wilson v . Troup , 2 Cow ., 231 ; Cooper v . King , 17 Abb ., 342) ,
the logical conclusion is, that a transfer of the mortgage without
the debt is a nullity , and no interest is acquired by it . The security
cannot be separated from the debt and exist independently of it.
This is the necessary legal conclusion , and recognized as the rule
by a long course of judicial decisions . (See cases cited above ;
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Unless then , the bond was, in effect , assigned with the mort
gage , Wentworth obtained no interest in the mortgage. Did the
bond or the debt which it evidenced pass to Wentworth ? In the
first place , the transfer of the mortgage did not of itself operate
to transfer the bond, for the legal maxim is , the incident shall pass
by the grant of the principal, but not the principal by the grant
of the incident . So that unless we are authorized to say , that such
was the intent of the parties , we cannot hold that it did . This is
a question of fact, which the counsel for the appellant argues in
his points , but unless the referee has found it, as a fact, or found
facts from which we are bound to infer its existence , it is a ques
tion not in the province of this court to determine . The act done
by Merritt, the mortgagee , was the delivery of the mortgage to
Wentworth , and the purpose of the delivery was to secure the pay
ment of the debts of the mortgagee to Wentworth . Does it nec
essarily follow that the intention of the parties was to transfer
the bond ? The referee has not found either way upon this ques
tion of intent, and therefore , unless the intent in question is to be
inferred , as a matter of legal necessity from what he does find , it
must now be held not to have existed .
If the transfer had been by a written assignment , describing the
mortgage alone , and expressing the object to be to secure the
debt of the assignor to the assignee , nothing being said about the
bond or the debt which it represents , and delivery of the mortgage
made , it would be impossible , I think , to hold that the intention
was to assign the bond . There would be no opportunity for an
implication to that effect . The circumstance that the assignment
would be inoperative , unless the bond is held to pass, would not
give the assignment that effect . The result of such holding would
be to reverse the maxim , and make the principal follow the inci
dent. To make the circumstance of its inefficiency a reason for
giving it the effect desired , would , manifestly , uproot the maxim ,
and establish the contrary rule .
The fact that here the transfer was by manual delivery , merely ,
nothing being said as to the bond , or the indebtedness secured by
it, does not afford any stronger evidence of intent to transfer the
bond than the case supposed . There is no circumstance in the
case not considered in the supposed case , and , as I think , nothing
to compel the inference of intent to transfer the bond . I am un
able to see , therefore , any escape from the conclusion , that, upon
this appeal , the judgment of the Supreme Court must be held
correct , and affirmed . 3
Davis , Ch . J., and Porter, Bockes , and Scrugham , JJ., concurring.
Hunt and Grover , JJ., for reversal.
Compare Stewart v. Crosby and Laduc v. D . & M . R . Co., supra .
See also , Barrett v. Hinkley , 124 111. 32 ; Woods v. Woods, 66 Maine
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MATTHEWS v. WALLYN .
COURT OF CHANCERY OF ENGLAND, 1798 .
4 Vesey , 118.
The Lord Chancellor (LOUGHBOROUGH ). In this cause the ques
tion was only , whether the assignee of a mortgage had a right to
be paid according to the sum that appeared due upon the mort
gage deed , whatever might be the state of the account between the
mortgagor and mortgagee . The circumstances had nothing in them
so particular as to vary at all the general question . Matthews had
created a mortgage , upon which Shephard had advanced money ;
and Shepheard being his attorney , the purpose of creating the
mortgage was, that money might be raised for the use of Matthews .
Shepheard ought not to have made any use of the mortgage, but
for the purpose , for which it was created : namely , to raise money
for Matthews : but he thought fi
t
to assign the mortgage without
the privity of the mortgagor ; and the assignee now claims to hold
the mortgage to the full extent o
f
the sum appearing due upon
the face of the deed .
When the cause came on before me , a case was referred to , in
which , it was supposed , Lord Thurlow had entertained an idea ,
but not decided , that a mortgagor having permitted the mortgage
deed without any endorsement upon it to be in the possession o
f
the mortgagee , an assignee taking from that mortgagee might have
a right to hold that mortgage to the full extent o
f
it against the
mortgagor , who permitted the mortgagee to deal with and to make
a security upon it . It was also supposed , that in practice there
is no occasion to make the mortgagor a party ; and in some cases
it may not be possible to make him a party to the assignment ;
and that to hold , that the assignee o
f
a mortgage is bound to settle
the accounts o
f
the person from whom he takes the assignment ,
would tend to embarrass transfers o
f mortgages . I have got all
the information I could ; and I think I have got the best . The
result is , that persons most conversant in conveyancing hold it
extremely unfit , and very rash , and a very indifferent security , to
take an assignment o
f
a mortgage without the privity o
f
the mort
gagor , as to the sum really due ; that in fact it does happen that
assigninents o
f mortgages are taken without calling upon the mort
206 ; Lunt v . Lunt . 71 Maine 377 ; Ruggles v . Barton . 13 Gray (Mass . )
506 ; Morris v . Bacon , 123 Mass . 58 ; Hilton v . Woodman ' s Estate , 124
Mich . 326 ; Kernohan v . Manss , 53 Ohio St . 118 .
228 ASSIGNMENT OF MORTGAGES .
gagor ; but that the most usual case where that occurs is where it
is the best security that can be got for a debt not otherwise well
secured ; and it is not in the course of transferring mortgages , but
of raising money upon such securities ; but no conveyancer of es
tablished practice would recommend it as a good title to take an
assignment of a mortgage without making the mortgagor a party ,
and being satisfied , that the money was really due.
*
Considering the general principles upon which this court acts
with regard to mortgages , I have no difficulty in deciding the point.
It is true there is a legal estate or term ; but it must be apparent
upon the face of the title that it is not an absolute conveyance of
the term or legal estate , but as a security for a debt ; and the real
transaction is an assignment of a debt from A . to B ., that debt
collaterally secured by a charge upon a real estate . The debt there
fore is the principal thing ; and it is obvious that if an action was
brought upon the bond in the name of the mortgagee , as it must
be, the mortgagor shall pay no more than what is really due upon
the bond : if an action of covenant was brought by the covenantee ,
the account must be settled in that action . In this court the con
dition of the assignee cannot be better than it would be at law in
any mode he could take to recover what was due upon the as
signment .
Therefore the plaintiff must be at liberty to redeem , upon pay
ment of what the master shall find due upon the original mortgage
from him to Shepheard .4
BAILEY V. SMITH .
SUPREME COURT OF Ohio , 1863 .
14 Ohio St. 396 .
RANNEY , J . On the 8th day of October , 1853, the plaintiff gave
to the defendant, Charles H . Bolles , his negotiable promissory note
for the sum of $ 5 ,370 , and payable two years after date, with inter
est. Prior to the 14th of December , in the same year , sundry pay
ments had been made and indorsed thereon , leaving then due the
4in the course of the argument, the Chancellor said , " It struck me
at first that it was quite different from the case of the bond ; for that is
not assignable at law . A mortgage is a conveyance of a legal estate ;
though this court only holds it a security : for what? For the money
that upon the face of the mortgage appears to be due."
Compare, First National Bank v. Stiles, 22 Hun ( N . Y .) 339 ; Davis
v. Bechstein , 69 N . Y . 440 .
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sum of $ 2 ,500 ; and on that day, the plaintiff executed and delivered
a mortgage upon real estate situated in Lorain county to secure
this balance . On the 9th of June, 1856 , he filed his amended peti
tion against Bolles , the original payee of the note - Kendall and
Lucas , through whose hands the note and mortgage had passed by
assignment, and Smith , the then holder - - to compel the delivery
and cancellation of these instruments ; alleging that the note was
given for a pretended patent right for a machine, which was utterly
worthless , whether patented or not ; that both the note and mort
gage were obtained by fraud ; and that every subsequent holder
thereof took them with full notice of the fraud and want of con
sideration .
* * * * * * *
The plaintiff obtained the relief demanded in his petition for
everything beyond the amount paid by Smith for the note and
mortgage , with interest thereon ; and for that amount, an affirma
tive judgment for the sale of the nortgaged premises was rendered
in favor of Smith , and the plaintiff was ordered to pay the costs
of the action .
This judgment was founded upon a finding by the court, that
the note was obtained by fraud, and without consideration , of which
the intermediate parties , Kendall and Lucas , had notice , and that ,
as against them and Bolles, the plaintiff was entitled to the
relief prayed for in hi
s
petition ; but the court further find , that
Smith purchased the note and mortgage from Lucas in September ,





consideration existing between the original parties ,
and is entitled to hold the mortgage for the sum so paid with
interest , and to recover thereon for that amount . Passing b
y ,
without any remark , the objection that this affirmative judgment
in favor of Smith , could not have been rendered without a distinct
counterclaim interposed by him , and coming , at once , to the merits
of the controversy , it is evident , that the judgment can only be
supported upon the establishment o
f
the two propositions : First ,
that upon the facts found b
y
the court , taken in connection with
his answer asserting his title , the defendant , Smith , in the sense
o
f
the commercial rule , was a bona fide holder o
f
the note , with
out notice o
f
the equities existing between the original parties ; and ,
second , that the immunity belonging to the note in the hands o
f
such a holder , in virtue o
f
this rule , is extended to the mortgage
by which it was originally secured , and equally entitles the holder
to recover upon that .
[His honor here considered the first point and came to the con
clusion that there was no error in the finding o
f
the District Court
that Smith was a bona fide holder o
f
the note . ]
The remaining question is one o
f
much importance , and for the
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first time presented in this court . As it was supposed to be in
volved in other cases upon our docket , we have given opportunity
to counsel in those cases to be heard , and after full argument , we
have bestowed upon it very careful attention . Does the fact that
a note , obtained by fraud , has passed into the hands of a bona fide
indorsee , entitle him to enforce a mortgage, given to the original
holder, to secure its payment ? Or may the mortgagor still insist
upon the fraud, as a defense to an action brought to foreclose it ?
On the one hand , the question is in no way affected by the fur
ther question , whether a mortgagee acquires such an interest in
the land as to enable his grantec , being also assignee of the note ,
by deed duly executed , to claim the benefit of the rule which pro
tects bona fide purchasers of real estate — there being no claim that
any such deed was made . And on the other , we assume , as un
doubted , that , whether a written assignment was made or not, the
assignee of the note acquired all the rights and interests of the
assignor, in the mortgage. Very little aid is to be derived , either
from adjudged cases or the elementary books, in the solution of
the precise question now before us . This is not because the pur
chase and assignment of mortgages is a new thing . On the con
trary , scarcely any business transaction has been more common
and familiar , or has oftener engaged the attention of the courts .
Nor has the nature of this instrument, and the rights of parties
growing out of its assignment , either alone or in connection with
a non -negotiable security , escaped attention , o
r
failed to receive
very full and accurate illustration . In such case , the universally
acknowledged doctrine , from the case o
f
Davies v . Austin , 1 Ves .




a chose in action , and , a
s expressed by Lord






e buys ; ” but during all that long period , neither in




states of the Union , does the ques
tion seem to have been presented , whether it might not have a
different effect upon it
s assignment , when made to secure a nego
tiable instrument . This may be accounted for , in part , undoubt
edly by the general practice o
f taking a non -negotiable bond with
a mortgage ; but it cannot be doubted that mortgages have many
times been taken to secure negotiable bills and notes , fraudulently
transferred , and if such a distinction was thought to exist , it seems
very singular that the holders should never have made the attempt
to avail themselves of such securities . In New York , the attempt
has been frequently made to confine the principle , that the pur




the seller , to the original debtor ,
allowing him to make the same defense against the assignee that
he could against the assignor , but protecting the assignee , without
notice , from what have been denominated latent equities , o
r
inter
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ests in third persons , not in the apparent chain of title . And this
for the very plausible reason , that one proposing to purchase such
an instrument, might inquire of the debtor whether he pretended to
any defense , and make his answer estop him from afterward as
serting any, but that no amount of diligence would enable him to
protect himself from such latent equities . But after some vacilla
tion in judicial opinion , the court of appeals , in Bush v . Lathrop ,
repudiated the distinction , and held , that the purchaser , in such
cases, must rely upon the good faith of the seller , that he could
“ take only such title as the seller had and no other ,” and that if
mortgages were " to be further assimilated to commercial paper ,
the legislature must so provide."
But the direct question arising upon mortgages given to secure
negotiable paper, has arisen in two of the new states of the west ,
whose courts are entitled to high respect for their learning and
ability , and it has there been held , that the quality of negotiability
is so far imparted to such mortgages , as to make them available in
the hands of a bona fide indorsee of the paper , without any re
gard to the equitable rights of the original parties. Reeves v .
Sently , Walker 's Ch . Rep . 248 ; Dutton v . Ives , 5 Michigan Rep .
515 ; Fisher v . Otis , 3 Chand. Rep . 83 ; Martineau v . McCollum ,
4 Id . 153 ; Croft v . Bunster , 9 Wisconsin Rep . 503 . In the first
of these cases , decided by the chancellor of Michigan , in 1843 , no
reasons are assigned , or authorities cited ; and in Dutton v. Ives ,
decided by the Supreme Court , in 1858 , the doctrine is again ad
vanced upon the authority of Reeves v . Sentley , and the two Wis
consin cases, reported in 3 and 4 Chandler. On referring to the
first case decided in that state ( Fisher v . Otis ) , we find it pro
fessedly based on authority , and it serves to show upon what a
slender foundation , a line of decisions may be made to rest . The
court say : “ This doctrine is sustained by respectable authorities ,
and by the reason and sound policy which have long ruled in rela
tion to commercial paper ;" and Powell on Mortgages , 908, and
note are cited . Mr. Powell certainly did suggest the question ,
whether such a distinction might not be made. His exact position is
thus stated by Mr. Coventry in the note : “When it is said that a
debt is not assignable at law , it must be understood with this re
striction , that if it be secured by a negotiable instrument, such as a
bill of exchange , the legal interest will pass by indorsement ,
and this has induced the learned author, in the next paragraph of
the text , to suggest , whether , in such a case , the rule as to the
mortgagee 's liability would apply .” The rule here referred to , is
that announced by Lord Loughborough , in the leading case of
Matthews v . Wallyn , 4 Ves . 126 , that the assignee of a mortgage
takes it subject to all equities which could be asserted against his
assignor . Now , it may be fairly assumed , that Mr. Powell sup
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posed that such a distinction could be judiciously made ; but it
must be admitted that he had then no authority to base it upon ,
that neither the judicial records of England , nor of any of the
old states, furnish any evidence that it has ever been adopted , and
that it was first acted upon , nearly half a century after the sugges
tion was made , by a new state upon another continent . Under such
circumstances , it cannot be reasonably claimed , that we are at lib
erty to regard it as an established principle , and we can only adopt
it when we are convinced that it is correct in principle , and con
sistent with the analogies of the law . The reasons for supposing
it to be so , are well stated in the case of Croft v . Bunster , 9 Wis .
Rep . 510 . The reason assigned , it is said , why the assignee can
recover no more in equity than is actually due from the mortgagor
to the mortgagee , is , that he could recover no more at law on the
bond or covenant , and the reason ceasing as to negotiable securi
ties , the rule also ceases to have application ; that the debt is the
principal thing, and the mortgage the mere incident , following the
debt wherever it goes, and deriving its character from the instru
ment which evidences the debt . To which may be added , the con
sideration pressed upon our attention in argument , that , if a re
covery may be had for the debt , the mortgagor can have no interest
in withdrawing the mortgaged property from liability to satisfy it.
This last position is easily disposed of. If it were true, it would
furnish no authority for changing the legal character and incidents
of the mortgage deed , and, it is evident, that other lienholders
would often have a deep interest in the question . But it is not
true as to the mortgagor . The right to dispose of property at the
will of the owner , and to pay honest debts instead of those tainted
with fraud , are valuable privileges , of which he should not be de
prived without a necessity exists ; and a decree upon the mortgage
would very often deprive him of the benefits of the homestead
la
w , which could not be effected b
y
a judgment upon the fraud
ulent note . It is very evident also , that the wife of th
e
mortgagor ,
in a large majority o
f
cases , might have a deep interest in the
solution o
f
this question . Wholly incapable o
f
becoming a party
to any commercial contract whatever , she may nevertheless con
vey her estate , o
r
release her dower , b
y way o
f mortgage for the
security o
f
her husband ' s negotiable paper . If the mortgage is to
b
e





the paper , we
see no escape from the conclusion , that the mortgage must be
enforced against her , however gross and palpable the fraud may
b
e , by which it was obtained .
. In a general sense , it may be very well and very correct , to
speak of a mortgage as an incident to the debt it is created to
secure ; but the importance o
f
this mere term may be easily over
rated . It certainly is not one of the incidental effects of the crea
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.
tion of the debt itself , and it can only be made to have relation
to the debt by the force of the contract contained in themortgage ;
and is incident to the debt only in the same sense , that every inde
pendent contract , having for its object the payment or better se
curity o
f
the debt , is incidental to it . The existence of the debt , is
the occasion out o
f
which they arise , and the subject o
f
their vari
ous provisions ; but they embrace all the elements o
f
a perfect
contract in themselves , and are enforced b
y appropriate remedies ,









equity , where alone the rights o
f
a
n assignee can b
e en
forced , it is a chose in action , having no negotiable quality , and
not differing in character from collateral personal agreements , de
signed to effect the same object . Any o
f
these collateral agree
ments may be entered into for the purpose o
f securing a debt , evi
denced b
y
a negotiable instrument ; and if they are not obtained
by fraud , and rest upon a sufficient consideration , in the absence
o
f any agreement to the contrary , they undoubtedly enure in equity
to the benefit o
f any owner of the debt . But the question here is ,
whether one of these collateral agreements , made to secure a ne
gotiable note , loses its character of a mere chose in action , and has
imparted to it the qualities o
f negotiability , so that upon the trans
fer o
f
the note , it may be enforced , although obtained b
y
fraud ?
This question has been repeatedly answered , in respect to a class
of collateral agreements , much more intimately connected with the
negotiable instrument , than is the mortgage deed . We refer to
guarantees indorsed upon the note itself . Passing by those which
have been claimed to b
e
such , but held by the courts to be mere
indorsements , or original contracts , with apt words o
f
negotiability
incorporated in them , the universal doctrine has been , that the legal
title does not pass upon the transfer of the note ; that they are
mere non -negotiable choses in action , and to be treated , in every
respect , as such . Lamorieux v . Hewit , 5 Wend . 307 ; McLaren v .
Watson ' s Executors , 26 Wend . 425 ; Miller v . Gaston , 2 Hill , 188 .
In the first o
f
these cases , Chief Justice Savage says : “ Promis




the statute , but this
negotiable quality is not extended to any other instrument relating
to the note ; ” and Bronson , J . , in the last , in support o
f
the same
position , says : “ But the guarantee itself is not a negotiable instru
ment , and can not be transferred to a third person so as to give
him a legal title to proceed in hi
s
own name against the guarantor .
As in the case of other contracts which are not in their own nature
assignable , the remedy upon a guarantee is confined to the original
parties to the instrument . ” We have said that these instruments
are much more intimately connected with the note , than is a mort
gage deed . This will be apparent when it is remembered , that the
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one ordinarily guarantees the particular instrument specified in it,
and does not survive a renewal or other change of the evidence of
indebtedness ; while the other secures the debt , whatever changes
may intervene , until it is paid ; and, even a positive statutory bar
which precludes a recovery upon the note , it has been held , does
not prevent the enforcement of the mortgage. Fisher v . Mossman ,
11 Ohio . St. Rep . 42 .
In order to sustain the judgment rendered in this case , it is in
dispensably necessary to affirm — either , that the mortgage , when
made to secure a negotiable note , contrary to its general nature
and qualities , becomes a negotiable instrument , or , that the transfer
o
f
such a note , without the aid o
f




decision , except those o
f very recent date , has an effect beyond the




f negotiability , a collateral contract having relation to
the same debt . A very careful consideration o
f
the whole subject ,
has convinced us that we have no power to do either ; and that
neither justice nor public policy would be promoted by making the
attempt . It certainly has never been thought to be within the prov
ince o
f
a court , to determine what instruments should be taken
from the list o
f
mere choses in action , and clothed with the at
tributes of negotiability . Bills , foreign and inland , assumed this
position upon the immemorial custom o
f
merchants , and were
adopted into the law , upon the reasons which availed to make up
the great body o
f
the common law . But the statute , third and
fourth Anne , was found necessary to place promissory notes upon
the same footing ; and from that day to this , neither in England
nor in this country has an instrument been added without express
legislative sanction . Indeed , this could not well be otherwise . The
necessities o
f
commerce , and the instruments best calculated to
answer its purposes , must a
ll
be considered before any intelligent
decision could be made . These are legislative functions requiring
experience and extensive information , and calling for the exercise
o
f
a discretion , wholly incompatible with the fixed certainty of
judicial decision . But if it were otherwise , and the discretion
rested with u
s , we could not introduce the mortgage deed into
the list o
f negotiable instruments , without disregarding the very
foundation principles upon which such paper has always been sup
posed to rest . From the case o
f
Miller v . Race , 1 Burr . R . 452 ,
to the very latest case in our own reports , the language o
f
the
courts has been uniform , that such paper is only allowed in the
interests o
f
commerce , and “ possessing some o
f
the attributes of
money , " to answer the purposes o
f currency . Lord Mansfield , in
answer to the “ ingenious " argument o
f
Sir Richard Lloyd , that
the plaintiff could take nothing b
y
assignment from a thief who
had stolen the paper , said the fallacy o
f
the argument consisted
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in comparing bank notes to what they did not resemble . “ They
are not goods ," he said , “ not securities , nor documents for debt ,
nor are so esteemed ; but are treated as money , as cash , in the
ordinary course and transaction of business , by the general con
sent of mankind ;" " the course of trade creates a property in the
assignee or bearer ," and they cannot be recovered “ after they have
been paid away in currency , in the usual course of business .” This
was said , it is true , of bank notes ; but the same principles , and
for the same reasons , were afterward applied by the same learned
judge , to every description of negotiable paper , and the case of
Miller v . Race is still the leading authority upon this branch of
commercial law .
Now , mortgages are not necessities of commerce , they have none
of the " attributes of money," they do not pass in currency in the
ordinary course of business , nor do any of the prompt and de
cisive rules of the law merchant apply to them . They are " securi
ties," or " documents for debts," used for the purpose of invest
ment , and unavoidably requiring from those who would take them
with prudence and safety , an inquiry into the value, condition and
title of the property upon which they rest ; nor have we the least
apprehension that commerce will be impeded by requiring the fur
ther inquiry of the mortgagor , whether he pretends to any defense ,
before a court will foreclose his right to defend against those which
have been obtained by force or fraud.
Against any amount of mere theory , advanced to sustain the po
sition that commerce requires these instruments to be invested with
negotiable qualities, may be successfully opposed the stubborn fact ,
that in the first commercial country of the world , as well as in the
great commercial states of the American Union , they have never
been used for such purposes, or heard of in such a connection .
It is quite immaterial whether this has arisen from the cause sup
posed — that they are never made to secure negotiable paper
or not ; since it equally shows that no necessity for their use has
ever been felt . A long experience has demonstrated , that they
are not necessary instruments of active trade and business ;
and we but follow in the footsteps of the ablest and wisest judges,
when we say , that the harsh rule which excludes equities , and
often does injustice for the benefit of commerce , should not be ap
plied to them . This remits them to the position they have so long
occupied — that of mere choses in action ; and whether standing
alone , or taken to secure negotiable or non -negotiable paper , they
are only available for what was honestly due from the mortgagor
to the mortgagee . If they are assigned , either expressly or by
legal implication , the assignee takes only the interest which his
assignor had in the instrument - acquires but an equity , and upon
the long -established doctrine in courts of equity , is bound to sub
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mit to the assertion of the prior equitable rights of third persons .
To hold otherwise , is to engraft legal incidents upon a mere equi
table title ; to give to the transfer of negotiable paper an effect be
yond what it imports , or is necessary in the accomplishment of
it
s legitimate purposes ; and , finally , to invest with negotiable quali
ties a class o
f
instruments , neither used for , nor adapted to , the
trade and commerce o
f
the country , and thereby to deprive the
mortgagor o
f
the just right o
f defending against fraud , without
subserving any public policy whatever .
These views necessarily lead to the conclusion , that , upon the
facts found in the court below , the plaintiff was entitled to have
his title cleared from the incumbrance o
f
this fraudulent mortgage ,
and that the court erred in giving the affirmative judgment of fore
closure in favor o
f
Smith . For this error , that judgment is re
versed , and the cause remanded for further proceedings .
Peck , C . J . , and Brinkerhoff , Scott and Wilder , JJ . , concurred .
CARPENTER v . LONGAN .
SUPREME COURT O
F
THE UNITED STATES , 1872 .
1
6 Wall . ( U . S . ) 271 .








March , 1867 , th
e
appellee , Mahala Longan , and
Jesse B . Longan , executed their promissory note to Jacob B . Car
penter , o
r
order , for the sum o
f
$ 980 , payable six months after
date , at the Colorado National Bank , in Denver City , with interest
a
t the rate o
f
three and a half per cent . per month until paid . At
the same time Mahala Longan executed to Carpenter a mortgage
upon certain real estate therein described . The mortgage was con
ditioned for the payment o
f




On the 24th o
f July , 1867 , more than two months before the
maturity o
f
the note , Jacob B . Carpenter , for a valuable considera
tion , assigned the note and mortgage to B . Platte Carpenter , the
appellant . The note not being paid a
t maturity , the appellant filed
this bill against Mahala Longan , in the District Court o
f
Jefferson
County , Colorado Territory , to foreclose the mortgage .
• She answered and alleged that when she executed the mortgage
to Jacob B . Carpenter , she also delivered to him certain wheat and
flour , which he promised to sell , and to apply the proceeds to the
payment o
f
the note ; that at the maturity o
f
the note she had ten
dered the amount due upon it , and had demanded the return o
f
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the note and mortgage and of the wheat and flour , all of which was
refused . Subsequently she filed an amended answer , in which
she charged that Jacob B . Carpenter had converted the wheat and
four to his own use , and that when the appellant took the assign
ment of the note and mortgage, he had full knowledge of the facts
touching the delivery of the wheat and flour to his assignor . Tes
timony was taken upon both sides . It was proved that the wheat
and flour were in the hands of Miller & Williams, warehousemen ,
in the city of Denver , that they sold , and received payment for, a
part, and that the money thus received and the residue of the wheat
and four were lost by their failure. The only question made in
the case was, upon whom this loss should fall , whether upon the
appellant or the appellee . The view which we have taken of the
case renders it unnecessary to advert more fully to the fact relat
ing to the subject. The District Court decreed in favor of the ap
pellant for the full amount of the note and interest . The Supreme
Court of the Territory reversed the decree , holding that the value
of the wheat and four should be deducted . The complainant
thereupon removed the case to this court by appeal.
It is proved and not controverted that the note and mortgage
were assigned to the appellant for a valuable consideration before
the maturity of the note . Notice of anything touching the wheat
and flour is not brought home to him .
The assignment of a note underdue raises the presumption of
the want of notice , and this presumption stands until it is overcome
by sufficient proof. The case is a different one from what it would
be if the mortgage stood alone, or the note was non -negotiable , or
had been assigned after maturity . The question presented for our
determination is , whether an assignee , under the circumstances of
this case , takes the mortgage as he takes the note , free from the
objections to which it was liable in the hands of the mortgagee .
We hold the affirmative . The contract as regards the note was
that the maker should pay it at maturity to any bona fide indorsee ,
without reference to any defenses to which it might have been
liable in the hands of the payee . The mortgage was conditioned
to secure the fulfilment of that contract . To let in such a defense
against such a holder would be a clear departure from the agree
ment of the mortgagor and mortgagee, to which the assignee sub
sequently in good faith , became a party . If the mortgagor desired
to reserve such an advantage , he should have given a non -negotiable
instrument . If one of two innocent persons must suffer by a de
ceit , it is more consonant to reason that he who " puts trust and
confidence in the deceiver should be a loser rather than a stranger .”
Upon a bill of foreclosure filed by the assignee , an account must
be taken to ascertain the amount due upon the instrument secured
by the mortgage . Here the amount due was the face of the note




and interest , and that could have been recovered in an action at
law . Equity could not find that less was due. It is a case in which
equity must follow the law . A decree that the amount due shall
be paid within a specified time, or that the mortgaged premises
shall be sold , follows necessarily . Powell , cited supra , says : “ But
if the debt were on a negotiable security , as a bill of exchange
collaterally secured by a mortgage , and the mortgagee , after pay
ment of part of it by the mortgagor , actually negotiated the note
for the value , the indorsee or assignee would , it seems, in all events ,
be entitled to have his money from the mortgagor on liquidating
the account , a though he had paid it before , because the indorsee
or assignee has a legal right to the note and a legal remedy at
law , which a court of equity ought not to take from him , but to
allow him the benefit of on the account .”
A different doctrine would involve strange anomalies . The as
signee might file his bill and the court dismiss it. He could then
sue at law , recover judgment, and sell the mortgaged premises un
der execution . It is not pretended that equity would interpose
against him . So, if the aid of equity were properly invoked to
give effect to the lien o
f
the judgment upon the same premises for
the full amount , it could not be refused . Surely such an excres
cence ought not to be permitted to disfigure any system o
f enlight
ened jurisprudence . It is the policy of the law to avoid circuity
of action , and parties ought not to be driven from one forum to
obtain a remedy which cannot b
e
denied in another .
The mortgaged premises are pledged a
s security for the debt .
In proportion a
s
a remedy is denied the contract is violated , and
the rights o
f
the assignee are set a
t naught . In other words , the






s express provisions to the contrary notwithstanding .
The note and mortgage are inseparable ; the former as essential ,
the latter as an incident . An assignment o
f
the note carries the
mortgage with it , while an assignment o
f
the latter alone is a nullity .
It must be admitted that there is considerable discrepancy in
the authorities upon the question under consideration .
In Bailey v . Smith et a
l
. — a case marked b
y great ability and
fullness o
f
research the Supreme Court o
f
Ohio came to a con
clusion different from that a
t
which we have arrived . The judg
ment was put chiefly upon the ground that notes , negotiable , are
made so by statute , while there is no such statutory provision as




would any other chose in action , subject to all the equities which
subsisted against it while in the hands o
f
the original holder . To
this view o
f
the subject there are several answers .
The transfer o
f
the note carries with it the security , without
any formal assignment o
r delivery , or even mention of the latter .
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If not assignable at law , it is clearly so in equity . When the
amount due on the note is ascertained in the foreclosure proceed
ing , equity recognizes it as conclusive , and decrees accordingly .
Whether the title o
f
the assignee is legal o
r equitable is imma
terial . The result follows irrespective o
f
that question . The proc
ess is only a mode of enforcing a lien .
All the authorities agree that the debt is the principal thing
and the mortgage an accessory . Equity puts the principal and ac
cessory upon a footing o
f




the debt the same rights in regard to both . There
is no departure from any principle o
f
law o
r equity in reaching
this conclusion . There is no analogy between this case and one
where a chose in action standing alone is sought to be enforced .
The fallacy which lies in overlooking this distinction has misled




the confusion that exists .
The mortgage can have no separate existence . When the note is
paid the mortgage expires . It cannot survive for a moment the
debt which the note represents . This dependent and incidental re
lation is the controlling consideration , and takes the case out of the
rule applied to choses in action , where no such relation o
f depend
ence exists . Accessorium non ducit , sequitur principale .
- In Pierce v . Faunce , 47 Maine 513 , the court say : “ A mortgage
is pro tanto a purchase , and a bona fide mortgagee is equally en
titled to protection as the bona fide grantee . So the assignee o
f
a
mortgage is on the same footing with the bona fide mortgagee .
In all cases the reliance o
f
the purchaser is upon the record , and
when that discloses a
n unimpeachable title he receives the protec
tion o
f
the law as against unknown and latent defects . ”
Matthews v . Wallyn is usually much relied upon b
y
those who
maintain the infirmity of the assignee ' s title . In that case the
mortgage was given to secure the payment o
f
a non -negotiable
bond . The mortgagee assigned the bond and mortgage fraudu
lently and thereafter received large sums which should have been
credited upon the debt . The assignee sought to enforce the mort
gage for the full amount specified in the bond . The Lord Chan
cellor was at first troubled by the consideration that the mortgage
deed purported to convey the legal title , and seemed inclined to




would be applied to the bond if standing alone . He finally came
to a different conclusion , holding the mortgage to be a mere se
curity . He said , finally : “ The debt , therefore , is the principal
thing ; and it is obvious that if an action was brought on the bond
in the name o
f
the mortgagee , a
s
it must be , the mortgagor shall
pay n
o more than what is really due upon the bond ; if an action
of covenant was brought by the covenantee , the account must be
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cannot be better than it would be at law in any mode he could take
to recover what was due upon the assignment ." The principal is
distinctly recognized that the measure of liability upon the instru
ment secured is the measure of the liability chargeable upon the
security . The condition of the assignee cannot be better in law
than it is in equity . So neither can it be worse. Upon this ground
we place our judgment.
We think the doctrine we have laid down is sustained by reason ,
principle , and the greater weight of authority .
Decree reversed , and the case remanded with directions to enter
a decree in conformity with this opinion .5
FOSTER v . CARSON .
SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA, 1894 .
159 Pa . St. 477 .
Scire facias sur mortgage.
Opinion by Mr. Chief Justice STERRETT , Jan . 22, 1894 : On the
trial of this scire facias, it appeared among other things that the
mortgage in suit was executed and delivered by the defendant
5 “ Conceding , then , that a mortgage given as security for a negotiable
note , which refers to it, may partake of the negotiable character of the
latteï , the rule should be limited by the proposition that when the terms
of the mortgage so affect the note as to render it uncertain in amount ,
or in time of payment, or ingraft upon it conditions as to the payment
of the amount, it takes away the negotiable character of the note , and
leaves its owner or purchaser in the same position as the owner or pur
chaser of any other chose in action . No good reason is suggested for
a contrary rule . If a negotiable note is ' a courier without luggage '
that passes from hand to hand , and choses in action , which are bur
dene : with uncertainties and conditions , are not, why should the courier
who carries his luggage in a trunk be held to be not excluded from the
negotiable class because he has no hand baggage ? If it be said that
the general usage justifies it, we should at least be able to find cases
in the books which support such general usage . Yet it is confidently
believed that such cannot be found where the language of the mortgage
goes beyond provisions for the collection of the security , and under
takes to increase , diminish , or place conditions upon the obligations of the
parties, thereby rendering the instrument uncertain .” Hooker , J ., in
Brooke v. Struthers , 110 Mich . 562 . Compare, Wilson v. Campbell ,
110 Mich . 580 .
“ It was urged that the note in question here , although payable to
order , and without contingency , on a day certain , was not negotiable ,
because it purported to be according to the condition of a mortgage .
But, as the terms of the mortgage correspond with those expressed
in the note , there is nothing to affect it
s negotiability . ” Campbell , J . ,
in Littlefield v . Hodge , 6 Mich . 326 .
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Agnes J. Carson to Mary Speelman , who assigned the same, on the
margin of the record thereof, to A . C . Jarrett : of which assign
ment the mortgagor had actual notice . The bond accompanying
the mortgage was also assigned , by indorsement thereon , to said
Jarrett , and a certificate of no defense, executed and acknowledged
March 28 , 1888 , was delivered to him . On May 22 , 1888 , said
Jarrett assigned , on the margin of said mortgage record , “ to plain
tiff , his heirs and assigns , seven hundred dollars of the moneys se
cured by the mortgage, with interest from January 26 , 1888 .”
Same day this assignment was noted by the recorder on the back
of the mortgage . The mortgagor had no actual notice of the as
signment to plaintiff until after she had paid said Jarrett the entire
mortgage debt, except the sum of two hundred dollars , etc.
A verdict was taken in favor of the plaintiff , subject to the opin
ion of the court on the question of law reserved . The facts above
stated are, in substance , those upon which the question was re
served . Judgment was afterwards entered for defendants non
obstante veredicto , and this appeal was taken .
Briefly stated , the question presented is whether the assignment
of May 22, 1888 , on the margin of the mortgage record , by Jarrett
to plaintiff , was such legal notice to the mortgagor as precluded
her from setting up payments made by her to Jarrett before she
had any actual notice of said assignment .
The key to the solution of this question is in the principle that
the recording act was intended not for the benefit of the mortgagor ,
but to provide a real security for his debt . Not being for the mort
gagor's benefit , it is obviously immaterial to him whether or not
the mortgage has been recorded . His creditor may or may not
avail himself of his security ; but the fact of record does not alter
the contract relations of the parties . The undertaking of the mort
gagor is to pay, and payment wherever or however made will satisfy
the debt. He is under no obligation to make inquiry as to the
record ; and the mortgagee cannot allege an unsatisfied record in
answer to a plea of actual payment .
If the debtor is under no obligation to take notice of the record
of his mortgage , much less must he take notice of the assignment
of it. The assignee has but an equity , and as he is bound to in
quire for al
l





not , so hemust give notice o
f
the assign
ment if he would protect himself against subsequent payments made
to his assignor ; Bury v . Hartman , 4 S . & R . 175 ; Henry v .
Brothers , 48 Pa . 70 ; Horstman v . Gerker , 49 Pa . 282 . “ Legal o
r
constructive notice as distinguished from actual , ” said Mr . Jus
tice Strong , in Heníry v . Brothers , supra , “ is that which the law
regards a
s
sufficient to give knowledge . If the existence o
f
knowl
edge is presumed from any other fact , if the presumption be
1
6
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juris et de jure , the other fact must be certain . But there is no
certainty that a debtor has knowledge of the entry of a judgment
against him by virtue of a warrant of attorney which he may have
signed , much less that he has knowledge of the assignment of a
judgment. * * * A subsequent incumbrancer or purchaser
must know , for it is his duty to examine the record .” The record
ing act imposes no such duty on a mortgagor ; it is to the interest
of the assignee , not his , that the assignment should be made ef
fectual ; and it would be an intolerable hardship if every time he
may wish to make a payment and obtain a credit on his debt , he
should be compelled to visit the recorder's office to ascertain
whether or not his mortgage has been assigned . It is therefore
apparent that actual notice of the assignment is essential to the
completion of the contract relations between the assignee and the
mortgagor ; and , consequently , until that has been given , the mort
gagor does no wrong in making payments to the mortgagee .
The court below was therefore right in entering judgment for
defendants non obstante veredicto ; and its judgment must be af
firmed .
MORSE , C . J . , in WILLIAMS v . KEYES , 90 Mich . 290 (1892 ) . The
note made by Keyes to C . L . Luce was a negotiable one , and was
transferred to complainant before due , and for a valuable consid
eration . Under the previous rulings o
f
this court he took his mort
gage free from all equities o
f
which he had no notice between
Luce o
r
his administrators and Keyes ; and any payment made to
Arthur B . Luce , o
r arrangement between him and Keyes , after
the note and mortgage were transferred to complainant , could not
affect the latter ' s rights in the premises . See Reeves v . Scully ,
Walk . Ch . 248 ; Dutton v . Ives , 5 Mich . 515 ; Helmer v . Krolick ,
3
6 Id . 371 ; Judge v . Vogel , 38 Id . 568 . After the assignment o
f
the mortgage , and indorsement and delivery o
f
the note , to com
plainant , and before maturity , the defendants assumed to pay the
note and mortgage to the administrators o
f
the original mortgagee ,
without requiring the production o
f
the note ; and the only ques
tion here is , could they thus discharge the note and mortgage , so
a
s
to defeat the right o
f
a good - faith purchaser ? The statute
(How . Stat . , § 5687 ) provides that ,
Conipare , Vann v . Marbury , 100 Ala . 438 ; Brown v . Blydenburgh ,
7 N . Y . 141 ; Foster v . Beals , 21 N . Y . 247 ; Robbins v . Larson , 69 Minn .
436 ; Brewster v . Carnes , 103 N . Y . 556 .
See also , Rodgers v . Peckham , 120 Cal . 238 , construing C . C . 2935 –
“ When the mortgage is executed as security for money due , or to
become due , on a promissory note , bond or other instrument designated




the mortgage is not ,
o
f
itself , notice to a mortgagor , his heirs o
r personal representatives , so
as to invalidate any payment made by them , or either of them , to the
person holding such note , bond o
r
other instrument . "
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“ The recording of an assignment of a mortgage shall not, in
itself , be deemed notice of such assignment to the mortgagor , his
heirs or personal representatives , so as to invalidate any payment
made by them , or either of them , to the mortgagee ."
This statute has no application whatever to the present case . It
was not intended to authorize the mortgagor to pay the mortgage
to one not the holder of the note ; but if a payment be made to
one who , by the possession of the evidence of debt, shows himself
prima facie entitled to receive payment , or , in case of non -nego
tiable security , if the payment be made to the original holder, the
fact that an assignment has been placed of record will not , of itself ,
invalidate a payment made in good faith to such apparent owner .
The statute means no more than that the mortgagor shall not be
required to search the record before making payment to the one
prima facie entitled to receive it . In case of negotiable securities , the
holder alone is the one prima facie entitled to receive payment.
Neither under the statute nor under the law -merchant can the
maker of a negotiable note assume that it has not been transferred ,
and make payment thereof before maturity to the original holder,
and thus defeat the right of a purchaser for value before maturity .
The case of Dutton v . Ives is directly in point. See , also , 2 Daniel ,
Neg . Inst., § 1233 , and cases cited .
JONES , MORTGAGES, § 843. Whether the rule [that the assignee
of a non -negotiable chose in action takes subject to the equities
against his assignor ) is limited to equities between the original par
ties is a question upon which different courts are not in accord .
On the one hand , the rule that the assignee of a bond and mort
gage , which are merely choses in action , takes them subject to
existing equities , is limited in its application to such equities only
a
s
existed between the mortgagor and mortgagee , and is not ex
tended to those existing between the mortgagee and third persons .
The reason for this limitation seems a strong one . “ The assignee , "
says Chancellor Kent , ( 2 Johns . Ch . 441 ) , “ can always go to the
debtor , and ascertain what claims he may have against the bond ,
o
r
other choses in action , which he is about purchasing from the
obligee ; but he may not be able , with the utmost diligence , to as
certain the latent equity o
f
some third person against the obligee .
He has not any object to which he can direct his inquiries ; and
for this reason the claim of the assignee , without notice , of a
chose in action , was preferred , in the late case o
f
Redfearn v .
Ferrier , ( 3 Dow . 50 ) , to that o
f
a third party setting u
p
a secret
equity against the assignor . Lord Eldon observed in that case
that , if it were not to be so , no assignments could ever be taken
with safety . "
$ 844 . But the settled rule in New York is that the assignee is
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affected by equities in favor of third persons in the same manner
that he is affected by equities existing against him in favor of the
mortgagor . This question has been frequently discussed in recent
cases in that State . In the case of Bush v . Lathrop , (22 N . Y . 535 ) ,
Mr. Justice Denio , after examining numerous authorities , came to
the conclusion that the supposed distinction between these equities
is without foundation , and that the assignee takes the security sub
ject to al
l
equities that third persons could enforce against the as
signor , a
s well as subject to those existing between the parties to the
instrument . In that case the holder o
f
the mortgage and bond as
signed them by an absolute and unconditional bond , as security for
a debt for a much smaller sum than that due upon the mortgage , and
his assignee transferred the mortgage for full value to a third per
son without notice o
f





third persons was applied to the case , and it was held
that the subsequent assignee took the security subject to the equity





the debt for which he had pledged it .
§ 844a . The doctrine o
f estoppel may come in to qualify the
application o
f
this rule . Thus in the case last named the applica
tion o
f
this rule to the facts presented was overruled by the case
o
f
Moore v . Metropolitan National Bank , 55 N . Y . 41 , although
the rule there stated as to the equities o
f
third persons was not
questioned . The latter case held that , where the holder o
f
a non
negotiable chose in action has conferred the apparent absolute own
ership o
f
it upon another b
y
assignment , one who purchases from
such assignee in good faith for value , relying upon the faith o
f
such apparent ownership , obtains a valid title as against the first
assignor , who is estopped from asserting a title in hostility to such
apparent ownership . The decision is based altogether upon the
doctrine o
f estoppel . The owner o
f
the security , having conferred
apparent ownership upon his assignee and apparent authority to
convey , is estopped a
s against a bona fide purchaser to deny that
ownership o





the case presented in Bush v . Lathrop , the owner of the
mortgage and bond having assigned them absolutely and conferred
upon his assignee apparent absolute authority over the securities ,
would be estopped from asserting his title to them against one
who had purchased upon the faith o
f
the assignee ' s apparent au
thority to sell .
But aside from the doctrine o
f
estoppel , the rule above stated
a
s
to the equities o
f
third persons has been several times approved
in recent cases before the Court of Appeals of New York ; and
the general doctrine is there well established , that one who takes
a
n assignment of a bond and mortgage takes them subject not only
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to any latent equities that exist in favor of the mortgagor , but
also subject to the latent equities in favor of third persons .?
5 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND PRACTICE , 937 . ( Title , Assign
ments ) . The authorities are in direct conflict on the question
whether , as between successive assignees , assignments of choses
in action take precedence according to their date or only from the
time of notice to the debtor .
According to the English rule , he will have the preference who
first gives notice to the debtor , even if he be a subsequent assignee ,
provided that at the time of taking it he had no notice of the
prior assignment .
In the United States , the English rule has been adopted in the
federal courts and in many of the state courts .
It is further held , however, even if a subsequent assignee can
acquire priority by notice , that such assignee must be a bona fide
purchaser for value , and if he have notice of a prior assignment ,
that will have priority , and so also if he be put on inquiry . In
other states the doctrine requiring notice is denied , and it is held
that the assignment is complete on the mutual assent of the assignor
and assignee , and does not gain additional validity as against sub
sequent assignees by notice to the debtor .
If none of the assignees gives notice or the notices are simul
taneously given , then the rule prevails that he whose assignment
is prior in time is prior in right .8
CONSOLIDATED Laws of New YORK ( 1909 ) , Chap . 52 , Art. 9,
§ 290 . 1 . The term “ real property ,” as used in this article , includes
lands, tenements and hereditaments and chattels real , except a lease
for a term not exceeding three years .
2 . The term “ purchaser ” includes every person to whom any
7See Williston 's Wald 's Pollock on Contracts , 284, note 78.
See Ames Cases on Trusts , 326 -328, note . The learned editor says ,
inter alia , “Whatever view may be entertained as to the English doc
trine which prefers the assignee who first gives notice , the second as
signee is in several contingencies clearly entitled to supplant the first
assignee . E . g . ( 1) if, acting in good faith , he obtains payment of the
claim assigned ; Judson v. Corcoran , 17 How . ( U . S .) 612; Bridge v . Conn .
Co ., 152 Mass . 343 ; Bradley v. Root, 5 Paige ( N . Y .) 632, 640 ; or ( 2 ) if he
reduces his claim to a judgment in his own name; Judson v. Corcoran , 17
How . ( U . S.) 612 ; Mercantile Marine Ins. Co . v . Corcoran , 1 Gray
(Mass .) 75 ; or ( 3) if he effects a novation with the obligor , whereby
the obligation in favor of the assignor is superseded by a new one run
ning to himself , N . Y . & N . H . R . Co. v. Schuyler , 34 N . Y . 30 , 80 ;
Strange v. Houston Co ., 53 Tex . 162 ; or (4 ) if he obtains the document
containing the obligation when the latter is in the form of a specialty ;
In re Gillespie , 15 Fed . Rep . 734 ; Bridge v. Conn . Co., 152 Mass. 343 ;
Fisher v. Knox , 13 Pa. 622. In all these cases, having obtained a legal
right in good faith and for value , the prior assignee cannot properly
deprive him of this legal right."
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estate or interest in real property is conveyed for a valuable con
sideration , and every assignee of a mortgage, lease or other con
ditional estate .
3. The term " conveyance " includes every written instrument,
by which any estate or interest in real property is created , trans
ferred , mortgaged or assigned , or by which the title to any real
property may be affected , including an instrument in execution
of a power , although the power be one of revocation only , and an
instrument postponing or subordinating a mortgage lien ; except
a will , a lease for a term not exceeding three years , an executory
contract for the sale or purchase of lands, and an instrument con
taining a power to convey real property as the agent or attorney
for the owner of such property .
§ 291 . A conveyance of real property, within the state , on being
duly acknowledged by the person executing the same, or proved
as required by this chapter , and such acknowledgment or proof
duly certified when required by this chapter , may be recorded in
the office of the clerk of the county where such real property is
situated , and such county clerk shall, upon the request of any
party , on tender of the lawful fees therefor, record the same in
his said office. Every such conveyance not so recorded is void as
against any subsequent purchaser in good faith and for a valuable
consideration , from the same vendor , his heirs or devisees , of the
same real property or any portion thereof, whose conveyance is
first duly recorded .
PEPPER 'S APPEAL .
SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA, 1875.
77 Pa. St. 373.
This case arose under the following facts :
On the 16th of February , 1869, Mary J. Pennypacker executed
a bond and mortgage to David F . Schuler for $ 2 ,000.
On the 27th of the same month , Schuler executed a power of
attorney to Raimond D . Fox , to sell, assign , etc ., all his real and
personal property , etc . ; by virtue of this power of attorney , Fox
assigned the mortgage to Carroll Neide , on the 28th of May, 1869 .
The assignment was recorded the same day . The mortgage and
bond, with the assignment , were left in the possession of Fox ,
who was Neide 's conveyancer and agent , had acted for him in the
purchase of the mortgage, and had been his intimate friend for a
long time. Fox had the reputation also of being a man of integ
rity , and a responsible conveyancer .
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gage "them to




f February , 1870 , Fox having the bond and mort
gage in his possession , under the same power o
f attorney , as
signed t to David Pepper , and delivered them to him with
the assignment . Pepp r s a bona fide purchaser , and had no
actual notice o
f
the assignment to Neide . Pepper ' s assignment
was recorded February 9th , 1870 .
On the 13th day o
f
December , 1871 , Neide issued a scire facias
o
n
the mortgage , and judgment being recovered on it , by agree
ment o
f parties the amount , $ 2 ,070 . 25 , was paid into court , to be
paid to the party whom the court should determine was entitled
to it . The matter was referred to W . W . Weighly , Esq . , who
found the foregoing facts .
He reported also , as hi
s
opinion , that the assignment o
f
a mort
gage is not within the recording acts , so as to make its record
notice to a subsequent assignee . He further reported that Neide
was guilty of gross negligence in selecting as hi
s agent , the agent
of the mortgagee , and leaving the bond and mortgage in his pos
session , knowing that he had a power o
f
attorney to assign , etc . ,
from the mortgagee .
He therefore awarded to Pepper the money in court , $ 1 ,818 . 50 ,
after deducting expenses .
Neide filed exceptions to the report o
f
the auditor .
The District Court , Mitchell , J . , sustained the exception , and
awarded the fund to Neide .
Pepper appealed to the Supreme Court , and assigned the decree
o
f
the District Court for error .
Mr . Justice MERCUR delivered the opinion of the court , May
10th , 1875 .
The contention in this case is between two claimants for the
money collected on a mortgage . Each has an assignment for a






The assignment to the appellee was made on the 28th o
f May ,
1869 , and duly recorded on the same day . The one to the ap
pellant was executed on the 7th o
f February , 1870 , and recorded
two days thereafter . The question raised by the first assignment
is whether the recording o
f
the first assignment was notice to the
appellant .
The 14th section o
f
the Act o
f April 9 , 1849 , Purc . Dig . 471 ,
p
l
. 66 , declares " all assignments o
f mortgages , and letters o
f at
torney authorizing the satisfaction o
f mortgages , duly executed
and acknowledged in the manner provided by law for the acknowl
edgment o
f
deeds , may be recorded in the office for the recording
o
f
deeds in the county in which the mortgage assigned o
r author
ized to be satisfied may be o
r





a duly certified copy thereof shall be
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as good evidence as the original assignment or letter of attorney ,
when duly proved in any court of justice .”
It is contended that although this act permits the assignment of
a mortgage to be recorded , yet the authority is so far discretionary ,
that if recorded , the effect is limited to making the record , or a
certified copy, evidence . That inasmuch as the language of the
statute declares it “may be recorded ,” it is insufficient to make the
record notice to a subsequent assignee .
To this we answer that “may be recorded ” are the identical
words used in many of the Acts of Assembly providing for the
recording of instruments of writing , and substantially the lan
guage used in others .
* *
Thus it appears that the language of the Acts of Assembly pro
viding for the recording of written instruments has not generally
been mandatory . When recorded , however , we do not understand
the effect thereof is in any respect lessened by the absence of an
imperative command to record . It is optional whether or not to
record . When the election is made and an instrument authorized
by law to be recorded , is actually recorded , all the incidents and
force of a public record attach to that record. It is an early and
well recognized principle that one great object in spreading an in
strument of writing on a public record , is to give constructive no
tice of its contents to al
l
mankind : Levine v . Will , 1 Dall . 430 ;
Evans v . Jones et al . , 1 Yeates 173 ; Brotherton v . Livingston , 3
W . & S . 334 . We discover no evidence of legislative attempt to




a mortgage less effective
than that o
f
the mortgage itself . It was held in Pryor v . Wood
e
t a
l . , 7 Casey 142 , the assignment o
f
a mortgage , duly executed
and recorded passed the legal title , and no suit could subsequently
b
e
maintained thereon in the name o
f
the assignor for the use
of the assignee . In Partridge v . Partridge , 2 Wright 78 , where
the assignment was not under seal nor in the presence o
f wit
nesses and not acknowledged and recorded , it was held , the scire




the legal title for
the use o
f
the assignee . The first section o
f
the Act o
f April 22 ,
1863 , Purd . Dig . 485 , p
l
. 130 , provides , however , that the assignee
o
f
a mortgage , although the assignment has been duly recorded ,
may , at his option , sue and proceed thereon , either in his own
name , or in the name o
f
the mortgagee , to his use .
Prior to the enactment of the 14th section of the Act of April





a mortgage was within the recording acts . In
Craft v . Webster , 4 Rawle 242 , and in Mott v . Clark , 9 Barr . 399 ,
it was held not to be ; but in Philips v . Bank o
f
Lewistown , 6 Har
ri
s
394 , it was held to be within the recording Act o
f May 28 ,
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1849 . To adopt the view urged for the appellant would




the statutes which we have cited .
Instead o
f
a system designed to give unity and harmony to the
recording acts , it would inaugurate one fraught with mischief and
uncertainty .
It was alleged on the arguinent that it is not customary in Phila
delphia to search the records for assignments o
f mortgages . In
other parts o
f
the state we think the practice is generally other
wise . Be that as it may , if any custom exists not in harmony with
the Act o
f
1849 , it must give way to the statute . Malus usus
abolendus est .
As the view we have taken is decisive of the case , it is un
necessary to consider the other assigninents .
Decree affirmed , and it is ordered that the appellee pay the costs
of this appeal . 10
Sharswood and Paxson , JJ . , dissented .
9The act provided that , " all bargains and sales , deeds and conveyances
o
f
lands , tenements and hereditaments , may be recorded . " The court ,
in the casc last cited , said , “ A mortgage is in form a conveyance of the
land , and an assignment o
f
it is another formal conveyance of the same
land . The assignment of a mortgage is therefore within the language
o
f
the recording act o
f




inal evidence . So , in Massachusetts , an assignment o
f
a mortgage
seems to have been assumed , without question , to be a “ conveyance "
within the meaning of the recording act , so that the record is construc
tive notice . Strong v . Jackson , 123 Mass . 60 . See also , Swasey v .
Emerson , 168 Mass . 118 . In Howard v . Shaw , 10 Wash . 151 , an assign
ment was held not to be within the act requiring record of " deeds and
mortgages " , the question being between the assignee and a subsequent
purchaser of the land . (See post , Chap . X . ) So in Williams & Co . v .
Paysinger , 15 S . Car . 171 , the statute dealing in one section with “ con
veyances " and in another with "mortgage or other instrument in the
nature o
f
a mortgage " , the court said , “ There is no law requiring the
assignment of a mortgage to be recorded , and if it had been put on rec
ord it would not have amounted to constructive notice " , holding that
the maker of a promissory note paying a transferee thereof after the
latter had transferred and delivered it to a third person , did not dis
charge his obligation to the holder , even though there was no record o
f
the last transfer .
The commonest form o
f
statute is that which , like the New York
statute supra , uses terms so comprehensive that an assignment o
f
a
miortgage can hardly be excluded from the " conveyances ” etc . which
may be recorded ; nor an assignee o
f
a mortgage , from the " purchasers "
etc . against whom an unrecorded conveyance is declared invalid . The
application of these statutes to assignments , for some purposes at least ,
has almost universally been conceded . See , however , Hull v . Diehl ,
21 Mont . 71 , and Reeves v . Hayes , 95 Ind . 521 .
It should be observed that in several states the carlier decisions
holding assignments not within the recording acts have been followed
by aniendment o
f
the statutes upon this point .
1
0 See also , Strong v . Jackson , 123 Mass . 60 ; Stein v . Sullivan , 31 N .
J . Eq . 409 ; Mott v . Newark German Hospital , 55 X . J . Eg . 722 .
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SYRACUSE SAVINGS BANK v . MERRICK .
COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK , 1905 .
182 N . Y . 387 .
CULLEN , Ch . J. The action was brought to foreclose a mort
gage held by the plaintiff on certain real estate situate in the city
of Syracuse . No defense was interposed to the plaintiff 's claim ,
but two of the defendants , each claiming to be the holder of a
mortgage on the land subsequent to that of the plaintiff , sought
to have their respective titles adjudicated in the action . No ques
tion has been made as to their right to inject such an issue into
the suit , and we shall raise none, though it may be doubted
whether the plaintiff should have been delayed in the enforcement
of its claim to await the settlement of a dispute in which it had
no interest . The facts out of which the controversy arose are
a
s
follows : The owners o
f
the property , subject to the plaintiff ' s
mortgage , executed on August 2 , 1895 , a bond and mortgage to
one Warner to secure the sum of $ 8 ,398 . 92 , borrowed from him ,
which last mortgage covered the premises in suit and others . On
the same day Warner , to secure payment of a loan of $ 3 ,500 , exe
cuted and delivered to the appellant ' s testator , Tolman , an assign
ment o
f
said bond and mortgage . At the same time Warner de
livered the bond to Tolman but retained possession of the mort
gage . The assignment to Tolman was not recorded until Novem
ber 12 , 1902 . On May 16 , 1900 , Warner assigned for value said
bond and mortgage with others to the respondent , the Salt Springs
Bank , which assignment was recorded on May 20 , 1901 . Warner
delivered to the respondent the mortgage but not the bond , which
was in the possession o
f
Tolman . The trial court found that the
respondent had no actual notice of the assignment to Tolman and
took it
s assignment in good faith and for value ; that while the
respondent did not receive the bond , it made due and diligent in
quiry a
s
to the rights o
f
other persons to the bond and mortgage ,
and did not discover that the , defendant Warner had not full right
to assign the same . On these facts the trial court awarded the
bond and mortgage to the bank . That judgment has been af
firmed by the Appellate Division by a divided court . From that
judgment this appeal was taken .
The appellants contend that the Recording Act , on the strength
o
f
whose provisions title to the bond and mortgage has been award
e
d
to the respondents , does not apply to the present case or
affect the rights of the prior assignee o
f
a bond and mortgage
whose assignment is not recorded a
s against a subsequent assignee













ment of a mortgage is a conveyance of real estate within the mean
ing o
f
the Recording Act . (Westbrook v . Gleason , 79 N . Y . 23 ;
Decker v . Boice , 83 N . Y . 215 ; Bacon v . Van Schoonhoven , 87
N . Y . 446 ; Gibson v . Thomas , 180 N . Y . 483 . ) But in nearly
all the cases the question arose , not with reference to the rights
of rival claimants to the security , but in regard to the rights of
subsequent purchasers o
r
lienors on the land itself . 11 The only
case in which the question now before u
s
was presented to this
court is that o
f Kellogg v . Smith , 26 N . Y . 18 , in which the ques
tion was not determined , th decision proceeding on another
ground . The difficulty in disposing o
f
the question is inherent in
the nature o
f
the security . On the one hand , it is contended that
a
s
the mortgage is merely collateral o
r








the bond , which is the principal obligation , an assignee ' s title to
the debt o
r obligation cannot be impaired by the failure to record
the assignment , nor can the mortgagor be subjected to a double
obligation , to wit , to have his land foreclosed under the mort
gage and to b
e
held personally responsible on the bond . This
view is strongly presented in the dissenting opinion below . 12 On
the other hand , it is contended that b
y
the Recording Act it was
intended to confer a quasi or limited negotiability on bonds and
1
1See post , Chap . X .
1
2
“ The assignment o
f
a mortgage may be in the form o
f
a convey
ance , and when thus executed and acknowledged it may be admitted to
record . But we all know that the assignment of a mortgage may be
effected without any such formal conveyance . It may be assigned by
a mere writing of the assignor declaring that he thereby assigns the
mortgage to the person named in such writing , o
r
it may be assigned
by a simple indorseinent o
r delivery o
f
the note for which the mortgage
is a security . It is a familiar principle that in the case of a debt secured
by nortgage , the debt is the principal and the mortgage an incident ,
and that an assignment o
f
the debt is an assignment o
f
the mortgage .
This principle is too well understood , and the authorities in support of
it are too numerous to require citation .
" And in cases of this character which are not in the form of a con
veyance , there is no assignment to record or which would be entitled to
record . Nor do we understand , when the assignment of the mortgage
is made in the form o
f
a conveyance , there is any obligation imposed
by the statute which requires the assignee to have it recorded to protect
hiniself against subsequent encumbrancers and purchasers ; only , when
executed in such form , it may be admitted to record , and when recorded
a certified copy o
f
it may , perhaps be used as evidence . ” Lord , J . ,
in Watson v . Dundee M . & T . I . Co . , 12 Ore . 474 .
The recording act o
f Oregon was substantially like section 291 o
f
the New York statute , supra . Misc . Laws ( 1872 ) Chap . VI , § 26 .
See also , Burhans v . Hutcheson , 25 Kans . 625 ; Byles v . Tome , 39
Md . 461 ; Hull v . Diehl , 21 Mont . 71 ; Holliger v . Bates , 43 Ohio St . 437 ;
Oregon & W . Trust Co . v . Shaw , 5 Sawy . ( U . S . ) 336 .
But see Pickett v . Barron , 29 Barb . ( N . Y . ) 505 .
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mortgages, and that to accomplish this result it must be held that
the title to a bond or evidence of debt to secure which a mort
gage is given will be defeated by failure to comply with the pro
visions of the Recording Act as to assignments of mortgages, what
ever may be the rule as to the assignment of other obligations.
The question is a broad one. In our . view , however , its decision
is not necessary to a determination o
f
this case , and , therefore ,
we leave it open .
As already stated , the learned trial court found as a fact that





Tolman to the bond and mortgage , nor was it
able to discover the same . As the decision of the Appellate Divi
sion was not unanimous the finding is open to examination b
y
this court and we are o
f
opinion that there is n
o
evidence to sus
tain it . The failure o
f
Warner to produce the bond at the time
o
f
the assignment was sufficient to put the respondent on inquiry




the defect in Warner ' s
title . (Brown v . Blydenburgh , 7 N . Y . 140 ; Kellogg v . Smith ,
supra ; Merritt v . Bartholick , 36 N . Y . 44 ; Bergen v . Urbahn , 83
N . Y . 49 . ) The only evidence o
f inquiry or diligence on the part
o
f
the respondent is that given b
y
the lawyer who acted for it in
procuring the assignment . He testified that upon his discovery
that several o
f
the bonds were not delivered to him with the mort




the bank to that
fact and spoke to Warner about it , to which Warner responded :
" Well , if any of them are missing they are doubtless in my office
and I will have them looked up and furnish them to the bank
hand them in . " He also took an affidavit from Warner that he
owned the securities . With this the subject was dropped and
nothing further was done . Now , so far from this showing due
diligence on the part o
f
the assignee , we think it discloses an en
tire failure to exercise diligence . The learned counsel for the
respondent relies on the case o
f




n authority for the proposition that where the mortgage itself
contains a covenant to pay the debt the production o
f
a bond is
not necessary . In that case , however , it was proved that while
the mortgage referred to a bond , in fact no bond had ever been
given . In the present case , however , the respondent was expressly
told that the missing bonds were in the assignor ' s office . After
that statement common prudence would have dictated that the as
signor be required to produce and deliver the bonds . If on such
demand he failed to deliver them , that failure itself would create
suspicion . It is argued that if the demand had been made the
assignor would have made some other excuse for his failure to
produce the missing security . This does not follow , even if we
assume the assignor to have acted dishonestly in the transaction .
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The assignor, however, testified on the stand that at the time of
the assignment to the bank , which was one of great excitement
on his part, he turned over all his securities to satisfy the bank 's
claim gainst him as an indorser and that he forgot that he had
previously transferred the mortgage to Tolman . If this state
ment is to be credited it may very well be that Warner , on dis
covering that the bond was not in his possession , would have
recalled the transfer to Tolman and have refused to assign it to
the bank . However this may be, it is no answer to the failure
of the bank to make proper inquiry and to obtain the bond to
assert that if it had the assignor would have told plausible false
hoods to account for his failure to deliver the bond . This might
or might not have proved the case . We cannot speculate on it.
The same argument was made before the Supreme Court of
Massachusetts in Shaw v . Spencer , 100 Mass . 382 , where a se
curity was registered in the name of A , trustee , and transferred
to the defendant for the trustee 's personal benefit . It was urged
that the defendant was relieved from making inquiry of the trus
tee as to the nature of his interest because the trustee would doubt
less have told a falsehood on the subject . It was held that there
was no such presumption and that even if such conduct on the
part of the trustee was probable it did not relieve the assignee
from the duty of making inquiry . The case before us is stronger
for the appellant than that of Kellogg v . Smith , supra . In that
case the assignor stated to the assignee that the bond and mort
gage which he failed to produce were locked up in the safe of his
agent who , at the time, was away . It was held that despite this
excuse the non -production of the bond and mortgage was suffi
cient notice to deprive the assignee of the benefit of the Record
ing Act . In the present case , if the story told by Warner to the
bank ' s lawyer had been true , the bond was immediately accessible .
The judgment of the Appellate Division and that part of the
judgment of the Special Term appealed from should be reversed
and a new trial granted , costs to abide the event .
Gray , O 'Brien , Bartlett , Haight, Vann and Werner , JJ ., concur .
Judgment reversed , etc .13
LEE v. KELLOGG .
SUPREME COURT OF MICHIGAN , 1896 .
108 Mich . 535 .
Mary Baker, being the owner of 40 acres of land , on March
30 , 1893, executed to one George E . Breck a mortgage thereon
13See also , Adler v . Sargent, 109 Cal. 42 ; Byles v . Tome, 39 Md.
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for $ 1,000 , collateral to six notes — one for the principal amount ,
and five interest coupon notes . The mortgage was recorded on
the day following it
s
execution . June 26 , 1893 , Breck sold and
delivered the notes and mortgage to one Hubbard , accompanying
the same with the usual form o
f assignment . March 17 , 1894 ,
Hubbard sold , assigned , and delivered them to defendant Kellogg .
These assignments were recorded September 24 , 1894 . August
1
7 , 1893 , Breck forged a mortgage and six notes , for the same
amount a
s
the others , upon the same land , with defendant Baker
a
s
the maker , and offered to sell and assign them to complainant ,
Lee . Lee went to an abstract office , and inquired if Breck was
the owner , upon the record , o
f
such a mortgage . The abstractor
informed him that he was . He then purchased , Breck delivering
to him the forged mortgage and notes as and for genuine ones .
Subsequently complainant ascertained the true situation , viz . , that
defendant Kellogg was the bona fide purchaser and owner o
f
the
mortgage and notes , and that those held b
y
him were forgeries .
He thereupon commenced foreclosure proceedings in chancery by
the ordinary suit , making defendant Kellogg a party thereto , “ a
s
having , o
r claiming to have , rights and interests in the premises
a
s subsequent incumbrancer or otherwise . ” Defendant Kellogg
answered , setting u
p
the true state o
f




cross -bill . Complainant answered the cross
bill , denying that the mortgage and notes held b
y
him were for
geries , and asserting their genuineness . Upon the hearing the bill
was dismissed .
GRANT , J . (after stating the facts ) . The theory of the com
plainant ' s bill , and of his answer to the cross -bill , was that he
owned and had in his possession the original and genuine mort
gage and notes . He did not prove , or attempt to prove , their
execution ; but , although forgeries , they were admitted in evidence .
The complainant made no case entitling him to relief . Under his
bill it was incumbent upon him to prove and produce the original
mortgage and notes . His bill was not framed upon the theory
upon which h
e
now seeks to recover .
Forged papers cannot be made the basis o
f
a recovery , either at
law o
r
in equity , against the supposed maker , or those in good
faith holding and owning the genuine papers . Austin v . Dean ,
4
0 Mich . 396 ; Camp v . Carpenter , 52 Mich . 375 ; Crawford v .
Hoeft , 58 Mich . 21 ; Laprad v . Sherwood , 79 Mich . 520 ; Williams
v . Keyes , 90 Mich . 290 . Had the suit been againt Mrs . Baker
alone , either at law , upon the notes , or in equity , to foreclose the
461 ; O 'Mulcahy v . Holley , 28 Minn . 31 ; Brumbach v . McLean , 19
6
Pa . St .
321 ; Richards Trust Co . v . Rhomberg , 19 S . Dak . 595 ; Potter v . Stran
sky , 48 Wis . 235 .
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mortgage, the suit would have failed , upon proof that the papers
were forged .
Where an assignor does not have the papers to be assigned , to
deliver, this is sufficient to put the purchaser upon hi
s
guard , to
put his good faith in doubt , and to charge him with any defect
in his assignor ' s title . 1 Jones , Mortg . (5th Ed . ) § 483 . Forged
papers cannot give to an assignee any greater o
r
better right than
he would have without any , nor can they be made the basis of a
valid assignment , o
r
held to convey to such pretended assignee
the original papers , which have been , in good faith , purchased b
y
another . The recording laws do not apply to such a case . Com
plainant might as well claim that if Mrs . Baker had sold and con
veyed the land , b
y warranty deed , to Kellogg , and , before she had
recorded it . Breck had forged a deed from Mrs . Baker to himself ,
and then conveyed to complainant , he would have been a bona fide
purchaser , entitled to the protection of the recording law . Ker
nohan v . Manss , 53 Ohio St . 118 .
The decree is affirmed , with costs . 14
The other justices concurred .
KERNOHAN V . MANSS .





SPEAR , J . The question presented by the record , is whether ,
both parties , acting in good faith , one who obtains title to a mort
gage given to secure several notes to several persons , by assign
ment for value b
y
one of the mortgagees with delivery of the




several notes secured thereby ,
indorsed b
y
the payee who was then the owner of the genuine
note , obtains a lien for money thus advanced on the faith o
f
the
security , in preference to the bona fide indorsee for value o
f
the
genuine note obtained afterwards , both transactions occurring be
fore the maturity o
f
the note ? 15
1
4 The recording act of Michigan was identical , in all material re
spects , with that o
f
New York , supra , the difference , if any , being in
the direction o
f
a more specific provision for the recording o
f assign
ments . See How . Ann . S
t
. $ S 10842 , 10843 , 10850 , 10855 , 10856 .
Compare Morris v . Bacon , 123 Mass . 58 .
1
5 The reporter ' s statement of facts shows that the first assignment
was not recorded until after the transfer of the genuine note , and that
the trarsferee o
f
the note examined the records before advancing his
money . For the provisions of the Ohio statutes and their construction
by the courts , see Swartz v . Hurd , 2 Ohio Dec . 134 ; Holliger v . Bates ,
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It seems to us that the question will be solved by the applica
tion of simple and well -established principles . The concession
that each party acted in entire good faith removes any necessity
for considering equities , and leaves the case to be determined on
purely legal grounds .
The following propositions we consider are settled in Ohio :
1 . Where a promissory note is secured by mortgage , the note ,
not the mortgage, represents the debt . The mortgage, is there
fore , a mere incident, and an assignment of such incident will not,
in law , carry with it a transfer of the debt ; on the other hand
a transfer of the note by the owner so as to vest legal title in the in
dorsee will carry with it equitable ownership of the mortgage. And
so , if the debt be evidenced by several promissory notes , the legal
transfer of a portion of the notes carries with it such proportional
interest in the security as the notes transferred bear to the whole .
Harkrader v . Leiby , 4 Ohio St., 602 ; Ex ’rs of Swartz v . Leist , 13
Ohio St., 419 ; Fithian v . Corwin , 17 Ohio St., 118 ; Allen v. Bank ,
23 Ohio St., 97 ; Holmes v . Gardner, 50 Ohio St., 167 .
2 . Being but an incident of the debt , the mortgage remains ,
until foreclosure or possession taken , in the nature of a chose in
action . Where given to secure notes it has no determinate value
apart from the notes , and , as distinct from them , is not a fit
subject o
f assignment . And where the notes are legally trans
ferred , the mortgagee , and all claiming under him , will hold the
mortgaged property in trust for the holder o
f
the notes . Jordon
v . Cheney , 74 Maine , 359 ; Jones on Mortgages , 818 ; Pomeroy ' s
E
q
. Jur . , § 1210 .
3 . All notes payable to any person or order are negotiable by
indorsement thereon , so a
s absolutely to transfer and vest the prop
erty thereof in each and every indorsee or holder successively .
Such indorsee , o
r
holder , may , in his own name , institute and main
tain a
n
action thereon against the maker . Sections 3171 and 3172 ,
Revised Statutes .
4 . ' A holder of negotiable paper who takes it before maturity
for a valuable consideration , in the usual course of trade , without
knowledge of facts which impeach it
s validity , holds it b
y
a good
title . To defeat a recovery it is not sufficient to show that he took
it under circumstances which ought to excite suspicion in the mind
o
f
a prudent man . To have that effect , it must be shown that he








. 437 . In the latter case , the court said , “ Conceding that a
written assignment o
f
the mortgage may , under the statute , be recorded
and thus be notice to others , yet the statute does not require it , and a
failure to have it done cannot divest the assignee of his rights and
equities . ”
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acter when secured by mortgage. Johnson v . Way , 27 Ohio St.,
374 ; Kitchen v. Loudenback , 48 Ohio St., 177 .
Applying these rules to the facts, the following conclusions seem
to result , viz . :
Kernohan , by the assignment of the mortgage, took the legal
title to it so far as the same was owned by McGill, and an equitable
right in the $ 7,602 .72 note . He did not take, nor did McGill in
tend to transfer to him , any legal title to the note , for McGill kept,
and intended to keep that in his own possession , unindorsed , and
subject to his continued control. Such rights as Kernohan took
he might assert as against McGill , but John and Louis Manss
alone can recover on the note . They , by their purchase and the
indorsement to them by McGill, took a full title to it as against
the world , together with the equitable title to the mortgage in
whosoever hands it might be . The one has the legal title to the
incident, with an equitable right in the debt ; the other the legal
title to the debt, together with an equitable title to the incident .
As both cannot have precedence the weaker must give way to the
stronger . The legal title to the incident must be subordinated to
that which is superior, viz . : the legal title to the debt, although
the holder of the incident acquired his right first . John and Louis
Manss were, therefore, entitled to the proceeds of the mortgaged
lands .
The case of Kernohan v . Durham , 48 Ohio St., 1 , is relied upon
by plaintiff in error. In that case Coddington took by indorse
ment the genuine note after due. Kernohan took an assignment
of the mortgage which assignment also purported to transfer the
note. This was not only before the transfer of the note to Cod
dington , but before the note was due. The holding is, that, as be
tween Kernohan and McGill ( the payee ) , the former took an
equitable title to the genuine note, and hence , as Coddington's title
was acquired after the note had been dishonored , he could take
no better right than his indorser had . The note being past due he
was put upon inquiry and was chargeable with whatever knowl
edge due inquiry would have elicited . The vital difference between
the position of the holder of the note in that case and in this is ,
that , while Coddington took his title after due and hence was
charged with all infirmities, John and Louis Manss being indorsees
and purchasers for value in the ordinary course of trade , before
due, took good title as against the world .
Judgments affirmed .16
16Compare , Himrod v . Gilman , 14
7
I1
1 . 293 ; Boyle v . Lybrand , 113
Wis . 79 .
CHAPTER VI.
REDEMPTION .
PEUGH v . DAVIS .
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES. 1877 .
96 U . S . 332 .
Mr. Justice Field delivered the opinion of the court .
This is a suit in equity to redeem certain property, consisting of
two squares of land in the city of Washington , from an alleged mort
gage of the complainant . The facts, out of which it arises , are
briefly these : In March , 1857 , the complainant, Samuel A . Peugh ,
borrowed from the defendant, Henry S . Davis, the sum of $ 2,000 ,
payable in sixty days , with interest at the rate of three and three
fourths per cent . a month , and executed as security for its payment a
deed o
f
the two squares . This deed was absolute in form , purport
ing to be made upon a sale o
f
the property for the consideration o
f
the $ 2 ,000 , and contained a special covenant against the acts of the
grantor and parties claiming under him . This loan was paid at its
maturity , and the deed returned to the grantor .
In May following the complainant borrowed another sum from
the defendant , amounting to $ 1 ,500 , payable in sixty days , with the
same rate o
f
interest , and as security for its payment redelivered





September following . The principal not being paid , the
defendant placed the deed on record on the 7t
h
o
f that month . In
January , 1858 , a party claiming the squares under a tax title brought
two suits in ejectment for their recovery . The defendant thereupon
demanded payment o
f





f February following , the complainant obtained from
the defendant the further sum o
f
$ 500 , and thereupon executed to
h
im a
n instrument under seal , which recited that he had previously
sold and conveyed to the defendant the squares in question ; that the
sale and conveyance were made with the assurance and promise o
f
a good and indefeasible title in fee - simple ; and that the title was
now disputed . It contained a general covenant warranting the title
against all parties , and a special covenant to pay and refund to the





deed , to which he might be subjected by reason of any claim or liti
gation on account of the premises . Accompanying this instrument,
and bearing the same date , the complainant gave the defendant a
receipt for $ 2 ,000 , purporting to be in full for the purchase of the
land .
The question presented for determination is whether these instru
ments, taken in connection with the testimony of the parties , had the
effect of releasing the complainant 's equity of redemption . It is in
sisted by hi
m that the $ 500 advanced a
t
the time was an additional
loan , and that the redelivered deed was security for the $ 2 ,000 , as it
had previously been fo
r
the $ 1 ,500 . It is claimed b
y
the defendant




which the complainant offered to sell for that sum , and at the same
time to warrant the title o
f
the property and indemnify the defend
ant against loss from the then pending litigation .
It is an established doctrine that a court of equity will treat a deed ,
absolute in form , as a mortgage , when it is executed as security for
a loan of money . That court looks beyond the terms of the instru
ment to the real transaction ; and when that is shown to be one o
f
security , and not o
f
sale , it will give effect to the actual contract o
f
the parties . As the equity , upon which the court acts in such cases ,
arises from the real character o
f
the transaction , any evidence , writ
ten o
r
oral , tending to show this is admissible . The rule which ex
cludes parol testimony to contradict or vary a written instrument
has reference to the language used b
y





natural import , but must speak for itself .





executing and receiving the instrument . Thus , it may be shown that
a deed was made to defraud creditors , o
r
to give a preference , or to
secure a loan , o
r
for any other object not apparent on it
s
face . The





it constitutes a ground for the exercise of its jurisdiction , which will
always be asserted to prevent fraud o
r oppression , and to promote
justice . Hughes v . Edwards , 9 Wheat . 489 ; Russell v . Southard , 12
How . 139 ; Taylor v . Luther , 2 Sumn . 228 ; Pierce v . Robinson , 13
Cal . 116 .
It is also an established doctrine that an equity o
f redemption is
inseparably connected with a mortgage ; that is to say , so long as the
instrument is one o
f
security , the borrower has in a court o
f
equity
a right to redeem the property upon payment o
f
the loan . This right
can not be waived o
r
abandoned by any stipulation of the parties
made a
t
the time , even if embodied in the mortgage . This is a doc
trine from which a court o
f
equity never deviates . Its maintenance
is deemed essential to the protection o
f
the debtor , who , under press
ing necessities , will often submit to ruinous conditions , expecting o
r
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hoping to be able to repay the loan at its maturity , and thus prevent
the conditions from being enforced and th
e
property sacrificed .





be made to the mortgagee . There is nothing in the policy o
f
the law
which forbids the transfer to him o
f
the debtor ' s interest . The trans
action will , however , be closely scrutinized , so as to prevent any op
pression o
f





this court , when the creditor has shown himself





rower . Russell v . Southard , supra . Without citing the authorities ,
it may be stated a
s
conclusions from them , that a release to the mort
gagee will not be inferred from equivocal circumstances and loose
expressions . Itmust appear by a writing importing in terms a trans
fer o
f
the mortgagor ' s interest , or such facts must be shown as will
operate to estop him from asserting any interest in the premises .
The release must also be for an adequate consideration ; that is to
say , it must be for a consideration which would be deemed reason
able if the transaction were between other parties dealing in similar
property in its vicinity . Any marked undervaluation o
f
the prop
erty in the price paid will vitiate the proceeding .
If , now , we apply these views to the question before us , it will not
be difficult o
f
solution . It is admitted that the deed o
f
the complain
ant was executed as security for the loan obtained by him from the
defendant . It is , therefore , to be treated as a mortgage , as much so
a
s
if it contained a condition that the estate should revert to the
grantor upon payment o
f
the loan . There is no satisfactory evidence
that the equity o
f redemption was ever released . The testimony o
f
the parties is directly in conflict , both being equally positive , the one ,
that the advance o
f
$500 in February , 1858 , was an additional loan ;
and the other , that it was made in purchase o
f
the mortgagor ' s in
terest in the property . The testimony o
f
the defendant with refer
ence to other matters connected with the loan is , in several essential




interest prior to September , 1857 , and his hesita
tion when paid checks for the amounts with his indorsement were
produced , show that his recollection can not always be trusted .
Aside from the defective recollection o
f
the creditor , there are
several circumstances tending to support the statement o
f
the mort
gagor . One o
f
them is that the value o
f
the property at the time o
f
the alleged release was greatly in excess o
f
the amount previously
secured with the additional $500 . Several witnesses resident at the
time in Washington , dealers in real property , and familiar with that
in controversy and similar property in its vicinity place its value a
t
treble that amount . Some o
f
them place a still higher estimate upon
it . It is not in accordance with the usual course of parties , when
n
o fraud is practised upon them , and they are free in their action , to
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surrender their interest in property at a price so manifestly inade
quate. The tax title existed when the deed was executed , and it was
not then considered of any validity . The experienced searcher who
examined the records pronounced it worthless, and so it subse
quently proved .
Another circumstance corroborative of the statement of the mort
gagor is, that he retained possession of the property after the time
of the alleged release , enclosed it, and either cultivated it or let it for
cultivation , until the enclosure was destroyed by soldiers at the com
mencement of the war in 1861. Subsequently he leased one of the
squares , and the tenant erected a building upon it . The defendant
did not enter into possession until 1865 . These acts of the mort
gagor justify the conclusion that he never supposed that his interest
in the property was gone , whatever the mortgagee may have thought.
Parties do not usually enclose and cultivate property in which they
have no interest .
The instrument executed on the 9th of February , 1858 , and the
accompanying receipt , upon which the defendant chiefly relies, do
not change the original character of the transaction . That instru
ment contains only a general warranty of the title conveyed by the
original deed , with a special covenant to indemnify the grantee
against loss from the then pending litigation . It recites that the deed
was executed upon a contract of sale contrary to the admitted fact
that it was given as security for a loan . The receipt of the $ 2,000 ,
purporting to be the purchase -money for the premises , is to be con
strued with the instrument , and taken as having reference to the con
sideration upon which the deed had been executed . That being ab
solute in terms, purporting on its face to be made upon a sale of the
property , the other papers referring to it were drawn so as to con
form with those terms. They are no more conclusive of any actual
sale of the mortgagor ' s interest than the original deed . The absence
in the instrument of a formal transfer of that interest leads to the
conclusion that no such transfer was intended .
We are of opinion that the complainant never conveyed his inter
est in the property in controversy except as security for the loan , and
that his deed is a subsisting security . He has, therefore , a right to
redeem the property from the mortgage . In estimating the amount
due upon the loan , interest only at the rate of six per cent. per an
num will be allowed . The extortionate interest stipulated was for
bidden by statute , and would , in a short period, have devoured the
whole estate . The defendant should be charged with a reasonable
sum for the use and occupation of the premises from the time he
took possession in 1865 , and allowed for the taxes paid and other
necessary expenses incurred by him .
The decree of the Supreme Court of the District must be re
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versed , and the cause remanded for further proceedings , in accord
ance with this opinion ; and it is
So ordered .
MANNING, J., in BATTY V. SNOOK , 5 Mich . 231 ( 1858 ) :
Once a mortgage always a mortgage ,may be regarded as a maxim
of the court . Equity is jealous of all contracts between mortgagor
and mortgagee, by which the equity of redemption is to be shortened
or cut off . The mortgagor may release the equity of redemption to
the mortgagee for a good and valuable consideration , when done
voluntarily , and there is no fraud , and no undue influence brought
to bear upon him for that purpose by the creditor. But it can not
be done by a contemporaneous or subsequent executory contract,
by which the equity of redemption is to be forfeited if the mortgage
debt is not paid on the day stated in such contract , without an aban
donment by the court of those equitable principles it has ever acted
on in relieving against penalties and forfeitures . What we now call
a mortgage was at common law a conditional conveyance of the land ,
by which the title of the vendee was to terminate or become absolute
on the performance or non -performance of the condition of the grant
by the vendor at the day . When such conveyance was made to se
cure a debt , or for the performance of some other act by the vendor ,
equity took cognizance of the transaction , and declared the convey
ance a security merely for the payment of the debt, or doing of the
act, and on the performance thereof by the vendor, after the day
had elapsed , and the estate had become absolute , would decree a re
conveyance of the premises . To allow the equity of redemption to
be cut off by a forfeiture of it in a separate contract , would be a re
vival of the common law doctrine , using for that purpose two in
struments , instead of one , to effect the object . 1
1 " This court, as a court of conscience, is very jealous of persons
taking securities for a loan , and converting such securities into pur
chases . And therefore I take it to be an established rule , that a mort
gagee can never provide at the time of making the loan for any event
or condition on which the equity of redemption shall be discharged ,
and the conveyance (become ] absolute . And there is great reason and
justice in this rule , for necessitous men are not, truly speaking , free
men , but, to answer a present exigency, will submit to any terms that
the crafty may impose upon them .” Lord Chancellor Northington , in
Vernon v. Bethell, 2 Eden 110 .
" There are , in decisions rendered in England and Ireland , dicta to
the effect that, if themaking of a mortgage is accompanied by an agree
ment in reference either to the mortgaged premises or to another sub
ject, by which the mortgagor obtains some 'collateral advantage ,' such
agreement is void . (See Coote , Mortgages , 19, 20 ; Jennings v. Ward ,
2 Vern . 520 ; In re Edwards ' Estate , 11 Ir. Ch . 367 ; Broad v. Selfe, 11
Wkly . Rep . 1036 .) This theory has, however , been exploded by recent
decisions , and the rule established that any agreement between the
mortgagor and mortgagee , however advantageous to the latter , if not
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ODELL V. MONTROSS .
COURT OF APPEALS OF New York . 1877 .
68 N . Y . 499 .
This action was brought to have a deed , absolute on its face , de
clared a mortgage , and for an accounting and reconveyance on pay
ment of amount due .
The court found , in substance , that in July , 1865 , plaintiff being
indebted to defendant for moneys loaned and advanced , executed
to said defendant a deed o
f
premises described in the complaint ,
which deed was absolute on it
s
face , and purported to convey the
fee , but that it was executed as and intended as a security for the
said indebtedness then existing and what might thereafter accrue ,
and it was agreed and intended b
y
the parties that plaintiff , upon
payment , should have the right to redeem and should be entitled to
a reconveyance . That in September , 1866 , defendant paid to the
plaintiff , at his request , the sum o
f fifty dollars , and plaintiff then
and there signed and delivered to the defendant a paper , o
f
which
the following is a copy , viz . :
“ New York , Sept . 17 , 1866 .
" Received from William Montross fifty dollars , in full satisfaction
attended with fraud o
r oppression , is valid , provided it does not inter
fere with the right of redeeming from the mortgage . (Biggs v . Hod
dinott (1898 ) , 2 Ch . 307 ; Santley v . Wilde , ( 1899 ) 2 Ch . 474 . See Noakes
v . Rice , ( 1902 ) App . Cas . 24 , and 13 Harv . Law Rev . 595 , 15 Harv . Law
Rev . 661 ) . So , in this country it has been decided , in a
t
least one case ,
that any agreement made a
t
the time of executing the mortgage , if
not affecting the right of redemption , and not intended for the purpose
of evading the usury laws , is valid . (Gleason ' s Adm ' x v . Burke , 20 N .
J . Eq . 300 . See , also , Uhlfelder v . Carter , 64 Ala . 527 . ) ” Tiffany , Real
Property , $515 .
In some of the early cases both in England and America , the validity
of powers of sale in mortgages was much questioned . Croft v . Powel ,
2 Comyns 603 (1738 ) ; King v . Edington , 1 East . 288 (1801 ) ; Bergen v .
Bennett , 1 Caine ' s Cas . ( N . Y . ) 1 ; Eaton v . Whiting , 3 Pick . (Mass . )
484 . And see Colonial Laws of New York , Vol . V , p . 687 (Act of
March 19 , 1774 ) .
When Powell wrote his treatise o
n Mortgages ( 1785 ) he considered
powers of sale "of too doubtful a complexion to be relied on as the
source of an irredeemable title " (Vol . I , p . 12 ) . Today , however , the
validity of powers of sale is recognized in England and almost all our
states and the exercise o
f
the power , like an equitable foreclosure ,
cuts off the equity of redemption . Jones , Mortgages , $ $ 1765 - 1767 . And
see post , Chap . VII . In at least one state , however , the view has been
taken that a power of sale is validated only by statute and that , therefore ,
the conditions imposed by the statute upon the exercise of such powers
can not be waived by the mortgagor . “ Parties may add to these con
ditions , but can not dispense with them . ” Pierce v . Grimley , 77 Mich .
















for all claims and demands whatsoever as to the conveyance o
f prop
erty , or otherwise , u
p
to this date .
“ THOMAS B . ODELL . ”
That such payment was made and received , and such receipt
signed and delivered with the intention o
f
the parties that the same
should b
e





f plaintiff to said lands
and premises , and of all claims to any reconveyance thereof . As
conclusions o
f
law the court found , that the deed was to be consid
ered a
s
a mortgage ; that the payment o
f
the fifty dollars and the
receipt given therefor did not operate to change the nature o
f
the
deed from a security to an absolute conveyance , nor to release plain
tiff ' s right to rdeem , and that upon payment of the sums due from
plaintiff to defendant and the sums paid out b
y
the latter , plaintiff
was entitled to redeem ; and judgment was directed adjudging that
upon payment o
f
such sums within thirty days defendant should re
convey , and in default of such payment that the premises be sold , as
in foreclosure sales .
Judgment was entered accordingly .






ber , 1866 , when the defendant upon the payment o
f fifty dollars to
the plaintiff took an unsealed paper signed by him acknowledging the




f property or otherwise , u
p
to this date , " the relation o
f
the parties in respect to the lands now
sought to be redeemed was that o
f mortgagor and mortgagee with
all the incidents of that relation . ( 4 Kent ' s Com . , 143 . ) The plain
tiff had conveyed the premises to the defendant b
y
deed absolute
in terms , but the conveyance was not intended a
s
a sale , but as a
security for the payment o
f money , and although there was no de
feasance in writing , the intent could be and was shown b
y parol
evidence , and the deed was but a mortgage . Parol evidence is ad
missible to show that an absolute deed was intended as a mortgage ,
or that a defeasance has been destroyed by fraud or mistake . (Dey
v . Dunham , 2 J . Ch . R . , 182 ; Clark v . Henry , 2 Cow . 324 ; Marks
v . Pell , 1 J . Ch . R . , 594 ; Horne v . Kettletas , 46 N . Y . , 605 . ) A con




a mortgage , and the rights and obligations o
f
the
parties to the instrument are the same as if the deed had been sub
ject to a defeasance expressed in the body o
f
the instrument , or
executed simultaneously with it . ( 4 Kent ' s Comi . , supra . ) It must
b
e
recorded as a mortgage and not as a deed . (Dey v . Dunham ,
supra . ) This case was reversed in 15 Johnson ' s Reports , 555 , but
this principle was recognized by the appellate court that reversed the
decree o
f
the chancellor . The reversal was on the ground that the
subsequent purchaser claiming adversely to the deed was not a pur
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chaser in good faith , and so not within the protection of the record
ing acts. ( James v . Johnson , 6 J . Ch . R ., 417 ; 2 Cow ., 249.) In
White v . Moore ( 1 Paige, 551 ) , the chancellor held that the fact that
there was no defeasance in writing , did not take the instrument out
of the effect of the statute , requiring all mortgages to be recorded as
mortgages.
The estate remaining in the mortgagor after the law day has
passed, before foreclosure , is popularly but erroneously called an
equity of redemption , retaining the name it had when the legal es
tate was in the mortgagee , and the right to redeem existed only in
equity . Although a misnomer it does not mislead . The legal estate
remains in themortgagor and is subject to dower and curtesy , to the
lien of judgments , may be sold on execution and may be mortgaged
or sold as any other estate in lands , while the mortgagee has but a
lien upon the lands as a security for his debt , and the land is not
liable to his debts, or subject to dower or curtesy , or any of the inci
dents of an estate in lands. ( 2 Wash . R . P ., 152 and seq. ; Jackson
v . Willard , 4 J. R ., 41 ; Powell on Mortgages , 258 , N . L . ) The
mortgagor is possessed of an estate in the land in virtue of his for
mer and original right, and there is no change of ownership . So far
as the entire estate is concerned , there is but one title and this is
shared between the mortgagor and mortgagee, the one being the
general owner and the other having a lien which , upon a foreclosure
of the right to redeem , may ripen into an absolute title , their re
spective parts , when united, constituting one title . A mortgagor
and mortgagee may, at any time after the creation of the mortgage
and before foreclosure , make any agreement concerning the estate
they please , and the mortgagee may become the purchaser of the
right of redemption . A transaction of that kind is , however, re
garded with jealousy by courts of equity , and will be avoided for
fraud , actual or constructive, or for any unconscionable advantage
taken by the mortgagee in obtaining it . It will be sustained only
when bona fide ; that is, when in al
l
respects fair , and for an adequate
consideration . ( Trull v . Skinner , 17 Pick . , 213 ; Patterson v . Yeaton ,
4
7 Maine , 30
6 ; Ford v . Olden , L . R . , 3 Eq . Cases , 461 ; Kaldridge
v . Gillespie , 2 J . Ch . R . , 30 ; Wash . on Real Prop . , ch . 16 , par . 1 ,
p
l
. 24 . )
The defendant claims to have extinguished the right o
f redemption
and acquired the entire estate by the payment o
f
the fifty dollars , and
in virtue o
f
the written acknowledgment o
f
it
s payment for the pur
poses named in it . The paper is , in its terms , ambiguous . It does
not purport to convey or transfer any property or estate in lands , but
is declared to be in full o
f
a
ll claims and demands whatsoever as to
conveyance o
f property or otherwise . It is but a parol admission of
a satisfaction for the right mentioned . The apparent meaning o
f
the
instrument is to admit a satisfaction o
f
all claims against the defend
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ant, claims and demands that may be enforced whether such claims
are of a right to a conveyance of property or any other matter. The
plaintiff required no conveyance of the lands from the defendant.
Upon the payment of the mortgage debt he would have been rein
vested with the unincumbered title without conveyance or release
from the defendant. As evidence of his title he might have required
a reconveyance or a satisfaction of the mortgage , and that the courts
would have compelled . But his right of redemption was not, in any
sense , “ a claim or demand as to conveyance of property or other
wise .” The receipt had upon its face , and without explanation , re
spect to personal claims and demands against the defendant . But
the transaction was explained upon the trial , and shown to have been
intended a
s




the plaintiff to the lands
and premises and o
f all claims to a reconveyance thereof . If this
payment and receipt did operate to change the nature o
f
the deed
from a mortgage to an absolute conveyance , and is a release o
f
the
right to redeem so that the mortgagee became seized in fee simple




themortgagor and mortgagee discharged
o
f
the mortgage , the defense to the action is perfect . It can not be
claimed that the written paper ex proprio vigore , could have that ef
fect . It does not profess to release the right of redemption or to
convey any lands o
r
interest in lands . No lands in particular are
referred to . No agreement can be spelled out o
f
the instrument
which could be specifically performed , and it could not be aided and
made a perfect contract to release o
r convey lands by parol proof .
The whole force o
f
the transaction , as affecting the rights of the
plaintiff , is in the payment and receipt o
f
the fifty dollars with in
tent to extinguish the title o
f








frauds . The mere
payment o
fmoney will not entitle a purchaser to a specific perform
ance o
f
a parol contract for the purchase o
f
a
n interest in lands .
That can be repaid with interest , and no damage ensues from the
non -performance o
f
the contract . The purchaser can be made good
for the use of his money , which is all that he has lost . Had the
defendant , acting upon the faith of this transaction , entered into
possession o
f
the premises and incurred expenses , and substantially
changed his situation so that he could not be placed in the same
situation in which h
e was before , it might have estopped the plain






the written instrument to carry out the agreement
and intent o
f















it ( except by way o
f
estoppel which does not exist ) b
y
some instrument which would be valid under the statute o
f
frauds ,
and in compliance with the statute prescribing the mode and manner
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of conveying lands . The statute of frauds (2 R . S ., 135 ; par. 8 ) is
very explicit , and needs no interpretation in its application to this
case . It declares that every contract for the sale of any lands , or
any interest in lands , shall be void , unless in writing , and subscribed
by the party by whom the sale is to be made. The whole contract ,
that is, the agreement to sell and the description of the lands or the
interets in lands agreed to be sold , must be in writing and subscribed
by the party . The other statute referred to ( 1 R . S ., 738 ; par . 137 )
is equally applicable to this case. To hold that the plaintiff had rot
a fee , would be to overthrow the well-established relation of mort
gagor and mortgagee , and reverse their respective positions in re
spect of the legal estate in the lands mortgaged . The statute declares
that every grant in fee or of a freehold estate, shall be subscribed and
sealed by the person making the grant, or his lawful agent . If a
seal only was wanting to make the instrument relied upon by the
defendant valid for the purposes intended , it is possible the court
might compel the sealing , but that would not supply the intrinsic
defects of the paper writing itself .
The rights of the mortgagor and his estate can only be foreclosed
by due process of law , or a release by deed in proper form , or a con
veyance sufficient to pass the title to an estate in fee. The defendant
has not purchased the equity of redemption or acquired the estate of
the plaintiff by any proper release or conveyance . No injustice will
be done the defendant by the result to which this conclusion leads .
He will receive his money and interest , and will be fully indemnified ,
and he is not entitled to speculate in his dealings with his mortgage
debtor .
The judgment of the Special Term might have directed a redemp
tion , upon the proper terms, within a specified time, or in default
thereof the plaintiff be foreclosed . That, I think , would have been
the proper judgment. But as no fault is found with the terms of the
judgment at Special Term , the judgment of the General Term
should be reversed and that of the Special Term affirmed .
All concur, except Rapallo , J., not voting .
Judgment accordingly .
WEST v . REED .
SUPREME COURT OF Illinois , 1870 .
55 I11 . 242 .
Mr. Chief Justice LAWRENCE delivered the opinion of the Court .
This litigation arose out of the following state of facts :
In April, 1850 , Reed , the appellee , applied to West , a banker , for
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the loan of $500 . West declined to lend the money , but referred
Reed to one Johnson , who agreed to lend the money if Reed would
give security on his farm , and if West would promise to pay the
money at maturity , in case of Reed 's default . This arrangement
was made. Reed received the money , and executed to Johnson an
absolute deed of the farm , containing 380 acres, and Johnson gave
back a bond , binding himself to re -convey in case Reed should repay
the money , in two installments , the first falling due September 15 ,
1850 , and the second January 1, 1851 . Reed was unable to meet the
first payment , and in pursuance of the agreement , West paid the
money , and took a conveyance of the land from Johnson . The bond
from Johnson to Reed had not been recorded , and Reed promised to
bring it and deliver it to the attorney of West, but neglected to do
so , and when the attorney subsequently mentioned it to him , he said
he had mislaid it. West continued to furnish Reed with money ,
from time to time, until May 7 , 1859 , at which date they had a settle
ment. Reed was a bachelor , with no family , and it was agreed be
tween him and West that the indebtedness should be canceled , and
Reed should abandon his right of redemption , and take from West
a lease of the farm for his own life , subject only to a rent little more
than nominal. The precise amount of the indebtedness we can not
ascertain from the record , but it was probably between $ 1,800 and
$ 2 ,000 , and undoubtedly much less than the value of the land , even
subject to Reed 's life estate . The annual rent to be paid , was ten
bushels of wheat, ten bushels of corn , one fat hog , twelve chickens ,
and the taxes . West also surrendered to Reed about five hundred
dollars' worth of notes , which were independent of the money paid
Johnson , and the bank account. The agreement , as stated by Reed




p , the object being , he says , " to secure me the
possession o
f
the land during my life time . ” At the same time with
the execution o
f
the lease , the parties executed the following instru
ment , written upon Reed ' s book of accounts , and designed to show
the settlement and cancellation o
f
the indebtedness . "
“ May 7 , 1859 .
“We hereby certify that al
l
matters herein mentioned and de
scribed , and all deals between us , are settled and cancelled ; the con
sideration o
f
which , in part , is a lease , executed this day , of the
Reed farm , in section 36 , township 40 , range 36 .
( Signed ) " W . B . West ,
H . S . REED . "
From this date until 1865 , the relations of the parties continued
amicable , Reed expressing to his neighbors his entire satisfaction
with the arrangement he had made , saying he would rather West
should have the farm , after he was gone , than any one else , and
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that he could get money from West whenever he needed it. In the
spring of 1865, Reed demanded a settlement from West , and a re
conveyance of the land, and about the same time West brought an
action against Reed for rent . This suit was subsequently dismissed ,
and in 1866 West filed a bill in chancery against Reed and Johnson
to procure a correction in the certificates of acknowledgment of the
deeds. Reed then filed his, cross bill, to redeem the land , and the
cause having been heard upon bill, answer , replication and proof the
court decreed that Reed should be permitted to redeem upon pay
ment of $ 1,999 .51, the sum found to be due by the master . To re
verse this decree, the administrators of West, who has died , have
prosecuted an appeal .
We do not dissent from the general principles urged by the coun
sel for appellee . It is settled beyond controversy , that contract be
tween mortgagor and mortgagee , for the purchase or extinguish
ment of the equity of redemption , are regarded with jealousy by
courts of equity , and will be set aside if themortgagee has , in any
way , availed himself of his position to obtain an advantage over the
mortgagor .
We do not, however , assent to the position , which we understand
counsel for appellee to assume , that when the original transaction
between the parties has not been in form a mortgage ,but an absolute
deed , with a bond to re-convey on the payment of the money at a
specific time , the right of redemption cannot be extinguished , except
by an instrument which will operate as a technical conveyance of the
mortgagor 's estate in the land . He undoubtdely has an estate , which
will pass by descent , or devise , or by deed . But it is nevertheless a
purely equitable estate , that is to say, an interest in the land based
upon equitable grounds , and which a court of chancery will protect
and enforce when equitable considerations demand . But he has
nothing more. The legal title has gone to his grantee by means of a
deed absolute upon it
s
face . If the deed , as in the present case , was
made to secure a loan o
f money , and a bond , or contract to re -con
vey , is taken , the transaction , in a court o
f equity , is regarded only
a
s
a mortgage . But we repeat , the naked legal title has vested in the
grantee , and if such transactions subsequently occur between the
parties as would render it inequitable that the grantor should be
permitted to redeem , a court of equity will , of course , refuse to aid
him , as it will always refuse its aid to perpetuate a wrong . It is
wholly immaterial whether he has executed a technical release o
f
his
equitable interest to the grantee o
r not . He might have done that ,
and still be entitled to the aid o
f
a court o
f equity , which looks to
the substance o
f
a transaction , and not to its form . And without
having done that , he may have had such transactions with his
grantee a
s
would render it inequitable to compel the grantee to
suffer a redemption . In such an event , the equitable estate is practi
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cally gone or annihilated without a release , because the equitable
considerations upon which it rested are destroyed by the acts of the
parties , and chancery will leave the legal title where they have placed
it. The rule is laid down in Washburne on Real Property , that ,
although equity will not permit a mortgagee to embarrass or defeat
the right of redemption by an agreement into which the mortgagor
may be induced to enter in order to effect the loan , yet this principle
does not preclude any subsequent bona fide agreement between the
parties , and where a mortgagor has, upon such subsequent agree
ment, voluntarily cancelled the instrument of defeasance held by him ,
it gives to the deed the effect of an original absolute conveyance as
between the parties . 2 Wash . on Real Proper . 67, 3 Ed. The
author cites numerous cases in support of this position .
In the case at bar, we are of opinion the complainant in the cross
bill has no equities which a court can reasonably enforce . There is
not a scintilla of evidence in the record tending to show that West ,
in any way, availed himself of his position as mortgagee to obtain this
arrangement from Reed. Indeed , it does not appear that he sought
an arrangement of any sort, or that he was, in any mode, holding
out threats or appealing to the fears of Reed. On the contrary, it
appears that for years before the execution of the instruments in
1859 , the same understanding had verbally been had between them ,
and for six years subsequent to 1859 , the arrangement continued in
all respects satisfactory , at least to Reed . By the transaction of
1859 , West not only cancelled his claims against Reed , but by the
lease which he executed to him , he cut himself off from all claim
for more than a nominal rent of the land during Reed 's life . The
cancellation of his claims, and the execution of the lease, could , of
course , only have been consented to and carried out by West in con
sideration that Reed was to relinquish all right of redemption , and
that this was the consideration , is shown by the testimony of both par
ties. It is objected , however, that the consideration was inadequate .
As a matter of theory , and forming an opinion upon annuity tables ,
it probably was very inadequate , but that is not the only question .
The parties themselves probably did not consider it so . By the ar
rangement, West was to go without either his money or the land , or
income from either , during the life of Reed , which was very likely
to outlast his own , as this record discloses it has. It is near twelve
years since the transaction , and neither West nor his estate has
received either interest or rent of any moment , nor will any , except
an almost nominal sum , be paid while Reed lives . Although life
tables are a sufficiently safe guide in reference to a large number of
persons in similar circnmstances , and where the doctrine of averages
can be applied , they are very unsafe in reference to an individual
case . These parties bargained in the dark . Reed had no relatives
for whom he cared , and , as he frequently said , West had been his
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friend , and he had rather West should have the farm when he was
done with it, than any one else. By the arrangement made , he at
once paid his debt and secured for himself a farm for life. Neither
could say with certainty that he was gaining an advantage in the
bargain , nor can this question be accurately settled by any one until
Reed has followed West to the grave .
But as we have already admitted , judging by ordinary rules , the
consideration was inadequate . Nevertheless, in his circumstances , it
was satisfactory to Reed , and continued so for six years thereafter .
The bargain was not pressed upon him . Tried by his own testi
mony , there was no taint of unfairness about it, and why a court
should arbitrarily rescind such a bargain , years after it was made,
simply because the parties were mortgagor and mortgagee , we are
wholly at a loss to discover . As we have already said , it is true
courts watch transactions between such parties very closely in order
to prevent oppression , but it would be folly to push this jealousy to
such an extent as to authorize the mortgagor to repudiate at his
discretion every contract he may make with the mortgagee . We are
not aware why a privilege should be given to him that is given to
no other person , not standing in a fiduciary relation . It is said , in
deed , in Coventry 's Notes to 1 Powell on Mort . 123, that a sale by
a mortgagor to a mortgagee , stands on the same principle as a sale
between parties having no connection with each other, and can only
be impeached on the ground of fraud. The authorities apply a more
rigid rule than this , but we understand the principle to be , that the
mortgagee must have availed himself of his position to extort an
unreasonable advantage before a court will interfere to set aside the
sale . If the parties deal at arms length with each other, without
threats, oppression , compulsion or fraud , we do not know why a
sale by the mortgagor of his equitable estate to the mortgagee should
be rescinded , on the ground of inadequacy of consideration alone,
any sooner than it would be if the sale had been to a third person .
In the present case , we see no ground for interference . Reed
was as anxious to enter into this agreement as West . There is no
pretense of fraud , or compulsion , or oppression . Each party exer
cised his own judgment in making the bargain , and Reed remained
satisfied with it for years . Tried by ordinary tests , the bargain was
an unwise one , but it was peculiar, and it is possible the life estate
of Reed may be of such long duration , that even the alleged inade
quacy of consideration will nearly or quite have vanished . The bar
gain involved an element of uncertainty as to which each party was
willing to take his own risks , and there was no unfairness which a
court can make a ground of rescission . To grant the relief sought
in this bill would certainly not tend to the preservation of good faith
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in the performance of contracts , and is not demanded by the equities
of the case.
The decree must be reversed and the cause remanded .
Decree reversed .2
MOONEY v . BYRNE .
COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK , 1900 .
163 N . Y . 86 .
VANN , J . The case made by the complaint was that of a mort
gagor with a right to redeem from a mortgagee or his devisees in
possession . The defendants denied that there was any mortgage ,
alleged an absolute conveyance from the plaintiff to one Owen
Byrne , and a subsequent conveyance from the latter to a bona fide
purchaser . They also pleaded the Statute of Limitations and speci
fied the period of six and ten years as the limit exceeded by the plain
tiff in bringing her action .
The facts agreed upon by the parties and admitted by the plead
ings are in substance as follows : On the 14th of August , 1878 , the
2 In Villa v. Rodriguez , 12 Wall. ( U . S.) 323 , the court said , “ Prin
ciples almost as stern are applied as those which govern where a sale by a
cestui que trust to his trustee is drawn in question ." In DeMartin v .
Phelan , 115 Cal. 538 , the court said , “ The relation between the parties
was in no sense fiduciary . " .
The mortgagee may purchase the equity of redemption at a sheriff ' s
sale upon a judgment obtained by a third person , or upon a judgment
obtained by himself upon a debt not secured by the mortgage , and
there can be no question of fraud or oppression arising out of the
mortgage relation , as in private transactions . The only difficulty in
this case is as to the effect of such purchase under the doctrine of
merger . See Chap . IV , above .
But if the mortgagee recovers judgment on the mortgage debt and
then seeks to levy on the mortgaged land , this procedure is generally
considered objectionable . In some cases it has been held that the
levy is invalid , at least in equity , leaving the mortgagor ' s right of re
demption unimpaired . Powell v. Williams, 14 Ala . 476 ; Atkins v. Saw
yer , 1 Pick . (Mass.) 351 ; McNair v. O 'Fallon , 8 Mo. 188. In other
cases the levy has been upheld but has been considered as operating
to foreclose the mortgage . Cottingham v. Springer , 88 Ill. 90 ; Youse
v. McCreary , 2 Blackf. (Ind. ) 243 . And see post, Chap . VII , note on fore
closure by scire facias . In other cases it has been held that the mort
gagor ' s only remedy is by injunction . Whitmore v. Tatum , 54 Ark . 457 ;
Lydecker v. Bogart, 38 N . J . Eq . 136 . The last view , which validates the
levy if it is allowed to proceed , involves difficult questions as to the ex
tent to which the mortgage lien is discharged as against a third person
purchasing at the sale , or the debt discharged if the mortgagee himself
purchases . See the two cases last cited ; also Fosdick v. Risk , 15 Ohio
84 . And see Hartshorne v. Hartshorne , supra .
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plaintiff owned and was in possession of a parcel of land in the city
of New York worth $ 10 ,000 and upwards , and at the same time she
was indebted to Owen Byrne in the sum of $ 3,000 , secured by three
mortgages on said premises , which were under process of fore
closure. In order to secure the payment of this indebtedness she
conveyed the land to said Byrne at his request by a deed dated on
the day last named and duly recorded . “ The said deed was given
as security ” and for no other purpose . It contained full covenants ,
subject to said mortgages , which , as it was declared , “ shall not
merge in the fee , but shall remain valid and subsisting liens.” Said
Byrne at the same time gave back a defeasance of even date whereby
he agreed to re - convey to the plaintiff upon the payment to him ,
within one year , of said indebtedness , certain advances which he
agreed to make for her benefit and the costs of the foreclosure pro
ceedings . It was stipulated that she should be relieved from per
sonal liability on the bonds, and that no judgment for deficiency
should be claimed or entered against her in any action that may be
taken upon said bonds or mortgages , so long as she and al
l
persons
claiming under her shall not dispute o
r
contest the title o
f
the ” said
Byrne " or his assigns to said mortgaged premises or the amounts
due him on said mortgages . * * * " Said instrument also pro
vided “ that a
s
to the agreement b
y
the " said Byrne " to reconvey said
premises , time is of the essence thereof , and , further , that this in







the ” plaintiff , “ and
that for a violation o
f
this provision , this agreement , so far as the
same provides for such reconveyance , shall thereupon become utterly
null and void . ” The defeasance was never recorded .
Said Byrne at once took possession o
f
the premises and remained
in possession thereof until the 13th o
f
June , 1881 , when he con
veyed to one Walker by a deed duly recorded , but " said conveyance
was made without the consent of the plaintiff , who had no knowledge
o
f
it until this action was begun ” on the 7th o
f
March , 1895 . Said
Byrne died on the 11th o





his property , real and personal , to the defendants . His exe
cutor accounted and has been discharged , and the property o
f
the
testator has been delivered to the defendants . The plaintiff claimed
that the rents and profits of the premises received by Byrne amounted
to more than the principal and interest of the debt secured . She al
leged in her complaint that if Byrne had conveyed the premises to
any one , such conveyance was made without her knowledge or con
sent . She demanded an accounting as to the amount due from her ,
and that she might "be at liberty to redeem said mortgaged premises
upon payment o
f
whatever may upon such accounting be found due ,
which this plaintiff hereby offers to pay , " and that the defendants be
compelled to convey said premises to her . She also demanded alter




was not made a party to the action . The trial judge dismissed the
complaint upon the ground that " the statute of limitations is a
conclusive defense ,” and the Appellate Division affirmed , on an
opinion rendered in overruling a demurrer to the answer, when the
case was in the first department . ( 15 App . Div . 624 ; 1 id . 31
6
. )
The facts agreed upon show that there was a mortgage ; for a
deed , although absolute on its face , when given as security only , is a
mortgage by operation o
f
law . (Horn v . Keteltas , 46 N . Y . 605 ;
Meehan v . Forrester , 52 N . Y . 277 ; Odell v .Montross , 6
8
N . Y . 499 ;
Barry v . Hamburg - Bremen Fire Ins . Co . , 110 N . Y . 1 , 5 ; Kraemer
v . Adelsberger , 122 N . Y . 467 ; Macauley v . Smith , 132 N . Y . 524 ;
1
5 Am . & Eng . Encyc . 791 ; 1 R . S . 756 , Sec . 3 ; Laws 1896 , ch . 547 ,
Sec . 269 . ) While there was no covenant to pay the debt , none was
needed , for the property was worth much more than the amount o
f
the indebtedness and the mortgagee could safely confine his remedy
to the land . ( 1 R . S . 739 . ) The absence of such a covenant , the
conditional release o
f any claim for deficiency , and the agreement
not to record the defeasance , are o
f
n
o importance in view o
f
the
express admission that the deed was given a
s security . The deed
and defeasance were executed a
t
the same time , and , as the latter in
express terms refers to the former , they must be construed the same
as if both were embodied in a single instrument . When read to
gether in the light o
f
the admission that the object was to secure a
debt , it is clear that the transaction was not a conditional sale and
that the covenant making timethe essence of the contract to reconvey
has no more effect than if it occurred in the defeasance clause of an
a
n ordinary mortgage . An instrument executed simply as security
cannot be turned into a conditional sale by the form o
f
a covenant
to reconvey , and even if there was a doubt a
s
to the meaning of
the contract would be regarded as a mortgage , so as to avoid a
forfeiture , which the law abhors . (Matthews v . Sheehan , 69 N . Y .
585 . ) As was said by the Supreme Court of the United States : “ It
is an etsablished doctrine that a court of equity will treat a deed ,
absolute in form , as a mortgage , when it is executed as security for
a loan o
f money . That court looks beyond the terms o
f
the instru
ment to the real transaction , and when it is shown to be one o
f
security , and not of sale , it will give effect to the actual contract of
the parties . * * * It is also an established doctrine that an
equity o
f redemption is inseparably connected with a mortgage ; that
is to say , so long as the instrument is one o
f security , the borrower
has , in a court o
f
equity , a right to redeem the property upon pay
ment o
f
the loan . This right cannot be waived or abandoned by
any stipulation o
f
the parties made at the time , even if embodied in
themortgage . This is a doctrine from which a court o
f equity never
deviates . " ( Peugh v . Davis , 96 U . S . 332 , 336 . )
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The plaintiff, therefore , is a mortgagor , whose right to redeem
from the mortgagee in possession has not been cut off nor cut down
by any act or omission on her part. As the defandants stand in the
shoes of Owen Byrne, with no rights except by way of gift under
his will , the case is the same in principle as if he were living and the
sole defendant. After the plaintiff had established her right to
redeem , as to him , what answer could he make thereto ? Would it
be an answer for him to say , “ I have conveyed the lands away , and ,
therefore , you cannot redeem ? ” While this would be a conclusive
answer in behalf o
f
Walker , the present owner o
f
the land , if he had
been made a party and the right to redeem had been asserted against
him , can Owen Byrne o
r
his devisees say that , by his wrongful act
in conveying the land , he deprived the plaintiff o
f
the right to re
deem , in any form , and confined her to an action for the moneys
received on the sale , to which the Statute o
f
Limitations would be a
bar ? Can a mortgagee , b
y
his own act , without a judicial sale or the
consent o
f
the mortgagor , destroy the right to redeem , which is so
carefully guarded by the courts ? The mortgagee could not , b
y
sell




against himself . As to him , she still has the right to redeem , for by
his act , without her knowledge o
r
consent , he could not annul his
covenant to reconvey . That covenant is still in force , and the plain
tiff may compel its performance , so far as the rights of third parties ,
acquired under the Recording Act , will permit . As Owen Byrne
conveyed to a bona fide purchaser , the plaintiff cannot follow the
land , as such , but she is not prevented b
y
that wrongful act from
any form o
f
redemption now practicable . No act o
f
his could ut
terly destroy her cause o
f
action to redeem . Hemight affect its value ,
but he could not take its life . As a substitute for a decree requir
ing him to repurchase the land and convey it to her , which might be
impossible and would be apt to involve hardship , she may treat the
value o
f
the land , measured in money presumed to be in his hands
when her right to redeem was established , as land , and enforce the
right o
f redemption accordingly . Unless we virtually sanction his
wrongdoing by permitting him to defeat her right o
f
redemption
absolutely by his own act , upon showing a right to redeem , she must
be permitted to make the best redemption possible as against him .
Because he has put it out of his power to render to her all she is
entitled to , he cannot refuse to make the nearest approach to it that
is left . A court o
f
equity , in order to bring about an equitable result ,
disregards forms and treats money as land and land as money , when
required to prevent injustice . A mortgagee in possession under a
recorded deed , absolute on its face , with an unrecorded defeasance ,
cannot sell the land and claim that the purchase price is money , as
against one who has an equitable right to insist that in legal effect









his covenant , the court does the best it
can to right the wrong by treating the money as land . In order to
prevent him from making a profit out o
f
his wrong , the law raises





separate fund in his hands , and treating it as land allows the plain
tiff to redeem , the same as if it were in fact land . As against the
wrongdoer and his estate it will exert all its power to make the
plaintiff whole , paying due regard to equities arising through im
provements upon the land , so as not to give her more than she is
equitably entitled to .
Thus , in Meehan v . Forrester ( supra ) the court , through Rapallo ,
J . , said : “ The sale was shown to have been made without the
consent o
f
Meehan and in violation o
f
his rights , and it does not
appear that the plaintiff ever had notice o
f
it . He was not bound by
such a sale . Hewas entitled to his land , on payment of the amount
due to Bertine o
r
his representatives . If Bertine , by reason of his
wrongful act , had deprived himself o
f
the ability to restore the land
to which the plaintiff is equitably entitled , he o
r
his representatives











the time when the plain
tiff ' s right to such reparation was etsablished . (Hart v . Ten Eyck ,
2 Johns . ch . 117 ; Peabody v . Tarbell , 2 Cush . 227 , 233 ; May v .
LeClaire , 11 Wall . 236 , 237 . ) ”
In that case , as in this , the only cause o
f
action alleged or proved
was the right to redeem , but as the premises had been wrongfully







the time of the trial . Com
pensation was allowed a
s
a
n equitable substitute for actual redemp
tion . In other words , the land which should have been conveyed was
appraised by the court , and the defendant compelled to restore the
amount o
f





relief granted was a money judgment , but that was
possible only because a right to redeem had been established , for
without that right the relief would be limited to the proceeds of the
sale . (Baily v . Hornthal , 154 N . Y . 648 , 661 . ) So in the case at
bar , the plaintiff established the same right , but the defendant showed
that he had placed it beyond his power to reconvey . Thereupon in




action , the plaintiff had the
right to prove the present value of the land , so as to follow the
money presumed to be in the defendant ' s hands , and redeem that
which he had wrongfully substituted for the land , the same as if it
were in fact land . Guided by the cardinal principle that the wrong
doer shall make nothing from his wrong , equity so moulds and
applies it
s plastic remedies a
s
to force from him themost complete
restitution which his wrongful act will permit . (May v . LeClaire ,
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78 U . S . 217 ; Van Dusen v . Worrell, 4 Abb . Ct. App . Dec. 473 ;
Miller v. McGuckin , 15 Abb . ( N . C .) 204 ; Hart v . Ten Eyck , 2
Johns . Ch .62, 108 ; Enos v . Sutherland , 11 Mich . 538 , 542 ; Budd v .
Van Orden , 33 N . J. Eq . 143 ; S . C ., Id . 564.) When he cannot
restore the land it will compel him to restore that which stands in
his hands for the land, and will not permit him to assert that it is
not land when the assertion would be profitable to himself but unjust
to the one whom he wronged . He cannot escape by offering to pay
what he received on selling the lands , but must pay the value at the
time of the trial. He cannot cut off the right of redemption and
convert it into a personal liability , for he is still a mortgagee , and
subject as such to the mortgagor 's rights . The fact that the injured
mortgagor need not take the proceeds of the sale , but may insist on
the proved value of the land , as well as the pleadings and proofs ,
show that this is a pure action to redeem , and must be so regarded
for all purposes , including the defense of the Statute of Limitations .
While the mortgagor is helpless as against his grantee , she is not
helpless as against him .
The defendants insist that as the plaintiff can only recover a
money judgment, the cause of action is in the nature of an account
ing for money had and received , and hence that the six -year , or at
the most the ten -year Statute of Limitations is a bar . This is not
an action , however , to recover money, but to redeem land from a
mortgage , and but for the misconduct of the defendant would have
resulted simply in a judgment of redemption , with an accounting
for the rents and profits of the land , after payment of the debt by
the plaintiff , according to her demand and offer before the com
mencement of the action : The period of limitation provided by the
Code , within which an action to redeem from a mortgage may be
maintained , is twenty years after breach of the condition or the non
fulfillment of the covenant therein contained . (Code Civ . Pro .,
§ 379 .) So far as the defendants are concerned , the plaintiff had a
right to redeem . She brought her action to redeem and established it
by evidence, and was entitled to judgment accordingly , but as that
judgment would be ineffectual because the mortgagee had sold the
land , equity will simply vary its relief from a judgment o
f redemp
tion in land to a judgment of redemption in money representing the
land . If the plaintiff had not elected to redeem , but to sue for money
had and received to her use , the case o
f
Mills v . Mills ( 115 N . Y .
8
0
) , relied upon by the defendants , might be an authority . In that
case , however , as was stated by this court , “ all the relief asked for
in the complaint is an accounting and a judgment for a sum o
f
money , and no other relief was needed o
r possible upon the facts
established . This was in no sense an action to redeem , as there was
no mortgage and nothing to redeem . ” The relief demandeci , as ap
pears from the appeal book on fil
e
in this court , was simply a judg
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ment " for a
ll moneys received b
y
" the defendant . No claim was
made that the two transactions , which were four years apart , con
stituted a mortgage , o
r
that there was ever a right to redeem . The
theory o
f
the action was that the defendant lawfully sold the land
and should account for the proceeds , after deducting his own claim .
Thus , the court said : “ Absolute title to the lands was vested in the
defendant , evidently with the intention that he might sell them and
reimburse himself , and pay over any surplus to his brother . ” The
fundamental fact that the defendant sold without right was wanting
in that case ,and hence the principle , which is the basis o
f
our judg
ment , could not be applied . It is the wrongful conveyance by the
mortgagee in possession , under a deed absolute on its face , that
enables a court o
f equity to hold on to the case after ordinary re
demption has been shown to be impossible , and to allow such a re
demption against the wrongdoer a
s
will prevent him from gaining
by his wrong , and will give the plaintiff her due as nearly as may be .
The judgment appealed from should be reversed and a new trial
granted , with costs to abide event .
Parker , Ch . J . , Bartlett , Martin and Werner , JJ . , concur ; Gray ,
J . , not voting ; Cullen , J . , not sitting .
Judgment reversed , et
c
. 3
3 The New York Code o
f
Civ . Proc . ( 1890 ) , $ 379 , expressly limited
a suit to redeem . In most states , however , there is no statute expressly
touching such suit . Under these circumstances , the courts have in most
cases , applied , by analogy , that section of the statute which limits
actions for the recovery of land . Gunn v . Brantley , 21 Ala . 633 ; Skinner
v . Smith , 1 Day (Conn . ) 124 ; Morgan v . Morgan , 10 Ga . 297 ; Roberts
v . Littlefield , 48 Maine 61 ; Ayres y . Waite , 10 Cush . (Mass . ) 72 ; Rob
inson v . Fife , 3 Ohio St . 551 . Other courts have applied by analogy
the section which limits foreclosure of the mortgage ; Bradley v . Nor
ris , 63 Minn . 156 ; or the omnibus section limiting actions not specifically
provided for ; Barr v . Vanalstine , 120 Ind . 594 ; Miner v . Beekman , 50
N . Y , 337 (prior to the statute above cited ) . Whatever period is to be
applied , it is generally agreed that the statute only runs in favor of a
mortgagee in possession ; Morgan v . Morgan , and Bradley v . Norris ,
supra ; Knowlton v . Walker , 13 Wis . 264 ; Clark v . Hannafeldt , 79 Neb .
566 ; and not then , if the possession is held under the mortgage and
not adversely . Robinson v . Fife , and Miner v . Beekman , supra ; Waldo
v . Rice , 14 Wis . 286 ; Anding v . Davis , 38 Miss . 574 ; but see McNair v .
Lot , 34 Mo . 285 ; Morgan v . Morgan , supra . There is , however , some
authority for the position that , as the remedies of the mortgagor and
mortgagee must be mutual , when , upon any mortgage , the suit to fore
close is barred , the suit to redeem is barred ipso jure , whether the
mortgagee has had possession or not . Taylor v . McClain , 60 Cal . 651
(now reversed by Code Civ . Proc . , § 346 ) ; Fitch v . Miller , 200 111 , 170 ;
Adams v . Holden , 111 Iowa 54 ; Holton v . Meighen , 15 Minn . 69 (over
ruled by Bradley v . Norris , supra , which exposes the fallacy in this
doctrine ) . See also Locke v . Caldwell , 91 Ill . 417 , involving a curious
inversion of the same doctrine .
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GIBSON v . CREHORE .
SUPREME COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS , 1827.
5 Pick . (Mass .) 146 .
[ Bill to redeem . The complainant is widow of the mortgagor and
joined in the mortgage to release her dower . The defendant , after
the death of the mortgagor , purchased the premises from his admin
istrator , subject to the mortgage in question , and subsequently pro
cured an assignment of this mortgage from the mortgagee. In a
prior suit between the same parties ( 3 Pick . 475 ) it was held that
the equity of redemption and mortgage had not merged in the de
fendant, and that he was entitled to claim the rights of the mort
gagee as against this complainant . The complainant has not had a
legalassignment of dower . ]
WILDE , J . That the widow of a mortgagor is entitled to redeem
the mortgage , is a necessary inference from the doctrine , repeatedly
laid down as the law of Massachusetts, that a widow is dowable of
an equity . It is a familiar principle in courts of equity , that every
person interested in an estate mortgaged is entitled to redeem ; and
this principle is confirmed , if it requires confirmation , by St. 1798 ,
c. 77, by which it is enacted , “ that the mortgagor or vendor, or other
persons lawfully claiming under them , shall have the right to re
deem .” If, therefore , a widow can lawfully claim under her hus
band , of which there can be no question , she has a right to redeem ,
by the express words of the statute.4
4 Compare, Rogers v. Herron, 92 111. 583 ; Loomis v. Knox , 60 Conn .
343 ; Bacon v. Bowdoin , 22 Pick . (Mass .) 401 ; Kebabian v. Shinkle , 26
R . I . 505 .
“ Any person who may have acquired any interest in the premises,
legal or equitable, by operation of law or otherwise , in privity of title
with the mortgagor , may redeem , and protect such interest in the land .
Story , Eq. Jur ., § 1023 . But it must be an interest in the land , and it
must be derived in some way , mediate or immediate , from or through ,
or in the right of the mortgagor ; so as, in effect , to constitute a part
of the mortgagor ' s original equity of redemption . Otherwise it can
not be affected by the mortgage , and needs no redemption .
" But whatever may be the title or interest claimed , it must in some
way appear on the face of the bill , and the nature and extent of it
must be set forth .” Christiancy , J ., in Smith v . Austin , 9 Mich . 465 .
" It is not stated that the sheriff ' s sale ( from which complainant
seeks to redeem ) was on the decree mentioned . If it was not, it may
have been on a junior lien . If that were true no right of redemption
existed because the appellee could sell on his foreclosure and the title
conveyed would be paramount to the title secured by the appellant by
his purchase. A person can only redeem when he has an interest to
protect , and where , without such redemption , he would be a loser ."
McCabe, J ., in Dawson v. Overmyer , 141 Ind . 438 .
" The tender proposed to be proved appears to have been made by
the plaintiff . The objection to it was that plaintiff was not in position
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The objection , therefore, to the plaintiff 's right to redeem is clearly
unfounded , unless it can be maintained that a legal assignment of
dower is an essential requisite to complete her title . It is true that
before such assignment she cannot enter on any part of the land ,
for it cannot be ascertained in what part her dower will be assigned ;
nor can she maintain a writ of entry , for her legal right is inchoate .
But an assignment of dower is not necessary to enable her to main
tain a suit in equity for the purpose of redeeming the mortgage ,
because the assignment of dower does not affect her equitable right
of redemption , and because she has no right to demand such assign
ment as against the mortgagee, before she redeems the mortgage .
Nor is an assignment of dower by the heirs necessary ; because , as
will be shown hereafter , she could not redeem a part or parcel of
themortgaged premises , without redeeming the residue also , if re
quired so to do by the mortgagee . The assignment of dower , there
fore , is of no importance , and is not necessary to perfect her title
to redeem the mortgage .
Proceeding on these principles , and considering the mortgage as a
subsisting incumbrance , we come next to the question , whether the
entry and possession of the defendant are sufficient in law to fore
close the mortgage .
To render an entry and a subsequent possession of three years
effectual for this purpose , there must have been notice , express or
implied , to the person who is to be bound by such foreclosure . The
case shows that there has been no express notice ; and as the de
fendant first entered as the purchaser of the equity , notice of the
subsequent entry cannot be presumed . In the bill the plaintiff denies
all knowledge of the entry under the mortgage, and this averment is
not denied by the answer ; so that it seems to be an admitted fact
that the plaintiff had no notice or knowledge of the defendant's
entry to foreclose , and if so , then clearly she is not bound .
Considering , then , that the plaintiff 's right to redeem is not extin
guished by the defendant's entry and possession under the mortgage ,
we are to decide upon what terms and to what extent she is now
entitled to redeem .
As the defendant has purchased the equity , as well as the mort
gage , it would seem equitable to allow the plaintiff to redeem a third
part of the mortgaged premises , by paying her equitable portion of
the mortgage debt , according to the value of her right of dower as
compared with the residue of the estate . But this cannot be done
to make it. He was not mortgagor or grantee of the mortgagor , or in
any manner at that time interested in the equity of redemption . He
had tax titles, it is true, but these were not subject to the mortgage .
* * * Nothing is plainer than that such a person has no right of re
demption ." Cooley , J ., in Sinclair v. Learned , 51 Mich . 335 .
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without infringing the defendant's rights as assignee of the mort
gage . He stands in the place of the mortgagee , and has an un
doubted right to insist on his whole debt . Nor can he be com
pelled to be redeemed by parcel, for by thus dividing the estate , the
income or value of the whole may be reduced . The rule therefore is,
when several are interested in an equity of redemption , and one
only is willing to redeem , he must pay the whole mortgage debt ; and
the others interested in the equity , who refuse to redeem , are not
compellable to contribute ; for it would be unreasonable to compel a
party to redeem , when perhaps it might be for his benefit to suffer
the mortgage to be foreclosed . The mortgagee , however , is not to
be entangled with any question which may arise between the owners
of the equity , in relation to contribution , but has the right to insist
on an entire redemption . If, therefore , several estates are mort
gaged to one mortgagee , and the mortgagor afterwards conveys the
estates separately to different persons , although each owner of the
separate estates may redeem , yet it can only be allowed by payment
of the whole mortgage debt. And the party so redeeming will be
entitled to hold over the whole estate mortgaged , until he shall be
reimbursed what he has been thus compelled to pay beyond his due
proportion . He is considered an assignee of the mortgage , and
stands , after such redemption , in the place of the mortgagee , in
relation to the other owners of the equity . So if there be tenant
for life and remainderman of an equity , either may redeem , but not
without paying the whole mortgage . In like manner a dowress or
jointress of lands mortgaged may redeem , she paying the mortgage
debt , and may hold over , if the heir refused to contribute , until she
and her executor shall be repaid with interest . Palmer v . Danby,
Prec . Ch . 137 ; Saville v. Saville , 2 Atk . 463 ; Banks v . Sutton , 2 P .
Wms. 716 ; Elwys v. Thompson , 9 Mod . 396 ; 15 Viner , 447 ; Ex
parte Carter , Ambl . 733 ; Powell on Mortg . 392 , 708, 309 , in notis .
If the defendant had redeemed the mortgage, the plaintiff would
have been let in by contributing her portion of the mortgage debt,
according to the value of her life estate in one -third part of the
mortgaged premises , in conformity with the rule adopted in the case
of Swaine v . Perine, 5 Johns . Ch . R . 482 . But as the defendant,
being assignee of the mortgage , insists on the payment of the whole
5 It has usually been held that one redeeming can not insist upon
the holder of the mortgage executing an assignment to him . “ He will
have done his whole duty by releasing his interest on receiving pay
ment . He is not required to adjust or regard the equitable rights to
contribution which may exist between parties having different interests
in the equity , or to protect them by transferring his title to any one."
Lamb v. Montague , 112 Mass . 352 . But in a few cases the contrary has
been held , with limitations . See Jones , SS 1086 , 1087 . Probably the 1
holder of the mortgage would everywhere be restrained from discharg
ing the mortgage of record , if he threatened so to do , in prejudice of
the equitable rights of the party redeeming .
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mortgage debt , the plaintiff cannot redeem on any other terms.
After redemption , she will hold as assignee of the mortgage, but
will be bound to keep down one -third of the interest during her
life, and may hold over for the residue of the mortgage debt. The
defendant must be held to account for the rents and profits from the
time of his entry under themortgage ; for although this entry cannot
operate by way of foreclosure , for want of notice to the plaintiff , yet
it is sufficient to charge him with the reception of the rents and
profits .
The case must be referred to one of the masters in chancery to
take an account accordingly , and redemption will be decreed upon
payment of the debt which remains due on the mortgage after de
ducting the rents and profits .
EARL , J., in CASSERLY V. WITHERBEE , 119 N . Y . 522 (1890 ) :
As a condition to his right to maintain this action it was not nec
essary for the plaintiff , before the commencement thereof, to tender
or offer to pay the balance due upon the mortgages. Nor was it
necessary for him to offer in his complaint to pay the amount which
should be found due. There are , undoubtedly , authorities laying
down the rule in general terms, that before an action to redeem from
a mortgage can be maintained , the mortgagor must either tender the
amount due upon the mortgage , or offer to pay the amount in his
complaint. But it has never been so decided in this court, and we
think it is now the settled law in this state , under our present
6 The defendant afterward consented to a redemption of complain
ant 's interest upon a proportional payment, which , as was said in Mc
Cabe v. Bellous , 7 Gray (Mass. ) 148 , he might well do , “because if she
paid the whole mortgage debt , she would hold the mortgage as equitable
assignee , beyond her proportion , and the defendant would have again
to redeem of her.” Compare Hartshorne v. Hartshorne , supra ; Eld
ridge v. Eldridge, 14 N . J. Eq. 195, and Bell v. Mayor of New York , 10
Paige 49 , 71. See also Coffin v. Parker , 127 N . Y . 117 ; North Hudson
County R . Co . v. Booraem , 28 N . J . Eq. 450 .
A stipulation is frequently introduced into a mortgage that part of
the premises may be redeemed upon part payment ; as , for example ,
" that upon any interest day the mortgagor will release any one or more
of said lots upon payment to him of all accrued interest and the further
sum of $100 for each lot released, which sum so paid shall be credited
upon the principal of said notes,” etc.
Under the doctrine that he who seeks equity must do equity , it has
sometimes been held that one seeking to redeem must pay not only
the whole mortgage debt but also any unsecured debt which he may
owe to the mortgagee . This doctrine has never been extended to per
mit the mortgagee to tack unsecured claims to his mortgage upon a
proceeding to foreclose , and the doctrine has usually been repudiated
in toto . The English doctrine of Consolidation by which one holding
several mortgages made by the samemortgagor on different parcels of
land could hold each mortgage as a security for all the debts , even
against a purchaser of one of such parcels , has never been recognized
in this country . See Tiffany , Real Property , Š 543.
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such a tender o
r
offer
is unnecessary . It certainly is not necessary to allege that a tender
o
r
offer to pay the amount due upon the mortgage was made before
the commencement o
f
the action ; and an offer in the complaint is
a
t
most a technical matter , serving no substantial purpose , because
in the judgment given in such a
n
action the court always provides
that redemption can be had upon payment of the amount due . The
tender and offer are important only , as they have bearing upon the
question o
f
costs . The mortgagor ' s right of redemption is not de
pendent upon his offer o
r
tender of payment . It exists independently
thereof , and antecedently thereto . The tender or offer is not needed





the parties are not changed thereby , and
independently thereof are always taken care o
f
and regulated in the
judgment . Payment upon redemption and as a condition o
f re
demption can be enforced in the action , and the dismissal o
f
the
complaint in such an action , on default o
f payment under the judg
ment , as a condition o
f redemption , operates as a foreclosure .
(Bishop o
f
Winchester v . Paine , 11 Vesey , 194 . )
In Quin v . Brittain (Hoff . Ch . 353 ) , it was held that it was not
essential in a bill to redeem to offer to pay the amount due upon
the mortgage ; that in such a suit there is no decree for payment ,
but the bill is dismissed in default o
f payment , and then the decree
becomes equivalent to a foreclosure . The learned vice -chancellor ,
in that case , said : “ It is objected that there is not in the bill an
offer to pay the amount due . I do not find in the precedents that
such an offer is distinctly made . The form is that upon the pay
ment o
f
what , if anything , shall be found due in respect to principal
and interest , the mortgagee may be decreed to deliver possession .
Neither can it be essential , because no decree is ever made upon
such a bill for the payment o
f
the amount personally . If the
amount found due is not paid , there is a decree o
f
dismission , with
costs , which is equivalent to a decree for foreclosure . " In Beach v .
Cook ( 28 N . Y . 508 ) , it was held that in an action to redeem from
a mortgage it was not necessary that the complaint should contain
a
n express general offer to pay any balance which might be found
due . Selden , J . , writing the opinion o
f
the court , said : “ There is
n
o express general offer to pay any balance which might be found
due ; but it was held under the former system o
f pleading that such
a
n offer in a bill to redeem was not necessary , and it is certainly
not indispensable now . * * * The case , therefore , was in form ,
one in which it was proper ' to allow the plaintiff to redeem , and I
can discover nothing in his position to render such redemption
unjust o
r inequitable . * * * If he fails to redeem within the






of such failure , operates as a foreclosure of the mortgage .”
also , Miner v . Beekman , 11 Abb . ( N . S. ) 147, 160 .) 7
(See ,
PECKHAM , J., in BOLLES V . DUFF , 43 N . Y . 469 ( 1871) :
The defense in this case claim that the suit of Roberts v . Whitney
& Earle was simply to redeem , and the failure to pay the sum de
creed to be due within the time allowed , and the complaint being
dismissed , operated as a strict foreclosure , and the estate of the
mortgagor was thereby forfeited .
But if the defendant Duff insist upon this forfeiture , he must
show that the decree clearly gives it to him . It seems that there
never was in this case any final order obtained ( upon proof of the
fact that there had been no payment ) , that the complaint should
stand dismissed . The authorities in England are quite uniform that
this final order is necessary in a strict foreclosure , and that until
that final order is obtained , the mortgage is not foreclosed , and no
title passes to the mortgagee . ( 2 Danl. Pl. and Pr., 1205 ; Sheriff
v . Sparks, West . Rep ., 130 ; Thompson v. Grant, 4 Mad., 232 ;
Faulkner v . Bolton , 7 Sim ., 319 ; 2 Fisher on Mortg ., p . 1037 , par .
1881 ; Smith 's Ch . Pr., 725 ; Hansard v . Hardy , 18 Ves ., 460 ; Wood
v . Surr, 19 Beav ., 551. ) No case is cited in this state to the con
trary of this rule , but Chancellor Kent , in Perine v . Dunn , 4 John .
Ch ., p. 143 , seems to give it sanction . (See his Commentary there ,
as to the case of Jones v . Hendrick .)
Without extending this rule beyond the cases to which it is now
applied , I think it sound in its application here , to a strict fore
closure implied from the dismissal of a bill to redeem .
Until that order be obtained , the records o
f
the court do not show
which party has finally obtained the judgment o
r
who is the owner
o
f
the land . Until that order is obtained , the complainant may
apply to have the time to pay the amount decreed to be due ex
tended . 8
1 .
7 The bill in this case charged that the defendant mortgagee had
made a foreclosure sale , had purchased the property at the sale , and
had taken possession , but that the sale was void , and prayed an account
ing by the defendant for the value o
f
the property . The court held
that the sale was void but that the defendant could not be compelled
to take the property “at a valuation " ; that the sale left the parties
where they were before and that the plaintiff ' s only right was to re
deem ; and that the bill might stand as a bill to redeem .
In the case of Beach v . Cook , cited by Justice Earl , the bill charged
that the mortgage had been fully paid and prayed a discharge ; it was
found that there was a small sum remaining due ; it was held that the
bill might stand as a bill to redeem . See Jones , Mortgages , $ 1095 .
& Compare , Flanders v . Hall , 159 Mass . 95 .
“ A further point is made that the decree is illegal because it
amounts to a strict foreclosure . It does not provide for a sale , but
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says if the amount required to be paid by way of redemption is not
paid within the time named then the mortgage shall stand foreclosed .
Such a decree is in effect the same as one providing that if the money
is not paid within the specified time then the bill shall be dismissed
at the costs of the plaintiffs ; for it seems that a decree in the latter
form followed by a dismissal will operate as a foreclosure . 2 Jones
on Mortgages (4 Ed.) , sec . 1108 ." Black , J ., in Martin v. Ratcliff , 101
Mo. 254 . Compare , Odell v. Montross , supra .
" The practice in this state on bills to redeem has long been settled
against strict foreclosure in case of default, unless in very peculiar cases .
In case the redemption money is not paid as decreed , the remedy will be
by sale as on foreclosure . The decree in this case will be so framed .”
Campbell , J ., in Meigs v. McFarlan, 72 Mich . 194 .
CHAPTER VII.
FORECLOSURE .
SECTION 1. EQUITABLE SUIT .
MOULTON v . CORNISH .
COURT OF APPEALS OF New YORK , 1893 .
138 N . Y . 133 .
MAYNARD , J. In 1886 the plaintiff was the owner of a mortgage ,
given to secure the payment of eighty - six hundred and fifty dollars
and interest , upon three several lots of land in the town of Floyd ,
Oneida county , known a
s
the Klock , Eells and Tavern farms , and the
defendant was the owner of a subsequent mortgage upon the same
property given to secure the payment o
f
$ 2 ,500 and interest , which ,
with the assignments to him , were recorded in the Oneida county
clerk ' s office .
On May 16th the plaintiff commenced an action in the Supreme
Court for the foreclosure o
f
her mortgage , but omitted to make the
defendant a party thereto . This omission was not intentional , but






a search obtained from the
clerk ' s office , from which it might have been fairly inferred that the
defendant ' s assignment was one in a series of transfers , and that
the title to his mortgage was in another , who was made a defendant ,
and who appeared from the abstract to be a subsequent assignee .
If a full statement of the search in the usual form had been ob
tained b
y
the plaintiff , the interest of the defendant in the mort
gaged property would have correctly appeared . The action resulted
in a judgment entered December 27 , 1888 , decreeing a foreclosure of
the plaintiff ' s mortgage , and a sale of the mortgaged premises by a
referee pursuant to the provisions of the Code , and the practice of
the court in such cases . The premises were first advertised by the
referee to be sold on March 2 , 1889 . Before that time the plaintiff
discovered that the defendant was a necessary party to the complete
foreclosure o
f
her mortgage , and she procured the sale to be post
poned until March 16th ; and made a motion , at a Special Term held
a
t Syracuse on that day , for an order granting her leave to amend
the summons , complaint , lis pendens and judgment in the action b
y
inserting therein the name o
f
this defendant , and adjudging and
286
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decreeing that he be forever barred and foreclosed of al
l
right ,
title , interest and equity of redemption in the mortgaged premises ,
o
r
for such further order o
r
relief as the court might deem proper
to grant . Upon the hearing o
f
that motion , the court made an
order , which was entered , and which has not been reversed or va
cated , directing that upon payment o
f
$ 1
0 costs , the plaintiff might ,
if she so elected , open the judgment in the foreclosure suit , and
amend the summons , complaint , lis pendens and all subsequent pro
ceedings , by making this defendant a defendant in that action , and
inserting the necessary allegations for that purpose , and that the
amended summons and complaint be served on him , and that he
have the usual time to answer . The plaintiff did not avail herself
o
f
the privilege afforded b
y
this order , and on March 16 , 1889 , the
referee proceeded to sell the mortgaged premises . At the opening
of the sale , and before selling , the referee announced and read the
conditions o
f
sale , which were in the usual form , except the last
paragraph , which was in these words : “ 7 . The property is sold
free and clear o
f
any and all rights o
f
dower , charge o
r
lien upon
the same , except that it is claimed b
y
one Nehemiah N . Cornish ( the
defendant in this action ) that he is the owner by assignment , of a
mortgage made b
y
Ichabod C . McIntosh to Miriam M . Kellogg ,
covering the premises in question , dated February 1s
t , 1878 , to
secure the payment o
f
$ 2 ,500 , which mortgage was recorded in
Oneida county clerk ' s office February 13th , 1878 , and is a second
lien upon said mortgaged premises . Cornish has not been made a
party defendant in this action . ” The plaintiff bid off the property
known as the Tavern farm , and the referee on the same day executed
to her a deed , and very soon thereafter she went into possession .
The sale was confirmed on the 6th o
f April , and on April 9th this
action for a strict foreclosure was brought . The other farms were
bid off by other parties , who have not been made defendants in this
action . The plaintiff has recovered a judgment which , as modified
b
y
the General Term , decrees : 1st , that the defendant ' s mortgage
is an existing lien on the lands purchased by the plaintiff upon the
foreclosure o
f
her mortgage , and was not affected by such fore
closure because not made a party to the action ; 2d , that if the de
fendant desires to redeem the land bid off by the plaintiff upon her




the judgment , give the plaintiff notice o
f
his desire and intent to d
o
so . If such notice is not given within the time specified , it is ordered
and adjudged that the defendant and a
ll persons claiming under him ,
do stand and be forever barred and foreclosed o
f
and from all right ,
title , interest and equity o
f redemption o
f , in and to such premises ,
and a
ll












otherwise , are to be adjudged as cut off and foreclosed , and the
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plaintiff shall hold the title thereto , free from such liens , and the
defendant shall pay the costs of the action ; 3d , if the defendant
gives notice of his intention to redeem , within the time required , the
plaintiff may apply on notice to the Special Term , for the appoint
ment of a referee , to take and state the account of the plaintiff ,
and to determine her interets in the mortgage debt , as applicable to
the lands bid off by her , and the referee 's report shall be made up
according to certain directions contained in the judgment, and shall
fi
x and determine the amount the defendant shall be required to
pay upon such redemption , and the amount so found due b
y
the
referee , with the interest thereon , shall be paid by the defendant




the report , and if
paid within such time , the payment shall operate as a redemption o
f
the premises from the plaintiff ' s mortgage , and her title acquired by
the sale shall become vested in him , and she shall , by a proper con
veyance , convey the premises to him free and clear from the lien o
f
her mortgage , and neither party shall have costs o
f
the action ; but
if the defendant fails to complete the redemption in themanner , and
within the time specified , it is ordered and adjudged that the lien of
his mortgage is cut off and removed , and the plaintiff is deemed to
hold the premises free and clear o
f
such lien , and the defendant
shall pay the costs o
f
the action .
The material facts are not disputed , and we are o
f
the opinion
that upon the proofs submitted and the findings o
f
the trial court ,
the plaintiff was not entitled to the relief granted to her in this
judgment .
The equitable remedy known as a strict foreclosure of a real
property mortgage , has never been recognized in this state , save in
a very limited class of cases .
In England it was the prevailing method o
f






5 and 16 Victoria , ch . 86 ( sec . e8 ) ,
known as the Chancery Improvement Act . It had its root in the
common -law doctrine that , upon the execution o
f
the mortgage , the
mortgagee acquired the fee o
f
the land , and upon default in pay
ment , a right to the possession , and the mortgagor nad no estate
or interest therein , and no right of possession , after default had been
made in the payment o
f
the mortgage debt . The mortgagee ' s rem
edy was by ejectment , and in a court o
f
law it was not an available
defense for the mortgagor to plead that he was willing and ready
to pay the debt , if he had once suffered a default to occur . In
order to mitigate the hardships of this relation , equity permitted the
mortgagor and his privies to redeem b
y discharging the mortgage
debt , and b
y restoring to him the possession of the land if the mort
gagee had taken possession . As it might be uncertain whether the
mortgagor o




f redemption , it was , while outstanding , a serious impediment






to the alienation o
f
the mortgaged property , and equity would ,
therefore , entertain an action to compel the parties entitled to this
right , to exercise it b
y
paying within a reasonable time , the amount
o
f











redemption ; and in case o
f
redemption , the d cree provided that
themortgagee should reconvey the lands to the mortgagor , o
r
other
party redeeming . 1
This proceeding has been termed a strict foreclosure , but it is
apparent that it has no appropriate place in a system of laws and
jurisprudence where it has been declared that the mortgage does
not operate as a conveyance o
f
the legal title , but is only a chose in
action constituting a lien upon the land a




the mortgagor . The courts o
f
this state have re
fused to adopt it as an authorized remedy in ordinary cases , and in
this respect have followed the practice o
f
the civil , rather than the
common law . In the Am . & Eng . Encyclopaedia o
f
Law (Vol . 8 ,
186 - 7 , ti
t
. Foreclosure ) it is stated that strict foreclosure is very
rarely resorted to in the American courts ; that in a large majority of
the states it is not recognized ; that in two it is the usual mode o
f
procedure ; and that in six of the states , including New York , it is
permitted in exceptional cases .
The plaintiff here rests her rights to this remedy principally upon
the fact that she was the owner of a prior mortgage , which she had
foreclosed , and that she became the purchaser of a part of the mort
gaged property a
t
the foreclosure sale , and that the defendant ' s sub






the foreclosure , be
cause she did not make him a party to the foreclosure action . Before
the sale occurred she had full knowledge that the defendant was
the owner o
f
the second mortgage , and leave was given her b
y
the
court to make him a party to the action , and so conclude him b
y
the judgment , which she declined to accept , but caused the sale to
proceed , and purchased the property upon such terms that both ex
pressly and in legal effect , her purchase was subject to the lien o
f
the
defendant ' s mortgage .
Under such circumstances no case was made for a resort to this
unusual , exceptional and severe remedy . It is insisted that , under
the provisions o
f
the Civil Code relating to foreclosure actions , such
a judgment a
s
the one entered herein cannot b
e
rendered in any
case ; but it is unnecessary to determine that question upon this ap
peal . Wemay assume that , in a proper case , jurisdiction still exists
to relieve a purchaser a
t
a foreclosure sale , who finds that , b
y
reason
1 In Goodman v . White , 26 Conn . 317 , Storrs , C . J . , speaking of
strict foreclosure , said , “ All that is formally done is the extinguishment
o
f
the right ( o
f redemption ) , the interposition o
f
a perpetual legal
bar against the party foreclosed . Such is the plain , literal meaning of
the terms used . The decree only professes to close a door , which




of some defect in the proceedings , the lien of a subsequent incum
brance has not been extinguished ; but the facts here shown are not
sufficient to authorize the exercise of that jurisdiction . We think
that in such cases the purchaser must show that he purchased in
good faith , relying upon the regularity and sufficiency of the fore
closure proceedings , and that the subsequent lienor had knowledge
of the sale , and permitted the purchaser to make the purchase , with
out disclosing the existence of his incumbrance , or calling attention
to the defect in the proceedings . In 2 Jones on Mort . ( Sec . 1540 ,
p . 421 ) , it is stated that a strict foreclosure is proper " where a
mortgagee or purchaser is in possession under a legal title from the




cumbrances , as in case one has purchased in good faith at a mort
gage sale , which is not conclusive against some incumbrancer not
made a party to the suit , and the purchaser has gone into pos
session . ” The cases have been very rare in this state where the
remedy has been invoked , but we fail to find a case where it has been
applied to relieve a party who buys with full knowledge o
f
the out
standing incumbrance and subject to it . * * *
As to this defendant , the plaintiff is only a mortgagee in pos
session . It is true she has also acquired the title of the mortgagor
and has extinguished the liens o
f
all other incumbrancers , who were
made parties to the foreclosure action .
But she occupies no better position with respect to the defendant
than if she had taken a deed from the mortgagor and an assignment
of the other incumbrances and had gone into possession . As to the
defendant , her mortgage is still unforeclosed , and the estate , which
the mortgagor had when he executed the defendant ' s mortgage , is
still subject to its lien . The plaintiff may a
t any time foreclose her
mortgage , as against the defendant , notwithstanding the former de
fective foreclosure (Brainard v . Cooper , 10 N . Y . 356 ; Walsh v .
Rutgers Fire Ins . Co . , 13 Abb . P
r
. 33 ; Franklyn v . Howard , 61
How . Pr . 43 . ) It imposes no hardship to require her to pursue such




defendant ' s mort
gage . She will be as fully protected upon such a foreclosure had she
made him a party to it .
The plaintiff may have the ordinary decree o
f
foreclosure against
the defendant in this action if she so desires , and al
l
persons who
are necessary parties defendant are brought in . It is not seen how




the other two parcels o
f
the mortgaged premises . If it is sought
to re - foreclose plaintiff ' s mortgage , they are unquestionably neces





mortgaged , and by their purchases they have respectively acquired
a
n
interest in plaintiff ' s mortgage . If the court is asked to appor
tion either the plaintiff ' s or the defendant ' s mortgage between the
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three farms, they are necessary parties to a determination of that
question . They would not be bound by any judgment rendered in
this action which adjudged the extent of the lien of either mortgage
upon their respective properties , and such adjudication would be
necessarily involved in the ascertainment of the amount of either
mortgage equitably chargeable upon the several parcels. In such a
case the objection of a defect of parties is available , although not
raised by demurrer or answer . The plaintiff is not entitled to the
equitable relief sought , if it appears that a complete determination
of the controversy cannot be had without the presence of other
parties, and the court must direct them to be brought in (Code, sec .
452 ) ; and where it appears upon appeal that this has not been done ,
the court will reverse the judgment, although the issue is not made
by the pleadings (Bear v . Am . Rapid Tel . Co., 36 Hun , 400 ) . If
the plaintiff obtains leave to amend by bringing in a
ll necessary
parties , she may have a decree for a foreclosure of her mortgage as
against the defendant , and a sale o
f
the mortgaged premises , in
which decree the equities o
f the different purchasers , as between
themselves , can be properly adjusted , and the court can direct the
application o
f
the net rents and profits upon the mortgage debt , in
ascertaining the amount which the plaintiff and her co -owners o
f
the
mortgage are entitled to receive upon a sale o
f
the property . In
general terms , we think this is the extent o
f
the relief to which she
is entitled under the pleadings and proofs in this action .
The judgment must , therefore , be reversed , a new trial granted if
plaintiff elects within sixty days after filing the remittitur in
the court below to proceed with the action , and applies for leave to
amend b
y bringing in the necessary parties . If such leave is not ap
plied for o
r granted the complaint is dismissed , with costs in this
court and in a
ll
courts ; if leave to amend is granted , costs in this
court to abide the determination o
f
the Supreme Court as to the con
ditions upon which leave to amend may be granted .
All concur .
Judgment accordingly . ?
2 Compare , Illinois Starch Co . v . Ottawa Hydraulic Co . , 125 11
1
. 237 ;
Shaw v . Heisey , 48 Iowa 468 .
By a strict foreclosure the debt is satisfied to the extent o
f the value
of the land but no further , and for any excess of the debt over the
value o
f
the property an action a
t
law may be maintained against any
party who is personally liable for the debt . If the value of the prop
erty exceeds the amount o
f
the debt , the mortgagee is under no obli
gation to refund , the mortgagor ' s only protection against such a loss of
his property being by redemption before the foreclosure is complete .
Spencer v . Hartford ' s Exrs . , 4 Wend . ( N . Y . ) 381 ; Devereaux & Me
serve v . Fairbanks , 52 Vt . 587 .
“ Akin to strict foreclosure in equity , as vesting in the mortgagee
an absolute estate in the land itself , is foreclosure by the peaceable
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SAN FRANCISCO v. LAWTON . -
SUPREME Court or CALIFORNIA , 1861.
18 Cal . 465.
FIELD , C . J., delivered the opinion of the Court, Cope , J., con
curring .
The object of the suit to foreclose a mortgage , under our law , is
to obtain the sale of the estate which the mortgagor held at the time
he executed themortgage , and the application of the proceeds of the
sale to the payment of the demand , for the security of which the
mortgage was given . All persons who are beneficially interested ,
either in the estate mortgaged or the demand secured , are proper
parties to the suit . This rule , as a general thing, will only embrace
the mortgagor and mortgagee, and those who have acquired rights
entry of the mortgagee upon the premises, and his retention of posses
sion thereafter for a specified time. This is provided for by the statutes
of Maine, Massachusetts , New Hampshire and Rhode Island . ( 1 Stim
son 's Am . St. Law , § 1921 . See 2 Jones , Mortgages , $ 28.)
“ The entry must be in the presence of witnesses , whose certificate
as to the entry is filed for record , and this serves as notice to the owner
and persons interested in the land . ( Thompson v. Kenyon , 100 Mass.
108 ; Bennett v. Conant, 10 Cush . (Mass .) 163 ; Snow v. Pressey , 82
Maine 552 ; Thompson v. Ela , 58 N . H . 490 .) The statutes require that
the entry be peaceable , and , if it is opposed , judicial proceedings must
be resorted to . (Rev . Laws Mass . 1902 , chap . 187 , § 1 ; Rev . St. Maine
1883, chap. 90 , § 3 ; Gen . Laws R . I . 1896 , chap . 207 , § 3 ; Pub . St. N . H .
1901 , chap . 139 , 8 14 .)
“ The severity of foreclosure in this way without a sale is mitigated
by provisions of the statutes giving a considerable time after entry in
which the property may be redeemed ; this being three years , except
in New Hampshire , where it is one year . ( 1 Stimson 's Am . St. Law ,
$ 1921 .) The effect of the foreclosure is to cancel the mortgage debt
to the extent of the value of the land at the time at which the fore
closure is completed . (Hatch v. White , 2 Gall . ( U . S .) 152 , Fed . Cas.
No. 6,209 ; Morse v . Merritt , 110 Mass . 458 ; Hunt v . Stiles , 10 N . H .
466 ; Flint v. Winter Harbor Land Co ., 89 Maine 420 ; Newall v. Wright,
3 Mass . 138 . )
“ In Maine, Massachusetts , and New Hampshire , the mortgagee may
bring a writ of entry for the purpose of foreclosure. This proceeding ,
though in form a common -law action , has, when used for the purpose
of foreclosure , the general characteristics of an equity proceeding , the
amount due being ascertained on equitable principles , and the judgment
being that, if this sum is not paid within a certain time, the mort
gagee shall be put into possession of the land. (Holbrook v. Bliss, 9
Allen (Mass. ) 69 ; Ladd v. Putnam , 79 Maine 568 ; 2 Jones , Mortgages ,
chap. 29.) When so put into possession , the mortgagee is in the posi
tion of a mortgagee who has peaceably entered without action , and
possession by him for the length of time required in such case, as
stated in the preceding section , will give him an indefeasible title . ( 1
Stimson 's Am . St. Law , § 1925 ( A ) ( 3) , ( C ) ( 2) ; 2 Jones, Mortgages ,
$ 1306 .) ” Tiffany, Real Property , S$ 551 , 552 .
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or interests under them . Where prior incumbrancers are made
parties , it is only for the purpose of liquidating the amount of their
demands , and paying them out of the proceeds of the sale. Adverse
titles to the premises held by parties claiming by conveyance from
the mortgagor prior to the mortgage , or from third parties prior
or subsequent to the mortgage, are not the proper subjects of deter
mination in the suit . Such titles must be settled in a different
action , giving rise , as they generally do , to questions of purely legal
cognizance . ( Eagle Fire Co. v . Lent, 6 Paige , 637 ; Corning v .
Smith , 2 Seld . 82 ; Holcomb v . Holcomb , 2 Barb . 23.) The fore
closure operates , except in a single instance , only upon the estate or
interest which the mortgagor possessed at the time , and the sale
under the decree passes, with the like exception , only such estate or
interest . The exceptional instance , to which we refer , arises where
the mortgagor has, subsequent to the execution of the mortgage ,
acquired a title which enures , by way of estoppel , to the benefit of
themortgagee . In such case , the foreclosure operates upon the sub
sequently acquired title to the same extent as if originally held by
the mortgagor , and the sale under the decree passes it. In a
ll
other
cases , the estate mortgaged is the only estate brought under the con
sideration o
f





(Clark v . Baker , 14 Cal . 612 . )
In the present case , the defendants , Howard , Perley , Gould and
Smith , who alone appeal from the decree , set u
p
in their answer title
to a portion o
f
themortgaged premises , under a grant from the for
mer Mexican Government , bearing date in May , 1839 , and a patent of
the United States , issued upon its confirmation , in March , 1858 , and
also under a deed executed by the tax collector o
f
the city and
county of San Francisco , upon a sale for unpaid taxes for state and
county purposes , fo
r
the fiscal year ending in June , 1856 . On the
trial , they produced the patent , and traced title thereunder to the de
fendants Howard and Perley . They also produced the tax deed , and
traced title thereunder to Perley . The record does not disclose any
evidence o
f
title in either Gould or Smith under the patent o
r
the tax
deed . Of the value of the titles conferred by those instruments , it is
unnecessary to express any opinion . Their validity is not the proper
subject o
f
determination in the present suit . It is only necessary to




to see that they are asserted in good faith ,
and are not mere pretenses for delay ; and this being seen , the rights
o
f
the defendants Howard and Perley should have been reserved in
the decree . If there were no other reasons than the assertion of
these adverse titles for making them parties , the suit should have
been dismissed a
s
to them . But there were other reasons . Mowry ,
the mortgagor , subsequent to the mortgage , sold and conveyed al
l
his right , title , and interest in the premises to Sawyer , and Sawyer
quitclaimed a portion o
f
the premises to Howard , Perley and Thorne ,
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and the balance to Perley alone. Thorne subsequently conveyed his
interest to Gould and Smith . The appellants thus succeeded to what
ever estate the mortgagor possessed , and as such successors were
proper and necessary parties to the foreclosure . (Goodenow v .
Ewer , 16 Cal. 461 ; Boggs v . Hargrave , id . 559 . ) The estate thus
acquired , whatever itmay have been , was subject to foreclosure and
sale under the decree of the court. This the appellants do not ques
tion ; but Howard and Perley , who claim under the patent and tax
deed , insist that they are not estopped by the acceptance of the quit
claim of Sawyer from denying that he ever possessed any estate
that is , title or interest in the premises and from showing that the
legal title derived from an independent and paramount source was
in fact in them at the time; and in this position they are undoubtedly
correct. The evidence of Sawyer shows that at the time he executed
the quitclaim , Howard, Perley , and Thorne claimed to hold an ad
verse title to the premises , and demanded possession , and threatened
a suit in ejectment against him , and that with his conveyance he ac
knowledged their title . It is not material that such threat was made
or acknowledgment had, but they furnish an illustration of the
good sense of the rule which permits a vendee to dispute the validity
of the title of his vendor . Parties possessing undoubted titles may
often find it to their interest to buy out settlers and trespassers on
their premises rather than incur the delay and expense of establish
ing their rights by litigation . It would be strange if, under such
circumstances , they should be estopped from denying the title of the
grantors ; and if a grantor had previously executed a mortgage upon
the premises , that their rights under their previous titles should be
subordinate to those of themortgagee . The law does not even look
that way. A quitclaim deed only purports to release and quitclaim
whatever interest the grantor possesses at the time. He does not
thereby affirm the possession of any title, and he is not precluded
from subsequently acquiring a valid title , and attempting to enforce
it. If he does not possess any title , none passes ; and he may subse
quently deny that any passed , without subjecting himself to any im
putation of a want of good faith . * * *
There are several other objections taken by the appellants to the
action of the court below , but upon them we express no opinion .
With a clause in the decree saving to the appellants their rights un
der the patent and tax deed , it is not probable that they will feel
disposed to press the objections . On the further hearing it will not
be necessary to take anew the testimony . The parties can use that
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already embodied in the transcript, and add such further testimony
as they may deem essential to the proper presentation of the case .
Judgment reversed , and cause remanded for further proceedings .3
BRAINARD v . COOPER .
COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK . 1852.
10 N . Y . 356 .
Appeal from the Supreme Court . Bill filed by the plaintiff in the
late court of chancery , to redeem certain land from a mortgage exe
cuted on the 29th December , 1830 , by Charles Giles to the New
York Life Insurance and Trust Company for $720 . On the 18th
3 Accord : Sommers v. Bromley , 28 Mich . 12
5 ; Banning v . Bradford ,
2
1 Minn . 308 .
S
o , a bill alleging that a defendant claims an interest adverse to that
o
f
the mortgagor is demurrable . Dial v . Reynolds , 96 U . S . 340 . But ,
if the bill alleges that a defendant claims an interest subordinate to the
mortgage , and the defendant sets u
p
a
n adverse claim , an adjudication
upon the adverse claim , though erroneous , is not void or subject to
collateral attack . Hefner v . Northwestern Mut . Life Ins . Co . , 123 U . S .
747 ; Palmer v . Yager , 20 Wis . 91 . Yet , if the pleadings frame no issue
a
s
to paramount claims a decree foreclosing the interests o
f
the par
ties defendant in general terms will not affect the defendant ' s claim
of title paramount , the decree being construed as affecting only inter
ests which were properly litigable in the suit . Lewis v . Smith , 9 N . Y .
502 ; Strobe v . Downer , 13 Wis . 10 .
The same principles have , by some cases , been applied to parties
who claim , as grantees o
r
encumbrancers , through the mortgagor , but
assert priority over the mortgage being foreclosed , such , for example ,
as prior mortgagees ; Jerome v . McCarter , 94 U . S . 734 ; Emigrant In
dustrial Sav . Bank v . Goldman , 75 N . Y . 127 ; Strobe v . Downer , 13
Wis . 10 ; and even to subsequent purchasers who claim priority by virtue
of the recording acts ; Cady v . Purser , 131 Cal . 552 . On the other hand
there is good authority for the position that the question o
f priority
between a mortgagee and other claimants from the mortgagor may prop
erly be tried out in the foreclosure suit . Stevenson v . Texas & c . R .
Co . , 105 U . S . 703 ; Brown v . Volkening , 64 N . Y . 76 ; Bisbee v . Carey ,
1
7 Wash . 224 ; Campbell v . Bane , 119 Mich . 40 . The latter case is , like
Cady V . Purser , 131 Cal . 552 , that o
f
a subsequent claim for which
priority was asserted under the recording acts . See also , Goodwin v .
Tyrrell , 8 Ariz . 238 . There is also authority for the position that one
who is admitted to be a prior lienor is , as such , a proper party ; Judson
v . Emanuel , 1 Ala . 598 ; Clark v . Prentice , 3 Dana (Ky . ) 468 ; at least
for the purpose o
f determining the amount o
f
his lien so that a sale
subject thereto can be intelligently made ; Bexar Bldg . Loan Assn . v .
Newman , 86 Tex . 380 ; Foster v . Johnson , 44 Minn . 290 ; Missouri , K . &
T . Trust Co . v . Richardson , 57 Nebr . 617 ; Sutherland v . Lake Superior
Ship Canal Co . , Fed . Cas . No . 13643 ; and it is universally conceded
that a prior encumbrancer , whose claim is due and payable , may be













May , 1832 , Samuel and Schureman Halstead recovered a judgment
in the Supreme Court against Giles for $ 3 ,500 , which was duly dock
eted . On the 18th August , 1832 , the plaintiff recovered a judgment
in the Supreme Court against Giles for $610 , which was duly dock
eted . No sale had ever been d under this judgment . On the 2d
October , 1833 , one W lliam H . Halstead , to whom the mortgage had
been assigned , filed his bill for the foreclosure thereof , to which
Samuel and Schureman Halstead , and other judgment creditors of
Giles , were parties ; but the plaintiff , in this case , was not . The
usual decree o
f
foreclosure and sale was made and the land duly
sold under it to Schureman Halstead , who purchased for the joint
benefit o
f
himself and Samuel Halstead , and received the master ' s
deed April 16 , 1834 . The purchase price was $ 800 , less than the
amount o
f
the mortgage and costs . On the 20th October , 1838 ,
Schureman Halstead , for the consideration o
f
$ 1 ,200 , conveyed the
premises to one Hall . On the 4th January , 1839 , Giles executed a
quit -claim deed to Hall , and Hall on the 13th April , 1841 , sold and
conveyed the land to the defendants in this suit . On the 4th July ,
1842 , the plaintiff offered to redeem the premises b
y
paying the de
fendants the amount due on the mortgage and made a tender for
that purpose ; which being refused , he instituted this action on the
20th July , 1842 , claiming to redeem upon paying the amount due




provements made upon the premises , deducting the rents and profits
received b
y
the defendants , and praying for an account , & c . The
cause was heard before Vice -Chancellor Gridley , o
f
the fifth circuit ,
who made a decree in accordance with the prayer o
f
the bill , ex
cept that it gave the defendants the alternative of paying the plain
tiff ' s judgment , if they should so elect . This decree having on ap
peal been affirmed by the Supreme Court at general term in the fifth
district , the defendants appealed to this court .




sale , the proceeding being
considered , as to him , as a bill to redeem from his senior lien . Jerome
v . McCarter and Emigrant Industrial Sav . Bank v . Goldman , supra ;
Hudnit v . Nash , 16 N . J . Eq . 550 .
There is a difference of opinion as to whether one who holds a tax
title , subsequent to the mortgage but paramount by reason of being de
rived directly from the sovereign authority , is a proper party . Hefner
v . Northwestern Mut . Life Ins . Co . , 123 U . S . 747 , and cases cited
therein .
It should be observed that the exclusion from the foreclosure suit
of questions concerning the title of the mortgagor or the priority of
claims under him , whatever justification it may have , has the unfortu
nate result of requiring a sale of a very uncertain quantity , largely de
feating the purpose of the change from strict foreclosure to that by
sale . See Sutherland v . Lake Superior Ship Canal Co . , Fed . Cas . No .
13643 ; Hefner v . Northwestern Mut . Life Ins . Co . , 123 U . S . 747 . It
would seem that a way might be found out of the difficulty by directing
a
n issue to be tried a
t
law .
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GARDINER , J . : Chancellor Kent, in his commentaries , remarks
that the right of redemption exists, not only in the mortgagor him
self, but in every other person who has an interest in , or a legal or
equitable lien upon , the mortgaged premises ; and that consequently
every judgment creditor, and every other incumbrancer may redeem .every
judeom., 162 . ) 2Story Eq . , $
10brancer , orhavia rede
Judge Story says ( 2 ry Eq . , § 1023 ) that a judgment creditor








It is a right inherent in the land binding all persons coming in un






. 94 . It rests upon a principle o
f
natural justice that
every person having a
n
interest in the mortgaged premises may pro




the mortgage , thereby
becoming substituted to the rights and interest o
f
the original mort






e deprived against his consent , without due process of law af
fording to him an opportunity o
f exercising it if he deems it advan
tageous to his own interest .
It is immaterial whether the lien or interest is legal or equitable ,
o
r
whether the equity o





These principles , if sound , and they have heretofore been sup .
posed elementary , dispose o
f
this case .
Wm .Halstead was the owner o
f
a mortgage , which was a specific
and prior lien upon themortgaged premises . I shall call him mort
gagee for convenience . The respondent , as creditor by judgment ,
was a junior incumbrancer , with a general and legal lien , upon the
same lands . Before foreclosure he had the right to redeem the mort
gage . The exercise o
f
the right is now indispensable to protect his
interest , as his lien will expire before a sale b
y
execution could be
effected . His sole remedy is a redemption .
The foreclosure o
f
the mortgage without making the complainant
a party , was , it is conceded , as to him a nullity . The relation there
tofore existing between the parties was unchanged b
y
that proceed
ing , and was consequently subsisting in its full force at the time
when the complainant offered to redeem , and at the time o
f
the
commencement of this suit .
But it is said that by the sec . 158 , 2 R . S . , 192 , the deed executed




the decree , is declared to be “ as
valid as if the same were executed by the mortgagor and mort
gagee . " But as against whom is this effect given to the conveyance ?
The statute proceeds to declare “ it shall be an entire bar against
each o
f
them (the mortgagor and mortgagee ) and against al
l
parties
to the suit in which the decree was made , ” & c . No others are af
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fected . But the statute does not stop here . The same section pro
vides “ that the deed shall vest in the purchaser the same estate , and
no other or greater than would have vested in the mortgagee if the
equity of redemption had been foreclosed .” The effect of a strict
foreclosure was merely to extinguish the right of redemption . The
mortgagee obtained and held his estate , and a
ll of it by virtue of the
mortgage . The foreclosure barred the mortgagor and al
l
other par




that estate from the mortgagee . As to all the world the latter
was but a mortgagee ; and the only difference between those made
parties to the suit and those not parties , was , that the former lost
the right o
f
redemption , which remained to the latter . (Watson v .
Spence , 20 Wend . , 262 , 263 . ) This estate , that of a mortgagee after
foreclosure , the statute in this case vested in Schureman Halstead a
s
purchaser under the decree , and no " other , o
r greater . " The deed o
f
the master by which it was conveyed , was an entire bar against the
mortgagee who had instituted the proceedings , and received value
for his interest , and against themortgagor , and subsequent incum
brancers made parties , whose right o
f
redemption was extinguished ,
a





a bar between those parties . But the sale
did not vest in the purchaser the estate o
f
the mortgagor , and make
the former an assignee of the mortgage a
t
the same time ; but the
estate and interest , one and indivisible , prescribed b
y
the statute ,
namely , “ that which would have vested in the mortgagee , if the equi
ty o
f
redemption had been foreclosed . ” According to the statute
therefore , as well as b
y
adjuded cases , it is clear that this foreclosure
a
s against the complainant , a judgment creditor and not a party is
utterly void . ( 3 J . C . R . , 465 ; 4 Kent , 184 ; 2 Seld . , 562 , 565 . ) It fol
lows , that as to the mortgagor and all other parties to the suit , a
mortgagee by the foreclosure obtains what is equivalent to a fee in
the mortgaged premises . As to the judgment creditor not a party ,
the mortgagee ( o
r purchaser a
t
the master ' s sale who succeeds to
his rights ) remains in possession as such , with a mere lien for his
debt , liable consequently to account for the profits , and either to pay
off the demand o
f
the redeeming creditor , or on receiving the mort
gage debt to convey to him the premises a
s
the only thing repre
senting the mortgage in his power to transfer .
But it is said , in the second place , that a naked judgment lien in




As this doctrine is in opposition to the principle laid down by
every elementary writer , some authority must be shown to warrant
the exception , and none such can be found . We are referred to
9 J . R . , 612 ; Coote on Mortgages , 514 ; and Powell on Mortgages ,
331 . It is there said , “ that no person can come to a court o
f equity ,
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for a redemption of a mortgage , but he who is entitled to the legal
estate of the mortgagor , or claims a subsisting interest under him .”
But a judgment creditor having a lien has a subsisting interest
under the mortgagor , within the letter and spirit of the rule , as held
by Powell , and every other writer. (Powell on Mortg ., 271 , 274 ,
note o .)
In Benedict v .Gilman (4 Paige, 58 ), the mortgage which was the
first lien , had been foreclosed at law , and the premises bid in for the
complainant , who filed his bill against Gilman , a subsequent judg
ment creditor , to compel him to redeem or stand foreclosed . Decree
accordingly.
This , like the case in Hopkins, R ., is directly upon the point in
controversy . By the foreclosure the mortgagor was barred of his
equity of redemption , precisely as in the present case . The bill then
called upon the judgment creditor, who had neither issued execution
nor sold the land , to redeem or to forfeit all his rights. According
to the doctrine put forth in this case , the creditor had no right to
redeem ; and yet , by a decree of the chancellor , he was compelled to
exercise a right which he di
d
not possess , or be foreclosed forever .
There are numerous cases in our reports which have not been cited ,
and to which I shall not refer , as they only recognize the general
principle laid down in elementary writers . I conclude b
y
expressing
my belief that , within the last one hundred years , no decision of any
court , no dictum o
f any equity judge , nor a suggestion of counsel in
any case involving the question , can be produced to sustain the posi
tion , that a judgment creditor having a lien upon mortgaged prem












I think the judgment should be affirmed . 4
Johnson , Jewett and Watson , Js . , concurred .
Ruggles , Ch . J . , Wells and Morse , Js . , were for reversal .
Five judges not concurring on the second re -argument , the judg
ment was affirmed by force of the statute , Code , sec . 14 .
4 Compare , Wiley v . Ewing , 47 Ala . 423 ; Hosford v . Johnson , 74
Ind . 479 ; Alexander v . Greenwood , 24 Cal . 505 ; Harris v . Hooper , 50 Md .
537 ; Farwell v . Murphy , 2 Wis . 533 .
“ In respect to the defendants in foreclosure suits , they are either
necessary or proper parties . A necessary party is one whose presence
before the court is indispensable to the rendering o
f
a judgment which
shall have any effect upon the property ; without whom the court
might properly refuse to proceed , because its decree would be prac
tically nugatory . The person who in this sense is a necessary party
defendant is the owner of the equity of redemption ; but the ownership
of the land subject to the mortgage may be distributed among several
persons , one o
f
whom is no more necessary to the rendering of an ef
fectual judgment than another . Moreover the equity o
f redemption
may have been conveyed again and more than once in mortgage , and
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COLLINS v . RIGGS.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITES STATES . 1871.
14 Wall. ( U . S .) 491.
In this case, Riggs had brought ejectment in the court below
against Collins to recover a lot , one of several mortgaged by Russell
to the United States , and bought by Corcoran from the United States
after the foreclosure by the government of their mortgage and the
purchase in by them of al
l




The lot in controversy in this case had been conveyed previously
to the mortgage , by a deed not put on record , to Breese .






the lot , prior to the date o
f
the mort
gage to the United States , and so owner of the equity of redemption ,
the person who holds the title subject to the mortgages may have an
interest which is in fact of no value , while the holders of the subsequent
mortgages have valuable interests ; yet according to the cases the owner
of the unconditional title which is of no value is a necessary party , and
the subsequent mortgagees are only proper parties . It is not , how
ever , the value o
f
the interest held by any one which in any way de
termines whether he is a necessary party o
r
not ; for although the in
terest of the owner of the equity may be valueless , yet a decree of fore
closure and sale is effectual in cutting off that interest , and in trans
ferring the title subject to the rights o
f subsequent incumbrancers , if
they have not been made parties . The decree is at any rate effectual




the title , and this is
doubtless the reason why the owner of the equity of redemption is
regarded as a necessary party .
" In one sense every person who has acquired any interest in the
property subsequent to the mortgage is a necessary party to the suit
for foreclosure , whether that interest be by way of a mortgage or
judgment lien , an inchoate right to tenancy in dower or curtesy or an
unconditional estate in fee ; because , in order to make the foreclosure
complete , and to transfer a perfect title by the sale , it is necessary that
the holder o
f every such right or interest should be brought before the
court . A party may be necessary in this sense although this term has
generally been used only to designate the present owner o
f
the prop
erty , without whom the general ownership o
f
the property can not be
transferred by a sale under the decree . It is doubtless for this reason
that there is much confusion in the cases as to the persons who are
necessary parties to the suit . As a practical matter , however , the dis
tinction between necessary and proper parties is not of much conse




the parties to it , is generally ineffectual as a foreclosure , unless
every interest subsequent to the mortgage is cut off by the decree
and sale under it ; for if a stranger purchases , he may decline to take the
title if any lien or right is left outstanding ; and if the mortgagee him
self buys he only subjects himself in such case to the expenses of an
other suit , to get rid o
f
the rights that others still have in the property . "
Jones , Mortgages , & 1394 .
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had not been brought into th
e
foreclosure suit ; and assuming this
to be true the defendant inferred and assumed that the mortgage was
still , therefore , in existence . He then offered to prove that during
the pendency o
f
the present suit in ejectment h
e
had tendered to
Riggs the amount for which this particular lot now in controversy
had been struck off at the marshal ' s sale , together with the taxes , in
terest , and costs ; informing the plaintiff at the time of this tender




f themortgage as had been paid at
the sale for the land in controversy , and that he wished to redeem
the said land , and that he , the defendant , made the tender for that
purpose ; which tender the plaintiff declined to receive ; the defend
ant offering to prove , further , that the said sum o
f money was then
paid into court as a tender to redeem the land in controversy from
the mortgage .
The court below decided , simply , that the evidence as presented
was not competent o
r
sufficient to constitute a defense to the action ,
but upon what ground this decision was made did not appear .
MR . JUSTICE BRADLEY delivered the opinion o
f
the court .
It is clear that the criterion by which the amount tendered was
gauged was incorrect . To redeem property which has been sold
under a mortgage for less than the mortgage debt , it is not sufficient
to tender the amount of the sale . The whole mortgage debt must be
tendered o
r paid into court . The party offering to redeem proceeds
upon the hypothesis that , a
s
to him , the mortgage has never been
foreclosed and is still in existence . Therefore he can only lift it b
y
paying it . The money will be subject to distribution between the
mortgagee and the purchaser , in equitable proportions , so a
s
to re




Judgment affirmed . 5
5 Compare , Wiley , Banks & Co . v . Ewing , 47 Ala . 423 ; Bradley v .
Snyder , 14 11
1
. 263 ; Martin v . Fridley , 23 Minn . 13 ; Renard v . Brown ,
7 Nebr . 449 .
One who , pending a suit to foreclose , acquires an interest in the
equity of redemption from a party to the suit need not be made a
party to the suit in order to cut off his interest . On general principles
one who purchases pendente lite is bound by any judgment or decree
that is subsequently rendered against the party from whom he derived
his interest (with the qualification , o
f
course , that in some states the stat
utory requirement of filing of notice of lis pendens must have been com
plied with ) . Warford v . Sullivan , 147 Ind . 14 ; Smith v . Davis , ( N . J . )
1
9 Atl . 541 ; Fuller v . Scribner , 76 N . Y . 190 . And see Littlefield v .
Nichols , 42 Cal . 372 .
One who acquires an interest in the equity o
f redemption before
foreclosure suit is commenced , by a conveyance which is not recorded
until after foreclosure is commenced , is bound by the decree , though
not a party , as against a purchaser at the foreclosure sale who had





SMITH v . SHAY .
SUPREME COURT O
F
IOWA . 1883 .
62 Iowa 119 .





a mortgage . The facts are as follows : On the
11th day o
f September , 1874 , Daniel Burns executed to the defend
ant , Walter Shay , a mortgage on the lands in controversy . In June ,
1878 , said Burns executed to plaintiffs a mortgage on the same lands .





United States circuit court , and on the 11th day o
f February , 1880 ,
obtained a master ' s deed to said lands , in pursuance of such fore
closure . Plaintiffs were not made parties to such foreclosure suit .
The plaintiffs foreclosed their mortgage by an action in the district
court o
f Shelby county , Iowa , to which action Shay was not made
a party . On the 12th day o
f February , 1880 , one day after the date
o
f
the master ' s deed to Walter Shay , the sheriff of Shelby county
executed to plaintiffs a sheriff ' s deed to said lands . March 1 , 1880 ,
defendant , Shay , made a contract with the defendants , Frank &
Elmendorf , giving them the right to lease o
r
sell said lands , b
y
which they were to have an interest in the proceeds thereof if they
effected a sale . March 25 , 1881 , Frank & Elmendorf sold said lands
to Thomas Jones , who now claims to be the owner thereof .
The defendants , Jones and Frank & Elmendorf , filed an answer ,
in which they ask that they may be allowed to redeem from the
plaintiffs 'mortgage . The court decreed that the defendants , Thomas
Jones and Frank & Elmendorf , be allowed to redeem said premises
by paying into the hands o
f
the clerk , on o
r
before October 1 , 1882 ,
the sum o
f
$ 1 ,131 . 10 , with interest from the date of the decree at
the rate o
f
ten per cent . , and that , if the defendants fail to make
such redemption within the time named , the plaintiffs may redeem ,
by paying to the clerk for the use o
f
defendants , on or before Vo
v . Randall , 116 Cal . 226 ; Shippen v . Kimball , 47 Kans . 173 ; Woods v .
Love , 27 Mich . 308 ; Ehle v . Brown , 31 Wis . 405 ; but possession may
under some circumstances be equivalent to record ; see the case last
cited and Noyes v . Hall , 97 U . S . 34 ; Hodson v . Treat , 7 Wis . 263 .
There is authority for the proposition that notice to the mortgagee ,
after suit is begun , o
f
a right acquired before suit begun , does not make
it incumbent upon the mortgagee to make such claimant a party . Boice
v . Michigan Mut . Life Ins . Co . , 114 Ind . 480 ; Leonard v . New York
Bay Co . , 28 N . J . Eq . 192 ; Hager v . Astorg , 145 Cal . 548 . This doc
trine would protect a purchaser a
t
the foreclosure with full knowledge
of the facts . However this may be , and even where the mortgagee has
notice before commencing suit , the purchaser without notice , actual or
constructive , o
f
such unrecorded conveyance is fully protected , since
he is a " purchaser ” within the meaning o
f
the recording acts and the
unrecorded conveyance is therefore void as to him .
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vember 1, 1882 , the sum of $ 1,125, with interest from August 22d ,
1882 , the date of the decree, at ten per cent. Both parties appeal .
DAY, CH . J . : I. The plaintiffs hold and claim under the junior
mortgage . They were not made parties to the foreclosure suit of
the Shay or senior mortgage. It is conceded by the defendants that
their right of redemption was not barred by the decree and sale
under the senior mortgage. It is claimed , however, that their right
to redeem is not an absolute one , and that defendants can prevent
the exercise of that right by themselves redeeming from plaintiffs .
This view was adopted by the court below , and it is , we think , cor
rect . In 2d Jones on Mortgages , 2d Ed ., section 1075 , it is said : “ A
junior incumbrancer , who , not having been made a party to a fore
closure of a prior mortgage, afterwards redeems , redeems not the
premises , strictly speaking , but the prior incumbrance , and he is en
titled , not to a conveyance of the premises , but to an assignment of
the security . Therefore, if the prior mortgagee in such case has
become the purchaser at the foreclosure sale, and has thus acquired
the equity of redemption of the mortgaged premises , the junior mort
gagee upon redeeming is not entitled to a conveyance of the estate,
but to an assignment of the prior mortgage ; whereupon the prior
mortgagee , as owner of the equity of redemption , may, if he choose ,
pay the amount due upon the junior mortgage , redeeming that.”
See also Pardee v . Van Anken , 3 Barb . 534 ; Renard v . Brown , 7
Neb . 449. In our opinion the court did not err in giving the de
fendants the paramount right o
f redemption .
The plaintiffs will pay the costs o
f
appeal . With the modification
above indicated , [ as to the accounting ] the judgment is
Affirmed . .
PEABODY v . ROBERTS .
SUPREME COURT O
F
NEW YORK . 1866 .
4
7 Barb . ( N . Y . ) 91 .
This action was brought to foreclose a mortgage given by Jared
D .Howe to the plaintiff , on the 14th day o
f
October , 1836 , to secure
the payment o
f
$ 440 and interest annually , according to the condi
tion of a bond at the same time executed by Howe and delivered to




the bond , the principal sum se
cured became due and payable on the 1st of January , 1838 . The
premises described in the mortgage were situate in Genesee county ,
6 Accord : Murphy v . Farwell , 9 Wis . 102 .
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and themortgage was duly recorded in the office of the clerk of that
county , on the 16th of June , 1837 .
It was alleged in the complaint, and proved upon the trial, that
themortgagor , on the 6th of December , 1836 , executed and delivered
to Elijah Turner another mortgage upon the same premises , to se
cure the sum of $ 1 ,244, besides interest . And that mortgage was
recorded in the clerk ' s office of Genesee county on the 12th day of
January , 1837 . That mortgage was foreclosed by proceedings in the
late Court of Chancery , and the premises described in it sold under
a decree of that court, to the mortgagee , in 1839 and 1842 . The
plaintiff in this suit was not made a party to the action for the fore
closure of that mortgage. The defendants derived their title to the .
premises under Turner , who purchased them at the mortgage sale .
DANIELS , J. : Although the mortgage in suit was in fact the first
incuumbrance on the premises in question , at the time when the
mortgage under which the defendants derive their title was executed ,
that priority was presumptively lost by the omission to record it
until after the second mortgage had been recorded . ( Freeman v .
Schroeder , 43 Barb . 618 .) And that presumption must prevail
against the plaintiff 's mortgage, unless it can be overcome by evi
dence , in the manner sanctioned by law . Butler v . Viele, 44 Barb .
166 . ) And as no such evidence has been given in this case , his
mortgage must be deemed to be, as it is in law , a second mortgage ,
though given before that which has acquired priority over it . But
as such the mortgagee possessed the right to maintain an action upon
it for the foreclosure of so much of the equity of redemption as re
mained in the mortgagor at the time when it was recorded , and for
a satisfaction of the debt secured by it, by a sale of the mortgaged
premises . This right has , from the time of the civil law , been se
cured to the mortgagee as an incident to , and growing out of, the
mortgage itself . ( 2 Story 's Eq. Jur., § 1024 .) And it has been so
generally assumed , and commonly sanctioned , as scarcely to have
been drawn in question in courts of justice in this state . Hence it is
laid down as an elementary principle , that a subsequent mortgagee
may elect either to foreclose , or bring an action to redeem the prior
mortgage . ( 1 Hilliard on Mortgages , 3d Ed . 332 .) In the case of
Cronin v . Hazeltine , ( 3 Allen , 324 ,) where the first mortgagee , un
der the laws of Massachusetts , had entered into possession of the
mortgaged premises in the presence of witnesses , for the purpose
of foreclosing his mortgage , it was held that the second mortgagee
might still maintain an action for the foreclosure of his mortgage ,
and be placed temporarily in possession to render the foreclosure ef
fectual. And in Norton v . Warner , ( 3 Edw . Ch . 106 ,) it was held
that there is no objection to a second mortgagee 's filing a bill for a
foreclosure and sale to pay off a
ll
the incumbrances according to
their respective priorities , or to redeem as respects prior mortgages ,
EQUITABLE SUIT . 305
and then to sell in order to repay the redemption money , as well as
to satisfy the subsequent incumbrances ; and in such cases the prac
tice formerly was to make all incumbrancers , whether prior or subse
quent, parties . ( 2 Barb . Ch . Pr. 174 .) It is very important for the
promotion of the interests of junior mortgagees that this right should
be carefully maintained ; for where they do not possess the pecuniary
ability of redeeming the senior mortgage, it is the only means af
forded them through which the security can be applied to the pay
ment of the debt it secures. This right is so important, in these
cases, that the holder of the mortgage can not be deprived of it,
without , at the same time, very sensibly impairing and depreciating
the security created by the mortgage . And as such it is an essential
attribute of property , which positive legislation , even , can not destroy
without impairing the obligation of the contract out of which it
arises . (McCracken v . Hayward , 15 Curtis , 228 ; 2 How . 609.
Gantley v . Ewing, 15 Curtis , 608 ; 3 How . 708 .) The general cor
rectness of this doctrine is not denied in this case . But it is insisted
that by a foreclosure and sale under the senior mortgage , this right
may be lawfully extinguished without even making the junior mort
gagee a party . How this result can be produced , consistently with
the well settled rules of law , and the established and acknowledged
principles of justice , it is difficult , if not altogether impossible , to
conceive . For it is generally , if not universally , true as a legal
proposition that no person can be affected or prejudiced by legal pro
ceedings against property in which he has an interest , unless he, or
those under whom he derives his title , were made parties to them .
Whatever exceptions may be found to this general principle, it is
believed they owe their existence to peculiar statutory provisions,
none of which , however , apply to the present controversy . This
principle is so thoroughly grounded in the early sources of consti
tutional law as now to have become one of its fundamental elements .
And accordingly , the constitutions of the state and nation alike de
clare , that no person shall be deprived of his property without due
process of law , which , according to the well settled legal definition of
these terms , means, an action or legal proceeding against him , and
not one against the party from whom he may have derived such
property , after his rights have become vested . (Campbell v . Hall ,
16 N . Y . Rep . 575 .) Upon general principles , therefore , there can
be no reason for depriving the junior mortgagee of his right to fore
close his mortgage , and sell the mortgaged premises , merely because
they have been previously sold under a foreclosure of the senior
mortgage without making him a party . And there is nothing what
ever in the instrument creating the security , which should produce
that result. Particularly as a mortgage , in this state , is well settled
to be only a lien upon , and not a title to , the land . Under the con








course must be different . For in those courts a mortgage is
held to create an estate in the land which , after default in payment ,
can only b
e
divested by a redemption in equity or a voluntary recon
veyance from the mortgagee . (Harring v . Smythe , 2 Barb . Ch .
119 . ) On that account the only remedy which the mortgagor o
r
subsequent incumbrancers have after the day of payment has passed ,
is that of a redemption in equity . And that remedy can be resorted
to with the like effect after , as before , a foreclosure o
f
the senior
incumbrance , if the person resorting to it was not a party to the
foreclosure . But whether before or after , his remedy is confined to
a bill to redeem , so far as the previous incumbrance is concerned .
On account o
f
the difference in the legal effect o
f
a mortgage , the
rule o
f
the English courts confining the remedy o
f
the subsequent
incumbrancer to a redemption in equity merely , is not entitled to




this state . * * *




the foreclosure and sale under the
senior mortgage , when the junior mortgagee was not made a party ,







Chancery in the case o
f
Vander
kemp v . Shelton , ( 11 Paige , 28 ) . In that case the bill was filed to
foreclosure a junior mortgage , after a foreclosure and sale under the
senior mortgage without making the junior mortgagee a party ; and
the chancellor held the proceeding to be proper , and decreed a sale
of the mortgaged premises .
* * * * * * * *
The judgment should be set aside and a new trial granted .
Grover , P . J . , concurred in the result .
Davis , J . , dissented .
Marvin , J . , expressed no opinion .
New trial granted . ?
LITTLEFIELD v . NICHOLS .
SUPREME COURT O
F
CALIFORNIA . 1871 .
4
2 Cal . 372 .
Appeal from the District Court o
f




This was an action o
f ejectment for three hundred and sixty acres
o
f
land , a portion o
f
the San Pablo Rancho , in Contra Costa County .
7 See also , Turner v . Phelps & Co . , 46 Tex . 251 ; Alexander v . Green
wood , 24 Cal . 505 .
Compare , Moulton v . Cornish , supra , and cases cited ,
Compare , San Francisco Co . v . Lawton , supra .



















Both parties claimed under Joaquin G . Castro , in whose name the
rancho was finally confirmed b
y
the United States on February 24th ,
1858 , and final survey approved August 17th , 1864 .
The plaintiff claimed a
s
follows : On December 28th , 1854 , Joa
quin G . Castro executed a mortgage to Martina Perre o
f
all his in
terest in the San Pablo Rancho , which was recorded on January 6th ,
1855 ; on September 21st , 1855 , suit o
f
foreclosure was commenced
upon the mortgage ; on January 17th , 1856 , there was a decree
against defendant for nine thousand one hundred and fifty dollars ,
with interest a
t
five per cent . per month ; on March 11th , 1856 , there
was a sale b
y
the Sheriff to Martina Perre for five thousand dollars ;
o
n March 23d , 1857 , Sheriff ' s deed to Martina Perre , recorded
March 24th , 1857 ; and there were divers mesne conveyances carry





among other things , that John Currey re
covered judgment against Joaquin G . Castro on October 23d , 1855 ,
for three hundred dollars ; docketed October 24th , 1855 ; execution
o
n
this judg ent on October 26th , 1855 ; Sheriff ' s sale on Novem
ber 29th , 1855 , and Sheriff ' s deed on April 25th , 1863 .
There having been a judgment for plaintiff , and motion for new
trial denied , the defendant appealed .
By the Court , WALLACE , J . :
The title formerly held by Castro is the true title to the premises
in controversy . The plaintiff claims to have acquired it , and the de
fendant claims that it is outstanding in a third person , who is not a
party to the controversy . The title o
f
the plaintiff relates to January ,
1855 , when the mortgage , through the foreclosure ofwhich it comes ,
was recorded and became a lien . The outstanding title to October ,
1855 , when the Currey judgment against Castro , through which that
title comes , also became a lien upon the premises .
The lien in which the plaintiff ' s title originated being thus the elder
in it
s origin , a title derived thereunder is prima facie superior to a
title from a common source , purporting to be derived under a judg
ment lien junior in point o
f
time ; and in an action o
f ejectment ,
where , as here , the controversy must turn upon the mere legal title ,
and no equitable defense is pleaded , the title originating in the elder
lien must prevail over that originating in the junior lien , provided
the lien o
f
the former had not been suffered , in the meantime , to
become dormant , or the proceedings through which it was fore
closed were not insufficient , in point o
f jurisdiction , for that purpose .
In Rankin et a
l
. , plaintiffs in error , v . Scott , defendant in error ,
1
2 Wheat . 177 , each party claimed to have acquired the title o
f
John Little to the premises through judgments and Sheriff ' s sales ,
etc . , resulting in a Sheriff ' s deed to each . These judgments respec
tively became liens upon the premises at different periods o
f
time ,
and the sale under the junior judgment preceded that under the
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other . It was held that the sale under the elder judgment and lien
gave the better title , notwithstanding such sale was itself subsequent
in point of time to that made under the junior judgment. In de
livering the opinion of the Court in that case Mr. Chief Justice Mar
shall said : “ By that law (of Missouri) judgments are to be a lien
on all the lands of the debtor . The lien commences with the judg
ment , and continues for five years . The principle is believed to be
universal that a prior lien gives a prior claim , which is entitled to
prior satisfaction out of the subject it binds , unless the lien be in
trinsically defective , or be displaced by some act of the party hold
ing it, which shall postpone him in a Court of law or equity to a sub
sequent claimant . The single circumstance of not proceeding on it
until a subsequent lien has been obtained and carried into execution ,
has never been considered as such an act ."
Upon these views it results that the plaintiff ' s title was superior
to the outstanding title set up by the defendant ; and the judgment is,
therefore , affirmed .8
& See also , Penryn Fruit Co . v . Sherman -Worrel Co ., 142 Cal. 643 ;
State Bank v. Wilson , 9 Ill. 57 ; Bateman v. Miller , 118 Ind. 345 ; Briggs
v. Chicago , K . & W . R .Co., 56 Kans . 526 ; Cook v . Detroit & c . R . Co .
43 Mich . 349 ; Renard v. Brown , 7 Nebr. 449 ; King v. McCully , 38 Pa .
St. 76 .
" The purchaser became vested with all of the estate which the com
plainant ( the mortgagee ) had in the premises by virtue of the mort
gage ." Baldwin v. Howell , 45 N . J . Eq. 519 , 537 . See, also , Davis v.
Connecticut Mut. Life Ins . Co ., 84 111. 508 ; Hart v. Beardsley , 67 Nebr .
145.
“ The title of the purchaser in these sales in equity under foreclosure
decrees takes effect by relation to the delivery of the mortgage as
against all intervening purchasers and encumbrancers who are made
parties or who become interested pendente lite.” Graves , J ., in Rug
gles v . First Bank , 43 Mich . 192 .
Of course the court can order a sale subject to subsequent encum
brances , provided such a sale realizes a sum sufficient to pay the prior
lien . Coleman v. Witherspoon , 76 Ind . 285 . And in Nebraska there
has been some uncertainty as to the effect , in this respect, of their
statutory appraisal of the property . See Hart v. Beardsley , 67 Nebr .
145 .
The purchaser is not affected by a suit against the mortgagor , com
menced after the mortgage was executed and to which the mortgagee
was not a party . " He is privy in estate with the mortgagor only in
respect to the estate as it existed when the mortgage was executed ."
Secor v. Singleton , 41 Fed . 725 ; Logan v. Stieff , 36 Fla . 473 ; Mathes
v . Cover , 43 Iowa 512 ; Gamble v. Horr , 40 Mich . 561 ; Murphy v. Fare
well, 9 Wis. 102 .
As against intervening parties who are in a position to take advantage
of non -record of the mortgage , the foregoing propositions must , of
course , be modified to the extent of giving the foreclosure purchaser
a title relating only to the date of recording the mortgage . And it is
equally clear that the purchaser ' s title is subject to all rights which
attached before the mortgage was executed , except as these may be
postponed by the recording acts . See further , Chapter X , Priorities.
"His deed will relate back , it is true , to the beginning of his lien ,
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CHRIST CHURCH v. MACK .
COURT OF APPEALS OF New York. 1883 .
93 N . Y . 488 .
This action was brought to restrain defendants from obstructing
the light and air from the windows of plaintiff 's church edifice , ad
joining a lot owned by said defendant, Rhoda E . Mack . Plaintiff
was formerly owner of said lot, which was subject to a mortgage
given to one Bell. It conveyed the same to defendant John Mack ,
subject to the mortgage which the grantee assumed and agreed to
pay . By the deed an easement was reserved of light and ai
r
to the
grantor ' s church so long as its premises were used for church pur
poses . Mack conveyed to a third person , who , on the same day , con
veyed to Rhoda E . , wife o
f
said John Mack . Her deed was made
subject to the Bell mortgage , but contained no assumption o
f
the
same by her . The holder o
f






fendants herein , foreclosed themortgage b
y
suit ; plaintiff was made
a party defendant therein . Judgment o
f
foreclosure in the ordinary
form was entered , and upon the sale under it Mrs . Mack became the
purchaser and received the referee ' s deed . Mrs . Mack thereafter
erected a fence upon her lot , which cut off the light from the base
ment windows of plaintiff ' s church .
Finch , J . : It is conceded that a purchase under a foreclosure o
f
the Bell mortgage would have given to a stranger to the title an
ownership discharged o
f
the plaintiff ' s easement . That the same
result attends the purchase b
y
Mrs . Mack , notwithstanding her rela
tion to the property , follows from the reason upon which the con
ceded rule is founded . The statute provides that the deed given in
pursuance o
f
a sale on foreclosure shall vest in the purchaser " the
same estate ( and n
o
other o
r greater ) that would have vested in
the mortgagee if the equity o
f redemption had been foreclosed , " and
further declares that such deeds shall be as valid as if executed b
y
the mortgagor and mortgagee . The construction to be put upon
these two provisions was early settled in this court . (Brainard v .
Cooper , 10 N . Y . 358 ; Packer v . The Roch . & Syracuse R . R . Co . , 17
id . 287 . ) In the last o
f
these cases it was said that where legal title
is concerned , a mortgage , which for many other purposes is a mere
chose in action , is a conveyance of the land ; that the interest remain
ing in the mortgagor is an equity , and that the foreclosure cuts off
in order to cut off intervening incumbrances , but it will not carry back
the absolute divestiture o
f
title , as is evident from the fact that neither
judgment debtor nor mortgagor can be called to account for rents and
profits . His title becomes absolute only when his right to a deed ac
crues . ” Lawrence , J . , in Stephens v . Illinois Mut . Fire Ins . Co . , 43
Ill . 327 .
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and extinguishes that equity , and leaves the title conveyed by the
mortgage . It was added that such was precisely the effect of a strict
foreclosure , and that in construing the statute its two clauses were
to be read in harmony. It was, therefore, decided that when the act
says the master 's deed " shall have the same validity as if executed
by the mortgagor it is not to be taken that the purchaser is to be
considered as holding under the mortgagor by title subsequent to the
mortgage in a sense which would subject him to the effect of the
mortgagor 's acts intermediate the mortgage and the foreclosure.”
While it is clearly the modern doctrine that the mortgagee has by
virtue of his mortgage no estate in or title to the land , or the right
of possession before or after the mortgage debt becomes due ( Ten
Eyck v . Craig , 62 N . Y . 421 ) , and only acquires such title by pur
chase upon the foreclosure sale , yet the character and extent of his
title so acquired is described in the statute by a reference to the ol
d
rule and the old practice , when the mortgagor ' s right could be
fitly termed an equity o





absolute estate in the mortgagee . The effect of the fore
closure deed , therefore , as determined by the statute , is to vest in
the purchaser the entire interest and estate o
f mortgagor and mort
gagee a
s
it existed at the date o
f
the mortgage , and unaffected by
the subsequent incumbrances and conveyances o
f
the mortgagor .
And thus , while the plaintiff corporation held title to the Mack lot ,
they held it subject to the Bell mortgage and to the absolute title
into which that mortgage might ripen b
y
a foreclosure and sale .
When they sold to Mack , reserving an easement in the lot for light
and a
ir
to their adjoining windows , they held their easement , and
Mack held his ownership , still subject to the Bell mortgage and the
absolute title into which it might be turned . Mack had assumed the
payment of the Bell mortgage , but conveyed through a third person
to his wife , subject to that mortgage , but without any liability for
it
s payment assumed b
y
her . Upon its foreclosure she became the
purchaser and took the deed . That vested in her , under the statute
provision , the title o
f





the mortgagor and those succeeding to his in
terest , unless there be something in her position which subjects her
to a different rule .
The statute allowed her to b
e
a purchaser , and in determining the
effect o
f
the foreclosure deed its terms draw no distinction among
purchasers . It does not discriminate . Whoever may lawfully pur
chase becomes the purchaser whose title is described and determined ,




the General Term , and o
f
the learned counsel
for the respondent on this appeal were both aimed at the result o
f
converting her purchase into a mere payment and discharge o
f
the
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mortgage lien , and her deed into a release of the incumbrance . The
General Term reached the result by a disregard of the first clause
of the stature declaring the enect of the deed , and what seems to us
a misinterpretation of the second clause . In brief the reasoning was
that the deed was to be equivalent to one made by the mortgagor
and mortgagee ; that the mortgagor had already conveyed , and his
title , incumbered by an after constituted easement, had reached Mrs.
Mack ; that she could not be said to purchase what she already had ;
that so her deed was only equivalent to one made by the mortgagee ,
and he having no title , but merely a lien , the foreclosure deed oper
ated only as a release to Mrs . Mack , however it might operate as to
a stranger . We deem this reasoning defective in two respects . It
construes the statute to transfer the mortgagor 's title as it stood, not
at the date of his mortgage , but burdened with its after incumbrances
and limitations , imposed by him or his grantees ; and it assumes what
is not true , that Mrs . Mack already had the entire title o
f
the mort
gagor , and so could take nothing from him , but only the right o
f
themortgagee . The mortgagor had the absolute title incumbranced
only by the mortgage . That title he transferred to the church , but
when the latter conveyed to Mack it reserved an easement o
r servi
tude , and so parted with less than it received from the mortgagor .
This title Mrs . Mack took and , therefore , did not get the entire in
terest which the mortgagor himself had . There was something
which she had not got ; which b
y
a foreclosure of the Bell mortgage
would pass ; and which it was possible for her to purchase .







the lot came under some obli
gation to pay off the mortgage , and so could not in equity assert a
title founded upon a breach o
f
that obligation . Cases are cited in
other States which hold that the mortgagor owes to his mortgagee
the duty o
f paying taxes upon the land , and can not , b
y
neglecting
their payment and causing a sale and then becoming a purchaser ,
cut off the lien o
f
the mortgagee . If the purchase had been made
by Mr . Mack , who had assumed the payment of the mortgage , the
question would have arisen . But Mrs . Mack owed no duty of pay
ment either to the mortgagee o
r
to the plaintiff . She assumed no
such obligation . She violated no duty and incurred no personal lia
bility by omitting to pay o
ff
the incumbrance . It was her right and
privilege not to do so , and in the omission she did no wrong o
f
which either party could lawfully complain . She had the right to
leave the mortgagee to his remedy , and when he asserted it , the law
allowed her to become the purchaser , and made no distinction be
tween her rights and those o
f
a stranger to the title .
It was urged that this view of the case left the plaintiff without
any power to save its easement , since on the sale Mrs . Mack could
safely outbid all others and beyond the mortgage debt . But the
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plaintiff should not have waited until the sale. When brought into
court as a defendant , and certain to be bound by the decree , it
should have sought to modify the decree, and showing the peril of
its easement and offering to bid the full amount of the mortgage
debt and costs upon a sale subject to the servitude , it should have
asked that the sale be so made . The mortgagee could not object
since his debt would be paid in full and he had no greater right ; and
Mrs. Mack could have asserted no equity to have the sale so made
as to free her from the easement. But when no limitation or con
dition is imposed by the decree , and no duty of payment rests on the
purchaser , the statute determines the estate which passes by the fore
closure deed .
The judgment of the General Term should be reversed and that
of the Special Term affirmed , with costs .
All concur.
Judgment accordingly .'
EVANSVILLE GAS CO . v . THE STATE .
SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA . 1881.
73 Ind . 219 .
[The State's' suit against theformer , by
[ The State , b
y
the auditor o
f Vanderburgh county as relator ,
prosecuted this suit against the appellant and Francis J . Reitz , and
obtained judgment against the former , but not against the latter .
The object of the action was to revive a decree of foreclosure upon
two school - fund mortgages , which had been taken on May 12 , 1862 ,
against James G . Jones and wife . Said decree was rendered upon
two several mortgages , one dated April 14 , 1855 , upon lot 23 , block
171 , in Lamasco City , and the other dated August 5 , 1859 , upon lot
2
9 , block 129 , both to secure the same sum . On the 3d day o
f No
vember , 1865 , said Jones and wife conveyed said lot 29 to the
Evansville Gas . Co . ]
ELLIOTT , J . : [ After stating the facts . ] The decree of foreclosure
which this proceeding sought to revive was , a
s appears from the
special finding , rendered on the 12th day o
f May , 1862 , and this ac
tion was not instituted until the 10th day o
f
November , 1877 , more
than sixteen years afterward . The appellant insists that the lien o
f








rendition . The argument is that the mortgage was merged in the
9 Compare , Van Horne v . Everson , 13 Barb . ( N . Y . ) 52
6 ; Huxley v .
Rice , 40 Mich . 73 ; Thompson v . Heywood , 129 Mass . 401 ; Manwarring
v . Powell , 40 Mich . 371 ( cf . Canfield v . Shear , 49 Mich . 313 ) ; Kennedy
v . Borie , 166 Pa . St . 360 ; Carlisle v . Libby , 185 Mass . 445 ; Brown v .
Winter , 14 Cal . 31 ; Russell v . Heirs of Mullanphy , 4 Mo . 319 .
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judgment , and that, as the statute limits the lien of a judgment to a
period of ten years from its date , with the expiration o
f
that period
terminated the lien o
f
the decrees sought to be revived .
Appellant ' s chief reliance is upon section 527 of the code , which




costs shall be a lien upon real estate for ten years after
the rendition thereof , and no longer . 2 R . S . 1876 , p . 233 . The stat
ute in terms applies only to judgments for the recovery o
f money ,
and does not apply to a decree o
f
foreclosure establishing a specific
mortgage lien upon real estate , and we do not think it should , b
y
construction , be so extended as to apply to such decrees o
f
foreclos
ure . Section 642 of the code is also relied upon by the appellant .
If the appellant is correct in asserting that the judgment merges
both the lien o
f
themortgage and the cause o
f
action evidenced by it ,
and that the lien o
f





gage , then , under the provisions o
f
either statute , it is entitled to
a reversal .
If the decree of foreclosure , which the State obtained against
Jones and wife , is to be treated as an ordinary judgment , then it
must be held that the lien was lost long before this action was insti
tuted . The controlling question , therefore , is , whether a decree o
f
foreclosure is to be treated as an ordinary judgment ; for , if it is to
be so regarded , then the appellant is clearly right .
If the judgment merged the mortgage lien , then the mortgage
lien was extinguished . It will not do to assume , as a matter of
course , that there was a merger , for there are many cases in which ,
in order to prevent injustice , courts will not allow merger to take
place , although al
l
the essential elements o
f
a technical merger com
bine in the particular case . Mergers are not favored . As Chief
Justice Parker tersely said , in Gibson v . Crehore , 3 Pick . 475 , "Mer
gers are odious in equity . "
Nor is it clear that , where a mortgage is foreclosed , the decree
“ swallows ” the lien o
f
the mortgage . There are a
t
least two very
strong reasons why this can not on principle be so : First , the mort
gage lien is a specific one , the judgment a general one , and the lien
o
f
the former is , therefore , the superior one . The difference be
tween mortgage and judgment liens is clearly drawn by Worden , J . ,
in Gimbel v . Stolte , 59 Ind . 446 . Second , the lien of the mortgage
is superior in duration to that of the judgment . In these two es
sential particulars , the mortgage lien is the greater , and it would
seem almost a contradiction o
f
terms to declare that the inferior lien
can swallow the greater . The whole theory o
f merger is that the
greater estate o
r thing takes into itself the less , and this can not be
so where there are essential particulars in which the one alleged to
be the inferior is really the superior . It can hardly be possible that









sorbing into itself another thing greatly larger in two very essential
and prominent features .
The merger of a judgment takes up the mortgage as a cause of
action , but not as a lien . There is a broad distinction between a
merger of a cause of action and the merger of a lien , It is owing
to error in confusing the merger of the cause of action with the
merger of a lien , that some of the courts have been led into the er
roneous holding , that a judgment extinguishes the mortgage lien .
A suit of foreclosure is a remedy for the enforcement of a mort
gage lien , and it ought not to be abridged by holding that the decree
cuts down , rather than enlarges , the lien . Without a decree the lien
continues for twenty years , and surely that which is meant to carry
into effect this lien ought not to be allowed to have the effect of
shortening the duration of the lien to a period one -half shorter than
that for which it would continue without the decree . Upon principle
it is, in our opinion , very clear , that although the judgment merges
the mortgage as a cause of action , it does not abfidge or extinguish
its lien .
Although there is some conflict in the authorities , we think the
weight is with the doctrine, that the decree of foreclosure does not
merge the lien of the mortgage . Counsel cite us to Freeman on
Judgments , sections 215 and 216 , but we think these sections afford
appellant's theory no support. The author is speaking of the effect
of a judgment upon the mortgage as a cause of action , not of its ef
fect upon the lien created by the mortgage . There can not well be
two opinions upon the proposition , that the mortgage a
s
a cause of







action are merged in the judgment or decree . This ,
however , is not the point here in debate . In The People v . Beebe , 1
Barb . 379 , it was held that the lien o
f
the mortgage was merged in
the decree , and this doctrine is stated approvingly in Gage v . Brews
ter , 31 N . Y . 218 . These are the only cases to which appellant has
referred , and we have found no others supporting the doctrine they
declare .
There are many well -considered cases holding a doctrine different
from that declared b
y
those upon which appellant relies . In our
own reports ,we have the case of Lapping v . Duffy , 47 Ind . 51 , where
it was held that a judgment did not extinguish the lien o
f
the mort
gage . It is true that the case just cited did not pass upon the ques
tion a
s
here presented , but the principle enunciated is substantially
the same a
s
that which must govern the case under examination .
We have also the case of Teal v . Hinchman , 69 Ind . 379 , where the
same general doctrine is declared and enforced . In the case of
Helmbold v . Man , 4 Whart . (Pa . ) 409 , the question was considered
and decided adversely to the doctrine o
f
the New York cases . It was
there said : “ The lien was created b
y
the mortgage itself ; the judg
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ment neither added to , nor took anything from it ; and it is clear ,
therefore, that the acts of Assembly , which require judgments creat
ing liens or binding lands or real estate, to be revived every period of
five years, for the purpose of continuing such liens, do not extend to
or embrace the liens of mortgages, and can have no application to
or bearing upon them whatever .”
The rule, that th
e
mortgage lien is not merged in the decree , is
asserted by the Supreme Court o
f
Iowa in two well -considered cases :
Stahl v . Roost , 34 Iowa , 475 ; Hendershott v . Ping , 24 Iowa , 134 .
The same rule has long since been the settled law o
f
Missouri . Ri
ley ' s Adm ’ r v . McCord ' s Adm ' r , 21 Mo . 285 . Illinois has adopted
and enforced a like doctrine . Priest v . Wheelock , 58 I11 . 114 .




r judgment , is in harmony with settled general rules , while the
opposite doctrine is in direct conflict with them . It is a rule o
f
very
frequent application , and upon which there is no contrariety o
f judi
cial opinion , that a mortgage lien is only extinguished by payment
o
r
release , and , with this rule , the doctrine that the decree does not
merge the lien o
f
the mortgage fully harmonizes ; while the opposite
rule is in direct and irreconcilable hostility to it . We have already
adverted to the well known rule , that , as the lien o
f
the mortgage is
specific , while that o
f
the judgment is general , the former is the
superior . The doctrine , for which the appellant contends , that the
lien o
f
the judgment supplants that o
f
the mortgage , can not be
brought into harmony with the general rule just stated . There is
a sharp and full conflict , but we deem it unnecessary to multiply
illustrations . It is obvious that appellant ' s theory jars and conflicts
with many settled principles ; while the opposite theory agrees and
harmonizes with al
l
the great rules o
f
law , except the technical one
o





Judgment affirmed . 10
1
0
" The mortgage -deed , though in some senses merged in the decree ,
remains a muniment of the title which passed to the purchaser at the
mortgage sale , and to be looked to , not only for the purpose of ascer
taining the point of time at which the mortgage lien attached , but also
( in the absence of express directions in the decree limiting the estate
to be sold ) the estate purporting thereby to have been conveyed by
way of mortgage , as being in fee or otherwise . ” Wallace , C . J . , in
Vallejo Land Assn . v . Viera , 48 Cal . 572 , holding that covenants of title





foreclosure , passing a title acquired by the mortgagor after
the execution of the mortgage .
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OGLE v . KOERNER .
SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS . 1892 .
140 Ill . 170 .
On the 6th day of February , 1890 , Gustavus A . Koerner and




t . Clair county , alleging , in substance that , on the 13th day of
October , 1886 , Russell Hinckley was indebted to Benjamin Higgins ,
in the sum o
f
$ 2
1 ,700 ; to Benjamin Smith in the sum of $ 12 ,728 ,
and to Joseph Ogle in the sum o
f
$ 2
0 ,000 , and that being so in
debted , he executed to each o
f
his said creditors his two certain
promissory notes , due in one and two years after date , for the
amounts o
f
his indebtedness to them respectively ; that he was also




f John Short , deceased , in the sum o
f
$ 1
0 ,000 , and that on
the same day he executed his promissory note for that amount , due
two years after date ; that to secure said notes to Ogle , Smith and
Higgins , said Hinckley and wife , on the same day , executed and de
livered to said Koerner , as trustee , their five deeds of trust on lands




. Clair , Marion , Clinton , Fayette and Wayne ,
the trust deed on lands in St . Clair county conveying certain lands
in said bill particularly described ; that also on said day , said Hinck
ley and wife , to secure said note to Needles , executed and delivered
to Koerner , a
s
trustee , five similar deeds o
f
trust , on the same lands ,
the deeds o
f
trust in favor o
f
Needles being made second and sub
ject to the lien o
f
those in favor o
f Ogle , Smith and Higgins .
The bill further alleges , that , a
t







. Clair . county , said Koerner exhibited his bill in
chancery to foreclose the deeds o
f
trust given to secure the indebt
edness to Ogle , Smith and Higgins , and that said Needles , as junior
mortgagee , was made a party defendant to said bill ; that such pro
ceedings were had in said foreclosure suit , that a decree was entered
finding the facts as to the indebtedness to Ogle , Smith and Higgins ,





above stated , and also finding the amount due to said several
creditors , the amount found due on the Needles note and trust
deed being $ 5 ,704 . 74 ; that said decree also found that , in June ,




said lands , subject
to the deeds of trust , to Willer H . Horner ; also that Needles had
assigned his note to certain parties , who , a
s
the bill alleges , after
wards , and on the 6th dav o
f August , 1889 , assigned and transferred
the same , with all their rights , claims , interest and equity o
f redemp
tion thereunder to McCarthy , one o
f
the present complainants .
It was further alleged that said decree ordered and adjudged that
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said deeds of trust be foreclosed and the lands thereby conveyed
sold by the master in chancery , and that the proceeds , after paying
costs and expenses, be applied to the payment of the indebtedness
to Ogle, Smith and Higgins , and that the surplus, if any, should be
applied to the indebtedness secured by said junior deeds of trust ,
and that the holders of said junior deeds of trust have twelve months
from the date of sale within which to redeem .
That in pursuance of said decree , said master sold said lands on
the 17th and 18th days of September , 1888 , and that at said sale ,
Andrew A . Miller bid of
f
and purchased certain lands in S
t
. Clair
county , containing in all about 488 acres , for the sum o
f
$ 2 ,685 , and
received the master ' s certificate of sale therefor ; that on the 26th day
o





trust , and o
f
the promissory note thereby secured , redeemed
said 488 acres o
f
land from said sale to Miller , b
y
paying to said
master the sum o
f
$ 2 ,894 . 82 , being the amount o
f




f eight per cent . per annum from the date of
sale , and that said master executed to said McCarthy a certificate of
redemption therefor .
The bill further shows that the sum o
f







the Needles note , with interest thereon from the
date o
f
the decree , is still due and payable to said McCarthy , and
that by reason o
f
said redemption , said sum o
f
$ 2 ,894 . 82 and inter
est , as well as the amount due on said note and deed o
f
trust , are
subsisting and valid liens upon said 488 acres o
f
land ; that Hinckley
has conveyed his equity o
f redemption in all o
f
said lands to Hor
ner and is insolvent ; that a
ll o
f




trust have been sold under said decree , the largest part in value
having been bid in by Ogle , Smith and Higgins , but that sufficient
was not realized therefrom to satisfy the first deeds of trust .
Said bill prayed that an account be taken o
f
the amounts due said





them , be decreed to pay said McCarthy the amount found
due him , with costs and attorney ' s fees , by a short day to be ap
pointed by the court , and that in default o
f
such payment , said de
fendants , and all persons claiming b
y , through o
r
under them , be
forever barred and foreclosed o
f
a




to said mortgaged premises o
r any part thereof .
Defendants Ogle , Smith and Higgins appeared and answered ,
and filed their cross -bill , in which , after alleging the indebtedness
from Hinckley to them , the execution o
f Hinckley ' s promissory notes
therefor and the execution by Hinckley and wife o
f
the trust deeds





trust to secure said note o
f
$ 1
0 ,000 to Needles ;
also the foreclosure proceedings and decree and the sale thereunder ;
the assignment o
f
the Needles note and deed o
f







lands , the largest piñ
sufficie
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tain third parties , to McCarthy ; the conveyance of all of said lands
by Hinckley and wife to Horner ; the payment by McCarthy to the











redemption , substantially as alleged in the orig




f redemption , McCarthy took possession of the lands so
redeemed and has ever since had possession thereof , claiming the
same by virtue o
f
said proceedings ; that the land so redeemed is
worth a
t
least $ 17 ,000 , and that 200 acres o
f
it are under cultiva
tion and are o
f
the annual rental value o
f
$ 4 per acre , and that Mc
Carthy is collecting the rents therefrom amounting to a
t
least $ 800
annually ; that the proceeds o
f
the master ' s sale were not sufficient to
pay the complainants in the cross -bill their respective claims , but
that there is now due them the sum o
f
$ 5 ,000 which is a first lien on
said 488 acres o
f
land , subject , however , to the redemption money
paid by McCarthy , less the amount received by him from rents and
profits while in possession of said lands ; that said Hinckley is in
solvent , so that the complainants have no means o
f collecting from
him the balance due them on said foreclosure decree ; that they ten
der the amount o
f
the redemption money paid as aforesaid , less the
amount o
f
said rents and profits , to said McCarthy .
Said cross -bill prays that an account be taken o
f
the amount due
McCarthy for the redemption money paid , deducting the amount re






the master , and that out o
f
the proceeds , after paying the
costs o
f
suit and the expenses o
f
sale , the amount found due Mc
Carthy for redemption money be first paid ; next the balance due the
complainants in the cross -bill , and next the amount found due MC
Carthy on the claim assigned to him , and that the residue , if any ,
be brought into court to await the further order thereof .
T
o
said cross -bill McCarthy demurred for want of equity . which
demurrer was sustained b
y
the court , and thereupon a decree was





therein . McCarthy and Koerner thereupon asked leave to dismiss
their original bill , which leave was granted , and said bill was dis
missed on their motion .
Said decree being taken to the Appellate Court , Ogle , Smith and
Higgins assigned for error the sustaining o
f
the demurrer to the
cross -bill and the dismissing o
f
said bill at their costs , and also the
dismissing o
f
the original bill without the consent o
f
the complain
ants in the cross -bill . The Appellate Court overruled said assign
ments o
f
error and affirmed the decree , and the record is now
brought to this court on appeal from said judgment o
f
affirmance .
Mr . JUSTICE Bailey delivered the opinion of the Court :
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missed , the court committed no error in allowing the complainants in
the original bill to dismiss their bill on their own motion and at their
own costs . It is true the statute provides that no complainant shall
be allowed to dismiss his bill after a cross -bill has been filed , with
out the consent of the defendant , but after a final decree dismissing
the cross -bill the case , so far as the original bill is concerned , stands
precisely as though no cross -bill had been filed . The complainants
are then at liberty to dismiss their bill, and it would be error for
the court to deny their motion to dismiss . Reilly v . Reilly , 139 I11 .
180 . It may be , if this court should be o
f
the opinion that the cross
bill in this case was improperly dismissed , and should reverse the
decree in that respect , so a
s
to reinstate the cross -bill , that the com
plainants in that bill would have a right to insist upon the vacation
o
f
the order dismissing the original bill , so as to restore the case
upon both bills to the position in which it stood before the commis
sion o
f
the error . But until it is found that the cross -bill is im
properly dismissed , the order dismissing the original bill can not be
disturbed .
The only substantial question presented by the assignment o
f er
rors then is , as to the propriety o
f
the decision o
f the court sustain
ing the demurrer to the cross -bill . The theory o
f
that bill seems to





the 488 acres o
f
land in question from the sale under
the decree foreclosing the senior mortgage , had the effect , not only
of cancelling the sale , but of wiping out al
l
its legal consequences , so
a
s
to subject said land again to the lien o
f
the senior mortgage , and
thus enable the holders o
f
that mortgage to satisfy the unpaid bal
ance o
f
their incumbrance in preference to the junior mortgage .
In support o
f
their contention , the complainants in the cross -bill
seek to invoke those principles which apply to equitable redemp
. tions , and which require the party seeking to redeem to pay the en
tire incumbrance from which redemption is sought . Doubtless if
McCarthy were in a court o
f equity praying to be permitted to re
deem from a prior incumbrance , relief would be granted him only
upon payment o
f
the entire incumbrance . Thus , if neither he nor
any person to whom h
e
sustains the relation o
f privity had been
made a party to the foreclosure suit , and he , after the statutory
period o
f redemption from the foreclosure sale had expired , had filed
his bill to redeem , he would have been required to redeem from the
mortgage and not merely from the sale . He would in that case have
been required to pay not merely the amount bid for the land and
interest but the balance which the sale left unsatisfied .
That the principles applicable to equitable redemptions do not ap
ply is obvious from a variety o
f
reasons . In the first place , Mc
Carthy , so far as his relation to the cross -bill is concerned a
t
least ,
is not a suitor in a court o
f equity asking relief o
f any kind , but is
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only a defendant seeking to contest the equities attempted to be en
forced by the complainants in that bill . Again ,McCarthy is not ask
ing to be allowed to redeem , even by the original bill . The redemp
tion is a fact already accomplished , and he is only seeking to enforce
equities to which he became entitled by having redeemed . Thirdly ,
McCarthy's redemption of said land not only professed to be but in
fact was a statutory redemption from the foreclosure sale , and enti
tled him to all those rights, both legal and equitable , which the stat
ute gives in case of such redemption .
In all cases of sales of land under foreclosure decrees , the statute
gives to any defendant , his heirs , administrators or assigns , or any
person interested in the premises through or under the defendant ,
the right to redeem the land sold , at any time within twelve months
from the date of the sale , by paying the purchaser or the master the
sum of money for which the land was bid off, and interest thereon
from the date of sale at the rate of eight per cent. per annum . R . S .
1874 , chap . 77 , sec . 18 . Needles, the junior mortgagee , was made
a defendant to the foreclosure suit , and McCarthy afterwards became
interested in the mortgaged premises under Needles, by assignment
to him of the junior mortgage and the indebtedness thereby secured .
He therefore was a party who , under the statute , was entitled to re
deem from the sale, and the admission of the cross -bill is that he
did so redeem , by paying to the master the sum for which the land in
question was sold with interest . The redemption therefore was un
questionably statutory , and whatever may be the rules applicable to
equitable redemptions , the only question here is , as to the rights, as
against the senior mortgagee , which a junior mortgagee acquires by
a statutory redemption from a sale under the senior mortgage .11
11 In about a third of the states the statutes provide for redemption
from a sale under a decree foreclosing a mortgage . These statutes
vary widely in their provisions , e. g., as to who may redeem , when he
may redeem , what sum he must pay to redeem , to whom , when and
where he must pay it , what the effect of the redemption is upon the
rights of the several parties , & c ; nor are the decisions construing these
statutes entirely harmonious ; but a few general principles regarding
them are fairly fixed .
In Eiceman v . Finch , 79 Ind. 511 , Elliott , C . J ., says, " There are two
rights of redemption ; the general equitable right and the statutory
right. The former is forever barred by the decree and sale ; the latter
does not spring into existence until the sale takes place . This statu
tory right comes into existence with the sale ; it continues for one year
and then expires."
In Spurgin v. Adamson , 62 Iowa 661, Beck , J ., says , “ It is insisted
that the only right of redemption was that conferred by the statute , and
that, as the time within which that right may be exercised under the
statute had expired before this suit was brought , he is not entitled to re
deem from the mortgage . It can not be doubted that he lost the statutory
right to redeem and we do not understand that he claimed it.
“ But the plaintiff , as the holder of a lien upon the property , has , in
equity , a right to redeem until that right is cut off by foreclosure . As
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A mortgage , or as in this case , a deed of trust in the nature of a
mortgage , vests in the party secured a lien upon the mortgaged
premises . By virtue of that lien the mortgagee is entitled to have
themortgaged property sold under a decree of foreclosure and the
proceeds of the sale applied to the payment of the debt secured . This
is the mode provided by law for the enforcement of the lien , and
when the lien has been once enforced by the sale of the property , it
has, as to such property , expended its force and accomplished its
purpose , and the property is no longer subject to it . 12
When the redemption is made b
y
a party primarily liable on the
mortgage debt , it may be that the same property may be resorted
to again for the purpose o





n the mortgage , but that is not because o
f any right to





law which subjects all the property o
f
a
debtor to the payment of his debts until they are satisfied in full .
But where the redemption is made b
y
a party not liable upon the
mortgage debt , the mortgage lien having been exhausted , the prop
erty can not be subjected a second time to the satisfaction o
f
the
same lien . The party redeeming does so for his own benefit , and the
holders of the senior mortgage having , by the sale , become entire
strangers to the property , are in no position to derive any advantage
this was not done , and he was not made a party to the action to fore
close , he retains this equitable right . Defendants insist that this
equitable right of redemption is merged in the statutory right , and limited ,
as to the time of its exercise , by the provisions of the statute . There
is nothing to be found in the statute taking away the equity o
f redemp
tion and substituting therefor the statutory redemption . Code , sec , 3321 ,





sales upon general executions . Under this
statute , an incumbrancer , or one holding an interest in the land , which ,
under the statute , would give him the right to redeem , may exercise that
right within the time prescribed by the statute , although he was a
party to the foreclosure action , and his equity o
f redemption was cut
off by the decree o
f
foreclosure . The equity o
f redemption ceases to
exist after the expiration o
f
the time fixed by the decree of foreclosure ,
or the rules of chancery applicable thereto . The statute , under our
view , confers a right upon the junior incumbrancer not given by chan
cery . By its terms it does not limit the right of redemption before
existing under the rules o
f equity . That right is , therefore , not taken
away by it . It was not the purpose of the statute , in conferring this
right of redemption , to take away another and different right recog
nized by equity . ”
1
2 Compare Lightcap v . Bradley , 186 11
1
. 510 .
When a mortgage is foreclosed for an installment o
f
the debt , it is
usually held that the mortgage lien is completely discharged , unless
the sale is expressly subject to the lien of the mortgage for the balance .
Harms v . Palmer , 73 Iowa 446 ; Fowler v . Johnson , 26 Minn . 338 ; Mc
Lean v . Hoehle , 98 Wis . 359 ; Curtis v . Cutler , 76 Fed . 16 . But see Edgar
v . Beck , 96 Mich , 419 , as to statutory foreclosure in Michigan . And
see 37 L . R . A . 737 , note .
21
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from the redemption . The sale having been made at public auction ,
and in the manner prescribed by the statute , the presumption , as be
tween the senior and junior incumbrancers , is a conclusive one, that
the property has produced it
s
entire value , and that value having
been once applied to the senior mortgage , the lien has accomplished
it
s full purpose and is thereafter functus officio .
It is idle for the senior mortgagee to urge that the property
redeemed is in fact worth much more than the price for which it
was sold at the foreclosure sale . He was a competent bidder at such




fair cash value , and if he failed to do so , a presumption arises from
which he can not escape , that the property sold for what it was rea
sonably worth . At any rate , the mortgagee under whose decree the
mortgaged property is sold , in the absence o
f
all irregularity and un
fairness in the sale , must be conclusively held to the price bid , as a
full equivalent for and satisfaction o
f
his lien , and having received
the proceeds o
f
the sale , hebecomes a mere stranger to the property .
It follows from what we have said , that McCarthy redeemed the
land in question free from the lien o
f




the redemption , the sale and certificate , as the statute declares , be
came null and void , but upon familiar principles o
f
equity , McCarthy
became subrogated to the rights o
f
the purchaser to the extent o
f
having a first lien on the land redeemed for reimbursement o
f
the
redemption money . The prior deed o
f
trust being out o
f
the way ,
the junior deed o
f
trust became subject only to McCarthy ' s lien for
the redemption money .
The view we have taken is supported by the case o
f Seligman v .
Laubheimer , 58 Ill . 124 . In that case the land in controversy was
subject to a senior and a junior mortgage , and a decree o
f
foreclos
ure was rendered finding the amounts due on both mortgages , and
declaring one to be a first and the other a second lien . Under the
decree the land was sold for a sum less than sufficient to pay the
amount o
f
the first mortgage . Before the expiration o
f
twelve
months from the sale , the junior mortgagee redeemed . On applica
tion o
f
the senior mortgagee to have the balance due him ascertained
and declared to b
e
a still subsisting lien on the mortgaged property
and for a resale of the property , it was held that the lien of the first
mortgage was extinguished , and that the junior mortgagee redeem
ing under the statute , took the land free from the lien o
f
the first
mortgage . The following was a portion o
f
the reasoning upon which
the decision was based :
"What was the effect o
f
the redemption ? The second mortgagee ,
who redeemed from the sale , was the grantee o
f
the mortgagors .
By the express provision o
f
the statute , he had the right to redeem
the lands ,by the payment o
f
the amount bid by the plaintiff in error .
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pelled to do equity , by the payment of the prior mortgage debt, be
fore he could obtain relief. But this redemption was a statutory
right . Upon the payment of the amount bid, with interest , the orig
inal certificate of purchase was null and void . The equity of re
demption established by the courts, is entirely different from the
statutory right. The one is governed by the principles of equity
jurisprudence ; the other is controlled , in its operation and effect ,
entirely by the statute . In the enforcement of the one right , the
party must pay all that is equitably due ; in the other he need only
comply with the statute . ”
Some decisions are cited from other states in relation to redemp
tions from foreclosure sales , but the statutes of the states where
those decisions were made were essentially different from ours , and
the cases cited are therefore of little weight as authority here . We
are o
f
the opinion that the rule laid down in Seligman v . Laub
heimer , supra , is entirely sound , and that it must control in the pres
ent case .
No other question is presented which is not substantially disposed
o
fby what has already been said . The cross -bill showed no equity ,
and the demurrer thereto was properly sustained .
The judgment o
f
the Appellate Court affirming the decree o
f
the
Circuit Court will be affirmed .
Judgment affirmed .
Lord , C . J . , in Willis v .Miller , 23 Ore . 352 . ( 1893 )






f Phipps is subject to resale
for the payment o
f
a




for deficiency rendered against Phipps ? The contention for the
plaintiff is , that when the land owned b
y
him was sold by the sheriff
to themortgagee under the decree foreclosing the mortgage upon it
and other lands , and the sale of the same was confirmed by the court ,
the lien o
f
the mortgage was extinguished , and if there remained
any portion o
f
the decree unsatisfied by reason o
f
such lands not
selling for a sufficient sum to pay the whole o
f
it , the judgment for
such deficiency , when docketed , became , b
y
force o
f general law , a
lien upon any lands owned then or thereafter by the judgment debtor
Phipps , but not against any land plaintiff had purchased o
f Phipps











r mortgagee , the effect was to terminate
the sale , and to restore him to his estate , freed from the mortgage
lien and decree for the unpaid balance . On the other hand , the
contention for the defendant is , that when the land o
f
the plaintiff
was sold under the decree o
f
foreclosure and sale , with other lands
covered by the mortgage , and the sum realized from such sale was
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less than the amount found to be due on themortgage , and plaintiff
redeemed the land from the sale , the mortgage and decree continued
as a lien on his land for the unpaid balance .
Our Code provides for the foreclosure of a lien of a mortgage by
a suit in equity in which the property subject to the mortgage lien
shall be adjudged " to be sold to satisfy the debt secured thereby ;"
and in such suit, in addition to the decree of foreclosure and sale ,
where there is a promissory note or other personal obligation for
the payment of the debt, " the court shall also decree a recovery of
the amount of such debt against such person or persons , as the case
may be, as in the case of an ordinary decree for the recovery of
money ” : Hill 's Code , § 414 . And it further provides, that when a
decree of foreclosure and sale is given , it may be enforced by an
execution “ against the property adjudged to be sold ," but that when
the decree is also in personam , and “ the proceeds of the sale of the
property upon which the lien is foreclosed is not sufficient to satisfy
the decree as to the sum remaining unsatisfied , the decree may be
enforced by execution as in ordinary cases ” : Hill' s Code, § 413 .
The decree has the effect to bar the equity of redemption , but the
property sold thereon “may be redeemed in likemanner and with like
effect ” as property sold upon a judgment, “ and not otherwise” :
Hill's Code , § 414 . By sections 303 and 304 , it is provided that the
judgment debtor, or his successor in interest , may redeem at any
time prior to the confirmation of sale , on certain terms therein speci
fied , and also under confirmation of sale , but “ if the judgment
debtor redeem at any time before the time for redemption expires ,
the effect of the sale shall be terminatd , and he shall be restored
to his estate ."
* * * * * * * *
I do not think that the decree of foreclosure and sale merges or ex
tinguishes the lien of the mortgage . The mortgage lien is a specific
one , and the judgment obtained is a general one. The suit of fore
closure is a remedy for the enforcement of the lien , and certainly is
not intended to have the effect to impair or abridge the mortgage
lien . That effect can only be accomplished by payment of themort
gage debt or a release. The lien was created by the mortgage , and
the decree neither added to nor took anything from it, and the effect
of the sale under it was vacated or terminated by the redemption ,
and thereafter the mortgage and judgment of foreclosure stood as
though no sale had ever been made. In Goddard v . Renner , 57 Ind .
536 , the court says : “When the real property is redeemed from a
sale under execution , either by the owner or some one else acting in
his behalf , the certificate of sale is simply annulled , and the property
restored to the position it occupied before the sale , with the judg
ment lien or liens reinstated for any balance or balances remaining
unpaid , and may be resold to discharge such judgment lien or liens."
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See also Teal v . Hinchman , 69 Ind : 385. The object of the sale is
to cut off the equity of redemption and the rights of all subsequent
incumbrancers . As to such the sale may extinguish their liens ,
since they are bound to protect themselves , when parties to the de
cree , by bidding on the property , as Lauriat v. Stratton , 11 Fed .
Rep . 114 , illustrates and declares .





cumbrancers that are made parties , so that to protect themselves they





their liens , as the object of the sale is to dispose of the
property to the highest bidder ; and this consequence to the later in
cumbrancer is calculated to promote a healthy competition and make
the property bring its full value . But the decree of foreclosure and
sale does not supersede the mortgage and extinguish the lien for
any unpaid balance , when the property is redeemed b
y
the judgment
debtor or his successor in interest , for in that case the effect o
f
the
redemption is to vacate the sale , or so far as the property is con
cerned , it stands as though no sale had ever been made .
The view expressed b
y Mr . Austin Abbott is in point upon this
subject . He says : “Our law requires that the mortgagee should
apply to a court o
f
equity , not for the purpose of cutting off the
mortgage and selling the land under the judgment a
s
land is sold un
der execution , but for the purpose o
f establishing the mortgage , and
cutting off the equity o




ate claimants . The decree o
f
foreclosure does not supersede the
mortgage . The mortgage remains upon the record , and is the
foundation o
f
the decree , and it is the title which was pledged b
y
the mortgage , thus freed from subsequent incumbrances , which the




later excrescences . To regard it as an execution sale , intended to
prune off the mortgage , is to reverse the legal fact and imagine the
less can include the greater . The legal fact involved in a decree of
foreclosure , so far as the title to the land is concerned , is that the
court lays hold o
f
the title which was in the mortgagor at the time
o
f
the mortgage , and which was expressed to be conveyed thereby ,
cuts off all later incumbrancers that are made parties , and transfers
the disincumbered right and title to the highest bidder . The decree
merges the cause o
f
action for foreclosure , * * * but it does not
merge the title to the land in the foreclosure case ” : Evansville Gas
Light Co . v . State , 73 Ind . 219 ( 38 Am . Rep . 133 , note ) . As bear
ing upon this point , the following authorities may be consulted :





. Rep . 211 ; 29 N . E . Rep . 35 ) ; Pence v . Armstrong , 95
Ind . 207 ; Settlemeir v . Newsome , 10 Or . 446 ; Freeman , Judgments ,
§ 398 .
It may be admitted that the case presents some harsh features ,
but in my view o
f
the law , I do not see how the plaintiff can be re
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lieved . But as the majority of this court has reached a different
conclusion , the decree must be reversed .13
TIFFANY , REAL PROPERTY , § 558 . As previously stated , the mort
gage is usually given to secure a debt for which the mortgagor is
personally liable , and the enforcement of this liability becomes a mat
ter of importance in case the amount of the debt can not be realized
from the mortgaged property . It has always been considered , in the
absence of a statutory provision to the contrary , that the mortgagee
may enforce his different rights at the same time , pursuing concur
rently his suit in equity to foreclose and his action at law on the note
or bond evidencing the mortgagor 's personal liability . Likewise , re
covery in an action on the debt does not affect the right to subse
quently foreclose ; nor does the completion of foreclosure prevent a
subsequent suit to recover on the personal liability , unless the result
of the foreclosure is to satisfy the debt .
Formerly , in case the proceeds of the sale of the property were in
sufficient to pay the obligation , the only mode in which themortgagee
could enforce the mortgagor 's personal liability was by a separate
action at law against the mortgagor . Of recent years , however ,
statutes have been passed in many states authorizing the entry in the
foreclosure proceeding of a personal judgment or decree for the
deficiency against the mortgagor or other person liable for the debt ;
and in such states the mortgagee is usually subject to restrictions of
a more or less positive character upon his right to institute separate
proceedings to enforce the personal liability and to foreclose .
13 Compare, Hervey v . Krost , 116 Ind . 268 ; Anderson v . Anderson ,
129 Ind . 573 ; Warford v. Sullivan , 147 Ind . 14 ; Clayton v. Ellis , 50 Iowa
590 ; People ' s Savings Bank v. McCarthy , 119 Iowa 586 ; Cooper V .
Maurer , 122 Iowa 321 ; Clark v. Butts , 78 Minn . 373 .
Where the statutes allow redemption after a foreclosure sale , they
usually provide that the purchaser shall not receive a deed until the
period of redemption has expired . He receives , at the time of the
sale , a certificate of sale which gives him a lien on the property for
the purchase money and a right to have a deed if no redemption is made.
Whether one who redeems from a foreclosure sale acquires the
rights of the purchaser , with the right ultimately to have a sheriff 's
deed , or merely discharges the encumbrance created in the hands of
the purchaser by the sale ; and whether , if the latter be the case , the
redemptioner has a lien for the money advanced to make the redemp
tion ; and whether , after a redemption by one of several persons en
titled to redeem , another has a right to redeem from the redemptioner ,
and , if so , upon what terms such re -redemption may be made - these
and many other difficult questions arise under the redemption statutes.
Their solution depends , of course , upon the terms of the statutes , which
are diverse , and the construction thereof , which is not entirely harmon
ious . See cases cited above , and Johnson v. Johnson , Walker Ch . (Mich . )
331 ; Moore v. Smith , 95 Mich . 71 ; McGregor v, Pierce , 17 S . Dak , 51.
It will be found that in solving these questions distinctions are neces
sary between redemptions by the different classes of persons who are
entitled to redeem .
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MALLIN v . WENHAM .








ll wages to be earned b
y
him in the future . Thereafter , Mallin
filed a petition in bankruptcy , under the Act o
f
1898 , his indebted
ness to Wenham being scheduled and Wenham having notice there
o
f , and subsequently obtained a discharge in bankruptcy . There
after Wenham brought suit in the name o
f
Mallin for the use of
Wenham , against Armour & Co . , claiming the wages of Mallin by
virtue o
f
the assignment . Mallin thereupon filed a bill in equity
against Wenham and Armour & Co . , to restrain the prosecution o
f
the suit . From a judgment o
f
the Appellate Court in favor o
f Wen
ham the complainant appeals . ]
Ricks , J . ( After deciding that the assignment created an equita
ble lien upon the wages which had accrued . ] It is next insisted by
appellant that because o
f bankruptcy proceedings had by him the
assignment is unenforceable . This position ,we think , is wrong . The
only effect of a discharge in bankruptcy is to suspend the right of
action for a debt against the debtor personally . It does not annul
the original debt or liability of the debtor . In Bush v . Stanley , 122
I1
1
. 406 , the court said ( p . 416 ) : " The discharge is analogous , in
effect , to the Statute o
f
Limitations , in so far as it does not annul
the original debt , but merely suspends the right o
f
action for its re
covery . " In Pease v . Ritchie , 132 11
1
. 638 , this court further said
( p . 646 ) : “ It is no doubt true that appellant ' s discharge in bank
ruptcy operated a
s
a bar to any action which might be brought to
recover any debt o
r obligation existing at the time he was declared
a bankrupt , and after acquired property was exempted from being
taken in satisfaction o




n equitable claim ,by mortgage o
r
otherwise , upon any prop
erty of the bankrupt , such right or rights would remain unaffected
by the proceedings in bankruptcy . ”
In the case o
f
Edwards v . Peterson , ( 80 Me . 367 ) , an employee
had given an assignment o
f
h
is wages . Subsequently he filed a peti
tion for discharge under the insolvent law o
f
the State , and in its
opinion the court there said : “ The rule laid down b
y Judge Story
in Mitchell v . Winslow , 2 Story , 630 , seems to have been very gen
erally held b
y
all chancery courts in this country . He says : “ It
seems to me a clear result of all the authorities , that whenever the
parties , by their contract , intend to create a positive lien o
r charge ,
either upon real o
r personal property , whether then owned b
y
the
assignor or contractor o
r not , or if personal property , whether it is
in esse o
r
not , it attaches in equity as a lien o
r charge upon the par
ticular property as soon as the assignor o
r
contractor acquires a title
thereto , against the latter and all persons asserting a claim thereto
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under him , either voluntarily or with notice in bankruptcy .' ” The
language above quoted is also quoted with approval in the case of
Gregg v . Sanford , 24 Ill . 17 .
In the case o
f Champion v . Buckingham , 42 N . E . Rep . 498 , it
was held that a creditor who has not proved his debt in bankruptcy
is still , after discharge o
f
the debtor , a subsisting creditor against
him to the extent o
f





insurance on the life o
f
the debtor as
signed to him by the debtor an ! beneficiary to secure subsisting de
mands in favor o
f
the creditor , and it was said that the discharge
did not extinguish the debt or demand , but that the effect o
f
such







tions , which only goes to bar a creditor ' s remedy and does not wipe
out the debt .
In discussing the right o
f
a creditor to maintain an action on a





Limitations , it was said in Shaw v . Sillo
way , 14 N . E . Rep . 783 : " If there is an actual pledge and the debt
becomes barred , this does not give to the debtor a right to re -claim
his pledged property . The debt is not extinguished — the statute
only takes away the remedy . (Hancock v . Insurance Co . , 114 Vass .




real or personal estate the security
is not lost though the debt be barred . ( Thayer v . Mann , 19 Pick .
535 . ) The rule is the same where there is a lien . (Spears v . Hartly ,
3 Esp . 81 ; Higgins v . Scott , 2 Barn . & Adol . 413 ; In re Bromhead ,
1
6
L . J . Q . B . 355 . ) And there appears to be no good reason why
a
n independent collateral agreement , given b
y way o
f guaranty or
other security , should not outlive the remedy upon the debt which
it was given to secure , under proper circumstances . ”
Section 67d o
f
the Bankruptcy law of 1898 provides : " Liens given
o
r





upon this act , and for a present consideration , which have been re
corded according to law , if record thereof was necessary in order






the assignment , nor was it such a
one as required any notice to be given , consequently we think the
assignment in question was one “ not affected b
y
this act . ”
We think the decided weight of authority is to the effect that a
discharge o
f
a debtor in bankruptcy is but a personal release , and
does not exonerate the effects o
f
the debtor to which a valid lien




the Bankruptcy act .
The assignments o
f
error , we think , are without merit , and the
judgment o
f
the Appellate Court should be and is affirmed .
Judgment affirmed . 14
1
4
A mortgage which is fraudulent as against creditors , by common
law , can be set aside by the trustee in bankruptcy by an appropriate
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BELKNAP v . GLEASON .
SUPREME COURT OF CONNECTICUT , 1835 .
11 Conn . 160 .
Bill in chancery for a foreclosure of a mortgage securing several
promissory notes . Defendant pleaded payment and the statute of
limitations . The superior court found that more than six years had
elapsed since the notes had become due.
WILLIAMS , Ch , J. Two questions arise upon the facts in this
case : Is the statute of limitations applicable to it ; and is there a
legal presumption of payment ?
As to the first . That no action at law will lie upon these notes , if
the statute of limitations is pleaded , can not be doubted . Nor can
it be claimed , that this statute , proprio vigore , shall operate in a court
o
f equity . But it is claimed , that in analogy to the proceedings at
law under that statute , a court of equity will apply it , when the claim
comes before that court .
There is n
o
doubt that courts o
f
chancery will not lend their ai
d
to claims which are barred in a court o
f
law . 4 Kent ' s Com . 187 .
Lansing v . Starr , 2 Johns . Ch . Rep . 150 . Roosevelt v . Mark , 6
Johns . Ch . Rep . 289 . Kane v . Bloodgood & al . 7 Johns . Ch . Rep . 90 .
But these cases do not prove , nor does the principle require , that
when a creditor holds different instruments to secure the same debt ,
if the remedy upon one of them is barred at law , the remedy upon
all is barred in equity ; the rule being analogous to the rule o
f
law .
The question would then seem to b
e , does the statute o
f
limitations
take away all remedy a
t
law ? It is not uncommon that a party may
have one remedy , when he has lost the benefit o
f
another . Thus , it
was formerly holden , that trover would lie for an article taken
wrongfully , although the action o
f
trespass was barred by the stat
ute . Ferriss v . Ferriss , 1 Root . 465 . So an action will lie upon an
adjustment o
f
accounts , although book debt is barred . Ashley v .
Hill , 6 Conn . Rep . 246 . So if a horse is taken under such circum
stances that trespass will lie , it has been decided , that an action o
f
assumpsit may be brought for the avails o
f
the sale , although tres
pass was barred b
y
the statute . Lamb v . Clark , 5 Pick . 193 . Here
the debt is secured by notes and a mortgage , each of which requires




which may be pursued at the same time .
Assumpsit upon the notes must be brought within six years ; an
action o
f
ejectment for the land may be brought within fifteen years .
proceeding ; likewise , a mortgage which is a preference under the Bank
ruptcy Act , provided the petition was filed within four months after
the mortgage was recorded . And a secured creditor who files a claim
against the bankrupt ' s estate thereby waives his security . Each of
these propositions is , of course , but the suggestion of a large topic in
bankruptcy law . A distinct set o
f questions , also o
f
considerable diffi
culty , arises in regard to the effect of bankruptcy proceedings upon
the jurisdiction of the state courts to entertain proceedings for the
foreclosure o




In this state, where payment after the law day will not defeat an
action of ejectment by the mortgagee , it will not be pretended that
that action would be defeated by the statute of limitations affecting
the note . What analogy requires a court of equity to say, that the
remedy at law is gone , and therefore , there is none in chancery ? One
remedy is indeed gone , and one only . Themortgagee may get and
hold possession of this land , by virtue of his legal rights . With
what face could the debtor come here for relief ? His case , if truly
disclosed , would be this : " I owed this debt ; gave my notes for it ;
and mortgaged my land to make it more secure. The creditor , by
his kindness or his negligence , has suffered his notes to be barred ,
by the statute of limitations , and is attempting to collect his debt out
of the only remaining security . I have not paid it ; but I pray this
court , as a court of equity , since the creditor has lost one security ,
to prevent his making use of the other .” The ready answer to this
claim , is , that if the statute of limitations protects the debtor at law ,
he does not need the aid of a court of equity . If it does not, this
court ought not, by analogy , to extend this statute to cases where
courts of law are not required to do it.
In the high court of chancery in Maryland , it has been expressly
decided , that not less than twenty years can operate as a bar of a
mortgage or equitable lien , although the bond or note may be barred
by twelve or three years . Lingan v . Henderson , 1 Bland 's Rep. 282 .
Our statute of limitations operates upon negotiable notes in six
years ; upon notes not negotiable in seventeen years ; upon entries
o
n lands in fifteen years . Now , if a note not neogtiable is secured
b
y
real estate , and is suffered to lie , without payment o
f
interest
and without entry on the lands , for sixteen years , the benefit of the
mortgage is lost ; but the note remains a subsisting and available
security . Had the note been negotiable , and lain more than six
years , but less than fifteen , the note would have been subject to the
operation o
f
the statute ; but the creditor might get possession o
f
the
lands . But the remedy now sought is neither a suit upon the notes ,
nor an action of ejectment for the lands ; and of course , neither of
the statutes barring those remedies , is strictly analogous . The ob
ject sought by the foreclosure , is payment o
f
the notes . The means ,
however , b
y
which it is sought , is through the medium o
f
another
security — that o
f










lands , procures payment of the debt . Here , unless the debt
is voluntarily paid by the debtor , the decree in effect gives him the
land in satisfaction o
f
the debt . The operation o
f
the decree upon
the notes , is merely incidental ; but upon the land , it is direct and
operative . It is true , that the mortgagee must also shew , that the
notes are unpaid . Whether he can do that , under the circumstances
o
f
this case , will form the next inquiry
It is said , there is no debt subsisting ; and that , of course , a court
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in chancery can not act. This presents the question , whether the
statute of limitations annihilates the debt, or only suspends the
remedy .
The statutes of limitations are statutes of repose . They suspend
the remedy , but do not cancel the debt . Lord v . Shaler, 3 Conn . Rep .
121 - 134. They are statutes founded upon principles of policy : “ In
terest reipublicae ut finis litium .” The debt remains , and a suit may
be brought upon it, and supported by a subsequent promise . It is
said , that the statute relative to lands, not only prevents an entry ,
but confers a title . Such has been the construction of our statutes ;
but as it respects personal actions, the construction has been uni
form , that the debt is not affected . The words of the statute seem
to justify , and indeed require such construction : “ No action of
account, of debt on book or on simple contract, & c . shall be brought,
except, & c .”
It has indeed been often remarked , by judges, in giving their opin
ions, that the statute was made to protect persons , who were sup
posed to have paid their debt, but had lost the evidence of it. Mount
stephen & al. v . Brooke & al. 3 Barn . & Ald . 141 ( 5 Serg . & Lowb .
245 ) . Or that the debt shall be presumed to be paid . Thornton v .
Illingworth , 2 Barn . & Cres. 824. ( 9 Serg . & Lowb . 257 . ) Dow
thwaite v . Tibbut, 5 Mau . & Salw . 75 . Thompson , admr. v . Peniman ,
8 Mass. Rep . 133 . But that they do notmean by this , that at law the
statute of limitations is sufficient evidence of payment , is apparent
from the fact, that upon the plea of payment , the statute of limita
tions was never considered as sufficient evidence . And where twenty
years have elapsed , it has been held , that payment of a bond might
be presumed . Oswald & al. v. Leigh , 1 Term Rep . 270. But no
case is produced from the English books, where a shorter term has
been held , of itself , sufficient . * * *
* * *
It is said , that the court must , if they pass a decree in this case ,
find , that there is a debt due to the plaintiff ; and that the fact thus
found , will conclude the defendant, in another action at law , should
there remain a balance , after themortgaged estate is exhausted ; and
thus the statute of limitations will in effect be nullified . This ground ,
however , is not tenable . The court must indeed find, that the debt
it unpaid ; but still this does not settle the question at law , that it is
not barred by the statute of limitations. According to the views
before expressed , these are entirely distinct questions . The debt may
not have been paid ; but still the statute may have attached upon it ,
unless it has been waived , by the defendant. This finding , therefore ,
will be utterly immaterial, when the question is , whether the debt is
barred by the statute of limitations.
Upon the whole , this court is satisfied , that the plaintiff is entitled
to a decree , and so advise the superior court.
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The other Judges concurred .
Decree for the plaintiff . 15
OZMUN v . REYNOLDS .
SUPREME COURT OF MINNESOTA , 1866 .
11 Minn . 341.
Action to foreclose a mortgage . Answer that the cause of action
did not accrue within six years . Demurrer to the answer overruled
by the court below .
WILSON , C . J . I think our statute limiting the time for the com
mencement of actions applies as well to equitable as to legal pro
ceedings . (His honor here examined the history and phraseology
of the statute. ] But whatever view may be taken of this question ,
the defense set up must be overruled . Subdivision 1 of chapter 6 of
this chapter of our statutes , above referred to , provides that “ an
action upon a contract , or other obligation , express or implied ," shall
be commenced within six years after the cause of action accrues ,
which the defendant 's counsel insists is a bar to this action . This
view , which is based on the hypothesis that this is an action upon a
contract — the mortgage - does not seem to me tenable , though there
are many dicta that seem to support it. In the examination of this
case , we need not notice the accidental fact that the mortgage was
accompanied by a note , for it is clearly unimportant , so far as the
application of the statute of limitations is concerned , whether the
mortgagor has, in any way , become personally liable for the sum
secured by the mortgage. So , too , I think it is unimportant whether
the mortgage contains a power of sale . The question in this case ,
fairly presented , is, whether an action or suit to foreclose a mort
gage , is an action on a contract, within the meaning of our statute
above cited . If it is, it must be for the enforcement of such con
tract , or for damages for its breach , and we must look to the con
tract to ascertain the nature o
f





ages to which the plaintiff is entitled . An action to foreclose a
mortgage ( a
s
the expression is ordinarily , but inaccurately , used ) is
1
5 Compare , Coyle v . Wilkins , 57 Ala . 108 ; Haskell v . Bailey , 22
Conn . 569 ; Joy v . Adams , 26 Maine 330 ; Green v . Gaston , 56 Miss . 748 ;
Hulbert v . Clark , 128 N . Y . 295 .
" A few cases apparently adopt this theory ( o
f analogy to an action
to recover land ) to the extent of holding that , since the defendant ' s pos
session must be adverse in order to bar an action to recover land , and
since a mortgagor ' s possession is not adverse to the mortgagee , the
right of foreclosure is not barred , as against a mortgagor in possession ,
even by the lapse of the statutory period after default , unless the mort .
agor ' s possession has become adverse by a repudiation of the mortga
gee ' s rights . Whittington vi Flint , 43 Ark . 504 (semble ) ; Lewis v .
Schwenn , 93 Mo . 26 ; Combs v . Goldsworthy , 109 Mo . 151 ; Chouteau v .
Riddle , 110 Mo . 366 ; Hodgdon v . Heidman , 66 Iowa 645 ; Elsberry v .
Boykin , 65 Ala . 336 . ” Tiffany , Real Property , § 549 , n . 356 .
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manifestly not an action to enforce any stipulation or contract ex
pressed in the mortgage, or implied from its language . There is no
covenant implied in a mortgage for the payment of the sum intended
to be secured , nor are the respective rights of mortgagor and mort
gagee ( the reciprocal rights of redemption and foreclosure ) which
exist between these parties secured by their contract ; such rights
would equally exist if the parties had expressly stipulated to the con
trary . No damages can be awarded to the plaintiff unless where
the mortgagor has, in some manner , made himself personally liable
for the sum secured . There has been no breach of any contract con
tained in the mortgage , either express or implied , and , therefore ,
there is no right of action on such contract , either for damages or for
a specific performance . The right to apply to the court, either to
redeem the premises or foreclose the mortgage , is a right incident
to the relation ofmortgagor and mortgagee - secured by the law and
not by contract . A mortgage is , in form , a conveyance , to be void
on the performance of certain conditions. It is true that equity looks
upon and treats it merely as an incident to the debt secured - as a
lien - but this is not by virtue of the agreement of the parties , but
in pursuance of those equitable maxims and rules that have come to
be acknowledged as the law of the land . According to the contract
of the parties , the plaintiff would be the owner in fee absolute of the
mortgaged premises , but equity secures to the mortgagor a right
of redemption , and to bar and foreclose the defendant of such equi
table right , this action is brought .
Nor is it material whether the court orders a strict foreclosure , as
in some places is the practice , or a sale of the premises . The direct
operation of the judgment is , in either case , to enforce the lien , and
incidentally , in both cases , it ordinarily secures the debt ; but from
this it does not follow that such action is an action for the recovery
of the sum secured , for it is only in such cases where the mortgagor
has assumed a personal liability that a personal judgment can be
rendered against him . From the fact that a mortgage is now held
to be a mere lien , or security , for the debt , it does not follow that ,
because an action for the recovery of the debt is barred , the enforce
ment of the lien is also barred. The language of the statute does not
justify such conclusions , and the decisions of the courts are nearly
unanimous against it. It is well settled that whether the security
for a simple contract debt is a lien on personal or real property , the
lien is not impaired in consequence of the debt being barred . Belk
nap v . Gleason , 11 Conn. 160 ; Angell on Lim . sec . 73, and notes , and
cases cited in notes . I think it admits of doubt whether subdivision
1 of section 6 of our statute , above cited , applies at al
l
to equitable
proceedings , but even if it does , this case is not within either its let
ter o
r spirit , and I think the order appealed from should therefore
be reversed , and the cause remanded . 10
1




BERRY , J. I think this is an action upon a contract , but that it is
also an action for relief within the meaning of section 12 , p . 533 .
Pub. Stat. ; 17 that section 12 controls in cases of this kind , and fixes
the period of limitation at ten years under the statute , as it was when
this action was brought . This view , of course , leads me to concur
in the disposition of the case.
LORD v. MORRIS .
SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA , 1861 .
18 Cal. 482 .
FIELD , C . J. delivered the opinion of the Court — Baldwin , J. and
Cope, J. concurring
The questions presented by the record for determination are : first ,
whether , when an action upon a promissory note , secured by a mort
gage of the same date upon real property , is barred by the Statute
of Limitations , themortgagee has any remedy upon themortgage ;
and second , whether a party having a subsequent mortgage upon the
same premises , executed after the statute has run against the note ,
can interpose the plea of the statute in a suit to foreclose the first
mortgage, and thus secure a priority of lien for his subsequent mort
gage . The facts of the case are these : On the fifth of May , 1855 ,
the defendants executed to the plaintiff a mortgage upon the prem
ises described in the complaint , to secure their promissory note to
him , of the same date, for the sum of four hundred dollars , pay
able in three months with interest . The mortgage is not set forth
in the record , nor are its contents given . The complaint only alleges
that it is of the premises in fee , and contains a clause authorizing the
plaintiff , upon default in the payment of the note , to cause a sale of
the premises in the manner provided by law , and to retain from the
proceeds the amount of the note and interest . We shall assume ,
therefore, that it is in the common form in use in this State — that of
an absolute conveyance , with a condition underwritten that it is
executed as security for the note , and will become inoperative and
void upon it
s payment at maturity ; otherwise , remain in full force .




the county where the premises are situated , within two days after its
execution . On the eighth o




f August , 1859 , the period o
f
limitation within which ,
by the statute , an action could be commenced upon it , expired . Sub
sequently to this , and on the eleventh of May , 1860 , the defendants
1
7
" An action for relief not being before provided for must be com
nienced within ten years after the cause of action shall have accrued . "
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indorsed , over their signatures , upon the back of the note , a memo
randum to the effect that for value received they “ renew , revive , and
agree to pay ’ the note and debt . It would appear that subsequent
to the execution of the mortgage , Morris , one of the defendants ,
disposed of his interest in the premises , for the petition of interven
tion , and the findings of the Court mention Goodman , the other de
fendant, and two other persons as being the successors of the de
fendants . We infer from this , and shall so assume in the considera
tion of the case , that these parties held the interest of the mortgagors
in the premises , and it matters not for the purposes of the appeal in
what mode the interest was acquired . Having such interest , they
executed on the nineteenth of January , 1860 , two mortgages upon the
premises - one to the intervenors to secure their promissory note of
the same date , for $ 4 , 894, payable on or before the fifth of June ,
1860 , with interest , and the other to one Polson to secure their prom
issory note to him for $ 2 ,185, payable three months after date with
interest . This last note and mortgage were assigned to the inter
venors , and in July , 1860 , both of themortgages were foreclosed , and
the usual decrees in such cases entered . In December , 1860 , the
present suit to foreclose the first mortgage was commenced , and the
owners of the second and third mortgages filed their petition of in
tervention , alleging that the remedy of the plaintiff upon the note
and mortgage to him was barred by the statute, and that the lien
of the mortgage was extinct previously to the nineteenth of January ,
1860 , and if the note had been revived , that such revival did not af
fect the extinct lien of the mortgage , or not in such manner as to
give it any priority over the liens of the mortgages owned by them .
The Court held that the liens of the intervenors must be first satis
fied out of the proceeds of the mortgaged property , and the lien
of the plaintiff be postponed until such satisfaction ; and ordered
judgment to that effect .
The Statute of Limitations of this State differs essentially from
the statute of James I , and from the Statutes of Limitation in force
in most of the other States . Those statutes apply in their terms
only to particular legal remedies , and hence Courts of Equity are
said not to be bound by them except in cases of concurrent jurisdic
tion . In other cases Courts of Equity are said to act merely by an
alogy to the statutes , and not in obedience to them . Those statutes
as a general thing also apply , so far as actions upon written con
tracts not of record are concerned , only to actions upon simple con
tracts -- that is , contracts not under seal, fixing the limitation at six
years , and leaving actions upon specialties to be met by the pre
sumption established by the rule of the common law , that after a
lapse of twenty years the claim has been satisfied . In those statutes
where specialties are mentioned , as in the Statutes of Ohio and of
Georgia , the limitation is generally fixed either at fifteen or twenty
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years . The case is entirely different in this State . Here the statute
applies equally to actions at law and to suits in equity . It is directed
to the subject matter and not to the form of the action , or the forum
in which the action is prosecuted . Nor is there any distinction in
the limitation prescribed between simple contracts in writing and
specialties . Thus the statute requires an action “ upon any contract,
obligation , or liability founded upon an instrument of writing,” ex
cept a judgment or decree of a Court of a State or Territory , or
of the United States , to be commenced within four years after the
cause of action has accrued . It matters not whether damages be
sought for a breach of the contract , and thus an action at law be
brought , or a specific performance be prayed , and thus a suit in
equity be commenced , the proceeding must in either case be taken
within the limitation designated . ( See Pearis v . Covillaud , 6 Cal.
617 .) The statute , after prescribing certain periods within which
actions upon judgments , upon simple contracts , for relief on the
ground of fraud , and for other causes , shall be brought , declares , in
general terms, that “ an action for relief” not thus provided for must
be commenced within four years after the cause of action shall have
accrued - covering all cases where equitable or other relief may be
sought.
A mortgage in this State also differs materially from a mortgage
at common law , or a mortgage in our sister States . At common law ,
a mortgage of real property was regarded as a conveyance of a con
ditional estate , which became absolute upon condition broken . It
gave to the mortgagee , except as otherwise stipulated by provisions
inserted in the instrument, a present right of possession . Upon it
the mortgagee could enter peaceably , or bring ejectment , or a writ
of entry ; and in those States where the common law view has been
modified by considerations arising from the real object of the instru
ment, and the nature of the transaction , it is still generally held that,
as between the parties , it passes the fee , and gives a remedy to the
mortgagee for the possession , though as to third persons it consti
tutes only a lien or charge , and leaves the mortgagor the owner of
the premises . Thus in Ewer v . Hobbs , 5 Met. 3 , Chief Justice Shaw ,
in delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts ,
after stating the object of a mortgage , said : " Hence it is that, as
between mortgagor and mortgagee , the mortgage is to be regarded
as a conveyance in fee , because that construction best secures him
in his remedy , and his ultimate right to the estate , and to its inci
dents , the rents and profits . But in all other respects , until fore
closure , when the mortgagee becomes the absolute owner, the mort
gage is deemed to be a lien or charge , subject to which the estate
may be conveyed , attached , and in other respects dealt with as the
estate of the mortgagor ." And in the subsequent case of Howard
v . Robinson , 5 Cush . 123 , the same distinguished Justice said : “ Al
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though , as between mortgagor and mortgagee , it is a transmission of
the fee which gives the mortgagee a remedy in the form of a real
action and constitutes a legal seizin , yet to most other purposes , a
mortgage before the entry of the mortgagee is but a pledge and real
lien , leaving the mortgagor for most purposes the owner .” The doc
trine with respect to mortgages is very different in this State. Here
a mortgage is regarded as between the parties , as well as with refer
ence to the rights of the mortgagor in his dealings with third per
sons , as a mere security , creating a lien or charge upon the property ,
and not as a conveyance vesting any estate in the premises , either
before or after condition broken . Here it confers no right to the
possession of the premises either before or after default , and , of
course , furnishes no support to an action of ejectment , or to a writ
of entry for their recovery . The language of the statute is express ,
that it shall not be deemed a conveyance , whatever its terms , so a
s
to enable the owner o
f
the mortgage to recover possession without
a foreclosure and sale . (See Pr . Act , sec . 260 ; McMillan v . Rich
ards , 9 Cal . 411 ; Nagle v . Macy , id . 428 ; Johnson v . Sherman , 15 id .
293 ; Goodenow v . Ewer , 16 id . 464 ; Boggs v . Hargrave , 16 id .
563 ; Fogarty v . Sawyer , 17 id . 592 . )
From this statement as to the Statute o
f Limitations , and the
operation o
f
a mortgage upon the right o
f possession in this State ,
it is evident that the decisions cited from the reports o
f
other States ,
to the effect that a mortgagee has a remedy upon his mortgage aiter
the Statute o
f
Limitations has run upon the promissory note for the
payment of which the mortgage was executed , have no application to
the questions presented for consideration in the case a
t
bar . Those
decisions are founded upon distinctions made by the Statutes o
fLimi
tations of those States , which do not exist in the statute of this State ,
o
r upon the right of possession which there accompanies the owner
ship o
f
themortgage . Thus in Elkins v . Edwards , 8 Geo . 326 , which
was a suit for the foreclosure of a mortgage , the Supreme Court of
Georgia said : “ Because the remedy on the note is barred by the
statute in six years , it does not follow that the creditor ' s remedy on
themortgage , being a sealed instrument , is also barred . The cred
itor ' s remedy on the mortgage is not barred until twenty years — the
debt being unpaid . ” So in Thayer v . Mann , 19 Pick . 535 , which
was a writ o
f entry to recover possession o
f
the mortgaged prem
ises , the Supreme Court o
f
Massachusetts said : “ The creditor has
a double remedy , one upon his deed to recover the land , another
upon the note to recover a judgment and execution for the debt ; and
it does not follow that he can not recover on one , although there
may be some technical objection or difficulty to his remedy upon the
other . ” These decisions are no authority in the case under considera
tion for the reasons already given , that the statute makes no distinc
tion in the period o
f




and a contract under seal , and a mortgage deed here does not con
fer any right of possession upon the mortgagee . It is undoubtedly
true , as stated by the Court in the case from Georgia , that the cred
itor stipulated by contract for two remedies against his debtor to
enforce the collection of his demand - the one by action upon the
note , and the other by petition and foreclosure upon the mortgage.
Similar remedies he can pursue in this State . He can proceed upon
the note, and take an ordinary money judgment for the amount due ;
or he can sue in equity upon the mortgage , and take a decree for its
foreclosure and the sale o
f
the premises . The difference is , that
here the limitation prescribed to the equitable suit is the same as
that prescribed to the action a
t
law . The mortgage is asmuch within
the general designation o
f
a " contract , obligation , or liability ,
founded upon an instrument o
f writing , " as is the note itself .
We do not question the correctness of the general doctrine pre




the States , that a mortgage re
mains in force until the debt , for the security o
f
which it is given ,
is paid . We only hold that the doctrine has no application under
the Statute o
f Limitations of this State . A mortgage is a specialty ,
and is not within the terms o
f





most of the States . An action founded upon such specialty can
only be met b
y proof o





the fact , and it may be presumed from the
lapse of twenty years , when such presumption is not countervailed
by evidence from the mortgagee . “ Thus , ” says the Supreme Court
o
f
Maine , in Joy v . Adams , 26 Maine , 333 , " a mortgage security has




tions . He who would avoid such security must show payment ;
otherwise , the mortgagee will not be precluded from entering upon
and holding possession o
f
the mortgaged premises . The mortgagor
has not been allowed to defeat such right b
y showing merely that the
personal security , to which the mortgage security is collateral , has
become barred ( Thayer v . Mann , 19 Pick . 535 ) ; but he has been
allowed to allege payment , and for proof to rely upon the lapse o
f
time , when it amounted to twenty years from the accruing o
f
the
indebtment . Such a lapse of time has been deemed to be sufficient
for the purpose , in the absence o
f any countervailing considerations .




law , which may be removed
by circumstances tending to produce a contrary presumption . ” The
view thus stated is met by our statute , which embraces a mortgage
security within it
s terms . Here payment may be pleaded , and so
may the statute itself without reference to the fact o
f payment .
Our conclusion , therefore , upon the first question presented is ,
that where an action upon a promissory note , secured by a mortgage
o
f
the same date upon real property , is barred by the statute , the
mortgagee has no remedy upon the mortgage ; that though distinct




personand , and he can bie is as to the prethe
remedies may be pursued b
y
him , the limitation prescribed is the
same to both .
The second question is one o
f
easy solution . The mortgagor , after
disposing o
f




sale , loses a
ll
con
trol over them . His personal liability thereby becomes separated
from the ownership o
f
the land , and he can by no subsequent act
create o
r
revive charges upon the premises . He is as to the prem
ises thenceforth a mere stranger . And if , instead o
f selling the
premises , he execute a second mortgage upon them , he is equally
without power to destroy o
r impair the efficacy o
f
the lien thus cre
ated . But it is said , that the plea o
f
the statute is a personal privi
lege of the party , and can not be set up by a stranger . This , as a
general rule , is undoubtedly correct with respect to personal obliga
tions , which concern only the party himself , o
r
with respect to prop
erty which the party possesses the power to charge or dispose o
f
.
But with respect to property placed b
y
him beyond his control , or
subjected b
y
him to liens , he has no such personal privilege . He
can not at his pleasure affect the interests o
f
other parties . His
grantees or mortgagees , with respect to the property , stand in his
shoes , and can set up any defense that he might himself have set u
p





In the case at bar , the defendant Morris had sold his interest in the
mortgaged premises ; and his grantees , with the other defendant ,
executed the second and third mortgages after the statute had run
upon the note secured by the first mortgage . The subsequent re
vival o
f
that note continued the personal liability o
f
the defendants .
Whether it also revived the mortgage executed b
y
them it is un
necessary to express any opinion , as the defendants do not appeal
from the decree . The revival could not affect , and did not affect
the previously acquired liens o
f
the second and third mortgages upon
the property ; and the intervenors holding those mortgages could
interpose the statute to the enforcement o
f





to secure a priority in their liens over that mortgage .
The ruling o
f
the Court below , therefore , in postponing the lien o
f
the first mortgage , assuming that the lien was revived , to the liens
o
f
the subsequent mortgages , was clearly correct .
Judgment affirmed . 18
1




. 482 ; Chick v . Willetts , 2 Kans . 384 ; Goldfrank , Frank & Co . v . Young ,
64 Tex . 432 . See Jones , Mortgages , $ 1198 .
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UNION WATER CO . v .MURPHY ' S FLAT FLUMING CO .
SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA , 1863 .
22 Cal . 621.
CROCKER , J., delivered the opinion of the Court- Cope , C . J . and
Norton , J . concurring .
This is an action to foreclose a mortgage . No note or other
written obligation to pay the money appears to have been executed ,
nor does the mortgage contain any covenant or agreement to pay
the mortgage debt . The action was commenced more than two
years and less than four years after the time of payment of the
money specified in the mortgage , and the appellant therefore con
tends that the action is barred by the Statute of Limitations . It is
true that in the absence of a direct agreement to pay the money
specified in the mortgage , the plaintiff is confined to his remedy
against the mortgaged property, and can have no personal judg
ment against themortgagor . (Shafer v . The Bear River and Au
burn W . and M . Co., 4 Cal . 294 ; Brooks v . Maltbie , 4 Stew . & Por
ter , 96 ; Hunt v . Lewin , id . 138 ; Hickox v . Lowe , 10 Cal . 210 .) But
it does not follow that because there is no personal liability the ac
tion is barred in two years . The action is upon a contract “ founded
upon an instrument of writing ," to wit, the mortgage , and is not
therefore barred until four years after the cause of action accrued .
This point, therefore , is not tenable .
On petition for rehearing , the following opinion was delivered by
Crocker , J. - Norton , J ., concurring .
Some corrections of our former opinion are necessary , and a
more full statement of our views upon one point may be proper . In
the former opinion it is stated that in the absence of a direct agree
ment to pay themoney specified in the mortgage, the mortgagee can
have no personal judgment against the mortgagor . That was a
point not necessary to be determined in this case , and should have
been omitted , as it was not fully discussed by the parties in their
briefs. The question whether an action to foreclose a mortgage is
barred when the debt it was given to secure is barred , should prop
erly have been more fully explained .
In most cases , the debt secured by a mortgage is evidenced by a
writing in some form , either by a covenant or agreement to pay it
in the mortgage, or by some independent written contract , such as
a note , bond , or agreement . In such cases the same clause in the
Statute of Limitations , fixing four years as the period of time which
will bar the demand , applies to both the debt and the mortgage , and
thus expressions are found in some cases of that character , to the
effect that the mortgage is barred by the same lapse of time as the
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debt, which is correct when applied to cases where the debt and the
mortgage are both evidenced by writing . In the present case , how
ever , it appears that the debt is not evidenced by a written contract ,
either in the mortgage , or by a separate instrument. The Statute of
Limitations does not operate as a payment or discharge of the debt ,
and the mortgagee still has the right to enforce any right of action
arising out of the contract of the mortgagor , not barred by the Stat
ute of Limitations . In this case his right to a personal judgment
against the mortgagor is barred by the statute , the contract to pay
the debt not being in writing , and the action not having been com
menced within two years from the time the cause of action accrued .
But the debt itself not being in fact paid or satisfied , and the con
tract , so far as it relates to the lien upon the property , being in writ
ing , and not barred by the Statute of Limitations relating to writ
te
n
contracts , the mortgagee has a right to enforce the right o
f ac
tion against the mortgaged property , because the action , to that ex
tent , is “ upon a contract , obligation , and liability , founded upon an
instrument o
f writing . ” This right o
f
action is not therefore barred
until the expiration o
f
four years from the time the cause o
f
action
accrued , and the action in this case having been brought within the
four years , it is not barred b
y
the statute . The rehearing is denied . 19
CLINTON COUNTY v . COX .
SUPREME COURT O
F
Iowa , 1873 .
3
7 Iowa 570 .
Action in chancery instituted b
y plaintiff to foreclose a mortgage
upon lands in Clinton county . Everhart , who purchased the land
from Cox , was made a defendant . Butterfield filed a cross -petition
setting out that Cox , the grantor in the mortgage in suit , on the 6th
day o
f
November , 1857 , executed to him a deed o
f
trust to secure
certain notes before given , and since the 1st day o
f
June , 1865 , has
been a non -resident o
f
the State . The cross -petition asks that the
deed o
f
trust be foreclosed against the land .
1
9 Compare , Duke v . State , 56 Ark . 485 ; Browne v . Browne , 17 Fla .
607 ; Elkins v . Edwards , 8 Ga . 325 ; Henry v . Confidence Mining Co . , 1
Nev , 619 .
In several states , there is a statute expressly limiting actions for the
foreclosure o
f mortgages .
The period usually prescribed by statutes o
f
this type is longer than
that fixed for an action a
t
law o
n the debt secured . Hence the question
has arisen whether a foreclosure suit , in so far as it seeks a deficiency
decree , is limited by the one provision o
r
the other . The answer seems
to have been unanimous that the provision limiting an action on the
debt governs . See 21 L . R . A . 550 , note .
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Everhart demurred to Butterfield 's cross-petition on the ground
that it shows the cause of action therein set out to be barred by the
statute of limitations. The demurrer was sustained , and Butterfield
appeals .
BECK , C11 . J. — The facts upon which the only question involved
in this case arises are these : The deed of trust and notes held by
Butterfield were executed more than ten years prior to the com
mencement of the suit , but Cox , who executed them , has been a
non -resident of the State for a sufficient time to take an action
against him upon the notes out of the operation of the statute of
limitations. Rev ., § 2745 .20 A deed of trust to secure the payment
of money is enforced by foreclosure as a mortgage. Rev ., § 3673 .
Counsel agree that, in this case , it is to be considered as a mortgage . -
Is Butterfield 's remedy by foreclosure against the land barred by
the statute ? This is the sole question presented by the case for our
decision .
Under the laws of this State a mortgage conveys no interest in ,
or title to , lands, but is simply a lien thereon for the purpose of se
curing the indebtedness which is its foundation . It is an incident
a security , in the nature o
f
a lien - o
f
the debt . It survives until the
debt be paid o
r discharged , o
r
the mortgage is released . It is a
convoy bearing a lien for the protection o
f
the debt , and as long as
that exists it is not relieved of the duty o
f protection or rendered




law , may no longer be enforced , its functions terminate ,
and not before . Gower v . Winchester , 32 Iowa , 303 ; Burton v .
Hintrager , 18 id . 348 ; State v . Lake , 17 id . 215 ; Vannice v . Bergen ,
1
6 id . 555 ; Crow , McCreery & Co . v . Vance , 4 id . 435 ; Hendershott
v . Ping , 24 id . 134 ; Packard v . Kingman , 11 id . 219 .
These principles determine the question before us , for , unless it
appears that the debt is discharged , o
r
is , under the law , no longer
capable o
f being enforced , the deed of trust stands as a security for
its payment . The non -residence of the debtor Cox , arrested the
operation o
f the statute o
f
limitations , and the remedy upon the in




trust may be enforced
to satisfy the debt .
These doctrines are so well supported by the authorities cited , and
the conclusion we reach is so plainly deducible therefrom , as to





a debt and a new promise to pay , which suspends
2
0 Section 2745 read , “ The time during which a defendant is a non
resident o
f
the state shall not be included in computing any o
f
the periods
of limitation above prescribed . "
Section 2740 read , “ The following actions may be brought within
the time herein limited respectively after their causes accrue . * * *
( 4 ) Those founded on written contracts , * * * and those for the
recovery o
f
real property , within ten years . "
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the operation of the statute of limitation , keeps alive the lien of a
mortgage given to secure the indebtedness . Mahon v . Cooley et al.,
36 Iowa, 479. The case is not distinguishable in principle from the
one before us. In each the debt would have been barred but for the
suspension of the operation of the statute , in the one case by a new
promise , in the other by non - residence .
The argument of appellee 's counsel ,based upon the fact that But
terfield could have brought an action to foreclose the mortgage
within the ten years , upon service of process by publication , notwith
standing the non -residence of Cox , is answered by the case just cited .
In that case an action could have been brought before the time fixed
by the statute , ten years , expired . Counsel contend that as ten years
have run in which an action could have been brought , it is now lim
ited. But the law does not so provide, and, in the case cited , we
have , in effect , held otherwise . But in truth , the time of limitation
provided for by the statute has not expired , for the period of the
non - residence of Cox is expressly taken therefrom . This is a suffi
cient answer to the argument.
The conclusion we reach , it is thought by appellee 's counsel , will ,
in this and other like cases , work hardship . Lands may be pur
chased upon which old , unsatisfied mortgages may rest , under the
supposition that they are satisfied or barred by the statute , and may
be subjected to such liens in the hands of the purchasers . But the
hardships in such cases result not from the law , but from the par
ties acting under a mistaken notion of their rights , and relying upon
presumptions and protection not recognized by the law . Against
hardships thus arising courts can extend no protection .
The judgment of the district court upon the demurrer is reversed ,
and the cause is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent
with this opinion .
Reversed .21
21 “ The grounds upon which a majority of this court holds that Water
son and Edwards cannot plead the statute of limitations are as follows:
Waterson and Edwards have merely succeeded to the rights of Pearsoll .
They stand in his shoes . They have got just what he would have if he
had not transferred his interest in the land to them . They have nothing
more than he at any time had the right to transfer to them . The stream
has not risen and cannot rise higher than the fountain , nor can they by
their purchase of Pearsoll ' s interest in the land cast additional burdens
and inconveniences upon the holder of the mortgage . And therefore , as
Pearsoll has never obtained nor had the right to plead the statute of
limitations , his grantees , Waterson and Edwards , have no such right."
Valentine , J., in Waterson v . Kirkwood , 17 Kans. 9.
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PETERS v. DUNNELLS.
SUPREME COURT OF NEBRASKA , 1877 .
5 Nebr. 460 .
MAXWELL , J .
This is an action to foreclose a mortgage on certain real estate in
Sarpy county . The note was due and payable August 31, 1859 .
The petition , in addition to the usual averments in an action of fore
closure, alleges that the defendant before the maturity of the note
removed from the state and has continued to reside out of the state
ever since .
The defendant demurred to the petition on the ground the facts
stated therein were not sufficient to constitute a cause of action .
The demurrer was overruled by the court. The defendant then an
swered the petition alleging among other grounds of defense , that
the cause of action did not accrue within ten years next before the
commencement of the action . Testimony was taken and a decree
rendered in favor of the plaintiff . The defendant appeals to this
court .
The principle is well settled under our code that where it appears
on the face of the petition that the cause of action arose at such a
period that under the statute of limitations no action can be brought ,
the defendant may demur to the petition on the ground that it does
not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action . Section ten
of the code of civil procedure provides that “ an action shall be com
menced within five years upon a specialty , or any agreement , con
tract , or promise in writing .” The proviso to section seventeen , which
took effect September 1, 1866 , is " that the absence from the state ,
death , or other disability of a non -resident, save the cases mentioned
in this section , shall not operate to extend the period within which
actions in rem shall be commenced by or against such non - resident
and his representatives .”
What is an action in re
m
? In Woodruff v . Taylor , 20 Vt . , 65 , the
Supreme Court o
f
Vermont say : “ The object and purpose o
f
a
proceeding purely in rem is to ascertain the right o
f every possible
claimant ; and it is instituted on an allegation , that the title of the
former owner , whoever he may be , has become divested , and notice
of the proceeding is given to the whole world to appear and make
claim to it . From the nature o
f
the case the notice is constructive
only a
s
to the greater part o
f
the world . ” “ But beside these , there
is another class o
f
cases , which may , perhaps , to some extent , be
considered a
s proceedings in rem , though in form they are proceed
ings inter partes . An attachment o
f property in this state , where
the court has jurisdiction o
f
the property , but not o
f
the person of
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the defendant , and a sale of it (or a levy upon it if it be real estate ) ,
on execution , is in the nature of a proceeding in rem .”
The payment of a debt in obedience to the order of the court
which issued the attachment , will protect the garnishee , not only
against the defendant , but against third person claiming under him ,
by an assignment made after notice was served on the garnishee .
While proceedings in rem appear originally in England to have
been restricted to cases arising in the Spiritual , admiralty , or prize
courts , such as those relating to the revenue , condemnations of cap
tured property , divorce and alimony , and probate of wills and let
ters of administration , it will not be contended that such restrictions
prevail at the present time. In this country the courts have gener
ally held proceedings in rein to include proceedings by creditors





the suit , the existence o
f
the property so seized o
r at
tached within the territory , constitutes a just ground o
f proceeding
to enforce the rights o
f
the plaintiff to the extent o
f
subjecting such
property to execution upon the decree or judgment . But if the
defendant has never appeared and contested the suit , it is to be
treated to all intents and purposes a
s
a mere proceeding in rem , and
not as personally binding on the party as a decree o
r judgment in
personam ; or in other words , it only binds the property seized o
r at
tached to the extent thereof . " Story ' s Conflict of Laws , Sec . 549 ;
Andrews v . Herriot , 4 Cowen , 520 , note ; Holmes v . Rawson , 20
Johns . , 229 ; McDaniel v . Hughes , 3 East . , 336 .
This action , so far as it is sought to subject the mortgaged prop
erty to the payment o
f
the debt , is clearly a proceeding in rem , and
more than five years having elapsed after the law took effect , before
the commencement o
f
the suit , the action is barred b
y
the statute
of limitations . .
In Kyger v . Ryley , 2 Neb . , 20 , this court held that if a recovery
upon a note secured b





tations , an action for foreclosure o
f
the mortgage is also barred ; the
demurrer to the petition , therefore , should have been sustained .
The judgment o
f
the district court is reversed and the cause re
manded for further proceedings .
Reversed and Remanded .




NORTH DAKOTA , 1905 .
1
4
N . Dak . 147 .
ENGERUD , J . This is an action to foreclose a mortgage upon 160
acres o
f
land situated in Dickey county . The mortgage was exe
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cuted on May 16 , 1883, and recorded on June 11, 1883 . It was
given by Fred West , who was then the owner of the land , to secure
his note for $ 335 of even date. The note became due November 1,
1888 . No payments have been made upon it. In the fall of 1887
West moved from the territory of Dakota , and has since been ab
sent from this jurisdiction . In December , 1887 , after leaving the
territory , he conveyed the land to E . S . Brown , receiver of the North
western Manufacturing and Car Company, a Minnesota corporation .
On February 1, 1888 , Brown conveyed to the Minnesota Thresher
Manufacturing Company, also a Minnesota corporation . Both deeds
expressly except the plaintiff 's mortgage from the covenants of war
ranty . On August 7 , 1901 , the last-named grantee conveyed to
R . H . Bronson , who had been appointed receiver for said corpora
tion , and on August 9 , 1901, the latter conveyed to the Northwest
Thresher Company , a Minnesota corporation , the defendant in the
present action . These several corporations had complied with the
laws of the territory and state, and were at al
l
times amenable to
suit in this jurisdiction . The mortgagor and debtor is not made a
party to this action . The only relief sought is a decree for the fore
closure o
f
the mortgage and the sale o
f
the mortgaged premises to
satisfy the debt . The defendant interposed as its sole defense the
statute o
f
limitations . This defense was overruled by the trial court ,
and judgment was rendered a
s prayed for in the complaint . The
defendant has appealed from the judgment , and demands a review
o
f
the entire case in this court , under section 5630 , Rev . Codes 1899 .
The only question involved upon this appeal is whether the stat
ute o
f
limitations is available to this appellant a
s
a defense against
the plaintiff ' s action . The time within which an action to foreclose
a mortgage o
f
real property must be commenced in this state is lim
ited to ten years from the time the cause of action accrued . Rev .
Codes 1899 , sections 5199 , 5200 . If , when a cause o
f
action shall
accrue against any person , he shall be out o
f
the state , the statute
does not begin to run until his return into the state . Rev . Codes
1899 , section 5210 . 22
2
2 Section 5200 read , “Within ten years : * * * ( 2 ) An action
upon a contract contained in any conveyance or mortgage of or instru
ment affecting the title to real property except a covenant o
f warranty ,
* * "
Section 5210 read , " If , when the cause of action shall accrue against
any person , he shall be out o
f
the state , such action may be commenced
within the terms herein respectively limited after the return o
f
such
person into this state ; and if after such cause of action shall have ac





continuously absent therefrom for the space of one year or more , the
time o
f
his absence shall not be deemed or taken as any part o
f
the time
limited for the commencement o
f
such action . " There was no express
exception of actions in rem from the operation of this section .
*
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Appellant first contends that this action is one in rem against the
mortgaged property , and hence that the several objections which
will be hereafter noticed , urged against the defense of the statute
on the ground that the person against whom the cause of action
accrued was absent from the state , have no application . We are
agreed that this is not an action in rem , but an action in personam .
Our views on this subject are fully and clearly expressed by Judge
Mitchell in Bardell v . Collins , 44 Minn . 97 : “ It is not an action
in rem , but an action in personam . It is true, it has for its object
certain specific real property against which it is sought to enforce
the lien o
f




a proceeding in rem , but not differently , o
r
in any
other sense , than do actions in ejectment , replevin , for specific per
formance o
f
a contract to convey , to determine adverse claims to
real estate and the like . The rights and equities of all parties in
terested in the mortgaged premises are to b
e adjusted in the action ,
which proceeds , not against the property , but against the persons ;
and the judgment binds only those who are parties to the suit and
those in privity with them . Whalley v . Eldridge , 24 Minn . 358 .
Next , it is not only an action in personam , but is also strictly juuicial
in it
s
character , proceeding according to due course of common law ,
like any other action cognizable in courts o
f
equity o





the opinion that the absence from the state
o
f
the person against whom the cause o
f
action accrued stays the
running o
f
the statute of limitations against an action to foreclose
a mortgage , the same as in any other action in personam .
This brings us to the question upon which the members o
f
this
court are unable to agree . Did the absence from the state o
f
the
mortgagor and debtor , West , prevent the running o
f
the statute
against this suit to foreclose the mortgage ? The courts o
f
Illinois ,
Texas , Kansas and Iowa hold that the debtor ' s absence , even though
he has parted with the title to the mortgaged premises , tolls the
statute . In California , Washington , Oregon , Nebraska , Missouri ,
New York and South Carolina the contrary has been held . The
majority of the court has reached the conclusion that the absence o
f
West did not toll the statute . Our attention has been called to the
following cases from Illinois : Emory v . Keighan , 94 Ill . 543 ; Schif
ferstein v . Allison , 24 Ill . App . 294 ; Id . , 123 11
1
. 662 ; Banking Ass ' n
v . Bank , 157 Ill . 524 ; Jones v . Foster , 175 Ill . 459 ; Richey v . Sin
clair , 167 Ill . 184 . Analysis will show that none of these cases are
authority in this jurisdiction . In Emory v . Keighan , Banking
Ass ' n v . Bank and Jones v . Foster , the facts were that the owner of
the equity o
f
redemption had been absent from the state ; and in
Schifferstein v . Allison a partial payment had been made within the
statutory period by the owner o
f
the fee . In Richey v . Sinclair ,
owing C




however , the mortgagor had been absent from the state after he had
parted with the title, and it was held that his absence prevented the
statute from running in favor of his grantee . The reasoning in the
last case cited , as well as in the others from that state , is based
upon two propositions, which will be found most clearly set forth in







estate in land , defeasible only by the extin
guishment o
f









the debt by lapse
o
f
time , and hence the neglect o
f
the creditor to commence an action
to recover his debt within the statutory period was presumptive evi
dence that the debt was extinguished . It followed as a necessary
consequence that , if the debt was extinguished , themortgagee ' s es
tate was likewise extinguished , and , conversely , if the debt was not
extinguished , the mortgagee ' s title was not defeated . As to whether







that state in the limitation laws
since the decision in Pollock v . Maison , we venture no opinion . See ,
however , Tate v . Hawkins , 81 Ky . 577 . It is manifest that the de
cisions from Illinois proceed upon a theory that is untenable in this
state . Here , under the express provisions o
f
our Civil Code a mort
gage is a mere lien , and conveys no estate in the land . Rev . Codes





this state does not create presumptions o
r
extin
guish obligations . It merely bars the remedy upon which it operates ,
if the defendant elects to avail himself o
f
the statutory defense b
y
answer . Satterlund v . Beal , 12 N . D . 122 ; Wood on Limitations ,
section 5 ; Fowler v . Wood , 78 Hun , 304 , affirmed 150 N . Y . 584 .
In Oregon and Nebraska it was held that the absence o
f
themort
gagor did not toll the statute , because the action to foreclose was an
action in rem . Anderson v . Baxter , 4 Ore . 105 ; Peters v . Dunnells ,
5 Neb . 460 . We can not follow these cases , because we hold that
this action is not in rem . The decisions from Texas , Kansas and
Iowa are in point , but , in our opinion , those decisions rest on propo
sitions which are as unsound in principle as they are opposed to
precedent . They lead to absurd and unjust results , and thwart the
object sought to be obtained b
y
the statute , instead o
f promoting that
object and furthering justice . Cases fairly representing the views o
f
the Texas courts are Ewell v . Daggs , 108 U . S . 143 ; Falwell v . Hen
ing , 78 Tex . 278 . From Kansas may be cited Waterson v . Kirk
wood , 17 Kan . 9 , and Schmucker v . Sibert , 18 Kan . 104 ; and from
Iowa , Clinton Co . v . Cox , 37 Iowa , 570 ; Brown v . Rockhold , 49
Iowa , 282 ; Robertson v . Stuhlmiller , 93 Iowa , 326 ; and Leeds Lum
ber Co . v . Hawroth , 98 Iowa , 463 .
The decisions in Kansas , Iowa and Texas are erroneous , because
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those courts have misapplied the doctrine that a mortgage is a mere
incident of the debt it secures. It is true that, by reason of this re
lationship of themortgage to the debt , anything that operates to ex
tinguish the latter necessarily discharges the former , because the in
cident can not survive the principal. These courts , however, fail
to distinguish between the extinguishment of the debt itself and the
absence or loss of a remedy to enforce the personal liability for it.
The failure to make the distinction is apparently due to the fact that
those courts have assumed , as it was expressly declared in
Schmucker v . Seibert , 18 Kan . 104, 109 ; and in Duty v . Graham , 12
Tex . 427 , 435 , 436 , that because the mortgage is an incident to the
debt, therefore the remedy to enforce the lien was also a mere inci
dent or part of the remedy or cause of action against the debtor to
enforce his personal liability . This reasoning , and the propositions
upon which it rests , are in direct conflict with the overwhelming
weight of authority . Joy v . Adams, 26 Me. 330 ; Thayer v . Mann ,
19 Pick . 535 ; Richmond v . Aiken , 25 Vt. 324 ; Baldwin v . Norton ,
2 Conn . 161 ; Pratt v. Huggins, 29 Barb . 282 ; Fowler v. Wood , 78
Hun , 304 ; Colton v . Depew , 60 N . J. Eq. 454 ; Demuth v . Bank , 85
Md. 315 ; Arthur v. Screven ( S . C .) , 17 S . E . 640 ; Elkins v . Ed
wards, 8 Ga. 326 ; Bizzell v . Nix , 60 Ala . 281 ; Browne v . Browne ,
17 Fla . 607 ; Kendall v . Clarke , 90 Ky . 178 ; Tate v . Hawkins , 81
Ky. 577 ; Ins. Co . v . Brown , 11 Mich . 265 ; Wisell v . Baxter , 20 Wis .
680 ; Whipple v . Barnes , 21 Wis . 332 ; Lewis v . Schwenn , 93 Mo.
26 ; Bush v . White , 85 Mo. 339 ; Bank v . Guttschlick , 14 Pet. 19 - 30 ;
Eubanks v . Leveridge , 4 Sawy. 274. It has been held that the two
causes of action could not even be joined in the absence of a statu
tory provision to that effect . Ins. Co. v . Brown , 11 Mich . 265 ; Bor
den v . Gilbert , 13 Wis . 670 ; Stilwell v . Kellogg, 14 Wis . 461 ; Cary
v . Wheeler , 14 Wis . 281 ; Faesi v . Goetz , 15 Wis . 231 ; Doan v .
Holly , 25 Mo. 357 , and 26 Mo. 186 .
The doctrine established by the foregoing cases is well stated by
Judge Deady in Eubanks v . Leveridge . The case was tried in the
federal court in Oregon , and , of course , the decision of the Supreme
Court of Oregon on the question involved was conclusive on the
federal court sitting in that state . The state court had held that an
action to foreclose was not barred by the absence of the mortgagor
after he parted with the title , because the action was in rem ; but
Judge Deady reached the same conclusions for reasons different
from those of the state court . He said : “ But I apprehend the true
doctrine to be that the remedy upon the note and mortgage is, like
the transaction itself, twofold . The making and delivery of the
note, and the failure to pay the same according to its tenor , gives
the holder thereof a right of action against the maker , upon which
he can obtain a personal judgment for the sum due thereon . So the
execution and delivery of the mortgage creates a lien upon the prop
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erty included in it to secure the payment of the sum mentioned in
the note, and , in case of a default in such payment, a suit may be
maintained upon this ‘ sealed instrument,' the mortgage , to enforce
such lien for the purpose of paying the debt. Notwithstanding sec
tion 410 of the Code provides that in a suit 'to foreclose a lien , where
there is also a personal obligation for the payment of the debt ,' in
addition to the decree of foreclosure sale , a decree may be given
against the person giving the same for the amount thereof, yet I
apprehend that either the remedy upon the personal obligation or
the mortgage may be pursued for the collection of the debt without
reference to the other . * * * These authorities go to show that
the holder of a note and mortgage has two distinct remedies for the
collection of his debt, and that they exist and may be pursued inde
pendently of each other ."
The doctrine recognized and established by these cases has been
embodied in our Civil Code , and is expressed by section 4696 , Rev .
Codes 1899 , which declares : “ A lien is not extinguished by the
mere lapse of time within which , under the provisions of the Code
of Civil Procedure , an action can be brought upon the principal ob
ligation.” Bearing in mind the proposition established by the fore
going authorities and embodied in our Civil Code by the section just
quoted , that the debt and the mortgage give rise to distinct and in
dependent remedies , either of which may be resorted to within the
time limited by the statute for each so long as the obligation secured
by the mortgage is not extinguished , it seems to us the question is
one of easy solution .
The remedy on the personal obligation for the debt and that on
the mortgage may, and ofter must , be pursued against different de
fendants and in divers jurisdictions. The remedy on the mortgage
must be invoked in the jurisdiction where the property lies , and the
time within which it must be commenced is governed by the law of
that state. The only person or persons affected by that remedy are
those who are interested in the property adversely to the mortgage .
Those persons are the only necessary parties to such an action . It
is against them that the cause of action for the foreclosure of the
lien accrues . It is in their favor and for their protection that the
statute operates . The acts or situation of the debtor who has no in
terest in the land clearly should not toll the statute in an action to
which he is not a necessary party . It is clear that it is only he in
whose favor and for whose protection the statute operates who can




California , Washington , New York , Missouri and
South Carolina , and we think those decisions are in accord with
both law and common sense . Wood v . Goodfellow , 43 Cal . 185 ;
Watt v . Wright , 66 Cal . 202 ; George v . Butler , 26 Wash . 456 ;
Denny v . Palmer , 26 Wash . 469 ; Bush v . White , 85 Mo . 339 ; Ar
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thur v . Screven ( S . C .) 17 S . E . 640 ; Fowler v. Wood , 78 Hun
304 , affirmed in 150 N . Y . 584 . See , also , Tate v . Hawkins , 81
Ky. 577.
* * * * * * *
We think that the term “ cause of action ” as used in the statute
of limitations is used , not in the technical sense that Prof. Pomeroy
uses it , but the statute uses it in the popular sense of the right to
maintain the particular action against which the statute is invoked .
It is a matter of common knowledge that such is the common mean
ing of the term , and that fact is well illustrated by the use of that
term in the numerous decisions we have cited . This interpretation
of the term serves to promote the object of the statute and further
justice and conforms to the requirement " words should be construed
in their ordinary sense .” Attaching the ordinary meaning to the
term " cause of action ," it is clear that a cause of action accrues ,
within the meaning of the statute of limitations, when the holder
thereof first obtains the right to resort to that particular form of
action for relief. Ganser v . Ganser , 83 Minn . 199 .
The question , then , is, against whom did the right of foreclosure
accrue ? There can be only one answer to that question . It accrued
against the person or persons who were interested in the land ad
versely to the mortgage. These are the only necessary parties de
fendant. It is their right or title which it is the object of the suit
to extinguish by means of a judicial sale , to the end that the pro
ceeds of such sale may be applied to the satisfaction of the debt .
Jones on Mortgages (6th Ed.) , § 1394 et seq . It is entirely imma
terial whether that person happens to be themortgagor and debtor ,
or some third person holding title subject to the mortgage . In
either case the obligation created by themortgage that the debt shall
be paid from a sale of the land in a judicial proceeding is equally
binding on the fee owner . The mortgage was a contract with the
owner of the fee to the effect that, if the debt was not paid at ma
turity , then the debt could be collected out of the land by an action
against any person who might subsequently become the owner. It
was not a contract that the mortgagor would pay , or that he would
sell the land and pay , but it was a contract that the land should pay .
It was an obligation which became fastened upon the land itself , and
was enforceable against any person who might subsequently become
the owner . Consequently the failure of the personal debtor to pay
at maturity gave the mortgagee a right to maintain an action to
enforce the obligation which the mortgage fastened on the land . It
manifestly does not lie in his mouth to say that he was not bound to
know against whom to commence the action . He had no right to
assume that the mortgagor would forever continue to be the owner
of the land . The mortgage gave him no assurance on that subject .
The statute was notice to the mortgagee that every day ' s delay in en
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forcing the mortgage brought him so much nearer to the time when
his remedy would be gone . In short , the instant the right to enforce
themortgage arose , that instant the mortgagee was put on inquiry
to ascertain against whom the action to enforce it must be brought .
It is incorrect to say that this reasoning foists a new contract on the
mortgagee without his consent . As stated before , his contract in the
mortgage was that the land should be answerable for the debt if the
personal debtor failed to pay , but the mortgagor did not agree to
continue his ownership o
f
the land nor to personally sell the land .
Hemerely gave the mortgagee a remedy for the collection of the
debt from the land by an action to be brought against whomsoever
might be the owner when the remedy became available . And the
mortgagee ' s neglect to avail himself of that remedy within the time
fixed b
y
the statute is a good defense to the action . Such is the plain
language and manifest intent o
f
the statute . Fowler v . Wood , supra .
It is also just as clear that it is the intent of the statute that the
remedy shall not be barred by the lapse of time in favor o
f
a neces
sary party defendant who is not within the reach o
f process , so he
can be personally served . Yet the Kansas cases lead to the result
that , although the owner of the fee is a necessary party , yet his ab
sence from the state does not toll the statute . Hogaboom v . Flower ,
7
2 Pac . 547 .





this case it must be presumed that the amount o
f
the
mortgage debt was retained b
y
West ' s grantee from the purchase
price for the purpose of satisfying the mortgage , and that the land
thereby became the primary fund for the payment o
f
the debt ; that
the land stood charged with a trust in the hands o
f
West ' s imme
diate and remote grantees , including this appellant , for the payment
out of the land of the mortgage debt ; that this trust was one for the
protection ofWest as well as the plaintiff ; and , inasmuch as West
is still liable for the debt , and could not plead the statute as a de







defendant ought not in equity to be permitted . To sustain this con
tention , the court would have to assume the power to ignore the
statute o
f
limitations because in it
s opinion equity requires it . There
are only two things which could stay the running o
f
the statute
against this action : Absence o
f




ment or new promise within ten years , which new promise o
r
ac
knowledgment can be proved only b
y
a partial payment or written
evidence . In this case neither o
f
these are present , and the court
has no power to recognize any exceptions to the statute other than
those which the legislature has made . Teign v . Drake , 13 N . D .
502 . The plaintiff ' s cause of action accrued in November , 1888 ,
against the Minnesota Thresher Company , and became barred in
November , 1898 ,before this defendant acquired the land .
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The judgment is reversed , and the district court is directed to en
ter judgment in favor of the appellant and against the respondent
for the dismissal of the action and for the taxable costs and dis
bursements.
[Young , J., delivered a dissenting opinion .]
SECTION 2 . - SALE UNDER A POWER .
JOHNSON v. JOHNSON .
SUPREME Court of South CAROLINA , 1887 .
27 S . Car . 309 .
MR. JUSTICE MCGOWAN . On November 17 , 1879 , one Joshua M .
Johnson , in order to secure a note for $ 150 , due to John H . Neigh
bors , executed to him a mortgage of a tract of land , containing 114
acres , and Louisa Johnson , the wife of the said mortgagor , relin
quished her dower in the said premises . The mortgage contained
a power of sale as follows : “ But in case of the non -payment of the
said sum , & c., * * * then , and in such case , it shall and may
be lawful for the said John H . Neighbors , his heirs , executors , ad
ministrators , and assigns , and the said Joshua M . Johnson doth
hereby empower and authorize the said John H . Neighbors , his
heirs , executors , administrators , or assigns , to grant, bargain , sell ,
release , and convey the said premises , with the appurtenances , at
public auction or vendue , at which sale they , or any of them , shall
have the right to become purchasers of the said premises , and on
such sale to make and execute to the purchaser his , her , or their
heirs or assigns forever , a conveyance in fee of the said premises ,
free and discharged from all equity of redemption , right of dower,
and every other encumbrance ,” & c ., & c. On January 6 , 1881 , the
mortgagee, Neighbors , assigned the note and mortgage to the plain
tiff, Margaret Johnson , and in the year 1882 Joshua M . Johnson ,
themortgagor , died intestate , seized and possessed of the said prem
ises ; leaving as his heirs at law , his widow , Louisa Johnson , and
five minor children , who are the defendants .
On December 22 , 1883, after the death of the mortgagor , Marga
ret Johnson , the assignee of the note and mortgage, advertised the
land for sale in the town of Clinton , County of Laurens , at 12
o 'clock m ., of January 12 , 1884 , by posting written notices of the
sale on the door of the court house , and at three other public places
of the county . This advertisement made no reference to the pre
vious death of the mortgagor , Joshua M . Johnson , or mention of
his widow and children , his heirs at law . At the sale , the land was
23
354 FORECLOSURE .
bid off by one Pitts for $ 325, who refused to comply with the terms
of sale , and James L . Simpson agreeing to take his bid , on January
24 , 1884 , a deed was made to him by the plaintiff in her own name ,
without any reference to the previous death of Joshua M . Johnson ,
the mortgagor , or mention of his heirs , the widow and children .
This deed was recorded . It seems that the sale was reasonably well
attended , the widow , Louisa Johnson , with others , being present ;
and that the land sold for what was considered a fair price . Simp
son agreed with the widow , Louisa , that she might remain on the
land for the remainder of the year for a certain rent .
Simpson , to whom the land was conveyed , never paid the pur
chase money, but on January 5 , 1885 , in pursuance of a previous
agreement to that effect , conveyed it back to Margaret Johnson ,
who credited $ 195. 90 , the amount due on the mortgage debt owned
by her as assignee , and brought this action against the heirs at law
of the deceased mortgagor , Joshua M . Johnson : 1. To confirm the
sale and conveyance made by her as assignee . 2. For leave to pay
into court the excess of the purchase money over the mortgage debt .
And 3. That the plaintiff may be put into possession of the said
premises , and for the costs of the action , & c . The minor defend
ants made formal answer , but the widow , Louisa Johnson , answered
resisting the claim , upon the ground that she and her children were
in possession as the heirs at law of the mortgagor ; and that they
were never made parties to any proceeding of foreclosure , so as to
divest them of the legal title ; and the plaintiff , Margaret Johnson ,
has no title under the illegal and void sale by her, and that her ac
tion should be dismissed .
• As we understand it, this is an action for the recovery of real
estate upon title claimed to arise out of a sale made under a power
contained in a mortgage ; but if it should be found that said sale
was irregular , and the title thereby acquired defective , then inci
dentally to cure the defect and validate the title. It is familiar doc
trine that in an action for the recovery of the possession of real
estate , the plaintiff must recover upon the strength of his own title,
considered with reference to the time the action was brought . If
the title was then perfect , no confirmation is necessary , but if
it was then imperfect, we do not clearly see how the court can ,
by subsequent proceedings , so validate it as to affect retrospec
tively the right existing when the suit was brought . See Moon
v . Johnson , 14 S . C ., 434 .
It has always seemed to us somewhat anomalous doctrine , that a
mortgagor of real estate may include in the mortgage a power to the
creditor himself to sell the mortgaged premises without any order of
foreclosure in a regular proceeding , such power being entirely er
parte , and carrying , as claimed , not only the right to ascertain the
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amount due on the mortgage debt, but to judge of the necessity for a
sale , its time , place , terms , & c . , and to execute title to the premises so
sold . This anomaly is more striking in those States , a
s
in South
Carolina , where it is expressly provided b
y
statute that a mortgage
o
f
real estate is a mere security , and even after condition broken , the
legal title remains in the mortgagor o
r
his heirs . We incline to
think that experience in the administration o
f
the law has shown
that this effort b
y
a summary proceeding to avoid litigation and
expense , has really increased both , and demonstrated the wisdom o
f
Lord Eldon , when he said : “How can it be right that such a clause
shall b
e
inserted in a deed under which a party is trustee for him
self ? * * * Here , to
o , it must be recollected that this is a clause
to b
e
acted upon — not b
y
a middle person , who is to do his duty be
tween the cestuis que trust — but the mortgagee is himself made
trustee to do all these acts . ” The same learned chancellor , however ,
said a
t
the same time : “ But it is too much to say that if the one
party has so much confidence in the other as to accede to such an
arrangement , this court is , for that reason , to impeach the trans
action , ” & c . 23
While , however , the court will not now se
t
aside a power author
izing the creditor , who is the interested party , to sell lands mort
gaged , for the reason that it is the contract o
f
the parties themselves ,
yet a
ll
the authorities agree that was such power may be so easily
used for purposes o
f
oppression , the courts should scrutinize sales
made under them very closely . ” Robinson v . Amateur Association ,
1
4
S . C . , 148 . From the view the court takes , it will not be neces
sary in this case to consider whether the power o
f
sale went with
the mortgage to the assignee , Margaret Johnson , nor whether the
mode o
f conducting the sale should have been conformed , as far as
possible , to that o
f ordinary judicial sales , nor whether the vendor ,
Margaret Johnson , when Pitts failed to comply with the terms of
sale , had the right to substitute for him as the last bidder Simpson ,
and without any consideration paid , to accept from him a convey
ance for the premises sold . This circuity o




f carrying back the title to Margaret
Johnson , the vendor , and must be considered as substantially the
same a
s if Margaret Johnson , the assignee and vendor , had bid off
2
3 Compare Chapter VI , note 1 .
In several states , the statutes expressly o
r impliedlynullify such
powers . Hurd ' s Il
l
. Stats . (1912 ) chap . 95 , § 22 ; Brown v . Bryan , 6
Idaho 1 ; Burns Ind . Stats . ( 1914 ) , S 1135 ; lowa Ann . Code ( 1897 ) ,
$ $ 4284 , 4287 ; Kans , Gen . Stats . (1909 ) , SS 5992 , 9711 ; Aultman & Taylor
Co . v . Meade , 121 Ky . 241 . Nebraska seems to be the only state in
which the power o
f
sale is judicially nullified , without statutory ground .
See Cullen v . Casey , (Nebr . ) 95 N . W . 605 ; Kirkendall v . Weatherley , 77
Nebr . 421 . It should be observed , however , that in several o
f
the states
where a power o
f













her own sale , and then in her own name conveyed it
directly to herself .
The main question is , whether after the death of the mortgagor ,
Joshua M . Johnson , leaving his ido and children in possession o
f
the premises , the mortgaged premises could be sold and conveyed by
Margaret Johnson in her own name , without any reference whatever




his heirs at law , some o
f
whom
were infants . This must , to a large extent , depend upon the de
termination a
s
to whose the legal estate was a
t
the time of the death
o
f






the mortgagor ( so far as the mortgage it
self was concerned ) , the title was in themortgagor , and a
t
his death
descended to his heirs . It is true that , according to the common





y way of pledge
for the security o
f
a debt , and to become void upon the payment o
f
it . ” But it is quite as clear that in our State , by the act o
f
1791
(now embodied in section 2299 o
f
the General Statutes ) , the legal
title , upon the execution of a mortgage , remains in the mortgagor ,
and “ the mortgagee shall not be entitled to maintain any possessory
action for the real estate mortgaged even after the time allotted for
the payment of the money secured ; but the mortgagor shall be
deemed owner o
f
the land , and the mortgagee as owner o
f
the
money lent or due ; and shall be entitled to recover satisfaction for
the same out of the land by foreclosure and sale according to law . "
See Simons ' v . Bryce , 10 S . C . , 368 ; and Warren v . Raymond , 17
S . C . , 163 .




title which remained in the mortgagor , but only gave a power o
f
sale , that power assuredly could only be executed in the name o
f
the principal . Webster v . Brown , 2 S . C . , 429 ; De Walt v . Kinard ,
1
9
id . , 282 . It is said , however , that Margaret Johnson did not
execute the deed in the name o
f
the principal , Joshua M . Johnson ,




the sale he was dead ,
and most o
f
his heirs , to whom the title had descended , were infants
and incapable o
f conveying the title .
This fact suggests another difficulty in the way o
f
the plaintiff ' s
recovery on her own title . We think that the power of sale given
by Joshua M . Johnson was revoked by his death ; and if so , of
course , it was incapable o
f
execution . The power o
f
one man to act
for another must depend on the will of that other , and when it is
withdrawn the power ceases . As the power o
f
sale in this case
formed a part o
f
a contract for consideration , it may be conceded
that it could not have been revoked in the lifetime of the creator of
it ; but , nevertheless , we think it was revoked b
y
his death . It cer
tainly was , unless it belonged to that exceptional class where the
SALE UNDER A POWER . 357
" power is coupled with an interest .” Hunt v . Rousmanier 's
Admnrs ., 8 Wheat ., 205 ; Lockett v . Hill , 1 Woods , 558 , and cases
there cited . Was the power here , in the sense of the rule , “ coupled
with an interest ” ?
I freely confess that the phrase , “ a power coupled with an inter
est," never seemed to me to convey a very clear and definite idea .
I am content to adopt the views of Chief Justice Marshall upon the
subject , as expressed in the case from Wheaton above cited , where
he says : "What is meant by the expression , a power coupled with
an interest ' ? Is it an interest in the subject on which the power is to
be exercised , or is it an interest in that which is produced by the
exercise of the power ? We hold it to be clear that the ' interest '
which protects a power after the death of the person who creates it,
must be an interest in the thing itself . In other words , the power
must be engrafted on an estate in the thing . If we are to under
stand by the word “ interest an interest in that which is to be pro
duced by the execution of the power , then they are never united ;
the power, to produce the interest , must be exercised , and by its
exercise is extinguished . The power ceases when the interest com
mences, and therefore can not , in accurate law language , be said
to be 'coupled with it. But the substantial basis of the opinion of
the court on this subject is found in the legal reason of the princi
ple. The interest or title in the thing being vested in the person
who gives the power, remains in him , unless it be conveyed with
the power, and can pass out of him only by a regular act in his
own name. The act of the substitute , therefore , which in such a
case is the act of the principal , to be legally effectual , must be in his
name - must be such an act as the principal himself would be cap
able of performing , and which would be valid if performed by him .
Such a power necessarily ceases with the life of the person mak
ing it,” & c .
We are aware that Mr. Jones (2 Mortgages , section 1794 ) has
expressed the opinion that “ the rule is the same in those States
where , by statute or adjudication , a mortgage is regarded as a mere
security for a debt , passing no title or estate to the mortgagee ; the
power of sale is coupled with an interest , and is irrevocable , just
the sameas it is where the common law doctrine, that the mortgage
conveys the legal estate , still prevails ” — and cites as authority for the
proposition the case of Calloway v . People 's Bank of Bellefontaine ,
54 Ga., 441. But as the learned author in the same book repeatedly
declares that the deed of sale under the power should be made by the
holder of the legal title, we must suppose that he failed to note
clearly the great difference as to title between a common -law mort
gage and one executed under a statute such as that in this State .
The judgment of this court is , that the judgment of the Circuit
Court be reversed , and the cause remanded to the Circuit , with
358 FORECLOSURE .
leave to the plaintiff to move to amend her complaint so as to pray
for a regular judicial foreclosure of her mortgage .
Upon this opinion the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice McIver made
the following endorsement :
We concur in so much of this judgment as reverses the judgment
of the Circuit Court ; but we do not concur in so much of the judg
ment as allows the palintiff leave to amend , for the reason that , in
our opinion, such an amendment as that contemplated would change
substantially the claim of the plaintiff and can not be allowed under
section 194 of the Code .24
VARNUM v . MESERVE .
SUPREME COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS , 1864 .
8 Allen (Mass .) 158 .
HOAR , J . The plaintiff is the administrator with the will annexed
of Patrick Manice , who made a mortgage with a power of sale to
the defendant, his wife joining in a release of dower and homestead .
The mortgage debt being due and unpaid, the defendant advertised
the mortgaged estate for sale , according to the requirements of the
power of sale ; but before the advertisement had been published the
requisite number of times , the mortgagor died . By his will , the
real estate was devised to hi
s
wife for life or widowhood , with re
mainder to his brothers and sisters . The mortgagee proceeded to
complete the sale after the death of the mortgagor ; and after satis
fying the mortgage debt , and paying the expenses attending the sale ,
there is a surplus left in his hands , to recover which this action is
brought .









the defendant was valid to pass the absolute
title to the property . The objection is , that the death o
f
the mort
gagor extinguished the power .
By the power o
f
sale the mortgagee , his executors , administra
tors o
r assigns , were authorized to sell the mortgaged premises , and
" in his or their own names , o
r
a
s the attorney o
f
the grantor , " to
convey the same absolutely and in fee simple to the purchaser ; and
out o
f
the proceeds to retain sufficient to discharge the mortgage




The question thus presented was argued , but not decided , in the
2
4 Compare Wilkins v . McGehee , 86 Ga . 764 ; Ray v . Hemphill , 97 Ga .
563 ; Rogers , Heirs o
f , v . Watson , 81 Tex , 400 .
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case of Brewer v . Winchester , 2 Allen , 389 ; and we believe has not
before been judicially determined in this commonwealth . But when
the power of sale is to be executed in the name of the mortgagee ,
we can have no doubt that it may be executd as well after the death
of the mortgagor as before. It is a power coupled with an interest ;
and not merely an interest in the proceeds of the property for the
sale of which the power is given , but in the property itself . Strictly
speaking , a mortgage vests the whole legal estate in the mortgagee .
His title to the land is complete as a legal title , and the power of
sale is to relieve him of the equities attached to the mortgage. The
power is to be executed out of the estate conveyed , and is not merely
collateral to it. Hunt v . Rousmanier , 8 Wheat . 174 , 203 . 1 Par
sons on Con . 62 . Wright v . Rose , 2 Sim . & Stu . 323. Clay v . Wil
lis , 1 B . & C . 364 .
The strongest form in which the objection to the execution o
f
the
power is stated is that which points out the difference between the
two estates o
f mortgagor and mortgagee , each o
f
which is regarded ,
for some purposes , as a separate legal estate . Until the sale under
the power , the equity of redemption remains in the mortgagor , and






inherited from him , as if the





the power . It is therefore urged that the power o
f
sale can only be considered as a power o




f redemption must be made b
y
a separate
instrument from that which transfers the mortgagee ' s estate ; be
cause the equity o
f redemption remains in the mortgagor after he
has made the mortgage and the power . But this objection would
be equally valid against any conveyance under the power in the name
o
f
the mortgagee . If such a conveyance can be sustained , (and it is








the parties , so just and equitable
in it
s provisions that it receives the sanction o
f
courts o
f equity , and




the sale was precisely in conformity with
the requirement o
f
the mortgage ; and the expenses for which the
defendant asks allowance do not seem objectionable .
Exceptions sustained . 25
2
5
“ The only notice published announced that the mortgagee would
sell a
t public auction , a
t
a time named , ‘all the equity o
f redemption o
f
the said Enoch Bartlett in and to the said premises ' & c . This was an
advertisement o
f
the intended sale o
f only the equity o
f redemption , and
not of the whole estate in the land . It offered to the public only the
mortgagor ' s interest in the premises , and did not include the mort
gagee ' s . The power was to sell the whole estate , including the equity
of redemption ; and gave no authority to sell the equity of redemption
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REILLY v . PHILLIPS.
SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH DAKOTA , 1894 .
4 S . Dak . 604 .
KELLAM , J . The object of this action is to determine the rights,
respectively , of the appellants , who were plaintiffs below , and the
respondents , who were defendants , in and to certain premises in the
city of Sioux Falls . The facts are undisputed and are these : Mar
garet Reilly , in her lifetime, was the owner of the premises , and
executed a mortgage thereon to Andrew C . Phillips , which was duly
recorded . The mortgage contained the following power of sale :
“ And in case default shall be made in the payment of said sum of
money , or any part thereof , at the time or times above specified for
the payment thereof, or in case of the non -payment of any taxes as
aforesaid , or the breach of any covenant or any agreement therein
contained , then , and in either case , the whole principal and interest
of said note shall, at the option of the holder thereof, immediately
become due and payable , and it shall be lawful in such case , for the
said party of the second part, (Andrew C . Phillips ) his heirs , execu
tors , and administrators or assigns , to grant, bargain , sell, release
and convey said premises , with the appurtenances thereto belonging ,
at public auction , in the manner now , or that may hereafter be , pro
vided by law , and in the name of the grantors , and as their attor
ney for that purpose hereby duly authorized , constituted and ap
pointed , to make, execute and deliver to the purchaser or purchas
ers , his , her or their heirs and assigns , forever , a good , ample, and
sufficient, deed of conveyance in the law ." Margaret Reilly , the
mortgagor , died . After her death , the mortgage being due and un
paid , Andrew C . Phillips , mortgagee , began and concluded proceed
ings for the foreclosure of said mortgage by advertisement as pro
vided by statute , under the power of sale in the mortgage. The
proceedings and sale were conducted and made by the sheriff of the
county ; the said Phillips becoming purchaser , and receiving a cer
tificate of sale , and , after the expiration of the statutory time for
redemption , a sheriff 's deed , in the usual form . No action or pro
ceedings at law were instituted to recover the debt secured by the
mortgage . The plaintiffs , except Thomas H ., were the minor heirs
alone. If only the equity of redemption were sold , it is difficult to see
what would become of the mortgage . Certainly , a person who might
wish to purchase would only infer from the advertisement that he could
buy an estate on which the encumbrance would continue. As the notice
of sale was not in conformity with the power of sale in the mortgage
deed , the attempted sale in pursuance of it was ineffectual, and passed
no title which can bar the right of redemption ." Hoar , J ., in Fowle v.
Merrill , 10 Allen (Mass .) 350 .
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of Margaret Reilly , and he was her surviving husband . No guard
ian was appointed for such minor heirs , and no notice of such fore
closure proceedings given them , other than by the publication of the
notice of the mortgage sale . After the delivery of the sheriff 's deed
to the mortgagee and purchaser , Phillips , the plaintiffs tendered to
him the amount due upon the mortgage , which he refused . Subse
quently Andrew C . Phillips died , and defendants are his widow and
heirs. This brief statement of the facts is sufficient for an under
standing of the questions involved , no attack being made upon the
regularity of the proceedings . The trial court confirmed the title in
the defendants and from such judgment plaintiffs appeal .
Two questions cover the discussion of counsel : ( 1 ) Did the
power of sale in the mortgage terminate at the death of Margaret
Reilly , the mortgagor ? And ( 2 ) if not, did the foreclosure by ad
vertisement and sale cut off the right of the heirs to redeem ?
Whether the power of sale , and the right to execute it survived
the mortgagor who granted it , depends upon its nature. Was it a
naked power, or , as is often expressed , a power coupled with an
interest ? Counsel on both sides have presented instructive briefs ,
showing by cited adjudications the views of eminent courts and
judges upon the question , which it would seem are not altogether
harmonious ; but we are inclined to think that the code of our own
state furnishes a complete and decisive answer to the question . The
power of sale in a mortgage is not treated in our statute as a simple
power of attorney , but is declared to be a trust, ( Section 4354 ,
Comp. Laws, ) and as such is an elemental part of the security , ( Sec
tion 2829 ;) and in Section 2813 a distinction between such a power,
which is a trust, and a simple power of attorney to convey land , is
expressly declared . The power of sale was not, then , a naked , inde
pendent power , whose life and effect are to be determined under the
principles and rules of agency , but was a substantial part of the
security itself . It was as much a part of the right conveyed to the
mortgagee as was the lien upon the mortgaged premises . It was a
right which Reilly sold to Phillips when he made the mortgage , and
for which Phillips paid when he paid for the mortgage . It lasted
as long as the security lasted , or until the mortgagee had taken
other means to enforce it. It was a power coupled with an interest ,
and such a power does not terminate with the death of the party
conferring it . Comp . Laws, par. 4007 . That the power of sale in
a mortgage survives , and may be executed after the death of the
mortgagor , is at least suggested by Section 5424 Comp . Laws, where
it is provided that the surplus must be paid to “ the mortgagor , his
legal representative or assigns." While the term “ legal representa
tives ” does not exclusively mean executors or administrators, it ordi
narily does. 13 Amer . & Eng. Enc. Law , p . 221. As before noticed
our statute expressly provides that a mortgage may contain a power
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of sale ; that it becomes a part of the security ; and how it may be
enforced . The mortgage in question was made with reference to
these provisions, and they became a part of it. Section 5411 Comp.
Laws provides that : “ Every mortgage of real property containing
therein a power of sale , upon default being made in the condition of
such mortgage , may be foreclosed by advertisement ," etc. No ex
ception or suspension of the right to thus foreclose is made or de
clared on account of the death or other disability of the mortgagor .
The appellants contend that the concluding words of the power of
sale in this mortgage show that it was the intention of the mortgagor
that the deed , in case of sale under such provision , should be made in
her name and as her act, through and by the mortgagee as her at
torney, and that such a power could not be legally executed after
her death . The words are : “ And in the name of the grantors and
as their attorney for that purpose hereby duly authorized , consti
tuted and appointed , to make, execute and deliver to the purchaser
or purchasers , his , her or their heirs or assigns , a good , ample and
sufficient deed of conveyance , in the law ." While we recognize
much force in this argument, the fact still remains that by the power
of sale she had already authorized the mortgagee to sell the prem
ises, in case of default, “ at public auction in the manner now , or
that may hereafter be , provided by law .” She knew when she
granted the power — for she was charged with knowing the law
that the statute definitely provided the means and method of its
execution , and she will be presumed to have contracted with refer
ence to it . In such case the statute becomes a part of the contract .
State v . Fylpaa , ( S . D . ) 54 N . W . 599 ; State v . Foley , 30 Minn .
350 . Itmay be the words first quoted were intended by the parties
to afford an additional or cumulative method of executing the power ,
but we do not think they should be construed to cut off the statutory
method . If we are correct as to the theory and effect of the several
statutory provisions above referred to , we need not look further for
the law which much control u
s . We think , however , that , inde
pendent o
f
these particular provisions , our conclusion upon this




law , and by the pre
ponderance o
f
adjudicated cases . 2 Perry , Trusts , par . 602 , says :
" It is a universal rule that a power coupled with an interest is ir
revocable ; and a
s
a power of sale inserted in a mortgage * * *





the donor or grantor o
f





donor will annul the power , o
r
suspend
its exercise . The debt remains , the right or lien on the property
remains , and the power is coupled with them . ” See , also , 4 Kent ,
Comm . 147 . That the power of sale in a mortgage is not termi
nated o
r suspended by the death o
f
the mortgagor , is directly
held in Connors v . Holland , 113 Mass . 50 ; Varnum v . Meserve , 8
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Allan 158 ; Hudgins v . Morrow , 47 Ark . 515 ; Beattie v . Butler , 21
Mo. 313 ; Jones v . Tainter, 15 Minn . 512 , (Gil. 423.) Upon the
same principle , and for the same reason , it is held that the subse
quent insanity of themortgagor does not terminate or suspend the
power of sale granted before the disability occurred . Encking v .
Simmons , 28 Wis . 272 ; Meyer v . Kenchler , 10 Mo. App . 371 ; Van
Meter v . Darrah , (Mo. Sup.) 22 S . W . 30 ; Berry v . Skinner ,
30 Md. 567 .
Appellants insist that the rule of these cases is not applicable in
this jurisdiction , because , under our law , the mortgagor retains the
title to the estate mortgaged , contrary to the law prevailing in most
of the states whence these decisions come ; but we apprehend that ,
upon principle , that fact ought not to make any difference in respect
to the survival of the power. Even in the states where the mort
gage is held to convey the legal title to the mortgagee , the transfer
is only nominal . It is more of a fiction than a reality . If the mort
gagee, who is said to hold the legal title , die , his interest does not
pass to his heirs , as real estate , but to his executor or administrator ,
as personal property . It is a chose in action , precisely as in this
state . Hil. Mort . 281 . In New York the mortgage does not convey
the legal title , and has not, since a very early day , and yet Chan
cellor Walworth , in Jencks v . Alexander , 11 Paige 624 , says that a
power of sale in such a mortgage is a beneficial power ; that it is
a power coupled with an interest , “ to the extent of the interest of
the mortgagee in the premises ." In Wilson v. Trout , 2 Cow . 236 ,
the court says : " The power of the mortgagee to sell the mortgaged
premises is undoubtedly a power coupled with an interest .” The
power of sale in that state is constantly treated as a power coupled
with an interest , and the cases are frequent in which it has been exe
cuted after the death of the mortgagor . See Anderson v . Austion ,
34 Barb. 319 ; King v. Duntz , 11 Barb . 191 ; George v . Arthur, 2
Hun 406 ; Cole v. Moffitt , 20 Barb . 18 . The amendment of 1844 , of
the law regulating sales under such power, expressly recognizes its
survival , b
y requiring that , in case o
f
the death of the mortgagor ,
notice should be served upon his personal representatives . In Wis
consin the legal estate remains in the mortgagor , but in Encking v .
Simmons , supra , it was held that the insanity o
f
the mortgagor did
not suspend the power . The quality o
f
the power does not depend
upon the general character o
r legal effect o
f
the instrument in which
it is granted , but upon whether or not the power itself is coupled
with an interest in the subject concerning which the parties are con
tracting . It would be difficult to justify the conclusion that in one
case the mortgagee had an interest in the subject of the mortgage ,
and in the other case did not . The purpose o
f




s mortgagor and mortgagee are the same




gagee are the same, with respect to the property mortgaged . He
may insure it. He may redeem it from tax sale. He may protect
it from waste , even as against him who holds the legal title. We
think , both under our statute or without it, the power of sale is one
so coupled with an interest that it survives the death of the grantor .
The case of Hunt v . Rousmanier , 8 Wheat. 174 , strongly relied upon
by appellants is distinguishable from this . In that case there was
no mortgage or pledge of the property , but a naked power of at
torney, authorizing Hunt to sell and transfer it in the name of Rous
manier . A bill of sale was to be given in the name of Rousmanier ,
and as his act, by his attorney . Neither possession , nor any lien
upon or interest in the property , was attempted to be conveyed . In
speaking of this case Chancellor Walworth says, in Knapp v . Al
vord , 10 Paige , 209, the decision would probably have been different
if the property had been delivered to Hunt as a pledge , but under
our law mortgaged 'property is pledged - hypothecated — without
delivery.
We are referred to cases not in harmony with the views we have
expressed . The strongest one, perhaps , is Johnson v . Johnson , ( S .
C . ) 3 S . E . 606 , where the court , after quite a thorough discussion ,
holds that the power of sale was not coupled with an interest , and
consequently expired with the mortgagor . To make the case more
applicable here , the learned judge who writes the opinion predicates
his argument and conclusion largely upon the fact that there , as
here, the mortgage creates a lien only , and does not convey the title.
Upon that point, and it
s
effect upon the questions in hand , we have
already expressed our views . In that state , however , it would seem
from the opinion and such seems to be the fact , so far as we can
ascertain — there is no statute recognizing , o
r declaring the effect o
f
o
r providing a method for the execution o
f , the power . It could be
executed only as any other power of attorney , in the name of the
principal . A sale , if made , would be in the name and as the act o
f
the deceased principal . Such is not the case here . Our statute pro
vides , and did when this power was created , that a power of sale
in a mortgage may be executed by the sheriff o
f
the county in which
themortgaged premises are situated ; that the sale may be advertised
and made by him , and the deed executed by him , as sheriff . It was
so done in this case . As before observed , a power of sale , if such is
contemplated in the statute , will be presumed to be created in view
of the statute , and that it may be executed in the manner provided
b
y
such statute , and not necessarily in the name o
f
the grantor , and
not as a simple power o
f attorney . The other cases cited by appel
lants are also from states having no statute like ours , so far as we
are able to ascertain . 26
2
6 McGuire v . Van Pelt , 55 Ala . 344 ; Hudgins v . Morrow , 47 Ark . 515 ;
More v . Calkins , 95 Cal . 435 ; Strother v . Law , 54 111 . 413 ; Berry v . Skin
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This brings us to the second question . Did the sale under such
power , conducted , as is conceded , in strict pursuance of the statute ,
cut off the right of the heirs to redeem after the expiration of a year
from the sale ? We have already expressed the opinion — and such
is, we think , the doctrine of the statute — that when Reilly made the
mortgage to Phillips , she conveyed to him , not only the lien upon the
land , but the right to enforce it under the power of sale. Such right
became property in Phillip 's hands, in the same sense that his lien
was property . As such , it would pass to his personal representatives
at his death , as a part ofhis estate . Reilly had then left such rights
in and to the mortgaged property as she had not conveyed to Phil
lips. She could leave no more to her heirs than she herself had at
the time of her death . Their rights must be measured by hers .
They took her place, and might only do, with respect to the prop
erty , what she might do . The rights of the heirs having accrued
subsequent to the mortgage , they are subordinate to it, — not only to
the lien of themortgage , but to the power of sale which it conveyed
as a part of the security . On this ground it was held in Brackett v .
Baum , 50 N . Y . 8 , that a statutory foreclosure and sale in a pur
chase money mortgage barred the dower right of the wife , who did
not sign themortgage . By the amendment of the New York statute
in 1844 , it was required that, if the power of sale be executed after
the death of the mortgagor , notice of sale should be given to the
administrator or executor of the deceased mortgagor ; but in An
derson v . Austin , supra , wherein the heirs of the mortgagor sought
to redeem , they having had no notice of the sale , the court held that
the mortgagee was only required to pursue the procedure provided
by the statute , and , if no administrator or executor had been ap
pointed at the time the sale was advertised and made, the provision
as to service upon them was inoperative , and , service upon the
heirs not being required by the statute , the foreclosure was com
plete when made in the mode otherwise prescribed by the statute .
Demarest v . Wyncoop , 3 Johns . Ch . 129 , was an action by heirs ,
who were infants when the sale was made, to redeem premises sold
under' a statutory foreclosure by virtue of a power of sale in the
mortgage . The foreclosure was prior to the amendment of 1844 ,
and when publication of notice of sale , only , was required . The
court denied the right of the heirs to redeem , saying : “ The statute
has no saving clause for persons laboring under disabilities , but is
peremptory that no sale under such power shall be defeated , to the
prejudice of any bona fide purchaser , in favor of any person claim
ner, 30 Md. 567 ; Jones v. Tainter , 15 Minn . 512 ; Beatie & Others v . But
ler , 21 Mo. 313 ; Muth v. Goddard , 28 Mont . 237 ; Bergen v. Bennett , 1
Caines Cases ( N . Y .) 1; Wilson v. Troup , 2 Cow . ( N . Y .) 195 ; Carter
v . Slocum , 122 N . Car . 475 ; Grandin v . Emmons , 10 N . Dak . 223; Enck
ing v . Simmons , 28 Wis. 272 .
See Mechem , Agency (2d Ed .) SS 570 -588 , 650 -663.
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ing the equity of redemption . Where the statute makes no excep
tion , the court, as I have already shown , can make none, on the
ground of any inherent equity applicable to infants .” And so Chan
cellor Kent, in discussing the effect of an advertised sale , pursuant
to the statute , under a power of sale in the mortgage, says : “ A
sale under a power , as well as under a decree , will bind the infant
heirs ." 4 Kent , Comm . 191. By the statute of our state , no notice
of sale is required to be served upon anybody . General notice to al
l
interested is given b
y









sale in the mortgage , was , without
question , intended to take the place o
f
a foreclosure by action , and
to have the effect o
f
a
n old foreclosure in equity . The statute hav




the sale either upon
heirs o
r
others interested in the mortgaged property , such service ,
if made , would be entirely voluntary on the part o
f
the mortgagee ,
and could add nothing to the legal effect o
f
the sale . This court
can not add to the statute another provision requiring that an ex
press notice shall b
e given to minor heirs or their guardian in order
to make the foreclosure sale effective against them . If , as the law
stands , a foreclosure would be good with such actual notice , it is
good without it . The statute expressly gives the right to redeem ,
within a year from sale , to the mortgagor , o
r
his successors in in
terest . These must be redemption rights which it was intended to
be affected by the foreclosure and sale ; otherwise , there would be no
occasion for so affirmatively preserving o
r conferring them . The
heirs of a mortgagor , whether minor or adult , are his successors in
interest , and included in the class which may so redeem . One o
f
two conclusions seems inevitable : Either a strict pursuance o
f
the
statute was intended to , and does , bar the rights of heirs , whether
minor or adult , to redeem , except as preserved for a definite time
by the statute , o
r
the statute , and the proceeding it authorizes , are







the time under disability . In our ex
amination , we have found no case announcing o
r sustaining the lat
ter conclusion , but find so many , some o
f
which are cited above ,
holding the reverse , that we are constrained to adopt the first propo
sition as the law . Whether the statute itself is wisely considerate of
all the interests that may be affected b
y
such proceeding is a legisla
tive , and not a judicial , question . It has not been questioned but that





the proceeding by a general publication o
f
the notice ,
and we think that is the theory and scheme o
f
the statute . We
think the judgment o
f
the trial court is correct , and it is affirmed . 27
2
7 Compare , Aiken v . Bridgeford Co . , 84 Ala . 295 ; Penryn Fruit Co .
v . Sherman -Worrell Fruit Co . , 142 Cal . 643 ; Mutual Loan & Bk , Co . v .
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GRAY , C . J., in Hall v. Bliss , 118 Mass . 554 (1875 ) . Although
equity will not allow the holder of a mortgage containing a power of
sale to become a purchaser at a sale under the power , unless ex
pressly so authorized by the terms of the mortgage ; Downes v .
Grazebrook , 3 Meriv . 200 ; Dyer v . Shurtleff , 112 Mass. 165 ; there
is no doubt that, under a mortgage containing such provisions as
that now before us, [ expressly authorizing the mortgagee to pur
chase a purchase made by the mortgagee and for his sole benefit
is valid and effectual to cut off a
ll right o
f redemption , provided the
mortgagee faithfully discharges in a






the power ; and that in the case at bar , if the
land had been conveyed b
y
him to one purchasing in his behalf , and
immediately reconveyed to him b
y
the latter , the power would have
been well executed . Dexter v . Shepard , 117 Mass . 480 . Wilson v .
Troup , 7 Johns . Ch . 25 , and 2 Cowen , 195 .
The plaintiff contends that the deed executed in this case was
void , because it wasmade by the mortgagee directly to himself . But





a mortgage with power o
f
sale , and o
f
a deed made
in execution of the power .
Such a mortgage vests a seisin and a conditional estate in the
mortgagee , with a power superadded to convey an absolute estate
by a sale pursuant to the terms o
f
the power . The execution o
f
the
power does but change , in accordance with the terms o
f
the mort
gage deed , the uses upon which the estate is to be held . The pur
chaser a
t
the sale takes , not as the grantee o
f
the mortgagee , but as
the person designated o
r appointed by the mortgagee in execution
o
f
the power , and derives his title from the mortgagor , as if the
Haas , 100 Ga . 111 ; Lowe v . Grinnan , 19 Iowa 193 ; Stróther v . Law , 54
111 . 413 ; Hall v . Bliss , 118 Mass . 554 ; Carlisle v . Libby , 185 Mass . 445 ;
Bolles v . Carli , 12 Minn . 113 ; Sims v . Field , 66 Mo . 111 ; Doolittle v .
Lewis , 7 Johns . Ch . ( N . Y . ) 45 ; Grandin v . Emmons , 10 N . Dak . 223 ;
Bancroft v . Ashhurst , 2 Grant ( Pa . ) 513 ; Woonsocket Inst . for Savings
v . American Worsted Co . , 13 R . I . 255 ; Hampshire v . Greeves , 104 Tex .
620 . See Howell ' s Ann . Stats . Mich . § 13928 .
In some states the statutes require personal notice to some o
r all of
the parties interested in the equity of redemption , and the power may
itself expressly make such requirement .
It has been held that all requirements of the statutes regulating the
sale under a power (which in some states are very elaborate ) must be
complied with , even though the power makes other provisions o
r express
ly waives them . Webb v . Haeffer , -53 Md . 187 ; Pierce v . Grimley , 77 Mich .
273 ; Lawrence v . Farmer ' s Loan & Trust Co . , 13 N . Y . 200 ; Kerr v .
Galloway , 94 Tex , 641 . But see Elliott v . Wood , 53 Barb . ( N . Y . ) 285 ,
305 ; Ib . 45 N . Y . 71 . On the other hand , it would seem that provisions
of the power which are not in conflict with the statute must also be com
plied with - in other words that the parties may add to , but cannot take
from , the statutory requirements . Pierce v . Grimley and Lawrence v .
Farmer ' s Trust Co . , supra . But see Butterfield v . Farnham , 19 Minn . 85 ,
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designation or appointment had been inserted in the original deed ,
and the seisin or interest to serve the estate is raised by that deed .
Butler ' s note to Co . Lit . 271a . 1 Sugd. Pow . (7th ed .) 242 . 2 Sugd.
Pow . 22 , 23 . 4 Kent. Com . (12th ed.) 327 , 337 .
MENZEL v . HINTON .
SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA , 1903.









[Action to quiet title to land . The defendant claims title b
y
a
sale under a power of sale contained in a mortgage . ]
CONNOR , J . The Code , Sec . 152 ( 3 ) provides that the period pre
scribed for the commencement o
f
" a









real property , where the mortgagor or grantor has been in posses
sion o
f
the property , within ten years after the forfeiture o
f
the
mortgage , or after the power o
f
sale becomes absolute , or within
ten years after the last payment on the same . " We are unable to
discover in this language any period o
f
time fixed within which the
mortgagee is required to execute the power of sale . It will be ob
served that this section prescribed the time for bringing an action ,
( 1 ) for the foreclosure o
f
a mortgage , ( 2 ) or deed in trust for cred
itors with power o
f
sale . The instrument executed by Foreman to
Hinton is a mortgage containing a power o
f
sale and is not within
the language o
f
the statute . It was not necessary for themortgagee
to institute an action for the foreclosure of the mortgage or the exe
cution o
f
the power ; hence no time is fixed b
y
the statute within
which he must execute the power . The word " action " in the para
graph evidently has reference to the action for foreclosure and not




sale , which requires no action . To
construe the statute otherwise would b
e
to write into it language
which we do not find there .
It must be conceded that the language used by this court in Hut
aff v . Adrian , 112 N . C . , 259 , would seem to sustain the contention
o
f
the plaintiff . In that case , the bond for the security of which the
mortgage was given was barred by the statute o
f
limitations , the last
payment thereon having been made more than ten years before the
threatened execution o
f
the power . The mortgagor applied for an
injunction to restrain the sale by the mortgagee under the power ,
which was refused . The only question presented in that case was
whether the mortgagor had any equity upon which to base his ap
plication for the interference o
f
the court . The case is correctly de
cided . If the execution of the power was not barred by the statute ,





















course not entitled to an injunction ; if it was barred and
his right to execute the power at an end , the legal title would not
pass by the sale . Itwill be observed that this case was decided prior
to the passage o
f the Act o
f
18 , Chapter 6 , permitting action to
b
e brought to remove a cloud from title . Clark , J . , in that case
says : “ The court will therefore not interpose by an injunction
merely to prevent a cloud upon the title . "
Hutaff v . Adrian , supra , is cited in Smith v . Parker , 131 N . C . ,
470 . No question was involved in that c se regarding the Statute
o
f
Limitations , nor was it cited for that purpose . Conceding that
a
n
action in personai upon the note held b
y
Hinton against Over
ton was barred by the statute , it would not affect the decision o
f
this cause . It is well settled that an action upon the debt may be
barred without affecting the right to maintain an action to foreclose
the mortgage given to secure it . Capehart v . Dettrick , 91 N . C .
344 . This because the bar o
f
the statute affects only the remedy and
not the right . Parker v . Grant , 91 N . C . , 338 ; Rouss v . Ditmore ,
122 N . C . , 775 ; 19 Am . & Eng . Enc . , 146 ; Sturges v . Crowning
shield , 4 Wheat . 206 . Hence it is that in an action upon a debt
barred by the statute , for the payment o
f
which a " new and continu
ing promise " is relied upon , the “ cause o
f
action ” is the original
debt , and the new promise is relied upon to repel the bar . Falls v .
Sherrill , 19 N . C . , 372 . In Kull v . Farmer , 78 N . C . , 339 , the dis
tinction between an action on a debt barred b
y
the statute and one
discharged in bankruptcy is pointed out ; in the latter " the cause o
f
action ” is the new promise , the old debt being a consideration to
support the promise . The reason for the distinction is obvious .
Prior to the adoption of our Code , there was no statute of limita
tions in regard to sealed instruments , bonds and mortgages . There
was a presumption of payment or satisfaction after the lapse of ten
years . Rev . Code , Ch . 65 , Sec . 18 . This presumption affected the
right as distinguished from the remedy . Copeland v . Collins , 122






r by presumption o
f
law ,
the mortgage which is incidental to the debt is likewise discharged
and , in equity , the purpose for which the legal title was conveyed
being accomplished , would be treated as discharged and the mort
gagor , as the owner o
f
the land . Ray v . Pearce , 84 N . C . , 485 ;
Edwards v . Tipton , 85 N . C . , 480 ; Simmons v . Ballard , 102 N . C . ,
109 . That such is not the law under our statute o
f
limitations is
settled by the uniform and unanimous decisions o
f
this court .
The question is clearly se
t
forth and discussed in the case o
f Gold
frank v . Young , 64 Tex . , 432 , in which Stayton , A . J . , said : “ In




limitations in any matter




to 'actions or suits in courts ,' and it provides within what time 'ac
tions or suits' in the different classes of cases may be brought , but
it does not attempt to determine within what period any one must
enforce a right which the debtor has placed it in the power of the
creditor to enforce otherwise than by an 'action or suit in court .'
* * * The declaration that persons must institute 'suits or
actions in courts ' within a fixed period to enforce their claims,
which can be enforced only in that manner, is not equivalent to de
claring that a creditor who has been given by contract a right and
means by which he may enforce his claims otherwise than through
the courts , shall not enforce it after the time at which he might in
stitute an action or suit , without subjecting himself to the bar which
would be urged by a plea of limitation . It is not always true that
rights which can not be enforced through the courts are valueless ,
nor that contracts which the courts can not enforce are invalid ." In
this case the Supreme Court of Texas held , “ That the statute of
limitation which applied to a money demand operates upon the rem
edy when it
s
enforcement is sought b
y
'suits or actions ' in courts .
It does not deprive the creditor of a remedy when he had provided
by contract , to enforce through a trust deed the payment of his
claim . ”
This case was approved in Fievel v . Zuber , 67 Tex . , 275 , the court
saying : “ The statute does not say that no debt shall be collected ,
but that no action shall be brought . Nor does it provide that the
debt shall be extinguished . Any statutes o
f
limitation worded like
ours are generally held to operate solely upon the remedy in the
courts and not to destroy the debt . ” Tombler v . Ice Co . , 17 Texas
Civ App . , 596 . To the same effect is Hartrauft ' s Estate , 153 Pa . ,
540 ; Slagmaker v . Boyd , 38 Pa . , 216 ; Gardner v . Terry , 99 Mo . ,
523 . In Grant v . Burr , 54 Cal . , 298 , it is said : “ The expiration o
f
the statute time for bringing an action to recover a debt , o
r
to en
force any personal obligation , does not operate as an extinguish
ment o
r payment ; therefore , where the legal title to land has been
conveyed to a trustee to secure a debt , the title and power o
f
the




the period prescribed to
bar the debt , and a court o
f
equity will not interfere to enjoin a sale
under the deed . The statute o
f
limitations is to be employed as a
shield and not as a sword ; as a means o
f
defense and not , as a wea
pon of attack . ”
In Hayes v . Frey , 54 Wis . , 503 , it is held , “ The validity of a sale




fact that the stat
ute o
f
limitations had run upon the note secured b
y
the mortgage . ”
Jones on Mortgages , $ 1204 ; Bush v . Cooper , 26 Miss . , 599 .
The point upon which we rest our decision is , that as the mort
gagor has expressly put it in the power of the mortgagee to sell
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the land for the payment of the debt and thereby relieved him of the
necessity of bringing an action for that purpose , his right is not
affected by the statute of limitations, which applies only to actions
brought for the enforcement of rights . The legislature may, if in





in respect to the time within which it must be exercised , upon the
same footing as actions to foreclose a mortgage with power of sale ;
but we can not , in the absence o
f any legislative declaration , make
the law . It is ours simply to declare it .
This opinion does not overrule o
r question Hutaff v . Adrian ,
supra , in respect to the point decided in that case , to -wit , that the
plaintiff was not entitled to injunctive relief . In so far as it is said
that after the expiration o
f
ten years the mortgage is dead , the right
is destroyed we can not concur .
The judgment o
f
the court below is affirmed . 28
[Clark , C . J . and Douglas , J . , delivered dissenting opinions . ]
EDITORIAL NOTE - FORECLOSURE B
Y
SCIRE FACIAS . — The usual
method o
f
foreclosure in Pennsylvania , and a permissible method
in a few other states , is that by scire facias . This is a proceeding
in a court o
f
law , leading to a judicial sale of the mortgaged land
which conveys to the purchaser the title which the mortgagor had
2
8 Compare , Hill v . Gregory , 64 Ark . 317 ; Emory v . Keighan , 88 Ill .
482 ; Hebert v , Bulte , 42 Mich . 489 ; Hall v . Bartlett , 9 Barb . ( N . Y . ) 297 .
In some states the statutes concerning redemption from foreclosure
sales are not broad enough to cover both judicial sales and sales under
powers . As a matter of legislative policy it is apparent that the right of
redemption is more needed in the latter case than in the former .
A court of equity may interpose by injunction to prevent or regulate
the exercise of a power of sale . But , in the absence of such judicial inter
ference , the mortgagee o
r
trustee , as in any case o
f remedy by act o
f
the
party , controls the whole proceeding in respect to all those features
which in the case o
f
a foreclosure by suit are regulated by the court :
e . g . the notice of sale , the time and place of sale , the manner of sale ,
the distribution of the proceeds & c . Of course , any departure from the
requirements o
f
the law and the contract will either invalidate the sale ,
or render the mortgagee or trustee liable to account or to pay damages ,
o
r
both , and all matters concerning the conduct o
f
the sale are , o
f
course ,
open to judicial investigation in any case to which they are material .
The recovery by the mortgagee o
f any deficiency o
f
the mortgage
debt remaining after the sale , and the recovery by the purchaser o
f pos
session of the land , matters which in the foreclosure by equitable suit






the suit , are , in the case o
f
fore
closure :by sale , the subject of common actions at law .





and the purchaser , of the sale under a power , as compared with the
foreclosure by suit , lies in the fact that , by the former , nothing is ad
judicated , either as to the status o
f
the mortgage as against the mort
gagor or other claimants of an interest in the land , or as to the validity
of the foreclosure proceedings .
For a digest of the statutes and equitable principles governing sales
under powers , see Jones , Mortgages , chaps . 39 , 40 .
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at the time of executing the mortgage, free from the claims of
all subsequent purchasers and encumbrancers . It is obvious that
the proceeding closely resembles the ordinary equitable foreclosure .
But the only necessary party is the mortgagor , or his executor or
administrator . Subsequent purchasers and encumbrancers need not




Mevey ' s Appeal , 4 Pa . St . 80 ; Hartman v . Ogborn , 54 Pa . St . 120 ;
Chickering v . Failes , 26 Ill . 507 ; Dennison v . Allen , 4 Ohio 495 .
In this respect the foreclosure by scire facias obviously resembles
the foreclosure b
y




For a discussion o
f
the procedure by scire facias in the several
states in which it is permitted , see Jones , Mortgages , $ $ 1328 , 1333 ,
1350 , 1355 .
CHAPTER VIII.
INJUNCTION AND ACCOUNT .
MORIARTY v . ASHWORTH .
SUPREME COURT OF MINNESOTA , 1890 .






















DICKINSON , J . This is an action to restrain the defendant from
quarrying and disposing o
f
granite rock from land mortgaged b
y
the defendant to the plaintiff , in April , 1887 , to secure a debt o
f
$ 1 ,000 , to become due years after that time . The land is o
f
the area of four acres . Its principal value is in the granite quarry
thereon . The removal o
f
this material depreciates the value o
f
the land to the extent o
f
such removal ; but the quarrying by the
defendant has not been carried on to such an extent as to so far
impair the value of the land as to render it insufficient security
for the plaintiff ' s debt , nor has he threatened to do so . The court ,
finding the facts to be substantially as above stated , considered
that the plaintiff was not entitled to an injunction . On this ap
peal we are only to consider whether , upon the facts found the
legal conclusion of the court was right .
While some authority may be found in support o
f
the claim
of the appellant that a mortgagee is entitled to an injunction re
straining any acts o
f
waste by a mortgagor in possession which
may diminish the value o
f
the mortgaged property , yet the great
weight o
f authority , both in England and in this country , is to the




s may render the security insufficient for
the satisfaction o
f
the debt , o
r o
f
doubtful efficiency . King v .
Smith , 2 Hare , 239 ; Humphreys v . Harrison , 1 Jac . & W . 581 ;
Hippesley v . Spencer , 5 Madd . 422 ; Harper v . Aplin , 54 Law T .
( N . S . ) 383 ; Coker v . Whitlock , 54 Ala . 180 ; Scott v . Wharton ,
2 Hen . & M . (Va . ) 25 ; Buckout v . Swift , 27 Cal . 433 ; Vander
slice v . Knapp , 20 Kan . 647 ; Harris v . Bannon , 78 Ky . 568 ; Van
Wyck v . Alliger , 6 Barb . 507 , 511 ; Snell , Eq . 304 ; 1 Wats . Comp .
Eq . 746 ; 2 Story , Eq . Jur . Par . 915 ; High , Inj . ( 2d Ed . ) Pars .
693 , 694 ; Bisp . Eq . (4th Ed . ) Par . 433 ; 1 Jones , Mortg . (4th Ed . )
Par . 684 ; 1 Lead . Cas . Eq . (4th Am . Ed . ) 992 , 1021 ; Kerr , Inj .
( 2
d Amer . Ed . ) 84 . In numerous other cases we find that the
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courts , in stating the grounds upon which equity will interfere ,
seem to regard it as a necessary condition that the sufficiency of
the security be threatened . See Cooper v . Davis , 15 Conn . 556 ;
Gray v . Baldwin , 8 Blackf. 164 ; Hastings v . Perry , 20 Vt. 272 ;
Fairbank v . Cudworth , 33 Wis . 358 . From the proposition which
we have stated as an established principle of equity , it is not to
be understood that equity will not interfere unless the acts threat
ened are such as may reduce the value of the mortgaged property
below the amount of the debt. On the contrary , as was considered
in King v . Smith , 2 Hare, 239, we think that the mortgagee is
entitled to be protected from acts of waste which would so far
impair the value of the property as to render the security of doubt
ful sufficiency . He is entitled to have the mortgaged property pre
served as sufficient security for the payment of his debt, and it is
not enough that its value may be barely equal to the debt . That
would not ordinarily be deemed sufficient as security to one whose




s market value . And not only must it be consid
ered that the mortgage is held to secure payment o
f
the debt , and
not for the purpose o
f converting the mortgagee into a purchaser ,
but that if the debt is not yet mature it is to be considered whether ,
during the time which may elapse before maturity , the present
value o
f
the property may not become depreciated from causes
not now known . It does not appear that the court in this case
failed to regard these considerations . 1
Judgment affirmed .
EAKIN , J . , in HUGHES V . JOHNSON , 38 Ark . 285 , 296 (1881 ) .
It is further , a well settled principle in equity , that one who has
a
n
interest in a security may advance what is fairly necessary to
its preservation , and may retain the advances out of the proceeds
before crediting any portion o
f
his debt . There can at least be no
doubt o
f
that , where such advances are made by the consent o
f
all parties interested in the property or fund . That was a strong
element in the case o
f
Bell v . Radcliff , ( supra ) . This is not upon
the idea that the security of the mortgage is thereby extended to
other advances , but rather upon the consideration that the proceeds
o
f





It remains , by way of preliminary remark , to allude again to the
fact that the money , concerning which the questions o
f application
arise , was the fruit o
f
the mortgaged property . Although , as has
been said , al
l
parties might agree to have it applied to the unse
cured items , yet as that is a diversion from the original intention ,
the onus o
f
showing such agreement is upon the party claiming it .
1 Compare , Morse v .Whitcher , 64 N . H . 59
0 ; Youle v . Richards , 1 N .
J . Eq . 534 .
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In the light of these principles the finding of the facts by the
chancellor , and the decree as to the law , must be reviewed .
The cause was heard alone upon the pleadings , and the deposi
tions of the parties, Bell , Moss and Hughes . The decree recited ,
as it
s
basis , the execution o
f
the mortgage upon the land and the
crop o
f
1876 , and that it was to enable the mortgagor to raise a
crop , and its assignment to complainant on the twenty -seventh of
June , 1876 . That Moss & Bell continued to furnish the supplies
required by the mortgage ; that on the first of November , 1876 , the
full amount of supplies named in the mortgage not being sufficient
to complete the crop and gather it , the mortgagees furnished addi
tional supplies at Hughes ' request ; that on the first of January ,
1877 , they amounted to $ 1 ,953 , and had been necessary to gather
and protect the property from loss . Further that the crop had not
been delivered and sold until the first o
f January , 1877 ; that it
was after that date argeed that Hughes should continue to purchase
goods on account , and that the cotton received should be applied
first to the payment o
f
said account , and the balance to the credit
of the mortgage account ; and that Moss & Bell did so apply the
cotton received after the first o
f January . Further : That the
goods furnished u
p
to the fifth o
f
March , 1877 , were so paid for
by cotton received and sold u
p
to that time , leaving , b
y
this mode
of statement , then due upon the mortgage of principal and interest ,
the sum o
f
$759 . 30 .
For this amount a decree was rendered , with the usual order of
sale for foreclosure . As to the items o
f
account after the fifth
of March , 1877 , the bill was dismissed without prejudice .
If the recitals are sustained by the evidence , the decree was cor
rect , in so far as it holds that the payments might be applied to
the advances made after the mortgage was due , and beyond its
amount .
[His honor proceeded to examine the evidence and found that
the sums advanced in excess o
f
the mortgage prior to January 1 ,
1877 , being cash to hire pickers and to purchase a gin , were prop
erly credited to the mortgagee , but that the later advances were
not o
f
this character . ]
DAVIS v . WINN .
SUPREME Court of MassaCHUSETTS , 1861 .
2 Allen (Mass . ) 111 .
Bill in equity to redeem land from a mortgage , given to the de
fendant by Moses Cummings , dated April 1 , 1840 , to secure the
sum o
f
$ 1 , 000 , and interest . Cummings died September 10 , 1840 ,
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and the plaintiff became owner of the equity of redemption by
several deeds from his heirs at law .
























The other point presented b
y
the report is equally free from
difficulty . The defendant , being in possession of the mortgaged
estate under his mortgage , after the death o
f
the mortgagor , was
compelled to pay a prior mortgage , in order to protect his title .
He had therefore , as against the mortgagor and those claiming
under him , a right to indemnify himself for this payment out of
the mortgaged estate . But the prior mortgagee discharged his
mortgage upon the record , instead o
f assigning it ; and the plain
tiff claims to stand in the po ition o
f
a bona fide purchaser with
out notice , and contends that he should not be obliged to pay a
mortgage which the record showed to be discharged and satisfied ,
a
t
the time he purchased the equity . There is certainly some force
in the reasoning b
y
which this position is supported ; but , without
intending to give a
n opinion upon it , we think the facts disclosed
by the report render it o
f
no avail . The whole amount which the
defendant now asks to be allowed to him is less than the amount
o
f
his mortgage and interest , after deducting what was received
from the estate of Cummings . The defendant has been charged
with a large amount of rents and profits of the estate , which ac
crued before the plaintiff ' s title was acquired . If the plaintiff
bought , trusting to the record , there was nothing on the record to
show that anything should b
e
deducted from the amount due on
the defendant ' s mortgage on account of these rents and profits .
Up to the year 1855 , they were matter o
f
account with the heirs
o
f Cummings ; against whom the right to apply them to reimburse
the defendant for the sum paid to redeem the prior mortgage was




o account had been settled b
y
which they were otherwise ap
plied , and as the plaintiff will not , in any event , be called upon to
pay more than appeared b
y
the record to be due , it is equitable
that they should b
e
so applied now .
The result is , that the plaintiff will have a decree that he may
redeem upon paying the amount which the master ' s report show ' s
to be due upon the mortgage , with interest and costs , subject to
a
n account for rents and profits since the date o
f
the report .
Decree accordingly . 2
2 In Miller v . Whittier , 36 Maine 577 , the mortgagee was also allowed
the expenses of maintaining a suit to redeem a prior mortgage .
See also Harper v . Ely , 70 111 . 581 ; Comstock v . Michael , 17 Nebr .
288 ; Riddle v . Bowman , 27 N . H . 236 ; Clark v . Smith , 1 N . J . Eq . 122 .
Compare , Magilton v . Holbert , 52 Hun ( N . Y . ) 444 ; Cason v . Con
nor , 83 Tex , 26 .
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Rice , J ., in WilLIAMS v . Hilton , 35 Maine 547, 554 ( 1853 ) .
Taxes legally assessed upon an estate create a lien thereon , and
lay the foundation for a title paramount to that derived by deed
or mortgage. They constitute a legal charge upon the estate, not
upon the mortgagee . Faure v . Winans, Hopkins, 283. It was the
duty of the mortgagor , and those holding under him , to discharge
all taxes thus assessed upon the demanded premises , while they
withheld the possession from the mortgagee , and in case taxes were
assessed in a manner which they deemed illegal, notice of this fact
should have been given to themortgagee , and in case payment was
to be resisted he should be indemnified against loss, because it
would be unreasonable to subject the mortgagee to the hazard of
contesting the legality of a tax title by a suit at law , in which , if
the final result should be in favor of the validity of that title , all
his rights under his mortgage would be forever lost .
* * *
This form of action (writ of entry to foreclose a mortgage ] as
now regulated by statute , approximates very closely to a process
in equity , for the foreclosure of mortgaged property , and the rights
of the parties in ascertaining the amount for which a conditional
judgment shall be rendered , must be determined upon the same
principles that would control were the mortgagor to bring his bill
in equity to redeem the premises from the mortgagee . In that
case the mortgagor would be required to pay not only the sums
directly secured by the mortgage, but also such additional sums
as the mortgagee had been compelled to pay to protect the estate
from forfeiture in consequence of the laches of the mortgagor .
· A conditional judgment is to be entered for the amount of the
two notes produced in evidence and also for the amount paid for
taxes , with interest thereon from the time of payment , with costs
for the demandant . 3
3 Compare , Fiacre v. Chapman , 32 N . J. Eq. 463; Barthel v . Syverson ,
54 Iowa 160 .
If the mortgagee , instead of paying the tax or redeeming from a tax
sale , himself purchases at a tax sale , this is usually treated as a pay
ment of the tax , so that the mortgagee is entitled to credit for his dis
bursement in the accounting but can not assert the tax title as such .
Moore v . Titman , 44 111. 367 ; Fair v. Brown , 40 Iowa 209 ; Connecticut
Mut. Life Ins . Co . v. Bulte , 45 Mich . 113 ; Woodbury v. Swan , 59 N . H .
22 ; Hall v. Westcott, 15 R . I . 373 ; Shepard v.. Vincent , 38 Wash . 493 .
But see, Waterson v. Devoe , 18 Kans. 223 ; Williams v. Townsend , 31
N . Y . 411. The question is largely controlled by the view which is
taken as to whether the mortgagee occupies a quasi - fiduciary rela
tion to the mortgagor , as to which , see also , Chap . VI, note 2.
It is usual to insert in the mortgage a covenant by the mortgagor
to pay taxes on the land together with a stipulation that, upon his
failure so to do , the mortgagee may pay them and add the amount to
the mortgage debt, and such provisions are fully enforcible .
A similar covenant concerning taxes which may be levied on the
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HONORE v . LAMAR INS . CO .
SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS , 1869.
51 I11. 409 .
Mr. JUSTICE LAWRENCE delivered the opinion of the Court :
The appellant executed his note to Rutter , Endicott & White
house , for $ 2 , 146 . 50 , and deposited with them , as collateral security ,
74 barrels of whisky . They effected an insurance on the whisky
in the Lamar Fire Insurance Company , appellees herein , at their
own expense , and in their own name, and without the authority ,
or even knowledge , of appellant . The whisky was subsequently
destroyed by fire, and the company paid the policy to Rutter , Endi
cott & Whitehouse , first requiring an assignment of appellant 's
note . The note was accompanied by a power of attorney to con
fess a judgment , and the company having caused a judgment to be
confessed , the appellant filed a bill to enjoin its collection . On the
hearing the circuit court dismissed the bill .
If the insurance had been effected at the request or by the au
thority o




his expense , o
r
under circumstances that
would make him chargeable with the premium , we should have no
difficulty in holding him entitled to its benefits , b
y applying the




his debt . But none
o
f
these circumstances are presented by this record . The appellant
prosecutes his appeal merely upon the ground that , in all cases
where a mortgagee insures themortgaged property , the mortgagor is
entitled to the benefits o
f
the policy .
This position is maintainable neither upon principal nor authority .
The contract o
f
insurance , it has been often remarked , is one o
f
indemnity merely . Any person having an interest in property may ,
through an insurance , indemnify himself against loss b
y
fire .
Mortgagor and mortgagee have each an insurable interest . The
interest o
f
both may be covered in one policy , o
r
each may take
out a separate policy . In this case the mortgagees insured at their
own cost , without privity with the mortgagor and without his
knowledge , and when the company paid the debt due them from
the mortgagor , it indemnified them against loss and was entitled
to be subrogated to their claim . The mortgagor , having had no
connection with the insurance , can not claim its benefit . As the
premium was not paid b
y
him o
r chargeable to him , as he was not
mortgage , or debt secured thereby , is valid , except that it is liable to be
treated , for the purpose o
f applying the usury statute , as an agreement
to pay additional interest . To meet this difficulty a proviso may be
inserted in the covenant that the mortgagor shall only be liable to
pay , in any one year , an amount which , together with the interest re
served , equals the maximum legal rate o
f
interest .
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bytheagee
mattgago
aware even that an insurance had been effected until after the fire,
it is difficult to see how such insurance, even when paid , can affect
his liability upon his note . Even the case of King v . The State
Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 7 Cush . 10 , on which the appellant chiefly
relies, holds that in such cases the liability of the mortgagor upon
his note remains the same, but that the mortgagee may recover it
for his own use , although already paid by t insurance company .
Certainly it is much more consonant to every principle of equity
to say that the debt may be recovered for the benefit of the insur
ance company , than that the mortgagee should be twice paid . The
doctrine of that case would sanction wager policies , and furnish
a dangerous temptation to incendiarism .
That the insurance company is entitled to be subrogated to the
claims of the mortgagee, in such a case as the present , is held in
Carpenter v . Providence Washington Ins. Co ., 16 Pet. 501 , Sussex
Ins. Co. v . Woodruff , 2 Dutcher , 555 , and Aetna Fire Ins. Co. v .
Tyler, 16 Wend . 397 . In Concord A . M . Ins. Co . v. Woodbury ,
45 Maine 452 , where the assured had voluntarily assigned his
claim to the insurance company upon payment by it, as in the
present case , the court held the company entitled to recover . The
question of the right to subrogation against the will of the mort
gagee , was not presented in that case , nor is it in this , because
the assignment was made by the mortgagee upon payment of the
loss. The only question strictly presented here is , whether the
mortgagor has been discharged from his debt by the payment of
the mortgagee's policy, and on this point there is no disagreement
among the authorities. The debt is still in existence , and the
strong equity of the insurance company has been united to the
legal title .















4 " Fire underwriters in these days , in this state , are the creatures of
statute , and have no rights , save such as the state gives to them . They
may agree that they will pay such loss or damage as happens by fire
to property . They are limited to this . It was not readily that it
was first held that they could agree , with a mortgagee or lienor of
property , to reimburse to him the loss caused to him by fire . He is
not the owner of it . How , then , can he insure it , was the query . And
the effort was not to enlarge the power of the insurer so that it might
insure a debt , but to bring the lienor within the scope o
f
that power ,
so that the property might be insured for his benefit . And it was
done by holding that , as his security did depend upon the safety of the
property , he had an interest in it
s preservation , and so had such inter
est a
s that he might take out a policy upon it against loss by fire ,
without meeting the objection that it was a wagering policy . The
policy did not , therefore , become one upon the debt , and for indemnifi
cation against its loss , but still remained one upon the property and
against loss or damage to it . It is , doubtless , true , as is said by Gib
son , J . , in 17 Pa . St . 253 , that in effect it is the debt which is insured .
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STINCHFIELD V . MILLIKEN .
SUPREME COURT OF MAINE , 1880 .
71 Maine 567 .
Bill in Equity to redeem . .
PETERS , J. [After holding that the deed and contract for re
conveyance involved in the case amounted to a mortgage and that
complainant was entitled to redeem .] It is intimated that the mill
has burned down , pendente lite , under an insurance obtained by
the defendants , and a question may arise , before the master ,
whether the complainant should have a credit of the net proceeds .
If the insurance was obtained on the mortgagees ' own account
It is only as an effect, however ; an effect resulting from the primary
act of insurance of the property which is the security for the debt .
It is the interest in the property which gives the right to obtain insur
ance , and the ownership of the debt , a lien upon the property , creates
that interest . The agreement is usually , as it is in fact in this case ,
for insuring , from loss or damage by fire , the property . The interest
of the mortgagee is in the whole property , just as it exists , undamaged
by fire at the date of the policy . If that property is consumed in part,
though what there be left of it is equal in value to the amount of the
mortgage debt , the mortgage interest is affected . It is not so great ,
or so safe , or so valuable , as it was before . It was for indemnity
against this very detriment, this very decrease in value, that the mort
gagee sought insurance and paid his premium .
" To say that it is the debt which is insured against loss, is to give
to most, if not all , fire insurance companies a power to do a kind of
business which the law and their charter do not confer . They are
privileged to insure property against loss or damage by fire . They are
not privileged to guarantee the collection of debts . If they are , they
may insure against the insolvency of the debtor . No one will contend
this ; and, it will be said , it is not by a guaranty of the debt, but an in
demnity is given against the loss of the debt by an insurance against
the perils to the property by fire . This is but coming to our posi
tion ; that it is the property which is insured against the loss by fire ,
and the protection to the debt is the sequence thereof . As the property
it is which is insured against loss, it is the loss which occurs to it which
the insurer contracts to pay , and for such loss he is to pay within the
limit of his liability , irrespective of the value of the property unde
stroyed . So as to the remark , that it is the capacity of the property to
pay the debt which is insured . This is true in a certain sense ; but it
is as a result and not as a primary undertaking . The undertaking is
that the property shall not suffer loss by fire ; that is , in effect , that
its capacity to pay the mortgaged debt shall not be diminished . When
an appreciable loss has occurred to the property from fire , its capacity
to pay the mortgaged debt has been affected ; it is not so
well able to pay the debt which is upon it . The mortgage interest ,
the insurable interest , is lessened in value , and the mortgagee , the in
suree , is affected , and may call upon the insurer to make him as good
again as he was when he effected his insurance .
“ Another consideration : It is settled that when a mortgagee , or one
in like position toward property , is insured thereon at his own expense ,
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nortgagorea'should be a suto doso, the
only , they should not be allowed . Cushing v . Thompson , 34
Maine 496 ; Pierce v . Faunce , 53 Maine , 351 . The head note in
Larrabee v . Lumbert , 32 Maine , 97 , is erroneous in that respect .
It was allowed in that case by consent . Insurance Co . v . Wood
bury , 45 Maine , 447 .





the mortgagor , and charges him with the expense , then any
insurance recovered should be accounted for . And if a mort
gagor covenants to insure , and fails to do so , the mortgagee can
himself insure a
t
the mortgagor ' s expense .
One o
f
the defendants testifies that “Stinchfield agreed to pay
all taxes and insurance . ” He also says , “We have had the house ,
stable and mill insured , and have paid the insurance , $ 108 . ” We
think this is evidence o
f
a







the mortgagor on account o
f
his failure to keep
his verbal covenant to insure , and renders it proper that the net pro
ceeds o
f any insurance obtained should be allowed in the settlement
between them .
But this cannot be , if the insurance was collected under a policy
in which it is agreed between the insured and insurer that the
company in case o
f
loss should b
e subrogated to the right o
f
the
mortgagee . For in such case the insurance is not in fact on the
mortgagor ' s account , nor is it such an insurance as could be made
available to him . Jones , Mort . ( 2d ed . ) § 420 , and cases in note . 5
EDITORIAL NOTE . If the mortgagee takes possession o
f
the
upon his own motion and for his sole benefit , and a loss happens to it ,
the insurer , on making compensation , is entitled to an assignment of
the rights o
f
the insured This is put upon the analogy o
f
the situa
tion of the insurer to that of a surety . If this analogy be made com
plete , then has the insurer no more right to refuse payment o
f
the
loss , so long as the insured has other remedy for his debt , than has
the surety . One as well as the other , as soon as the creditor ' s right
to make demand is fixed , must respond to it and seek his reimburse
ment through his right of subrogation ; and , indeed , the application of
this equitable right o
f subrogation makes our view o
f
this subject har
monious and consistent with all the rights and interests of all the
parties . " Folger , J . , in Excelsior Fire Ins . Co . v . Royal Ins . Co . , 55
N . Y . 343 , 357 .
5 Compare . Fowley v . Palmer , 5 Gray (Mass . ) 549 : Pendleton v .
Elliott , 67 Mich . 496 ; Waring v . Loder , 53 N . Y . 581 ; Foster v . Van
Reed , 70 N . Y . 19 .
It is usual to insert in a mortgage a stipulation that the mortgagor
and his assigns will , during the continuance o
f
the mortgage , keep the
buildings thereon insured in a stated amount by a policy payable to
the mortgagee as his interest may appear , and that upon default in the
performance o
f
this covenant the mortgagee may effect such insur
ance and add the amount o
f




As to the right of the mortgagee to the benefit of insurance effected
by the mortgagor in his own name , see Ames v . Richardson , post .
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mortgaged premises , he will be charged in the accounting either
with the rents and profits or with the fair rental value of the prop
erty . If he rents the property to tenants , exercising reasonable
prudence in the choice of tenants and reasonable diligence in col
lecting the rent, he will be charged with the rent he actually re
ceives . In other cases he may be charged with the revenue (rents
or profits ) which he receives , or with that sum plus such sums
as it appears that he should receive, but does not, or with the fair
rental value of the property ; the choice between these several
methods of accounting , resting largely in the discretion of the
court and depending upon the circumstances of each case , cannot
be made the subject of definite rules . See Jones , Mortgages ,
$ $ 1121-1125 . The mortgagee in possession will also be charged
with waste committed by him , and even for permissive waste in
failing to keep the premises in repair if he is guilty of gross negli
gence in this respect . Wragg v . Denham , 2 Younge & C . 117 ;
Dexter v . Arnold , Fed . Cas . 3858 .
The mortgagee in possession will be credited with expenditures
for necessary repairs , but not, it is generally said , for improve
ments , as distinguished from repairs, though they appear to be
beneficial to the estate. The rule regarding improvements is
rested on the principle that if such credits were allowed the mort
gagee might " improve the mortgagor out of his estate .” The dis
tinction , however, between repairs and improvements is not always
clear , and , even in case of manifest improvements , the rule may
be tempered to meet peculiar equities , as where possession has
been taken under an invalid foreclosure so that there was reason
able cause for believing the possession to be, that of an owner .
See Jones , Mortgages , $ $ 1126 -1129 .
Upon the whole , the rules regarding the accounting of the mort
gagee in possession are so severe that mortgagees who are well
advised will seldom take possession .
CHAPTER IX .
EXTENT OF THE MORTGAGE LIEN .
McFADDEN V . ALLEN .
COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK , 1892 .
134 N . Y . 489.
Action to recover for the alleged conversion of certain struc
tures, machinery and other articles placed upon real estate by
plaintiff .
FOLLETT , CH . J. In determining as between mortgagor and
mortgagee, whether articles are or are not fixtures , the same rules
prevail which are applicable to cases arising between grantors and
grantees . (Snedeker v . Warring, 12 N . Y . 170 ; Gardner v . Fin
ley , 19 Barb. 317 ; Laflin v . Griffiths , 35 id . 58 ; Robinson v . Pres
wick , 3 Edw . Ch. 246 ; Main v . Schwarzwaelder , 4 E . D . Smith ,
273 ; 1 Dart V . and P . (6th ed .) 607 ; 1 Jones Mort., § 428 . ) And
as between mortgagor and mortgagee the same rules are applica
ble to articles placed on the mortgaged premises by the mortgagor
after the execution of the mortgage. (Gardner v . Finley , 19
Barb . 317 ; Rice v . Dewey , 54 id . 455 , 472 ; Sullivan v . Toole ,
26 Hun , 203 ; Walmsley v . Milne, 7 C . B . ( N . S . ) 115 , 135 ; Wins
low v . Merchants ' Ins. Co ., 4 Met . 306 ; Ex parte Belcher , 4 D . &
C . 703; Ex parte Reynal , 2 M . D . & De Gex , 443; 1 Jones Mort .,
Par. 436 ; 1 Sug . Vendors (7th Am . ed .) 37 , note 1 ; Phoenix
Mills v . Miller , 4 N . Y . S . R . 787 .) In the case last cited the
rule was well stated , as follows : “ A mortgagee of real property
is entitled to have his lien respected as to all that was realty when
he accepted the security ; also as to all accession to the realty ,
save , perhaps , when the accession is made under an agreement
with the party that its purchase price o
r expense shall be secured
and is secured by a lien thereon . ”
The same rules apply to articles annexed to the premises b
y
a
subsequent grantee or vendee in possession under an executory
contract to purchase . ( Eastman v . Foster , 8 Met . 19 ; Lynde v .
Rowe , 12 Allen , 100 ; Glidden v . Bennett , 43 N . H . 306 ; Cooper
v . Adams , 6 Cush . 87 ; Ogden v . Stock , 34 Ill . 522 ; Poor v . Oak
man , 104 Mass . 309 , 318 ; 1 Wash . R . P . , page 2 , par . 4 . )
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to the particular facts involved in the case at bar, which briefly
are as follows : Jeremiah McFadden was the owner in fee of
eighteen acres of land , upon which was a mill -pond , saw -mill,
dwelling and barn . December 11, 1878 , he mortgaged the prop
erty to Orson Wallace to secure the payment of $400 five years
thereafter, with semi-annual interest , which mortgage was duly
recorded September 2 , 1879 . The plaintiff , a son of Jeremiah
McFadden , occupied the premises from December , 1879 , until
May 21 , 1887 , when he was ejected by a writ of assistance issued
in and in pursuance of a sale made by virtue of a judgment fore
closing said mortgage.
The plaintiff testified that it was orally agreed between himself
and his father that the former should take possession of the prop
erty , have the use of it, and when he had paid the mortgage he
was to have a deed . The son was to make such improvements
as he chose, with the right of removing them if he failed to pay
the mortgage and acquire the property . Under this contract the
son occupied the property for nearly eight years , and added to it
some new buildings and machinery . Under this contract the
plaintiff became the equitable owner of eighteen acres , and on
paying the mortgage could have compelled a conveyance of the
legal title by his father . ( Freeman v . Freeman , 43 N . Y . 34 .)
The plaintiff could have devised the land, and, had he died intes
tate , his interest held under this oral contract would have de
scended to his heirs subject to the dower right of his widow .
( Cogswell v . Cogswell , 2 Edw . Ch . 231-239 ; Griffith v . Beecher ,
10 Barb . 432 ; Warren v . Fenn , 28 id . 333 ; Dayton 's Surrogate
(3d ed .) , 630.) While in possession of the eighteen acres under
this arrangement with the father , the plaintiff and his father , with
their wives, executed a mortgage on the eighteen acres and an
other parcel of thirty -seven acres June 16 , 1885 , to secure $634 . 26
to Frances L . and Anna M . Harrison , who were made defend
ants in the action to foreclose the first mortgage , and they be
came the purchasers at the sale and afterward conveyed to the
defendant. It is not asserted that Wallace , the first mortgagee ,
or the Misses Harrison had notice , actual or constructive, of the
alleged contract between the father and the son . The son , by the
execution of the mortgage, treated the eighteen acres as his own ,
and the buildings and the machinery as par of it , and he cannot
now be permitted to assert as against the Misses Harrison or the
defendant, their grantee , that the buildings and machinery were
not fixtures .
The plaintiff , his wife , Jeremiah McFadden , his wife , Frances
L . Harrison and Anna M . Harrison were defendants in the action
brought by Orson Wallace to foreclose his mortgage, and were
personally served with the summons and complaint in that action .
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The complaint contained this allegation : " The plaintiff further
shows, upon information and belief, that Alexander McFadden ,
Lunetta McFadden , Francis L . Harrison , Anna M . Harrison and
Truman Jones have , or claim to have , some interest in or lien
upon said mortgaged premises , or some part thereof, which inter
est or lien , if any, has accrued subsequently to the lien of said
mortgagee ."
None of said defendants appeared in the action and a judgment
of foreclosure was recovered by default , pursuant to which the
sale before mentioned was made, and the writ of assistance was
issued .
The plaintiff 's rights in the eighteen acres were subsequent in
time to the mortgage given to and foreclosed by Wallace , which
was alleged to be a lien on the property , prior in law and equity
to the rights of the plaintiff in this, and the defendant in the fore
closure action . If the plaintiff intended to assert title to the fix
tures he was bound to do it in that action and he could not lie by
until a judgment has been entered declaring his rights inferior to
the mortgage , and then assert as against the purchaser under the
judgment or his grantee that his claim to the buildings and ma
chinery was prior to the lien o
f
the mortgage . On the trial o
f
this action , the plaintiff testified that July 7 , 1886 , he “ stated in
writing to the Ames Engine Manufacturing Co . for the purpose
of obtaining credit that he owned in fee the fifty - five acres of
land covered b
y
said two mortgages , and that March 3 , 1887 , he
wrote to the agents o
f
the Misses Harrison ( the second mort
gagees ) that he had paid his father for the eighteen acres and
held a deed thereof subject to the mortgage .
This statement was made for the purpose o
f obtaining a fur
ther loan from them . This evidence is entirely inconsistent with
the plaintiff ' s present claim that he was merely the occupant of the
premises , with the right to remove betterments , instead o
f
the
equitable owner with the right to have the legal title upon the
payment o
f
the Wallace mortgage ; the plaintiff testified that he
was not a tenant o
f
his father , and paid no rent . His position
was that o
f
a beneficial owner , subject to the mortgage , and all
improvements which he made upon the property were subject to
the rules of law applicable to mortgagors and mortgagees .
The judgment should be affirmed with costs .
BRADLEY , J . The mortgage , through the foreclosure o
f
which
the defendants derived their title , was prior to the agreement
between the mortgagor and the plaintiff . The title taken b
y
the
foreclosure vested by relation as o
f
the time mortgage was made .
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plaint
Globe M . ll of the prem . 217 )
theontro
id . 484 . ) It does not appear that the mortgagee in any manner
assented to such agreement .
In Sheldon v . Edwards ( 35 N . Y . 279 ) the arrangement that




made between the mortgagor and mortgagee .
In Tifft v . Horton ( 55 N . Y . 377 ) there was a stipulation of
the mortgagee made before the sale that the legal rights o
f
the
plaintiff should not be changed b
y
the foreclosure sale .





the premises made prior to the mortgage , and
in Tyson v . Post ( 108 N . Y . 217 ) the mortgagee was a party to
the agreement that the property in controversy there should re
main personal .
I concur in affirmance .
Brown and Vann , JJ . , concur with Follett , Ch . J . ; Haight , J . ,




Judgment affirmed . 1
PARTRIDGE v . HEMENWAY .
SUPREME COURT O
F MICHIGAN , 1891 .
8
9 Mich . 454 .
LONG , J . This bill was filed to foreclose a mortgage given b
y
Hiram F . Hemenway and wife . At the time the mortgage was
executed upon lots 9 and 10 , some buildings were situated thereon ,
which were thereafter removed . The testimony abundantly show ' s




about $ 50 a
t
the time
the mortgage was given , aside from the buildings , and are worth
no more now . No question is raised but that J . F . Partridge &
Bro . paid full value for the mortgage , $ 400 , and that it was
assigned to the complainant for value . At the time she took it
the property was not o
f greater value than the nortgage . So
showing is made that she ever consented to the removal of the
buildings from these lots , and she denies ever hearing that Hem




1 Difficult questions arise when articles which have been affixed to
mortgaged land by the owner , either before or after the execution of




their annexation , mortgaged to a
third person o
r subject to a conditional sale agreement , reserving the title
in a third person for security . The problem develops into many distinc
tions and much difference o
f authority . As it is usually , and properly ,
treated in connecttion with the general topic o
f
Fixtures , the student is
here merely referred , for a summary o
f
the subject , to the article on Fix
tures by Nathan Abbott , in 19 Cyc . 1033 , 1048 -1055 .
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removal was after they had been removed and placed on lot 2,
which defendant Hartwell thereafter purchased . The contract en
tered into by J. F . Partridge & Bro., set out in the opinion of my
Brother Morse , was to reduce the amount of the principal in the
mortgage on condition that certain monthly payments were made .
This was not kept by Hemenway . I am unable to see how this
contract should be construed as an assent on complainant's part
to the removal of the buildings . Nothing of the kind is said in
the contract , and, if there were, the contract was not performed
by Hemenway . I am satisfied from the testimony and the sur
rounding circumstances that Mr. J. F . Partridge never consented
to the removal of these buildings. He testifies that he never con
sented thereto , and it is impossible to believe that he would waive
complainant's right to a lien upon the buildings while nearly $400
yet remained due upon the mortgage, and accept the two lots val
ued at $ 50 in lieu thereof.
The case is then presented whether the bona fide assignee of
the mortgage shall lose her lien by the removal of these buildings
upon a lot, the title to which was afterwards acquired by defend
ant Hartwell by a quitclaim deed . No one would claim , if the fact
be established , which I think is established , that the complainant
or J . F . Partridge & Bro . never consented to the removal of the
buildings , and that Henienway removed them without the knowl
edge or consent of these parties , that the complainant would lose
her lien under the mortgage. Hemenway , the mortgagor , could
not set up this claim , and Hartwell under his quitclaim deed stands
in no better position .
The case is a peculiar one . It is contended that this is a liti
gation of the title to the property , which cannot be done in the
foreclosure proceedings . The case of Summers v . Bromley , 28
Mich . 125, is cited . I do not think the case falls within the prin
ciples laid down in that case. The buildings were covered by the
lien of the mortgage before they were removed . This is not dis
puted . The defendant Hartwell was made a party defendant by
reason of his claim as subsequent purchaser or incumbrancer .
The court below decreed that the buildings were still incum
bered by the mortgage , and I think correctly so held ; and that
they be sold if the lots did not bring enough to satisfy the mort
gage.
The decree must be affirmed .
Champlin , C . J ., McGrath and Grant, JJ ., concurred .
Vorse , J., dissented , on the ground that the question could not
be adjudicated in a foreclosure suit , at least upon the allegations
of this bill, and on the further ground that the defendant's claim
of assent to the removal was established by the evidence . ]
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VERNER v . BETZ .
COURT OF ERRORS OF NEW JERSEY , 1889 .
| 46 N . J. Eq. 256.
On this bill to foreclose and the answers and proofs , the ques
tion arises whether or not the complainant has any remedy against
a dwelling -house which was removed without the consent of the
mortgagee from the premises , included and described in his mort
gage , after the execution of the mortgage, to another lot of land
near by, which , after such removal , was purchased and owned
by the defendant, the mortgagor , and then sold by him to the de
fendant Verner . The land upon which the house was so erected ,
and which is described in the mortgage , was a lot of twenty feet
in width , and , without the building , is not worth over $ 250 , but
with the dwelling-house upon it, was worth about the amount of
the mortgage, $ 1,500 .
SCUDDER , J.
*
Assuming that the appellant , Verner, bought the house and paid









testifies , to raise money to pay for the hall building and the im
provements he was making , the important question is presented ,
whether the complainant is in a position to obtain the relief he
asks here for the injury he has sustained .
Can a court o
f
equity return to the wasted property the build
ing that has been wrongfully removed , and sold to a bona fide
purchaser , after being affixed to other land not included in the
mortgage ?
The subject o
f legal and equitable relief , where such removals
are made , is considered by Mr . Jones in his book on Mortgages ,
Pars . 143 , 144 , 453 , 684 , with abstracts from cases and numerous
citations in the notes . It is a question o
n
which the authorities






the effect given to a
mortgage of lands .
It seems that where the mortgage is regarded as a conveyance o
f
the legal title to the property , giving the mortgagee the right o
f pos
session , there his legal ownership and actual , o
r
constructive , pos
session , give him the right to follow and recover the property sev .
ered . The principle applied is , that property severed from the realty ,
so a
s
to become a chattel , belongs to the legal owner of the land .
But where the mortgage is regarded merely as a lien for security and
the mortgagor has the right o
f possession until ejectment , or fore
closure , there the mortgagee has merely the right to restrain the re
EXTENT OF THE MORTGAGE LIEN . 389
moval of the property by injunction , to protect his lien ; or , after the
removal , a right to recover damages for the wrongful diminution of
his security .
* * * *
In our state the title of the mortgagee to lands under his mortgage
has been defined by this court in Shields v . Lozier , 5 Vr. 496 , 503,
where it is said , that the mortgage is regarded ,not as a common - law
conveyance , on condition , but as a security for debt , the legal estate
being considered as subsisting only for that purpose . This is else
where called the equitable and the American doctrine by which the
mortgagor has a right to lease , sell and in every respect deal with
mortgaged premises as owner , so long as he is permitted to remain in
possession and so long as it is understood and held , that any person
taking under him takes subject to all the rights of the mortgagee .
4 Kent Com . 157.
There is no difficulty in applying this rule while fixtures remain
attached to the realty , and so long as the mortgagor continues in pos
session ; or when the property severed passes into the possession of
a person in collusion with him to defeat the lien and security of the
mortgagee, whether upon or off the mortgaged premises , it would
seem that the rights of the mortgagee would be unaffected . But
when the property is severed and sold by a mortgagor in possession ,
having the legal title , to an innocent purchaser , the lien in equity is
gone , and the remedy of the mortgagee is by an action at law against
the mortgagor and those who act with him to impair or defeat the
security of the mortgage.
The case of Kircher v . Schalk , 10 Vr. 335 , holds, that a mortgagee
of real estate , whose debt is due, but who had not entered into pos
session , can not maintain replevin for a steam -engine affixed to the
realty subject to the mortgage, which the mortgagor or his assigns
had severed from the realty and removed from the premises , be
cause the mortgagee can not, with propriety, insist upon being le
gally entitled to a remedy the enforcement of which pertains to the
general legal ownership of the land. But in Jackson v. Turrell, 10
Vr. 329 , it was decided that a mortgagee may maintain an action
on the case against the mortgagor , or his assigns , for an injury to
the security resulting from the removal of fixtures , or other waste
by the defendant. Notice, without fraud , was said to be sufficient
to charge the purchaser with liability .
It is not necessary in this case to determine whether a court of
law will enforce this remedy against a bona fide purchaser without
actual notice , or the exact form of remedy that may be there used ;
but in a court of equity the right of such purchaser is equal to the
equity of a mortgagee who has not such title to the article severed
that he can maintain an action for the recovery , in specie , of the
fixture removed .
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It is a maxim , that where there is equal equity the law must pre
vail. It is upon this account that a court of equity constantly re
fuses to interfere , either for relief or discovery , against a bona
fide purchaser of the legal estate , for a valuable consideration , with
out notice of the adverse title , if he chooses to avail himself of the
defense at the proper time and in the proper mode . 1 Story Eq.
Jur ., Par . 64 c.
The conclusion given in 2 Pom . Eq . Jur. Par. 743 on this matter
is , that wherever one or the other of the parties has a legal estate
over which a court of law can exercise jurisdiction , then , in an
equity suit between them , as a general rule , the defense of a bona
fide purchaser for valuable consideration will avail as against the
plaintiff, whether he has a legal or an equitable estate ; in either
case the court of equity simply withholds its hand and remits the
party to a court of law .
In the review o
f
cases which appear to conflict with the con
clusion in this case , cited from the English courts , it must be borne
in mind that there the mortgagee has the legal title to the mort
gaged land , and the right o
f possession .
Having found that the appellant , Verner , is a bona fide purchaser
o
f
the building in controversy , affixed to his land , according to the
weight of the evidence , as presented , the decree will be reversed and
modified so that the land described in the mortgage with the building
and improvements thereon , a
s they existed a
t
the time of filing the





the building formerly on the land , the
mortgagor will be remitted to his remedy a
t
law .
For affirmance — None .
For reversal — The Chief Justice , Dixon , Garrison , Knapp , Magie ,
Van Syckel , Brown , Clement , Cole , McGregor , Smith , Whitaker - 12 .
JOHNSON v . BRATTON .
SUPREME COURT OF Michigan , 1897 .
112 Mich . 319 .
MOORE , J . This is a proceeding to foreclose a mortgage dated
November 2 , 1876 , given b
y
David Bratton to complainant Wheeler .
* * * The Wheeler mortgage was put upon record soon after
it was given . May 10 , 1880 , Bratton sold the premises to Sidney
Case , and he sold to defendant Lizzie Johnson , April 13 , 1881 .
When the Wheeler mortgage was given , there was a large two
story building on the land described in the mortgage , which con
stituted the chief value o
f
the property ; the value of the lot alone
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not exceeding $ 300 . After Mrs. Johnson got the property , she
moved the building to another piece of ground owned by her . Oc
tober 17, 1881, Mrs. Johnson gave a mortgage upon the lot to
which she had moved the building to one Robinson . After the
foreclosure proceedings were commenced , Robinson was made a
party .
* * * * * * *
It is said to be error not to subject th
e
building to the lien o
f
the Wheeler mortgage ; and counsel cite Turner v . Mebane , 110
N . C . 413 , and Partridge v . Hemenway , 89 Mich . 454 , and we think
these cases are in point . The Wheeler mortgage was upon record
when Mrs . Johnson obtained title to the land , in 1881 . It was
her duty to take notice o
f
the lien created b
y
it . We can not sub
scribe to the doctrine that a lien created b
y
a mortgage upon build
ings attached to the freehold in such a way a
s
to make them part
o
f
the real estate can be defeated b




It may be urged that , as Mr . Robinson had no knowledge of the
existence o
f
the Wheeler mortgage when he took his mortgage , his
mortgage should be a prior lien . We understand the rule to be
that when the equities o
f
parties are equal , and neither has the
legal title , the prior equity will prevail . Wing v . McDowell , Walk .
Ch . 175 ; Norris v . Showerman , id . 206 . Applying these doctrines
to this case , we think the Wheeler mortgage is the prior equity ,
and must first be satisfied . The proofs show that the land cov
ered by the mortgage and the building removed from that land are
valuable enough to pay both mortgages . The land covered b
y
the
Wheeler mortgage should first be sold , and , if enough money is
not realized from that sale to pay the Wheeler mortgage , the build
ing should then be sold , and from the proceeds the balance o
f
the
Wheeler mortgage be first paid , and the surplus , so far as neces
sary , be applied to the payment of the Robinson mortgage .
The decree o
f
the court below will be modified as here sug
gested , and affirmed , with costs to the complainants .
The other Justices concurred . ?
TEAL v .WALKER .
SUPREME COURT O
F
THE UNITED STATES , 1883 .
111 U . S . 242 .
O
n August 19th , 1874 , Bernard Goldsmith borrowed of James
2 See also , Buckout v . Swift , 27 Cal . 433 ; Harris v . Bannon , 78 Ky .
568 ; Hamlin v . Parsons , 12 Minn . 108 .
Compare , cases in Chap . III , § 2 .
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D . Walker the sum of $ 100 ,000 , and gave to the latter his note ,
dated Portland , Oregon , August 19th , 1874 , for the payment to
Walker or his order , two years after date , of the sum borrowed ,
with interest payable monthly at the rate of one per cent . per month
from date until paid . Goldsmith , at the time the note was exe
cuted , was the owner in fee of certain lands in the State of Oregon
and in the Territory of Washington , and he and Joseph Teal were
the joint owners and tenants in common of certain other lands
in Oregon . On August 19th , 1874 , Goldsmith conveyed to one
Henry Hewett , by four several deeds, absolute on their face, the
lands in Oregon and in Washington Territory of which he was
the sole owner , and on the same day he and Teal executed and
delivered , to the same grantee , three several deeds , absolute on
their face , for the lands which they jointly owned as tenants in
common , one being for lands in Linn County , another for con
tiguous lands in Polk and Benton Counties , and the third for .
lands in Clackamas County , all in the State of Oregon . These
deeds were intended as a security for the above -mentioned note ,
as appeared by a defeasance in writing, executed on the same day
as the note by Goldsmith , Teal, Hewett and Walker. This instru
ment, after reciting the execution of the note above mentioned ,
declared that Hewett held the legal title to the lands conveyed to
him as aforesaid , in trust and for the uses therein described . It
· then declared as follows : “ Subject to the legal title of Hewett,
Teal and Goldsmith , or Goldsmith alone shall ( 1 ) retain posses
sion of the lands , and take and have, without account the issues
and profits thereof — they paying all taxes and public charges im
posed thereon — until said note should become due and remain un
paid thirty days ; ( 2 ) that if such default is made in the payment
of said note , Goldsmith and Teal 'will and shall, on demand , peace
fully surrender to Hewett ' the possession of said property , who
‘may and shall proceed and take possession ' of the same , and on
thirty days ' notice in writing to Teal and Goldsmith requiring them
to pay said debt , and on their failure so to pay , shall sell the same
at public auction on not more than thirty days' notice ,' or sufficient
thereof to pay the debt and charges .”
Interest was paid on the note made by Goldsmith to the plaintiff
up to January 21st, 1877, but none after that date . In April , 1877 ,
Goldsmith conveyed to Teal all his estate in the lands which he had
conveyed in trust to Hewett by the deeds of August 19th , 1874 ,
and put Teal in possession thereof.
On July 6th , 1877 , the interest on the note being in arrear since
January 21st preceding , Hewett demanded of Teal the possession
of all the property conveyed by said deeds. He refused to yield
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ber 30th , 1878 , and the farm lands until some time in the same
month and year .
Walker, by reason of Hewett's refusal to surrender possession
of the property conveyed in trust to Hewett , was compelled to and
did bring suit to enforce the sale of the property . All the prop
erty was sold , either in accordance with the terms of the de
feasances above mentioned or by order of court , and the proceeds
of the sale fell far short of paying the note , leaving a balance due
thereon of more than $ 50 ,000 which Goldsmith had no means
to pay .
This action was brought by Walker, the payee of the note, against
Teal, to recover the damages which he claimed he had sustained by
the refusal of Teal to surrender possession of the property of
which Goldsmith had been the owner , or which he had owned
jointly with Teal, and which had been conveyed to Hewett in trust
as aforesaid . The complaint recited the facts above stated , and
averred that by reason of the refusal of Teal to surrender posses
sion of the property to Hewett , Walker had been damaged in the
sum of $ 16 ,000 , for which sum the complainants demanded
judgment .
Teal filed a demurrer to the complaint, on the ground that it
did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action . The
demurrer was overruled .
Woods , J.
* *
We believe that the rule is without exception that the mortgagee
is not entitled to demand of the owner of the equity of redemption
the rents and profits of the mortgaged premises until he takes
actual possession . In the case of Moss v . GALLIMORE , 1 Doug.
279 , Lord Mansfield held that a mortgagee , after giving notice of
his mortgage to a tenant in possession holding under a lease older
than the mortgage, is entitled to the rent in arrear at the time of
the notice , as well as to that which accrues afterwards . This
ruling has been justified on the ground that the mortgagor , having
conveyed his estate to the mortgagee , the tenants of the former
became the tenants of the latter, which enabled him , by giving
notice to them of his mortgage , to place himself to every intent in
the same situation towards them as the mortgagor previously oc
cupied . Rawson v . Eicke , 7 Ad . & El. 451 ; Burrowes v . Gradin ,
1 Dowl. & Lowndes , 213.
Where , however, the lease is subsequent to the mortgage, the
rule is well settled in this country , that, as no reversion vests in
the mortgagee , and no privity of estate or contract is created be
tween him and the lessee , he can not proceed , either by distress or
action , for the recovery of the rent. Mayo v . Shattuck , 14 Pick .
533 ; Watts v . Coffin , 11 Johns. 495 ; McKircher v . Hawley , 16 Id .
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289 ; Sanderson v . Price , 1 Zabr. 637 ; Price v . Smith , 1 Green 's
Ch. ( N . J.) 516. .
The case of Moss v . Gallimore has never been held to apply to
a mortgagor or the vendee of his equity of redemption . Lord
Mansfield himself , in the case of Chinnery v . Blackman , 3 Doug.
391, held that until the mortgagee takes possession the mortgagor
is owner to all the world , and is entitled to all the profits made .
The rule on this subject is thus stated in Bacon ' s Abridgment ,
Title Mortgage C : “ Although the mortgagee may assume posses
sion by ejectment at his pleasure , and , according to the case of
Moss v . Gallimore , Doug . 279 , may give notice to the tenants to
pay him the rent due at the time of the notice, yet , if he suffers
the mortgagor to remain in possession or in receipt of the rents ,
it is a privilege belonging to his estate that he can not be called
upon to account for the rents and profits to the mortgagee , even
although the security be insufficient .”'
So, in Higgins v . York Buildings Company , 2 Atk . 107 , it was
said by Lord Hardwicke : “ In case of a mortgagee , where a mort
gagor is left in possession , upon a bill brought by the mortgagee
for an account in this court, he never can have a decree for an
account of rents and profits from the mortgagor for any of the
years back during the possession of the mortgagor ,” and the same
judge said in the case of Mead v . Lord Orrery , 3 Atk . 244 : “ As
to the mortgagor , I do not know of any instance where he keeps in
possession that he is liable to account for the rents and profits to
the mortgagee , for the mortgagee ought to take the legal remedies
to get into possession .”
In Wilson , ex parte , 2 Ves . & B . 252 , Lord Eldon said : “ Ad
mitting the decision in Moss v . Gallimore to be sound law , I have
been often surprised by the statement that a mortgagor was re
ceiving the rents for the mortgagee * * * . In the instance of
a bill filed to put a term out of the way , which may be represented
as in the nature of an equitable ejectment , the court will , in some
cases, give an account of the past rents . There is not an instance
that a mortgagee has per directuin called upon the mortgagor to
account for the rents . The consequence is , that the mortgagor does
not receive the rents for the mortgagee ." See , also , Coleman v .
Duke of St. Albans, 3 Ves . Jr. 25 ; Gresley v . Adderly , 1 Swanst .
573 .
The American cases sustain the rule that so long as the mort
gagor is allowed to remain in possession , he is entitled to receive
and apply to his own use the income and profits of the mortgaged
estate ; and , although the mortgagee may have the right to take
possession upon condition broken , if he does not exercise the right ,
he can not claim the rents ; if he wishes to receive the rents , he
must take means to obtain the possession . Wilder v . Houghton ,







1 Pick . 87 ; Boston Bank v . Reed , 8 Pick . 459 ; Noyes v . Rich ,
5
2 Me . 115 .
The case against the right of the defendant in error to recover
in this case the rents and profits received by the owner o
f
the equity
of redemption is strengthened by section 323 , chapter 4 , title 1 ,
General Laws of Oregon , 1843 -1872 , which declares that “ a mort
gage o
f
real property shall not be deemed a conveyance so a
s
to
enable the owner o
f
the mortgage to recover possession o
f
the real
property without a foreclosure and sale according to law . ”
This provision o
f
the statute cuts u
p b
y
the roots the doctrine
o
f
Moss v . Gallimore , ubi supra , and gives effect to the view of
the American courts o
f equity that a mortgage is a mere security
for a debt , and establishes absolutely the rule that the mortgagee
is not entitled to the rents and profits until he gets possession
under a decree o
f
foreclosure . For if a mortgage is not a con
veyance , and the mortgagee is not entitled to possession , his claim




f Oregon as the effect o
f
a mortgage in that State . In
Besser v . Hawthorn , 3 Oregon , 129 at 133 , it was declared : " Our
system has so changed this class o
f
contracts that the mortgagor
retains the right o
f possession and the legal title . ” See , also , An
derson v . Baxter , 4 Oregon , 105 ; Roberts v . Sutherlin , id . 219 .
The case o
f
the defendant in error can not be aided b
y
the stipu
lation in the defeasance o
f August 19th , 1874 , exacted b
y
the mort
gagee , that Goldsmith and Teal would , upon default in the payment
of the note secured by the mortgage , deliver to Hewett , the trustee ,
the possession of the mortgaged premises . That contract was con
trary to the public policy o
f
the State of Oregon , as expressed in
the statute just cited , and was not binding on the mortgagor or
his vendee , and , although not expressly prohibited b
y
law , yet , like
all contracts opposed to the public policy o
f
the State , it can not
be enforced . Railroad Company v . Lockwood , 17 Wall . 357 ; Bank
o
f Kentucky v . Adams Express Company , 93 U . S . 174 ; Marshall
v . Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company , 16 How . 314 ; Mequire
v . Corwine , 101 U . S . 108 .
In any view o
f
the case , we are o
f
opinion that defendant in
error was not entitled to receive the rents sued for in this action .
As this conclusion takes away the foundation of the suit , it is un
necessary to notice other assignments of error .
The judgment of the Circuit Court is reversed , and the cause
remanded to that court for further proceedings in conformity
with this opinion . 3
3 Compare , Hazeltine v . Granger , supra .
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NOYES v . RICH .
SUPREME COURT OF MAINE , 1861.
52 Maine 115 .
Davis, J. — In the suit in equity of Mason & als . v . Y . & C . Rail
road Co . & als . , ante p . 80 , the plaintiff was appointed a receiver ,
and was ordered to take certain property o
f
the corporation into
his possession . The defendant had possession a
t
the time , as su
perintendent o
f
the railroad ; and he also had money in his hands
amounting to about seven hundred dollars , which had accrued b
y
operating the road . This he refused to deliver to the receiver ;
and this suit is brought to recover it .
In a suit in equity , in it
s
nature in rem , when a receiver is ap
pointed , the right to the custody o
f
the property in controversy
vests in him immediately upon the filing o
f
his bond . Albany
Bank v . Schermerhorn , 1 Clark ' s Ch . , 297 . And he may , by order
o
f
Court , bring a suit for it in his own name . Green v . Bostwick ,
1 Sandf . Ch . , 185 .
But this right o
f
custody extends only to the property which is
the subject -matter o
f
the litigation . Under a general creditor ' s
bill , to recover the entire property of a debtor , the receiver is en
titled to the whole o
f
such property . Chipman v . Sabbaton , 7
Paige , 47 . So assignees in bankruptcy , or insolvency , take the
whole estate . So would receivers o
f
banks , under our statute ,




Mason and others is not a general creditor ' s bill ,





the corporation , but in behalf o
f
certain specified cred
itors . Nor does it seek to reach al
l
the property of the corpora
tion , but certain specified property , mortgaged in trust for their
benefit , b
y
a deed to Myers , dated February 6 , 1851 . The right of
the plaintiffs can not extend beyond the property mortgaged ; and
the right o
f
the receiver must necessarily have the same limitation .
There are certain defendants in the equity suit , trustees under
a subsequent mortgage , who have other conveyances from the
railroad company . Whether they can hold the money in the hands
o
f
the defendant , in any adjustment o
r controversy with him , it is
immaterial now to inquire .
The mortgage , o
f
which Mason and others claim the benefit ,
was afterwards assigned by Myers , b
y
his deed to the trustees re
ferred to , and to other parties who also deeded to said trustees .
But the assignees did not take possession o
f
the railroad , under
the mortgage , for condition broken . Smith and Myers undertook
a
n
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to take possession ; but it was after the mortgage had been assigned ,
and so no rights were affected by it .
It will hardly be contended that , while mortgagors remain in
possession , they can be compelled to pay the rents and profits of
the property to the mortgagees . Boston Bank v . Reed , 8 Pick .,
459 ; Mayo v . Fletcher , 14 Pick ., 525 . And yet , that is just what
is attempted in the case at bar. No one had ever rightfully taken
possession under the mortgage, until it was done by the receiver ,
in March , 1860 . The money in the defendant 's hands accrued from
the earnings of the road prior to that time. The mortgage did
not attach to it. Therefore it was not embraced in the subject
matter of the suit in equity ; and the receiver was not entitled to it.
Plaintiff nonsuit .
NEW YORK SECURITY & c. CO . v . SARATOGA GAS & c . CO .
COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK , 1899 .
159 N . Y . 137.
O 'Brien , J.
*
On the first day of February , 1887 , the Saratoga Gas and Elec
tric Light Company, a domestic corporation , executed and deliv
ered to the American Loan and Trust Company a mortgage to
secure it
s bonds , amounting in the aggregate to three hundred
thousand dollars , due in 1907 . The bonds so issued had interest
coupons attached , payable semi -annually , at the rate o
f
six per
cent . The property covered b
y
the mortgage is described therein
a
s follows : “ All the corporate property , real , personal and mixed ,
including a
ll
lands , easements , rights o
f way , buildings , fixtures ,
materials , supplies , machinery and plant , franchises , contracts and






said gas company , together with the appurtenances
thereto , and all rents , tolls , issues , income and profits of said gas
company , present and future , to have and to hold the same unto
said American Loan and Trust Company , its successors and assigns





said bonds , and subject to the following covenants , conditions
and provisions which are assented to by both parties , to wit , ” et
c
.
It must , I think , be admitted that this language is broad enough to
cover not only all the property that the corporation then had , but
all that it ever could have b
y any possibility , whether lands , chat
tels , moneys o
r things in action . But the language here used , broad
and comprehensive as it is , is very much qualified and restricted b
y
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other provisions of the instrument as will be seen by reference to
the following stipulations : I. “ Until default occurs in some duty ,
or upon some covenant , agreement or promise of the gas company
hereunder , said gas company , its successors and assigns shall retain
the possession , control and enjoyment o
f
all the property and fran
chises hereby mortgaged , and may receive and use the earnings , in
come and profits thereof in any manner not inconsistent with these
presents , nor tending to lessen the security hereby provided . ”
II . “ The said gas company , for itself and its successors , cove
nants to pay to the several holders of the bonds hereby secured , the
principal and interest of said bonds , according to the tenor and true
intent of said bonds and the coupons thereto attached . ” V . “ But
if default be made in any payment o
f principal or interest upon
said bonds when due , o
r
in the performance o
f any covenant or
agreement on the part o
f
the said gas company herein contained ,
and if such default shall continue for the period of sixty days ,
then , and in either o
f
said cases , the trustee may enter into and
upon and take possession , management and control o
f
all the
property and franchises covered by these presents , and may operate
the same , and continue the business , and exercise the franchises of
said gas company , making a
ll
needful repairs , alterations and ad
ditions , and may collect and receive all earnings and income there
o
f
. ” VII . “ If any default shall occur or continue as in article five
specified (that is , ' continue for the period of sixty days ' ) , the trus






one - fourth o
r more o
f





hereinafter provided , shall , with or without entry
a
s





sale according to law , o
r by proper judicial proceedings . "
These several provisions o
f
the instrument must obviously be
read together in order to ascertain the real intention of the parties
and the true construction which should be placed upon the agree
ment . Notwithstanding the broad general language used in the de
scription o
f
the property mortgaged it is plain that the mortgagor
was to have , a
t
least until default , the possession and enjoyment of
all the property , whether existing a
t
the time or acquired in the
future , and was to use the future earnings for the purpose o
f
con
ducting the business for which the corporation was organized . This




s operations as its own , free and clear from any lien o
f
the
mortgagee . The intention was that it should purchase materials for
its business , employ labor , contract debts and discharge all obliga












In this condition o
f things the corporation made default in the
payment of the interest coupons due on the first of August , 1893 ,
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and on November 11th following the plaintiff , as substituted trus
tee, brought an action to foreclose the mortgage, and a receiver
was appointed on the 16th of November, following , and on the
same day , and at the same time, the sequestration creditor procured
the appointment of a receiver in his action . The receiver in the
foreclosure action took possession of the gas plant and proceeded
to operate the works and to make and sell manufactured gas and
electricity . At that time there were moneys in the office of the
company and to it
s
credit on deposit in banks , and due to it on
open accounts for gas and electricity manufactured before , and it
owed various debts for materials which it had purchased in con
ducting its business . There came to the hands o
f
the receiver in
the foreclosure action from the moneys on hand , prior to the com
mencement o
f
the action , and from the earnings o
f
the corporation
prior to that date and after the execution o
f
the mortgage , in the
form of open accounts or notes the sum of over four thousand
dollars , which the receiver in the sequestration action , represent
ing general creditors , claims should be paid to him for distribution
among such creditors . In other words , the question is , whether the
earnings of the corporation from its business , in the sale of its





foreclose the mortgage and the date of the possession b
y
the re
ceiver in that action , belong in equity to the bondholders o
r
to the
general creditors ? The Special Term held that the general cred
itors of the corporation had the prior equitable right to the fund .
but the orders o
f
that court were reversed by the Appellate Divi
sion , which held that the fund in equity belonged to the receiver
appointed in the foreclosure action for the benefit o
f
the mortgage
bondholders . An appeal to this court was allowed , and the follow
ing question certified for it
s opinion :






the mortgage given b
y
the Saratoga Gas and Electric Light Company , has the mortgagee ,
o
r
the receiver appointed in the foreclosure action , an equitable lien ,
prior to the right o
f
the receiver in the sequestration action , upon
the debts and accounts due to the corporation upon sales b
y
it of
products of its plant , produced after the giving of the mortgage and
before the appointment o
f
either receiver ? ”
The right o
f
the mortgagor to deal with these products and earn
ings as its own under the stipulations o
f
the mortgage has already
been noticed . That right , it seems to me , is entirely inconsistent
with the existence of any lien upon future products or earnings
by the mortgagee . The latter could not have a lien upon such earn
ings o
r products while the mortgagor was permitted to use them
for the conduct of its business and the payment o
f
it
s current debts .
We think that the true construction of the instrument is this :
Where a mortgage b
y
a corporation to secure the payment of the
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principal and interest of its bonds , such as this is , is made , although
in terms purporting to include future earnings and products , it does
not , a
s against general creditors , operate as a lien upon such earn
ings until actual entry and possession under the mortgage b
y
the
mortgagee . This results from the stipulation in the instrument
that until default the mortgagor shall have the use of the earnings
in the conduct o
f
its business , and that upon default the mortgagee
may go into possession , exercise the corporate franchise and ap
propriate the earnings to the payment o
f
the debt secured b
y
the
mortgage . The right o
f
the mortgagor , in the meantime , to the
use o
f
the earnings , amounts , practically , to absolute ownership ,
and hence the mortgage can not operate as a lien upon such earn
ings to the prejudice o
f
the general creditors until actual entry and
possession taken , and then only upon what is carned after that time .
The lien of the mortgage upon future earnings is consummated as
against other creditors only b
y
the fact of the possession of the
property , and can not have any retroactive operation , since it would
then deprive the unsecured creditor o
f




e may have given credit to the mortgagor during the
time when the latter was permitted to deal with and use it a
s
his
own . The lien upon the earnings , in favor o
f
the bondholders , at
taches only upon what is earned after the time when the lien is per
fected by entry and possession . This is the construction which has
been given to corporate mortgages , expressed in substantially the
same terms , b
y
the Supreme Court o
f
the United States , b
y
the
English courts and b
y





states . The authorities on this question are quite numerous and
when examined will be found to sustain the proposition that I have
stated . It will be quite sufficient to cite some o
f
the cases without
enlarging this opinion b
y any quotations from the discussion , since
the decisions speak for themselves . (Galveston Railroad v . Cow
drey , 11 Wall . 459 ; Gilman v . Ill . & Miss . Tel . Co . , 91 U . S . 603 ;
American Bridge Co . v . Heidelbach , 94 U . S . 798 ; United States
Trust Co . v . Wabash Western Ry . Co . , 150 U . S . 287 , 307 ; Teal
v . Walker , 111 U . S . 242 ; Dow v . Memphis & L . R . R . Co . ,
124 U . S . 652 ; Sage v . Memphis & L . R . R . Co . , 125 U . S . 361 ;
Freedman ' s Saving & Trust Co . v . Shepherd , 127 U . S . 494 ; Ellis
v . Boston , Hartford & Erie R . R . Co . , 107 Mass . 1 ; Smith v . East
ern R . R . Co . , 124 Mass . 154 ; Holmes v . Turner ' s Falls Co . , 142
Mass . 590 ; Emerson v . European & N . American Ry . Co . , 67 Me .
387 ; M . V . & W . Ry . Co . v . United States Express Co . , 81 Ill . 535 ;
DeGraff v . Thompson , 24 Minn . 452 ; Governments , etc . , Invest .
Co . v . Manila Ry . Co . , L . R . (Appeal Cases 1897 ) , 81 . )
I have not been able to find any case in this state , and we are re
ferred to none , where the precise question now under consideration
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has been determined , but it seems to me the principle which controls
the case has been decided .
In Rochester Distilling Co . v . Rasey (142 N . Y . 570 ) there was
a controversy between the plaintiff , who claimed title to chattels un
der a sale by the creditor on execution , and the defendant, who
claimed title to the same chattels under a chattel mortgage , which ,
in terms, covered the grass growing upon the premises at the time
of the execution of the mortgage, and also the products of the farm
thereafter to be produced . The question in that case was whether
the farm products , not existing at the time of the execution of the
mortgage , but coming into existence thereafter by the ordinary
operations of farming , were covered by the lien of the mortgage as
against the execution creditor , and it was held that they were not.
The only difference between that case and the one at bar is that
here the fund in controversy was realized from the collection of
accounts accruing to the mortgagor from earnings subsequent to
the mortgage and before the appointment of either receiver . I
can see no distinction in principle so far as concerns the question
of equitable priority of lien between the future earnings of a cor
poration and the future products of a farm when both are de
scribed as covered by the lien of a mortgage.
There are numerous cases to be found in the books where the
controversy in regard to the lien of a mortgage , like the one now
under consideration , was between the parties to the instrument.
These cases are scarcely applicable to the question involved in this
appeal, which is one between the general creditors and the mort
gage bondholders . Most of them are reviewed in the opinion of
Judge Gray in the case last cited , and it is there shown that their
authority is limited to controversies between the parties to the
mortgage . Argall v . Pitts (78 N . Y . 239 ) and Frank v . N . Y ., L .
E . & W . R . R . Co . ( 122 N . Y . 197 ) are cases that bear somewhat
on the questions now under consideration , though , perhaps , not
directly .
In this case , it seems to me, that the sequestration creditor oc
cupies the position of a plaintiff in a credtior 's bill. If the receiver
who represents the mortgage bondholders has the prior right to the
fund in question , as the learned court below held , the practical
operation and effect of the principle should not be overlooked . The
foreclosure of a corporate mortgage does not necessarily mean a
sale of the property in the ordinary sense . It simply means a re
organization conducted by or in behalf of the bondholders. Some
times , but not often , the shareholders may be consulted , but it is
rarely that a general creditor has any voice in the matter. The
property mortgaged is generally of such a character , and the debt
of such magnitude , that a public sale in the ordinary sense is sel
dom practicable . Whatever may be the real value of the property
26
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sold upon the foreclosure , there generally is and may always be a
deficiency . If the receiver under the mortgage can go back of his
appointment and appropriate earnings of the corporation accruing
before his appointment and after the execution of the mortgage, in
almost every case the only fund upon which the general creditor
can rely for the payment of his debt may be absorbed by the bond
holders , and this too although the receiver may have taken posses
sion of or received the benefit of property furnished at their ex
pense , and on the faith of the current earnings .
We think that justice and equity are best promoted by limiting
the right or lien of the bondholders to such earnings only as shall
accrue after the mortgage trustee or the receiver shall have actually
taken possession . The earnings prior to that time should in equity
be awarded to the general creditor.
For these reasons we think that the orders appealed from should
be reversed and those of the Special Term affirmed , with costs , and
that the question certified should be answered in the negative .
All concur.4
WAITE , C . J., in Fosdick V . SCHALL , 99 U . S . 235. ( 1878 .)
We have no doubt that when a court of chancery is asked by
railroad mortgagees to appoint a receiver of railroad property ,
pending proceedings for foreclosure , the court, in the exercise of
a sound judicial discretion , may, as a condition of issuing the nec
essary order, impose such terms in reference to the payment from
the income during the receivership of outstanding debts for labor ,
supplies , equipment , or permanent improvement of the mortgaged
property as may , under the circumstances of the particular case,
appear to be reasonable . Railroad mortgages and the rights of
railroad mortgagees are comparatively new in the history of ju
dicial proceedings . They are peculiar in their character and affect
peculiar interests . The amounts involved are generally large , and
the rights of the parties oftentimes complicated and conflicting . It
4 A mortgage may cover both land and personal property , such a
mortgage being for some purposes treated as two mortgages embodied
in one instrument , e. g ., for the purpose of applying the recording acts.
A mortgage , therefore , which includes in the description of the prop
erty mortgaged , together with land , " all profits of the mortgagor,
present and future , " might be treated as to future profits , as a separate
and independent mortgage of future personal property . As to its legal
effect, if so considered , see article by Samuel Williston in 19 Harv . L .
Rev . 557 . But when the profits , upon which a lien is claimed by virtue
of such a mortgage , were earned by the mortgagor in the possession and
use of land which was mortgaged at the same time to the same
mortgagee , such a mortgage of profits might meet with judicial annul
ment on the principles advanced in Teal v. Walker and Hazeltine v.
Granger , supra , and cases cited .
As a matter of practice , mortgages covering future rents and profits
usually contain , in substance , the other provisions found in the principal
case .





rarely happens that a foreclosure is carried through to the end
without some concessions by some parties from their strict l l
rights , in order to secure advantages that could otherwise be
attained , and which it is supposed l operate for the general good
of all who are interested . This results almost as a matter of ne
cessity from the peculiar circumstances which surround such
litigation .
The business of all railroad companies is done to a greater or
less extent on credit . This credit is longer or shorter , as the neces
sities of the case require ; and when companies become pecuniarily
embarrassed , it frequently happens that debts for labor supplies ,
equipment , and improvements are permitted to accumulate , in or
der that bonded interest may be paid and a disastrous foreclosure
postponed , if not altogether avoided . In this way the daily and
monthly earnings , which ordinarily should go to pay the daily and
monthly expenses , are kept from those to whom in equity they be
long , and used to pay the mortgage debt. The income out of which
the mortgage is to be paid is the net income obtained by deducting
from the gross earnings what is required for necessary operating
and managing expenses , proper equipment , and useful improve
ments . Every railroad mortgagee in accepting his security impliedly
agrees that the current debts made in the ordinary course of busi
ness shall be paid from the current receipts before he has any claim
upon the income. If for the convenience of the moment something
is taken from what may not improperly be called the current debt
fund, and put into that which belongs to the mortgage creditors , it
certainly is not inequitable for the court, when asked by the mort
gagees to take possession of the future income and hold it for their
benefit , to require as a condition of such an order that what is due
from the earnings to the current debt shall be paid by the court
from the future current receipts before any thing derived from that
source goes to the mortgagees . In this way the court will only do
what , if a receiver should not be appointed , the company ought it
self to do. For even though the mortgage may in terms give a lien
upon the profits and income , until possession of the mortgaged
premises is actually taken or something equivalent done, ' the whole
earnings belong to the company and are subject to its control . Gal
veston Railroad v . Cowdrey , 11 Wall. 459 ; Gilman et al. v . Illinois
& Mississippi Telegraph Co ., 91 U . S . 603 ; American Bridge Co .
v . Heidelbach , 94 id . 798 .
The mortgagee has his strict rights which hemay enforce in the
ordinary way. If he asks no favors, he need grant none . But if
he calls upon a court of chancery to put forth its extraordinary
powers and grant him purely equitable relief , he may with propriety
b
e required to submit to the operation o
f
a rule which always ap
plies in such cases , and do equity in order to get equity . The ap
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pointment of a receiver is not a matter of strict right. Such an
application always calls for the exercise of judicial discretion ; and
the Chancellor should so mould his order that while favoring one ,
injustice is not done to another . If this can not be accomplished ,
the application should ordinarily be denied .
We think , also , that if no such order is made when the receiver
is appointed , and it appears in the progress of the cause that bonded
interest has been paid , additional equipment provided , or lasting
and valuable improvements made out of earnings which ought in
equity to have been employed to keep down debts for labor, sup
plies , and the like, it is within the power of the court to use the
income of the receivership to discharge obligations which , but for
the diversion of funds, would have been paid in the ordinary
course of business . This, not because the creditors to whom such
debts are due have in law a Jien upon the mortgaged property or
the income, but because , in a sense , the officers of the company are
trustees of the earnings for the benefit of the different classes of
creditors and the stockholders ; and if they give to one class of
creditors that which properly belongs to another , the court may,




s , if practicable , to restore the parties to their
original equitable rights . While , ordinarily , this power is confined
to the appropriation of the income o
f
the receivership and the pro
ceeds o
f moneyed assets that have been taken from the company ,





the mortgaged property in the same way . Thus it
often happens that , in the course of the administration o
f
the cause ,
the court is called upon to take income which would otherwise be
applied to the payment o
f
old debts for current expenses , and use
it to make permanent improvements on the fixed property , o
r
to buy
additional equipment . In this way the value o
f
the mortgaged
property is not unfrequently materially increased . It is not to be
supposed that any such use o
f
the income will be directed b
y
the
court , without giving the parties in interest an opportunity to be
heard against it . Generally , as we know both from observation
and experience , al
l
such orders are made at the request of the par
ties o
r
with their consent . Under such circumstances , it is easy to
see that there may sometimes be a propriety in paying back to the
income from the proceeds o
f
the sale what is thus again diverted
from the current debt fund in order to increase the value of the
property sold . The same may sometimes be true in respect to ex
penditures before the receivership . No fixed and inflexible rule
can b
e
laid down for the government o
f
the courts in al
l
cases .
Each case will necessarily have its own peculiarities , which must
to a greater o
r
less extent influence the Chancellor when he comes
to act . The power rests upon the fact , that in the administration
EXTENT OF THE MORTGAGE LIEN . 405
of the affairs of the company the mortgage creditors have got pos
session of that which in equity belonged to the whole or a part of
the general creditors . Whatever is done, therefore , must be with
a view to a restoration by the mortgage creditors of that which
they have thus inequitably obtained . It follows that if there has
been in reality no diversion , there can be no restoration ; and that
the amount of restoration should be made to depend upon the
amount of the diversion . If in the exercise of this power errors
are committed , they , like others , are open to correction on appeal .
All depends upon a proper application of well - settled rules of equity
jurisprudence to the facts of the case , as established by the evidence .
In this case no special conditions were attached to the order ap
pointing a receiver in the Circuit Court of the United States ; and
it is not contended that the intervener has brought himself within
the rule fixed by the State court, in respect to the payment of gen
eral creditors. He asks to be paid a rent for his cars ; but he en
tered into no express contract with the company which requires
such a payment , and there is nowhere to be found any proof of an
implied obligation to make such compensation . Two years and
more before the appointment of a receiver by the State court , he
contracted to sell his cars to the company at an agreed price, pay
able in instalments , secured by what was in legal effect a paramount
lien upon the cars. Payments were made according to the contract
until October , 1874 , when they stopped . The cars remained in use
after that, not under a new contract of lease , but under the old
contract of sale . The price agreed upon not having been paid in
full, the power of reclamation , which was reserved , has been exer
cised and sustained . The cars were not included in what was sold
at the foreclosure sale , and consequently have contributed nothing
directly to the fund now in court for distribution . So far as ap
pears , no moneys growing out of the receivership remain to be ap
plied on the bonded debt ; and , if there did , through the rent al
ready paid by receiver Anderson , full compensation has been made
for a
ll











r of the company has been in any manner employed so as to




his equitable rights . In short , as the
case stands , no equitable claim whatever has been established upon
the fund in court . Prima facie that fund belongs to the mortgage
creditors , and the presumption which thus arises has not been over
come . Schall , for the balance , his due , after his own security has
been exhausted , occupies the position of a general creditor only .
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AMES v. RICHARDSON .
SUPREME COURT OF MINNESOTA , 1882 .
29 Minn . 330 .
BERRY , J. On December 16 , 1879 , Cochran , being owner of a
piece of land in this state , insured a mill, machinery and fixtures
therein against damage by fire , in the Western Manufacturers ' Mu
tual Insurance Company, for $ 2 ,000 . December 18 , 1879, he bor
rowed of defendant $ 5 ,200 , for which he gave his promissory note
on five years , secured by a mortgage of the land mentioned , which
was duly recorded December 22d. By the terms of the mortgage
Cochran covenanted with Richardson that at a
ll
times during its
continuance he would keep the buildings on the premises " unceas
ingly insured ” for at least $ 5 ,200 , payable in case o
f
loss to Rich
ardson , to the amount then secured b
y
the mortgage . December 28 ,
1879 , Cochran insured the mill , machinery and fixtures for $ 1 ,500
in one copmany , and for $ 2 ,000 in another , and , b
y
indorsement
upon each of the two policies issued to him , the loss was made pay .
able to Richardson , as her interest might appear . On July 9 , 1880 ,
while the three insurances were in force , the insured property was
totally destroyed b
y
fire . Before this Richardson had no knowledge
of the first insurance . The loss was adjusted by Cochran and the
three insurance companies a
t
$ 4 ,298 . 03 , as the true value o
f
the
property destroyed . The result was that the losses payable to Rich
ardson were scaled from $ 3 ,500 ( the face o
f
the last two policies )
to $ 2 ,442 . 20 , and this sum was paid to her and applied on the note .
The loss under the first insurance was scaled and adjusted a
t
$ 1 ,317 . 70 , and that sum agreed to be paid Cochran accordingly .
This was done July 19 , 1880 , and on the same day the certificate
which had been issued to Cochran b
y
the Western Manufacturers '
Mutual Insurance Company , in lieu o
f
a policy , was for a valuable
consideration duly assigned to the plaintiffs . They brought this




$ 1 ,317 . 70 . Nothing having been paid upon
Richardson ' s note and mortgage other than the sum of $ 2 ,442 . 20
before mentioned , and the whole debt having been declared due
under a provision in the mortgage , there remains due and unpaid
thereon something over $ 3 ,000 . Richardson laying claim to the
money ( $ 1 ,317 . 70 ) realized from the first insurance , the company
paid it into court , and Richardson was substituted as defendant in




It is well settled that , in the absence of an agreement by a mort
gagor to insure for the benefit of his mortgagee , the latter has no
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right to any advantage whatever from an insurance upon the mort
gaged property effected by the former for his own benefit . 1 Jones,
Mortg . pr. 401 ; Nichols v . Bacter, 5 R . I. 491 ; Plimpton v . Ins. Co.,
43 Vt. 497 ; May , Ins. Par. 449 , 456 ; Carter v . Rockett , et
c
. , Ins .
Co . , 8 Paige , 437 .
It is equally well settled that an agreement b
y
the mortgagor to
insure for the benefit o
f
his mortgagee gives the latter an equitable
lien upon the proceeds o
f
a policy taken out b
y
the former and
embraced in the agreement . And when the agreement is that the
mortgagor shall procure insurance upon the mortgaged property ,
payable in case o
f
loss to the mortgagee , and the mortgagor , o
r
some one for him , procures insurance in the mortgagor ' s or a third
person ' s name , without making it payable to the mortgagee , though
this be done without the mortgagee ' s knowledge , or without any
intent to perform the agreement , equity will treat the insurance as
effected under the agreement , (unless this has been fulfilled in some
other way , ) and will give the mortgagee his equitable lien accord
ingly . This is upon the principle b
y
which equity treats that a
s
done which ought to have been done . That is to say , inasmuch as
the insurance effected ought to have been made payable to the
mortgagee , equity will give the mortgagee the same benefit from it
as if it had been . In support of these general propositions we re
fer to Thomas v . Voukapff , 6 Gill & J . 372 ; Carter v . Rockett , etc . ,
Ins . Co . , and Nichols v . Baxter , supra ; Wheeler v . Ins . Co . , 101
U . S . 439 ; Cromwell v . Brooklyn Fire Ins . Co . , 44 N . Y . 42 ; Miller
v . Aldrich , 31 Mich . 408 ; 1 Story Eq . Jur . par . 64g ; 2 Am . Lead .
Cas . ( 5th Ed . ) 832 - 4 ; In re Sands Ale Brewing Co . , 3 Biss . 175 .
In the cases cited (with the exception o
f
Nichols v . Baxter ) the
insurance was effected after the agreement to insure . In Nichols
v . Baxter it would seem that the court thought this made no dif
ference , though the opinion alludes ( somewhat as a makeweight ,
as it occurs to us ) to the fact , which appeared b
y
inference only ,
that the insurance in that case , though effected before the agree
ment to insure , was understood b
y
the parties to be embraced in it .
We , however , can see no reason why the same rule should not be
applicable to insurance already subsisting when the agreement to
insure is made , as to that subsequently obtained , unless this result




the case . Such subsisting
insurance can b
e
made payable to the mortgagee , o
r assigned to
him , so a
s





bar , " to keep " the premises insured , it is entirely con
sistent with its letter a
s
well as it
s spirit to hold that it embraces
prior as well as subsequent insurance . And where , as in the present
instance , the value o
f
the insured property is such that subsequent
insurance , sufficient to satisfy the agreement , can not be obtained
so long a
s the prior insurance stands , this is an equitable circum
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stance entitled to great weight upon the question whether the prior
insurance ought to be held to be covered by the agreement . This
equitable circumstance is much enhanced when the effect of the
prior insurance is, as in this case , to scale and reduce the subsequent
insurance procured and made payable to the mortgagee under the
agreement .
In such a state of facts , to permit the mortgagor to withhold the
prior insurance from the mortgagee is to permit him to profit by his
own wrong , at the expense of him whom he has wronged , and a
violation of one of the first principles of law as well as of equity .
The question is not what the mortgagor 's intention was with refer
ence to the prior insurance , but whether it was equitable that , in
carrying out any intention , he should be permitted to withhold the
benefits from the mortgagee , especially in view of the maxim that
equity regards that as done which ought to have been done . Crom
well v . Brooklyn Fire Ins . Co ., Wheeler v . Ins. Co., Miller v . Ald
rich , and In re Sands Ale Brewing Co., supra .
Applying these considerations to this case , we are of opinion that
Richardson is clearly entitled to an equitable lien upon the proceeds
of the first insurance , to be applied upon her note and mortgage.
Cochran ought to have kept his covenant . He could have done this
by procuring a third new policy , or by assigning the first insurance ,
or having it made payable to Richardson . As he did not do the
former, he should have done the latter , and therefore Richardson
is in equity entitled to stand in the same position as if he had done
what he ought to have done .
Stearns v . Quincy Ins. Co., 124 Mass. 61, relied upon by the
plaintiffs is not a case presenting the precise question whether an
insurance effected before an agreement to insure is to be regarded
as embraced in such agreement , so as to give a mortgagee an equi
table lien on the proceeds . But the principle there enunciated , and
which appears to be supported by other decisions of that state , is
that the mortgagee can not have the lien unless the insurance was
obtained by the mortgagor as his agent , or with intent to perform
an agreement to insure . If this was to be regarded as the correct
rule , it would seem to be decisive in the plaintiffs ' favor. But it is
against the weight and current of authority , and, as it seems to us,
inequitable , and therefore we do not follow it .
Another question was discussed upon the argument, viz ., whether
the covenant to insure ran with the land , so that the record of the
mortgage was constructive notice to the plaintiff and to all others
of Richardson 's (the mortgagee's ) equities . We do not deem it at
all necessary to consider this question . The mortgagor 's assign
ment of his claim under the certificate after the loss was an assign
ment of a debt , a mere chose in action , which the plaintiffs took
subject to all defenses and equities against him . Archer v . Mer
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chants ' & M . Ins . Co., 43 Mo. 434 ; Wilson v . Hill, 3 Met. 66 ;
Brichta v . N . Y . Lafayette Ins. Co., 2 Hall , ( N . Y .) 372 ; Mellen
v . Hamilton Fire Ins. Co ., 17 N . Y . 609 ; Greene v . Warnick , 64
N . Y . 220 ; May, Ins . par . 386 . From all this it follows that , in our
opinion , the defendant is entitled to the proceeds of the first insur
ance paid into the court, instead of the plaintiffs, as found by the
court below .
There being no dispute as to the correctness of the findings of
fact , the case is remanded , with directions to the district court to
render judgment for the defendant accordingly . Though there is
no formal reversal of the order denying a new trial, the defendant
is entitled to costs , as of course .
CHAPTER X . .
PRIORITY BETWEEN MORTGAGE LIENS AND COMPET
ING CLAIMS TO THE LAND .
POMEROY , EQUITY , § 679 . Among purely legal titles to the same
subject -matter , successive legal conveyances of and legal estates in
the same tract of land , the equitable doctrine of priorities growing
out of the presence or absence of notice , or of a valuable considera
tion , or of any other incident , has absolutely no application nor ef
fect ; such legal titles , estates , and interests are , in the absence of any
statutory modification , completely controlled , with respect to their
priority , by the order of time. Even the mere want of a valuable
consideration in the earlier conveyance would not, at the common
law , affect the priority of legal right given by the priority of time.1
ERIE COUNTY SAV . BANK v . SCHUSTER .
COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK , 1907 .
187 N . Y . 111 .
O 'BRIEN , J. : This was an action for the foreclosure of a mort
gage . Several persons were made defendants who have not ap
peared and judgment went against them b
y
default . The defend
ants , the Schusters , however , appeared and answered , and the ques
tion involved in the case arises between these defendants and the
plaintiff . The complaint contains the usual allegations in foreclos
ure cases . It alleges that the Schusters were in possession o
f
the
premises and claimed under some right o
r
title inferior and sub
ordinate to the lien o
f
the mortgage and the usual relief in foreclos
ure cases was demanded against them , that is , that they be barred
and foreclosed from all right , title and interest in the mortgaged
premises . The Schusters , in their several answers , denied the al
legation o
f
the complaint that they claimed under a titled subordinate
to the lien o
f
the mortgage , and they alleged that they were in pos
1 See Burns v . Berry , 42 Mich . 176 ; Rumery v . Loy , 61 Nebr . 755 ;
Ely v . Scofield , 35 Barb . ( N . Y . ) 330 ; Purdy v . Huntington , 42 N . Y . 334
(per Sutherland , J . ) ; Fallass v . Pierce , 30 Wis . 443 . See also , 11 Mich .
L . Rev . 495 .
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session under a deed executed by the proper authorities upon a sale
of the land for taxes that were levied subsequently to themortgage
in question .
At the opening of the trial the answering defendants requested
the court to dismiss the complaint as to them , since it appeared
from the pleadings that they claimed under a title paramount to
the lien of the plaintiff 's mortgage . The court denied their motion
and proceeded to take proof as to the nature of the defendants '
claim of title . When the proofs were closed it appeared that the
lands covered by the mortgage had been sold for taxes levied sub
sequent to the execution of the mortgage , and that they were bid in
by the state and were afterwards sold by the commissioners of the
land office to the defendants . The defendants again requested the
court to dismiss the complaint as to them , since it now appeared that
their title was paramount to that of the plaintiff . The motion was
denied and the defendants excepted . The trial court found the facts
here stated and other facts as to the execution of the plaintiff 's
mortgage and the amount due thereon , and he directed that the de
fendants , including the Schusters , should be forever barred and
foreclosed from any right , title and interest in the property . There
was an exception to this finding.
The answering defendants appealed from the judgment to the
Appellate Division and the decision of the trial court was there re
versed and the complaint dismissed as to them and the plaintiff has
appealed to this court . We think that the judgment is correct. The
appeal of the plaintiff presents but two questions of law , and in the
opinion of the learned court below these questions are fully dis
cussed and the conclusion is fully sustained by the cases in this
state . Both questions are quite familiar , and it is unnecessary to
refer to the authorities upon which the conclusion is based . There
can be no doubt that a title resting upon a sale of land for taxes
regularly conducted is paramount to the lien of a prior mortgage.
The owner of such a mortgage has the statutory right of redemption
upon giving notice to the public authorities as to his right and title ,
but it is unnecessary to discuss the proceedings to be followed in
such a case , since it is not claimed that the plaintiff complied with
the statute or is in an attitude seeking to redeem . ' The plaintiff sim
ply insists that the lien of its mortgage is prior and superior to the
title acquired by the tax sale . Upon that proposition the plaintiff
rests its whole contention , and its position in this respect is obviously
untenable .
It is equally clear that the defendants in this case , who were in
2 Compare . Osterberg v . Union Trust Co . , 93 U . S . 424 ; Heiner v .
Northwestern Mut . Life Ins . Co . , 123 U . S . 747 ; Greenwalt v . Tucker ,
8 Fed . 792 ; Abbott v . Frost , 185 Mass . 398 ; Allen v . McCabe , 93 Mo .
138 ; Becker v . Howard , 66 N . Y . 5 ; Blackwell v . Pidcock , 43 N . J . L . 165 .
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possession under the tax title , were not proper parties to the action .
Their title and possession cannot be assailed in an action to fore
close a mortgage, since they are entitled to defend their claim in a
court of law in the usual way in which actions for the recovery of
real property are tried . The defendants cannot be required to de
fend their title in an equitable action like this , but are entitled to
have their rights passed upon by a jury in a court of law . It fol
lows that the defendants had the right to object to have their title
tried in this action , since it was not upon its face subordinate to the
lien of the mortgage . 3
The judgment appealed from is right and should be affirmed , with
costs .
Cullen , Ch . J.,Gray, Edward T . Bartlett, Werner and Chase , JJ .,
concur ; Hiscock , J., not sitting .
Judgment affirmed .
GLASS v . FREEBURG .
SUPREME COURT OF MINNESOTA , 1892 .
50 Minn . 386 .
The defendant Olaf A . Freeburg was on May 17 , 1890 , the owner
of a lot in Highland Park Addition in the city of Minneapolis , and
on that day entered into an oral contract with Nels A . Freeburg to
build thereon for him a block of brick flats and other improvements .
The plaintiffs, James E . Glass and Daniel H . McEwen , soon there
after contracted orally with Nels A . Freeburg to furnish , and did
furnish and deliver upon the lot certain lumber and other materials
worth $ 809. 17 , to be used , and which were used , in the construction
of thebuilding . Other persons furnished materials for and did work
upon the building. On August 1, 1890 , and while the construction
was going on , Olaf A . Freeburg mortgaged the property to the
Pioneer Savings and Loan Association for $ 8 ,000 . The mortgage
was recorded August 8, 1890 . Some of the materials were pur
chased , and some of the work done under contracts made by Nels
A . Freeburg with Fulton & Libbey and others a considerable time
after this mortgage was made and recorded . The material men and
mechanics afterwards filed liens on the property . This action was
brought to foreclose these liens . The Freeburgs and the mortgagee
and all the lien claimants were made parties . The trial court held
the lien of Fulton & Libbey to be junior and subject to the mortgage ,
and they appealed .
MITCHELL , J . : Counsel for the respondent building association
3 See ante, Chap . VII , note 3.
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is that Nels A . Freeburg was merely the agent o
f Olaf A . Freeburg ,
and as such contracted in the name and behalf o
f
his principal for
material and labor for the construction o
f
the buildings referred to .
We do not concur with this view . We think the findings are clearly
to the effect that Olaf , as owner of the premises , contracted with
Nels for the erection by the latter o
f
the buildings , and that the lat
ter , as principal and in his own behalf , purchased and contracted for
the material and l for the construction of the same , and that
when the court described him as the “ agent ” ( as well as the con
tractor ) o
f Olaf , " with authority and power to contract for labor
and material for the construction o
f
the buildings , ” it had reference
merely to the legal principle upon which it is held that a contractor
has authority to charge the land o
f
the owner with debts for labor
and material incurred b
y
him in performing his contract . See O 'Niel
v . S
t
. Olaf ' s School , 26 Minn . 329 ; Laird v . Moonan , 32 Minn . 358 ;
Meyer v . Berlandi , 39 Minn . 442 ; Bardwell v . Mann , 46 Minn . 285 .










certain buildings ; that in the perform
ance of his contract the contractor purchased from plaintiffs , and
the plaintiffs furnished to him , certain material for the construction
o
f
such buildings on May 17 , 1890 , so that it must be taken as a
fact that the actual work of the construction of the buildings was
commenced a
s early as that date ; that subsequently , and while the
work was in progress , the owner o
f
the premises executed a mort
gage thereon to the respondent building association ; that after this
mortgage had been executed and recorded , and while the work was
still in progress , the appellant , the Fulton & Libbey Company , fur
nished to the original contractor certain material for the construc
tion o
f
the buildings in question . So far as appears , and presum
ably , the erection of the building was one continuous jo
b
performed
under the original contract between the owner and the original con
tractor . The original contractor never filed any claim for a lien , but
the appellant , not having received its pay , seasonably filed its claim
for a lien for the material thus furnished to the contractor .
The sole question on this appeal is whether the lien o
f
the appel
lant is entitled to a preference over the mortgage o
f
the building
association . This question has never before been presented for our
consideration . In Finlayson v . Crooks , 47 Minn . 74 , each o
f
the liens
arose under a separate and independent contract b
y
the claimant di
rectly with the owner o
f
the property . Moreover , the question of
priority between the mortgagee and the lien claimants was not
raised . In Hill v . Aldrich , 48 Minn . 73 , the rights of subcontractors
were not involved , and it also appeared that themortgage was exe
cuted and recorded before anything had been done towards the con
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struction of the building . In Haupt Lumber Co . v . Westman , 49
Minn . 397 , the original contractor had not commenced performance
of his contract when the mortgage was executed , but it was inti
mated that possibly a different result might have been reached had
the work of the construction of the buildings been commenced be
fore the execution of the mortgage . We have had occasion recently
to refer to the fact that the mechanic 's lien law fails to make any
express provision with reference to cases where a mortgage or other
incumbrance is placed on the premises after the work of construc
tion has been actually commenced . But we have arrived at the con
clusion that, even in the absence of any express provision on the
subject , upon certain general equitable principles , and also as a
necessary implication from certain provisions of the statute that are
expressed , the appellants ' lien is entitled to a preference over that
of the mortgage. The lien of the original contractor for the entire
building , if he had claimed one , would have been held to have at
tached at the date of the actual commencement of the work , or of
the furnishing the first material , and no subsequent sale or incum
brance of the land by the owner would have affected this right, and
any party purchasing or taking an incumbrance on the property
while the buildings were thus in process of erection would have done
so subject to it. The contract for the erection of the buildings being
an entirety , the contractor , notwithstanding the mortgage to the
building association , had a right to go on and finish them , and to
insist on the priority of his lien for his entire pay over the lien of
the mortgage. A subcontractor comes in by reason of his direct
contract relation to the contractor, and the right of lien of the for
mer for his claim is pro tanto , in a certain sense , substitutionary to
that of the latter , and by relation is deemed to have attached at the
date when the lien of the original contractor attached . The whole
work , being done in the performance of one entire contract with the
owner , is to be deemed a unit, whether done directly by the con
tractor himself or by subcontractors , and all liens therefor , with
out regard to the time in the progress of the work when the labor










the work . The
authority o
f
the contractor to charge the land for the purposes of
the contract is coextensive with the necessities o
f
the building , and
continues until it is finished , and the commencement o
f
the building




the power . Every one
dealing with the property has the means , by ocular examination , of






The fact that buildings are in process o
f
erection on premises




the parties doing the
work . If a building is being erected under a contract with the
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owner , any one dealing with the property is bound to take notice of
the fact that labor and material for the completion of the building
will be required , and that those who perform or furnish it will , under
the law , be entitled to a lien therefor ; and if they see fit to take a
mortgage under such circumstances they assume the risk of its being
subordinated to all liens which may attach to the premises for labor
o
r
material for the completion of the building in accordance with
the contract under which it is being erected .









between the contractor and the subcontractors and as between the
subcontractors themselves . The incongruities and confusion that
would arise in attempting to carry out these provisions upon any
other theory will be apparent on a moment ' s reflection , as , for ex
ample , where a lien is given to the contractor as well as to subcon
tractors , o
r
where , after judgment , the contractor pays off the sub
contractors and is subrogated to their rights .
Our conclusion is that appellants ' lien is entitled to a preference
over respondent ' s mortgage .
The cause is remanded , with directions to modify the judgment
accordingly .
4 This section o
f
the statute provided , among other things , that if ,
upon the foreclosure o
f the liens , the proceeds of the sale of the property
· was not sufficient to cover all the lien claims , " then to divide and dis
tribute the same among the creditors in proportion to the amount due
to each , and without priority among themselves . ” Acts of 1889 , chap .
200 , sec . 10 .
5 See also , Neilson v . Iowa R . R . C
o
. , 44 Iowa 71 ; Nixon v . Cydon
Lodge No . 5 , 56 Kans . 298 ; Kay v . Towsley , 113 Mich . 281 ; In re
Hoyt , Fed . Cas . No . 6805 .
Under some statutes the liens date from the time when the contract
was made under which the work was done or the materials furnished .
Batchelder v . Rand , 117 Mass . 17
6
; Paddock v . Stout , 121 11
1
. 571 .
See also , Crowell v . Gilmore , 18 Cal . 370 ; Henry & c . Co . v . Fisher
dick , 37 Nebr . 207 ; Choteau v . Thompson , 2 Ohio St . 114 .
" In a number o
f
states the general rule as to priority between
mechanics ' liens and other incumbrances is modified to this extent :
that where buildings or improvements are erected upon land subject
to a prior incumbrance , the mechanic ' s lien takes priority over such
incumbrance as to the building or improvement upon or for which the
work was done or the material furnished , though it remains subordinate
to the prior incumbrance as to the land itself and any other improve
ments which were upon it before the mechanic ' s lien attached .
" Statutes establishing this modification o
f
the general rule as to
priority have been held constitutional . ” 20 Am . & Eng . Enc . 481 .
As to the title of a purchaser upon the foreclosure of a mechanic ' s
lien , see Purser v . Cady , 120 Cal . 214 ; Van Buskirk v . Summitville Min .
Co . , 38 Ind . App . 198 ; Shields v . Keys , 24 Iowa 298 .
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NORFOLK STATE BANK v. MURPHY .
of Januari
eptember
, 138 ,was du
SUPREME COURT O
F
NEBRASKA , 1894 .
4
0 Nebr . 735 .
Norval , C . J . On the 24th day of June , 1890 , appellee Fred W .
Gray commenced an action in the district court of Douglas county
against Martin T . Murphy to recover the amount due on a promissory
note executed by Murphy . Summons was duly served upon Murphy
o
n June 26 , and at the September , 1890 , term o
f
said court , to -wit , on
the 3rd day o
f January , 1891 , Gray recovered a judgment in said
action against Murphy for $ 1 ,285 . 49 and costs . The September
term , 1890 , o
f





n the 22d day o
f September . After the commencement of said suit ,
and while the same was pending , on the 29th day o
f
November ,
1890 , Murphy and his wife gave to appellant , the Norfolk State
Bank , a mortgage upon certain real estate in Douglas county to
secure the payment o
f
a promissory note for $ 4 ,676 . 70 , executed
by Murphy to cover his overdrafts on the bank . The property de
scribed in the mortgage was owned b







which the judgment aforesaid
was rendered . On the 11th day of September , 1891 , the Norfolk
State Bank brought its action in the court below to foreclose said
mortgage , to which the Murphys , Fred W . Gray , and others were
made defendants . Gray filed an answer , setting up said judgment ,
and praying that the same be decreed a lien on the premises included
in plaintiff ' s mortgage prior to the lien of the mortgage . Upon the
trial a decree was entered foreclosing themortgage , but making the
lien thereof junior to the judgment lien o
f Gray .
The sole question to be decided on this appeal is , which lien has
priority , the mortgage o











Civil Procedure , which reads as follows :
“ Sec . 477 . The lands and tenements o
f
the debtor within the
county where the judgment is entered shall be bound for the satis
faction thereof , from the first day o
f
the term at which judgment is
rendered ; but judgments by confession , and judgments rendered a
t
the same term a
t
which the action is commenced , shall bind such
lands only from the day on which such judgments are rendered . All
other lands , as well as goods and chattels o
f
the debtor , shall be
bound from the time they shall be seized in execution . "
The language just quoted is too plain to admit of more than one
construction , and that is , all judgments rendered in a district court
in actions brought therein prior to the term , except judgments by
confessions , become liens upon the real estate of the judgment debtor
situate within the county from the first day o
f
the term . At com
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mon law all judgments of a court of record relate back to the first
day of the term , and are regarded as rendered on that day , no matter
on what day of the term they were actually entered . Our statute is
declaratory of the rule of the common law , and places all judgments
of a district court, except rendered on confession , or in cases in
which actions were instituted during the term , upon equality in re
gard to liens. The judgment of Gray has relation to the first day
of the term at which the same was recovered , and was a lien upon
the lands owned by Murphy within the county from the first day
of such term . The same construction was placed upon the statute
in Miller v . Finn , 1 Neb . 294 , and was followed in the case of Colt
v . Du Bois , 7 Neb . 391.
It is insisted by counsel for plaintiff in error that the section
quoted merely determines the priority of liens of judgment creditors
as between themselves ; and further, that the lien of a mortgage duly
recorded during a term of court, and before the entry of a judgment
at that term , is paramount to the lien of a judgment. We are un
able to so construe the statute. It in express terms declares that " the
lands and tenements of the debtor within the county where the judg
ment is entered shall be bound for the satisfaction thereof, from the
first day of the term at which judgment is rendered .” Plainer lan
guage could not have been selected . The lien of a judgment does
not attach merely to the debtor 's interest in lands when the judg
ment is obtained , but to whatever interest therein he possessed on
the first day of the term at which the same was entered . To hold
otherwise would be to make the law , and not simply to apply the
same. A judgment being a lien upon real estate from the first day
of the term , such lien is superior to the lien of a mortgage sub
sequently given by the debtor . To adopt the construction contended
for by counsel would be injecting words into the statute by judicial
interpretation , which we have no power to do . Had the legislature
intended that the doctrine of relation as to lien of judgments should
not apply where a mortgage is recorded before the judgment is
actually entered , it would have used apt words indicative of such
purpose . Our conclusion is that the lien of the mortgage is junior
to that of the judgment . The construction we have given the sec
tion does not conflict with the prior decisions of this court cited in
the brief of counsel , as a cursory examination of the cases will dis
close .
In Galway v . Malchow , 7 Neb . 285 , certain judgments were recov
ered against Malchow after the recording of a mortgage given by
him to the plaintiffs . By mistake the land intended to be included
in the mortgage was described as being in section 28 instead of sec
tion 33 . It was held that the lien of the judgments were subject to
the equity of the mortgage. The proposition we have been discussing
was not involved nor passed on in that case . That decision simply
27












affirms the doctrine that a judgment upon real estate is subject to









a judgment attaches to the lands o
f
the defendant . The
rule stated in Galway v . Malchow has been reaffirmed and applied in
Metz v . State Bank of Brownville , 7 Neb . 165 ; Mansfield v . Greg
ory , 8 Neb . 434 , 11 Neb . 297 ; Leonard v . White Cloud Ferry Co . ,
1
1 Neb . 338 ; Dewey v . Walton , 31 Neb . 819 . It is unnecessary to
point out the difference between the facts upon which they were de
cided and those in the case we are considering . It is sufficient to
say that in none of the cases mentioned was section 477 of the Code
before the court for consideration , nor was the question raised b
y
this record discussed therein . Under the above authorities a judg
ment lien is subject to all prior liens on the land of the defendant ;
but this principle does notmilitate against the construction we have
given section 477 . Had plaintiff ' s mortgage been made before the
term of court at which Gray ' s judgment was entered , although re
corded subsequent thereto , the cases would have some bearing here ;
but it was not so made , hence the judgment lien antedates the mort




this court is that a creditor ac
quires no better right to his debtor ' s property than the latter him
self has . The lien of a judgment is subordinate to all equities which
existed in favor of third parties when the lien of a judgment is lim
ited to the actual interest the debtor has in the property .
Another decision of this court relied on by the appellant is Horn
v . Miller , 20 Neb . 98 . It was there ruled that the time within which
to perfect an appeal taken from a decree o
f
the district court begins
to run from the date on which the court formally announces its con
clusion and judgment , and not from the date on which the clerk
enters the same on the court journal . Horn v . Miller was expressly
overruled in Bickel v . Dutcher , 35 Neb . 761 , it being there decided
that the time within which an appeal may be taken does not com
mence running until the decree is entered o
f




n appeal , the date of a judgment is deemed to be the time
it is actually sprad upon the records , but that is no reason for hold
ing that the lien o
f
a judgment does not attach until that time . The
language o
f
the section relating to the time for perfecting appeals
is quite different from the provision on the subject o
f judgment liens .
For the purpose of an appeal the date of a judgment is regarded as




the debtor , by a legal fiction , it is considered as having
been entered a
t
a date often anterior to the time it was pronounced
by the court .
The decisions o
f
this court to the effect that a judgment does not
become a lien upon the lands o
f
the defendant , as against a subse
quent purchaser , without notice , until properly indexed have no ap
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plication to the case at bar , since plaintiff is not such a purchaser .
It is not even a good faith mortgagee . The bank did not extend
credit to Murphy on the strength that the land was free from liens ,
but the mortgage was given to secure a prior indebtedness of the
mortgagor . When the security was taken the officers of the bank
knew , or ought to have known , that the records of the district
court of Douglas county disclosed that the action was pending
against Murphy , and that a judgment might be recovered therein
during the term which would be a lien on the land . We are unable
to perceive that the statute relating to lis pendens , section 85 o
f
the
Code , has any bearing upon the question under consideration , since
in actions a
t
law to recover money judgments , merely , no notice o
f
their pendency is required to be given to third parties . It is only in
a suit brought to affect the title to real property that the statute re
quires that notice lis pendens shall be given . The pendency of an
action to recover a money judgment is of itself notice to any one
purchasing the lands o
f
the defendant during a term o
f
court that
before the close o
f
the term the plaintiff may recover a judgment
therein which will be a lien upon said real estate . We know that
text -writers state the general rule to be that judgments do not relate
back to the first day of the term so as to create a lien on the real





the courts in most o
f
the states . But it should
be remembered that a
ll
the states , excepting a few , have statutes
which in express terms provide that judgments shall become liens
upon the lands of the debtor , either from the date on which they are
rendered , o
r
the last day o
f
the term . ( Black , Judgments , sec . 443 . )
Such , however , is not the common - law rule , nor is it the doctrine
in states having statutes similar to our own . Mr . Black , in his
treatise on Judgments , a
t
section 441 , observes that " it was the rule
of the common law (and this rule still obtains in some of the states )
that the judgments of a court of record all relate back to the first
day o
f
the term , and are considered as rendered on that day , and
therefore their lien will attach to the debtor ' s realty from the be
ginning o
f
the term , and will override a conveyance or mortgage
made on the second , o
r any succeeding day , although actually prior
to the rendition o
f
the judgment . " True , the same author in the
next section says that “ as against intervening purchasers it may be
regarded a
s
settled that the lien o
f
a subsequent judgment will not
attach , justice forbidding that in such a case it should relate back
to a time anterior to the conveyance , " citing Morgan v . Sims , 26 Ga .
283 ; Pope v . Brandon , 2 Stewart (Ala . ) 401 . The same doctrine
is stated in a note on page 115 of volunie 12 American & English
Encyclopedia o
f
Law , and the following , in addition to the Georgia
case above referred to , are cited in support thereof : Skipwith v .
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Cunningham , 8 Leigh (Va.) 272 ; Withers v . Carter , 4 Gratt . (Va.)
407 ; Brockenbrough v . Brockenbrough , 31 Gratt . (Va.) 580 .
An examination of the foregoing authorities will disclose that all
but one fall far short of sustaining the principle they are cited to
support .
We have been unable to find , although we have made diligent
search , a single decision under a statutory provision similar to the
Nebraska statutes which sustains the contention of counsel for ap
pellant. We do not think that the district court erred in giving the
judgment priority over themortgage. The decree is affirmed .
6 " At common law , a creditor had no remedy against the lands of
his debtor for the satisfaction of his claim ; but by 13 Edw . I. c. 18 , it
was provided that, when a debt is recovered or damages awarded , it
shall be thenceforth “ in the election " of the creditor to have a writ of
fieri facias against the goods and chattels of the debtor , or else a writ
that the sheriff deliver to him all the chattels of the debtor and the
one -half of his land . The writ issued to the sheriff under this statute
was called a writ of elegit , because it stated that the creditor had elected
( elegit ) to pursue the remedy furnished by the statute . In construing
this statute it was decided that the creditor could enforce his remedy
against the lands even in the hands of one to whom they had been sold
by the debtor after the recovery of the judgment, and this in effect
made the judgment a lien or incumbrance on all the lands of the debtor .
In one or two states the lien has been regarded as existent by force
of this statute , or of a colonial statute giving a right to levy an execu
tion , but it is usually considered that no such lien exists , in the absence
of a state statutory provision therefor , and there is , in most of the states ,
such a provision subjecting the judgment debtor 's land, or certain in
terests therein , to the lien of a judgment .
" At common law , a judgment related back to , and was regarded as
rendered upon , the first day of the term . This rule still applies in some
states , so as to give the lien of the judgment precedence over a prior
conveyance made during the term . More generally , however , the lien
attaches either at the time of the rendition of the judgment or at the
time of its docketing or record .” Tiffany , Real Property , $ 570 .
Compare , Root v. Curtis , 38 Il
l
. 192 ; Ray v . Adams , 4 Hun ( N . Y . )
332 .
" In some states , the delivery to the sheriff of a writ of execution
creates a lien on such property of the judgment debtor as is subject
to levy under the execution . In most states , however , the mere delivery
o
f
the writ to the sheriff does not create any lien , and a levy under the
writ is necessary to make the claim of the creditor effective .
“ So far as a lien already exists by force o
f
the judgment , any ad
ditional lien by virtue of the execution is usually of no value , and , in
view of the fact that the former lien is recognized in most of the states




cution lien in connection with the law o
f
land . " Tiffany , Real Property ,
$ 572 .
As to the title of a purchaser at execution sale , see Cockey v .
Milne ' s Lessee , 16 Md . 200 ; Paxton v . Sterne , 127 Ind . 289 ; Higman
v . Stewart , 38 Mich . 513 .
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Irvine, C ., having presided in the court below , took no part in
the above decision .
Ryan , C ., dissenting .
TEFFT V. MUNSON .
COMMISSION OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK , 1874 .
57 N . Y . 97 .
This was an action to restrain defendants , loan commissioners for
Washington county , from foreclosing a mortgage executed to them
by Martin B. Perkins and wife .
On the 18th day of January , 1848 , Gamaliel Perkins purchased
of Cortland Howland certain lands in Washington county , which
were conveyed to him b
y warranty deed recorded March 7 , 1848 , in
the clerk ' s office in said county . Gamaliel Perkins , immediately
after his purchase , le
t
his son , Martin B . Perkins , into possession
o
f
the premises , who forged a deed o
f
the land from his father to
himself and placed it upon record in the clerk ' s office of said county ,
May 27 , 1850 . On the 1st day of October , 1850 , Martin B . and his
wife executed a mortgage upon said land to the loan commissioners
o
f
said county , to secure the sum of $ 1 ,000 loaned to him . This
mortgage contained covenants that Martin B . and his wife were
lawfully seized o
f
a good , sure , perfect , absolute and indefeasible
estate o
f
inheritance in the premises , and that they were free and
clear o
f
and from all former and other gifts , grants , bargains , sales ,
liens , etc . ;and this mortgage was , on the day of its date , duly record
e
d
in the book kept b
y
the loan commissioners , as required b
y
law .
On the 23d day of January , 1860 , a deed o
f
said lands bearing date





Martin B . and wife to his father . On the
16th day o
f
December , 1859 , Gamaliel Perkins conveyed said land
to Martin B . , b
y
deed recorded January 14 , 1860 . Until this con
veyance from his father Martin B . had no title to the land , although
h
e
remained in possession o
f
the same from 1848 . On the 31st day
o
f January , 1867 , Martin B . , being still in possession o
f
the lands ,
conveyed them to the plaintiff , who paid full value for the same
without any actual notice of the mortgage to the loan commissioners .
The deed to the plaintiff was recorded February 9 , 1867 .
The court below decided that plaintiff was not entitled to the re
lief sought and directed a dismissal of the complaint . Judgment was
perfected accordingly .
EARL , C . The plaintiff claims that the mortgage to the loan com
missioners has no validity a
s against him , and that his deed has
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priority over it under the laws in reference to the registry of deeds
and mortgages. It is a principle of law , not now open to doubt,
that, ordinarily , if one who has no title to lands , nevertheless makes
a deed of conveyance , with warranty , and afterward himself pur
chases and receives the title , the same will vest inimediately in his
grantee who holds his deed with warranty as against such grantor
by estoppel . In such case the estoppel is held to bind the land , and
to create an estate and interest in it. The grantor in such case , be
ing at the same time the warrantor of the title which he has assumed
the right to convey , will not, in a court of justice , be heard to set
up a title in himself against his own prior grant ; he will not be heard
to say that he had not the title at the date of the conveyance , or that
it did not pass to his grantee in virtue of his deed. (Work v . Wel
land , 13 N . H . 389 ; Kimball v . Blaisdell , 5 id . 533 ; Somes v . Skin
ner , 3 Pick . 52 ; The Bank of Utica v . Mersereau , 3 Barb . Ch . 528 ,
567 ; Jackson v . Bull, 1 John . Cas. 81, 90 ; White v . Patten , 24 Pick .
324 ; Pike v . Galvin , 29 Maine 183. ) And the doctrine, as will be
seen by these authorities , is equally well settled that the estoppel
binds not only the parties , but all privies in estate , privies in blood
and privies in law ; and, in such case , the title is treated as having
been previously vested in the grantor, and as having passed imme
diately upon the execution of his deed , by way of estoppel . In this
case Martin B . Perkins conveyed the lands to the loan commissioners
by mortgage with warranty of title , and thereby became estopped
from disputing that, at the date of the mortgage , he had the title
and conveyed it ; and this estoppel applied equally to the plaintiff
to whom he made a subsequent conveyance , by deed , after he ob
tained the title from his father , and who thus claimed to be his
privy in estate. The plaintiff was estopped from denying that his
grantor, Martin B . Perkins , had the title to the land at the date
of themortgage , and he must , therefore, for every purpose as against
the plaintiff , be treated as having the title to the land at that date.
I , therefore , can see no difficulty in this case , growing out of the
law as to the registry of conveyances . Martin B . Perkins , having
title , made the mortgage which was duly recorded . He then con
veyed to his father and the deed was recorded . His father then con
veyed to him and the deed was recorded . He then conveyed to the
plaintiff and his deed was recorded . Thus the title and record of
the mortgage were prior to the title and record of the deed to plain





the rule that the record o
f




o title , is , ordinarily , a nullity , and constructive notice to
n
o
one ; the plaintiff cannot avail himself o
f





estopped from denying that the mortgagor had the title at the date
o
f
themortgage . The case o
f
White v . Patten ( supra ) is entirely
analogous to this . In that case , the plaintiff derived his title from
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a mortgage , made to him by one Thayer , containing covenants of
seizin , warranty , etc ., and recorded February 19 , 1834 . At the time
of the execution of this mortgage the title was not in Thayer , but
in one Perry , his father in law . Perry afterward , by deed , recorded ,
August 2, 1834 , conveyed the land in fee simple to Thayer , who
conveyed the land by mortgage to the defendant, recorded the same
day . The counsel for the defendant used the same arguments in a
great measure , which have been urged upon our attention by the
counsel for the plaintiff in this case, both as to the title and the reg
istry of the mortgages ; and , yet the court held in a very able opinion ,
that the plaintiff had the prior and better title .
I am , therefore , of opinion that the judgment should be affirmed ,
with costs .
For affirmance , Earl, Gray and Johnson , CC .
For reversal, Lott , Ch . C ., and Reynolds , C .
Judgment affirmed .?
7 See also , Whipple v. Pope, 33 11
1
. 334 ; Cockrill v . Bane , 94 Mo .
444 . And see Tiffany , Real Property , $ $ 456 , 476 ; and Jones , Mortgages ,
$ 1483 .




and made by the defendant Parks , through
the tax deed to Ballard and thence by quitclaim to himself , is unavailing
[ a
s
a defense to this suit to foreclose a mortgage ] . Parks acquired
title to the land in 1860 . The deed was issued for the unpaid taxes
of 1861 , assessed after Parks became the owner . As the owner in fee
o
f
the land (subject to the mortgages , o
r
which became subject b
y
his
omission to record ) and party presumptively in possession and liable
by law for the payment of the taxes at the time of assessment , Parks
could gain no advantage as against any one by suffering the land to g
o
to sale , and then taking a quitclaim from the grantee in the tax deed .
This was but a circuitous and dilatory way o
f paying the taxes , and
after all , nothing but a payment which it was his legal duty to have
made in the first place . 20 Wis . 356 ; 22 Wis . 175 ; 22 Maine 331 . It is
impossible to conceive o
f
a speculation in tax titles upon one ' s own
lands , or how the owner who is under obligation to the public and
bound by law to pay the taxes , can change his status o
r
affect his
title by such roundabout proceedings . He must in the end come right
back to the point whence he started . It is clearly not the policy of the
law to encourage delays of this kind in the payment of taxes . ” Dixon ,
C . J . , in Fallass v . Pierce , 30 Wis . 443 , 481 .
Compare , Frye v . Bank of Illinois , 11 111 . 367 ; McAlpine v . Zitser ,
119 Ill . 273 ; Stears v . Hollenbeck , 38 Iowa 550 ; Shrigley v . Black , 66
Kans . 213 ; Sands v . Davis , 40 Mich . 14 ; MacEwen v . Beard , 58 Minn . 176 ;
Drew v . Morrill , 62 N . H . 565 .
Compare Chap . VIII , note 3 , and Christ Church v . Mack , supra .
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GILLIAM v . MOORE .
COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA , 1832 .
4 Leigh (Va . ) 30 .
Ejectment . Upon the trial , the jury found a special verdict,
stating , in substance , the following case :
W . B . Gilliam being seized in fee of the 560 acres of land ,whereof
the land in question was parcel , sold the whole 560 acres to J. S .
Moore, for £1 ,000 and conveyed the same to him by deed of bargain
and sale , dated the 10th October , 1804 ; and Moore, on the same day ,
by deed of bargain and sale (purporting to be the deed of Moore
and Anna his wife, but she never executed it ) conveyed the land
to trustees , upon trust to secure payment of the purchase money
to Gilliam . Several years afterwards , the whole 560 acres of land
was duly sold by the trustees , in pursuance of the deed of trust ,
to pay the purchase money due to Gilliam ; and at that sale , Gilliam
himself became the purchaser , and the trustees conveyed the land
to him ; but before he got possession of it , Moore died . Moore 's
mansion house was on part of the land and his widow , Anna Moore ,
claimed to hold possession of this part on which the mansion house
was situated , until dower of the whole tract should be assigned to
her , under the provisions of the statute , 1 Rev. Code, ch . 107 , sec .
2 , p . 403. And the question of law upon the verdict , was , whether
Mrs . Moore was entitled to dower of the 560 acres of land or not ?
The circuit court gave judgment for her ; to which , upon the pe
tition ofGilliam , this court awarded a supersedeas .
CARR, J. The first and principal question arising on this special
verdict is, whether under the deed from Gilliam to Moore , a title
to the land vested in Moore, whereof his wife was dowable ?
I am clearly of opinion , that she was not dowable . It was objected ,
that the verdict has not found , that the deeds were executed at the
same time, and as parts of the same transaction , and that , this being
a special verdict, we cannot draw this inference ; but to my mind
the finding is abundant to justify , and indeed to compel , the conclu
sion , that the two instruments were parts of one and the same trans
action , and that the seizin of Moore was that instantaneous seizin .
spoken of in the books, where the land was merely in transitu , and
never vested in the husband. The deeds bear the same date ; they
are between the same parties ; relative to the same subject matter .
The vendor conveys the land , for so much money ; the vendee re
conveys it to secure that money. It is impossible to doubt for a mo
ment, the meaning , connection and ( I may say ) unity , of the trans
action . We have no reported case in our own books directly in
point ; and this, no doubt , has resulted from the general impression
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of the bar, that no such right existed in the widow ; for the case
must have happened a thousand times . The English books , how
ever , all lay down the position that a transitory seizin in the husband
for an instant , does not entitle the wife to dower , and the point has
been decided in the same way , in Massachusetts and New York . A
different decision at this day , would be exceedingly mischievous, and
open an inexhaustible source of litigation . * * *
TUCKER , P .
The real question , in this case , is as to the right of dower . The
authorities cited by the counsel for the plaintiff in error, leave no
doubt that where the vendor passes the title to the vendee , and at
the same time takes a mortgage or deed of trust for the security of
the purchase money, in which the wife of the vendee does not join
she will nevertheless take her dower in the estate subject to the trust
or mortgage . In such case , the husband is seized but for an instant,
and not beneficially for his own use ; the deed of conveyance , and
the mortgage or deed of trust , are to be considered , like the levy of
a fine , as parts of the same transaction and of the same contract ;
as taking effect at the same instant , and as constituting but one act .
If both contracts were contained in the same instrument, there could
be no doubt ; and it is the same thing though they are contained in
different instruments , provided they are parts of the same contract ,
and make together but one transaction . That they are parts of the
same transaction , must be presumed where they are executed at
the same time; and , moreover , as they cannot be absolutely isochron
ous , as there must be some interval, however small; the court ought
always to take the same day to mean the same time, unless the
contrary be found — unless it be found , that the acts were separate ,
distinct and independent .
Judgment reversed , and judgment entered for the plaintiff .s
STEWART v. SMITH .
SUPREME COURT OF MINNESOTA , 1886 .
36 Minn . 82 .
Plaintiff brought this action in the district court of Hennepin
county , to determine adverse claims to certain land in that county .
The action was tried, without a jury , by Young , J ., who found the
8 Compare Perkins v . Davis , 120 Mass . 408 . As to the effect of a
mortgage executed at the same time that the mortgagor receives his
title , but not for purchase money , see Atkinson v. Hancock , 67 Iowa
452 ; Hazleton v. Lesure, 9 Allen (Mass.) 24 ; Ray v. Adams , 4 Hun ( N .
Y .) 332 ; Weil v. Casey , 125 N . C . 356 .
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facts recited in the opinion , and directed judgment for the plaintiff .
The defendants appeal from an order refusing a new trial.
MITCHELL , J. Both parties claim title through Hiram Burling
ham - defendants under an execution sale on a judgment against
Burlingham rendered and docketed in October , 1859 ; plaintiff under
a foreclosure sale on a mortgage from Burlingham to one Sidle ,
executed and recorded September 16, 1861. The facts regarding
the execution of this mortgage, as found by the court upon undis
puted evidence, are, in substance, that Burlingham , being desirous
of entering this land by pre -emption , applied to Sidle for money
with which to make the entry ; that it was agreed between them that
Sidle should lend Burlingham the money or land -warrant with which
to make the entry , and that , as security therefor , Burlingham should
give Sidle a purchase -money mortgage on the land when entered ;
that pursuant to the agreement Sidle loaned Burlingham the funds
with which to enter the land ; that thereupon Burlingham immediate
ly went from his home (both parties resided in Minneapolis , 80 or 90
miles distant from the land -office ) to Forest City , where the land
office at which the entry was to be made was situated , and upon
his arrival , on Friday , September 13th , entered the land , paying
therefor with the funds loaned him by Sidle, and immediately start
ed back for his home, where he arrived on Sunday , September
15th ; that on Monday , September 16th , pursuant to the agreement
above referred to , he and his wife executed to Sidle the mortgage
in question as security for the money so loaned and interest , accord
ing to the previous agreement of the parties .
Upon this state of facts it is quite clear that the lien of Sidle 's
mortgage had precedence over the lien of defendant's judgment.
This is so under the familiar doctrine, more than once approved by
this court, that a purchase -money mortgage , executed at the same
time with the deed of purchase , takes precedence of any other claim
or lien arising through the mortgagor . It will take the precedence
whether executed to the vendor or to a third person who advanced
the purchase -money which was paid to the vendor . Jones v . Taintor ,
15 Minn . 423, (512 ) , Jacoby v . Crowe , post , p . 93 ; 4 Kent. Comm .
* 39 ; Washb . Real Prop . * 176 ; Jones Mortg . 416 .9
The case of Jones v . Taintor , supra , is decisive of the present case ,
9 Accord : Kaiser v . Lembeck , 55 Iowa 24
4 ; Clark v . Munroe , 14
Mass . 351 ; Haywood v . Nooney , 3 Barb . ( N . Y . ) 643 . In a few states ,
the contrary rule prevails , apparently as a result o
f
a statutory defini
tion of purchase -money mortgages . See Heuisler v . Nickum , 38 Md .
270 ; Stansell v . Roberts , 13 Ohio 148 .
As to the status of a purchase -money mortgage to a third person
who has advanced part o
f
the purchase price , a
s against a purchase
money mortgage to the vendor for the balance of the purchase price ,
see Brower v . Witmeyer , 121 Ind . 83 ; Schoch v . Birdsall , 48 Minn , 441 ;
Rogers v . Tucker , 94 Mo . 346 .
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the facts in both being almost identical. An attempt is made to dis
tinguish the two cases because in the former the claim was the right
of dower of the widow of the mortgagor , while in the present case
it is the lien of judgment against themortgagor . There is no room
for any such distinction . The doctrine which gives precedence , in
such cases , to a purchase -money mortgage, is one of equity , and not
of statutory origin , and applies to any claim to or lien upon the
property arising through the mortgagor .
The present case is also sought to be taken out of the operation
of the rule because the purchase of the land and the execution of the
mortgage were not simultaneous , Burlingham having entered the
land and obtained his certificate of entry on Friday , September
13th , while the mortgage to Sidle was not executed until Monday ,
September 16th . The rule , as generally stated in the books, is that
to give a purchase -money mortgage this precedence it must have
been executed simultaneously , or at the same time, with the deed of
purchase . Some ground for a narrow and literal construction of
this language is furnished by the fact that the reason usually as
signed for the doctrine is the technical one of the mere transitory
seizin of the mortgagor , rather than the superior equity which the
mortgagee has to be paid the purchase -money of the land before
it shall be subjected to other claims against the purchaser . But
it is evident , both upon principle and authority , that what is meant
by this statement of the rule is not that the two acts — the execution
of the deed of purchase and the execution of the mortgage - should
be literally simultaneous . This would be almost an impossibility .
Some lapse of timemust necessarily intervene between the two acts .
An examination of the cases will show that the real test is not
whether the deed and mortgage were in fact executed at the same
instant , or even on the same day , but whether they were parts of
one continuous transaction , and so intended to be, so that the two
instruments should be given contemporaneous operation in order
to promote the intent of the parties . 1 Washburn , Real Prop . * 178 ;
Wheatley v . Calhoun , 12 Leigh , 264 ; Love v . Jones , 4 Watts 465 ;
Snyder ' s Appeal, 91 Pa . St. 477 . Hence it will be found that in
some of the cases the fact that the mortgage was executed pursuant
to an agreement made prior to the execution of the deed of purchase
has been the controlling consideration upon which the mortgage
has been given precedence , although not in fact executed until some
time after the execution of the deed . The reason is that such a
state of facts would show that both acts were but parts of the same
continuous transaction . As evidence of the fact , such previous
agreement would have equal probative force , although it might not
be enforceable , because not in writing , and within the statute of
frauds . Even if such agreement , while executory , was not enforce
able , yet , when once executed by the execution of the mortgage ,
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it becomes as effectual as if originally in writing , and in equity will
be deemed (if the rights of no innocent purchaser have intervened )
as taking effect by relation as of the date of the agreement .
The facts bring the case clearly within the rule . There was a
previous agreement that Burlingham should , after entering the land ,
give Sidle a purchase -money mortgage upon it. The mortgage was
subsequently executed in pursuance of that agreement , and as soon
after the entry of the land as was reasonably practicable . Both acts
were evidently intended by the parties as parts of a single continu
ous transaction . 10
There is no force to the suggestion that one " 40 " of the land
entered was not included in the mortgage. If Sidle, either by mis
take or intentionally , took security for the purchase -money on only
part of the land purchased , defendants certainly have no ground of
complaint.
As these views are necessarily decisive of the case , it is unnec
essary to consider any of the other points discussed by counsel .
Order affirmed .
DUSENBURY v . HULBERT .
Court of APPEALS OF NEW YORK , 1875 .
59 N . Y . 541.
This was an action to foreclose a mortgage executed by John La
Grange to Lewis Seymour , plaintiff 's testator , upon lands in Cort
land county . Defendant George A . Hulbert was made a party , as
assignee , of a mortgage made by La Grange to George O . Bowen .
Hulbert answered alleging his mortgage to be a purchase -money
mortgage and a prior lien .
10 In: Ray v. Adams , 4 Hun (N . Y .) 33
2 , the grantee , before receiv
ing his conveyance , obtained from plaintiff , to whom he already owed
$ 500 , a loan o
f
$ 500 more to enable him to make his purchase , agreeing
to secure the whole amount , $ 1 ,000 , by a mortgage of the land to be
executed as soon as it was conveyed to him . The mortgage was not ,
however , executed until about a year after the conveyance . Prior to the
conveyance , the defendant had recovered a judgment against the grantee .
The action was brought to foreclose the mortgage . It was held that ,
a
s
to the $ 500 advanced for the purchase of the land , the lien of the
mortgage was prior to that of the judgment , but that , as to the prior
debt , the judgment was entitled to priority .
In Wheatley ' s Heirs v . Calhoun , 12 Leigh (Va . ) 264 , a deed o
f
trust
by grantees to secure purchase money due the grantor , executed ten
months after the grant , in pursuance o
f
a stipulation in the contract




See also , Spring v . Short , 90 N . Y . 538 .











The facts which were undisputed were briefly as follows : On the
1st day o
f April , 1868 , Bowen had the legal title and was in pos
session o
f
the premises in question . He had before that contracted
to sell them to La Grange for $ 2 ,500 , $ 100 o
f
which had been paid .




the contract , was to be paid and se
cured on that day . Seymour , who resided in Binghamton , had
agreed to loan La Grange $ 1 ,500 , to be secured b
y
a bond and a
mortgage on the premises . On the first day o
f April La Grange
went to Binghamton and delivered his bond to Seymour for the loan
of $ 1 ,500 , and agreed to execute a mortgage on the premises and
have it recorded in the county clerk ' s office and represented that he
owned the premises and had a deed o
f
the same , and it was under
stood that Seymour ' s mortgage was to be the first lien . Seymour
o
n that day paid to La Grange $ 900 , and the next day , the second
o
f April , sent him b
y
express $600 , being the balance o
f
the loan .




f April , when he received a deed from Bowen ,
and at the same time gave back a mortgage for $ 900 to secure the
balance of the purchase -money and took possession of the premises .
La Grange executed and acknowledged the mortgage to Seymour
o
n
the first day of April and left it at the clerk ' s office for record ,
with the deed from Bowen , on the fourteenth o
f April . The pur
chase -money mortgage to Bowen was recorded on the seventeenth
o
f April , when he sold and assigned it to the defendant .
Upon these facts both the Special and General Terms held that
the Seymour mortgage was entitled to preference , although they
differ as to the grounds o
f







latter upon the ground
of superior diligence .
CHURCH , Ch . J . This is a contest for priority o
f
mortgages .
There are two aspects in which to consider the plaintiff ' s mortgage ,
one a
s
a prior and the other as a subsequent lien . If it is to be
deemed a
s
executed and delivered on the first day of April the
question is , whether it was a prior lien to that o
f
the Bowen mort
gage . I think it very clear that it was not . It would attach , as





his contract of purchase , and on the sixth it would at




then acquired , but that interest
was the legal title subject to the purchase -money mortgage . The
deed and Bowen mortgage executed at the same time are to be con
strued together a
s
one instrument . They constitute an indivisible
act . There never was a moment between the seisin and mortgage
when La Grange could encumber the estate to the exclusion o
f
the
latter , and it follows that a prior mortgage could not insert itself
between them . Such a transaction is sometimes illustrated as a con
ditional sale . Thus , in Stow v . Tifft ( 15 J . R . , 458 ) , which was a
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question between a right to dower and a purchase -money mortgage ,
Spencer , J ., in delivering the opinion , said : “ The substance of
the conveyance , where land is mortgaged at the same time the deed
is given , is this : the bargainer sells the land to the bargainee on con
dition that he pays the price at the stipulated time, and if he does
not , that the bargainer shall be reseized of it free from the mortgage ;
and whether this contract is contained in one and the same instru
ment as it may well be, or in distinct instruments executed at the
same instant , can make no possible difference ."
The same principle was adopted as to the question of escheat ( 1
Sandf. Ch ., 141 ) , and was applied to a defeasance in 3 Wendell , 233 ,
and was recognized and fully approved by this court in 26 New
York , 68 .
It is not material that it should be regarded technically as a con
ditional sale ; in substance , it is a sale subject to a lien for unpaid
purchase -money which attaches eo instanti, as a lien as a part of an
indivisible transaction . Independent of authority the rule com
mends itself to every one's sense of justice . A vendor of real es
tate has no occasion to examine the records for incumbrances created
prior to his conveyance . He has the power to protect himself by a
qualified or conditional transfer , or by any legal mode of creating
a lien to secure himself for unpaid purchase -money . When he con
veys and instantly takes a reconveyance as such security , no author
ity is needed to demonstrate the gross injustice of permitting a prior
mortgage from intervening to his prejudice.
If the mortgage is to be deemed executed and delivered subse
quently on the fourteenth of April , when it was recorded , the ques
tion is, whether it is protected by the recording act . ( 1 R . S ., 756 ,
par. 1 ) , the Bowen mortgage not having been recorded until the
seventeenth . The fatal difficulty with this theory is to establish that
Seymour was a subsequent purchaser , “ in good faith and for a
valuable consideration ," as the statute requires he should be to be
protected against an unrecorded conveyance . The mortgagee must
part with value upon the faith of the conveyance . Seymour paid
nothing and parted with no value on the fourteenth of April . He
parted with his money on the first and second of April. The rec
ords then notified him that Bowen had and La Grange had not the
title , and , besides Bowen was then in possession , whose rights he
was also bound to take notice of. ( 16 Paige, 388 ; 15 N . Y ., 354 ;
52 id ., 612 ; 40 id ., 314 .) He did not part with his money upon an
apparent record title or possession . Nor did he part with his money
upon the faith of the conveyance , but he parted with it upon the
bond of La Grange , and his promise to execute a mortgage and the
false representation that he owned , and had a deed of the premises .
Assuming the mortgage to have been given on the fourteenth , it was
given to secure a precedent debt created on the first and second , and
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for the purpose of this question it might as well have been created
six months before .
The law is well settled that, to enable a subsequent purchaser,
to invoke the protection of the statute, he must part with value upon
the faith of the conveyance . (22 N . Y ., 567 ; 46 Barb ., 211, 52 N .
Y ., 138 ; 4 Paige , 215 ; 3 Barb . 270 .) If Seymour's mortgage had
been canceled the day after it was given , his position would have
been precisely the same as it was on the sixth when the Bowen
mortgage was given . His position had not been changed , and he
had neither paid nor advanced anything after that time . The execu
tion and delivery of the mortgage might well relate back , and be
deemed operative from the time the bond was delivered and the
money paid ;but the payment of the money cannot be transferred, as
claimed by the counsel for the plaintiff , to a subsequent occasion ,
when , if it had been paid , he might have been protected . His situ
ation at the time he paid the money and the inducement then operat
ing , must determine the question . Neither Bowen , nor his assignee ,
is responsible for , nor should they be prejudiced by , the fraud of
La Grange in procuring the money . If Seymour had made inquiry
himself he would have ascertained the true facts ; but as he parted
with his money upon the false statement of La Grange he must
bear the consequences .
I am inclined to the opinion that Seymour cannot be regarded as
a subsequent purchaser ; that the mortgage to him was intended as
a present conveyance on the first day of April, and that it remained
in the hands of La Grange as a bailee simply . (42 N . Y ., 422 ; 20
Wend ., 44 ; 5 Barn . & C ., 671 .) The latter could not have inter
posed his own negligence in putting it on record to prevent its opera
tion ; and there is nothing to show but that he intended to make it
a valid instrument when he executed and acknowledged it accord
ing to his agreement , and the circumstances tend strongly to prove
that he did . I prefer , however , to place the decision upon the
ground that no value was parted with .
The learned judge , in delivering the opinion at the General Term ,
held that Seymour was not a subsequent purchaser , and therefore
not protected b
y
the recording act , but that his mortgage was en
titled to preference by reason o
f
his greater diligence in getting it
recorded . He says that both mortgages took effect upon the estate
a
t
the same instant . This is true as to time , but they did not take
effect upon the same interest o
r
estate . Bowen ' s mortgage attached
to the whole estate , while Seymour ' s only to the interest which La
Grange had , which , as we have seen , was subject to Bowen ' s mort
gage .
Having a lien subordinate to the defendant ' s mortgage and so
situated a
s
to be unable to invoke the protection o
f
the recording
act , the circumstance that Seymour procured his mortgage to be
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recorded three days in advance of the other , could not possibly create
a preference , and is immaterial. The time of recording had no effect
whatever, and the question of diligence has no application to the
case . (7 Cow ., 360.)
The judgment declaring the priority of Seymour 's mortgage can
not be sustained upon any principle of law or equity that I am aware




POMEROY, EQUITY , $ 681. The equitable doctrine concerning prior
ities resulting from the presence or absence of notice , or of a valu
able consideration or other incident, by which a precedence may be
11 See also , Ely v. Pingry , 56 Kans. 17 ; Schoch v . Birdsall , 48 Minn .
441; Boyd v. Mundorf , 30 N . J . Eg. 545; Protection Bldg . Loan Assn .
v. Knowles, 54 N . J . Eq. 519 ; Continental Inv. Loan Co. v. Wood , 168
111. 421.
Of course a bona fide purchase intermediate the execution of the
deed and the recording of the mortgage may defeat the mortgage by
virtue of the recording acts . “ The fact that a mortgage is given for
purchase money does not place it outside the provisions of the registry
act .” Jackson v. Reid , 30 Kans . 10 . And see Houston v. Houston , 67
Ind . 276 .
See also , Ansley v . Pasahro , 22 Nebr. 662.
“Upon the face of the record , the judgment was the prior lien .
Title passed to Smith on the 18th . At that time the judgment lien
attached . No mortgage was executed or recorded for five days there
after, so that apparently the judgment was, by five days, a prior lien to
the mortgage . The facts giving the mortgage priority ( that it was a
purchase -money mortgage , to a third person advancing the purchase
money ] existed only dehors the record . And if the property had been
sold upon the judgment , and passed into the hands of bona fide pur
chasers , they would doubtless have taken the title discharged of the
mortgage . It was necessary therefore for plaintiff to take some action
to preserve his rights as a prior lien holder . He applied for an order
restraining an attempted sale upon execution . * * * If the record
had disclosed the fact of the priority of the mortgage lien , doubtless
the mortgagee would have no right to interfere with such a sale, for
the purchaser , if any one was willing to buy under those circumstances ,
would be chargeable with notice of the record , and would take the
property subject to the mortgage . As the record did not disclose the
priority of the mortgage , the mortgagee had a right to interfere and
restrain an attempted sale of a full title and interest . * * * While
the order should be such as to restrain the sale as threatened , it should
be so worded as to leave the judgment creditors free to proceed under
the sections cited to a sale of the mortgagor ' s interest in the property ."
Brewer , J ., in Plumb v . Bay , 18 Kans. 415 . As to whether a mortgage
bearing the same date as the deed , but not reciting that it was for
purchase money , would be considered as sufficient to give notice of
its character as a purchase -money mortgage , or to put a purchaser upon
inquiry , see Brower v. Witmeyer , 121 Ind . 83 ; Grant v. Dodge , 43
Maine 489 ; Smith v. McCarty , 119 Mass . 519 .
See Heffron v. Flanigan , 37 Mich . 274 .
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given contrary to the mere order of time, applies to conflicting legal
and equitable estates or interests in the same subject -matter , and
to successive equitable estates , equitable interests such as liens and
charges , and mere “ equities ," meaning thereby purely remedial rights ,
such as that of cancelation , reformation , and the like ; and it applies
to no other kind of estates, interests , or rights.
TIFFANY , REAL PROPERTY , § 475 . As between interests or claims
of a purely equitable character , — that is , enforcible in equity alone ,
—while , as a general rule, they will be ranked according to the time
of accrual, this is by no means always so , equity frequently post
poning an earlier to a later claim , the rule being that only as between
equal equitable claims, or " equities ," as they are usually called ,
will priority of time give priority of right. Consequently , the equity
prior in time may be deferred from considerations of the respective
natures of the two equities , as when a mere gift is postponed to a
subsequent trust or lien created for a valuable consideration . Like
wise , the equity prior in time may be postponed because the person
entitled thereto was guilty of fraud or negligence . Finally , a court
of equity may , under certain peculiar circumstances , refuse to en
force a claim , though prior in time, as against the holder of a title
or claim subsequently obtained , on the ground that the holder of the
latter is a " purchaser for value without notice,” — that is , that he ob
tained his right not only by paying value, but without notice of the
prior equity .
While the absence of notice may have the effect of preventing the
enforcement of an equity as against the holder of the subsequent
equity , courts of equity have also adopted and unfailingly enforced
the rule that , if the holder of the subsequent equity , even though
he be a purchaser for value, does , at the time of obtaining such
equity , have notice of the prior equity , he takes subject thereto .
The equitable rule just referred to , by which one who takes an
interest with notice of a prior equity takes subject thereto , is not
confined to the case of a purchaser of an equity , but is also applied
as against a purchaser of the legal title with notice of a prior equity ,
— that is , it is a general rule in equity that one who takes an interest
with notice of an outstanding adverse interest takes subject thereto .
HARGRAVE AND BUTLER'S NOTES TO COKE UPON LITTLETON , 290b ,
note 1, xv . If a person has the legal estate or interest of the sub
ject matter in contest , he must necessarily prevail at law over him
whose right is only equitable , and therefore not even noticed by the
courts of law . This advantage he carries with him , so far , even
into a court of equity , that if the equitable claims of the parties are
of equal force , equity will leave him who has the legal right in full
possession of it , and not do anything to reduce him to an equality
with the other, who has the equitable right only .12
12 Compare , Simpson v . Del Hoyo , supra, and cases cited .
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POMEROY , EQUITY , § 738. The protection given to the bona fide
purchaser had it
s origin exclusively in equity , and is based entirely
upon the fact that the jurisdiction o
f
equity is ancillary and supple
mental to that o
f
the law , and upon the conception that a court o
f
chancery acts solely upon the conscience o
f litigant parties , by com
pelling the defendant to do what , and only what , in foro con
scientiae he is bound to do . If the relations between the two contest
ants standing before the court o
f chancery are such that , in equity and
good conscience , the plaintiff ought to obtain the aid which he asks ,
and the defendant ought to do or suffer what is demanded o
f
him ,
then the court will interfere and grant the relief ; if the relations
are not o
f
this character , then the court will withhold its hand , and
will leave the parties to the operation of strict legal rules , and to
the remedies conferred b
y
the legal tribunals . All equitable prin
ciples and doctrines had their origin in this conception , however
much it may sometimes be overlooked b
y
courts a
t present in the
administration o
f
the doctrines which have been thus established .
The protection given to the bona fide purchaser simply means , there
fore , that from the relations subsisting between the two parties , es
pecially that which is involved in the innocent position o
f
the pur
chaser , equity refuses to interfere and to aid the plaintiff in what
he is seeking to obtain , because it would be unconscientious and in
equitable to d
o
so , and the parties must be left to their pure legal
rights , liabilities , and remedies ; the court will not aid either against





f authority . In the vast majority o
f
cases the protec
tion is only given to a defendant , and as a consequence the doctrine
itself is commonly spoken o
f , and ordinarily treated , as essentially
a matter o
f
defense . The very few instances in which affirmative
relief is granted to the bona fide purchaser are exceptional ; they rest
upon their special facts , and arise from the fraud o
f
the defendant
against whom the relief is awarded .
Ib . $ 735 . In the United States these elementary notions seem
to have been sometimes overlooked , and the courts sometimes seem
to have extended the doctrine o
f
bona fide purchase farther than
the acknowledged principles o
f equity would warrant . The ten
dency is marked and strong in the courts o





law , to make the doctrine a legal rule of prop




n equitable title to chattels and things in action , a
s well
as to those who have acquired any legal or equitable interest in
land . A subsequent holder , even for a valuable consideration and
without notice , has certainly no higher right than a prior holder
equally innocent and with an equally meritorious ownership . Amer
ican courts seem sometimes to have acted upon exactly the opposite
notion , and to have assumed that a subsequent title was necessarily
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the better one. When the original legal owner has done or omitted
something by which it was made possible that his property should
come into the hands of a bona fide holder by an apparently valid
title , it may be just to regard him as estopped from asserting his own
ership , and thus to protect the subsequent purchaser . But when the
prior legal owner is wholly innocent , has done and omitted nothing, it
certainly transcends , even if it does not violate , the principles of
equity to sustain the claims of a subsequent and even bona fide pur
chaser .
Ib . § 736 . The most extensive and important change , however ,
in the United States has been produced by the recording acts. They
have extended the doctrine of bona fide purchase to al
l
conveyances
and mortgages , and often to executory contracts , and to every in
strument which can create , transfer , or affect legal estates o
r equi
table interests , liens , and encumbrances , and have therefore brought
it within the cognizance of the courts of law as a rule for determin
ing the validity of legal titles . The greatest diversity is found in the
statutory provisions of the various states , and a consequent diversity
prevails among the local rules which define the resulting rights o
f
the bona fide purchaser . In some they are conferred upon judgment
creditors , upon all purchasers at execution sales , and even upon
those who have secured the first record although charged with no
tice . It would be impossible , within any reasonable limits , to state
all the results of these statutes , and to formulate all the special rules
which have been derived from them in the different states .
CONSOLIDATED LAWS OF NEW YORK ( 1909 ) , Chap . 52 , Art . 9 , .
$ 290 . 1 . The term “ real property , " as used in this article , includes
lands , tenements and hereditaments and chattels real , except a lease
for a term not exceeding three years .
2 . The term “ purchaser ” includes every person to whom any es
tate o
r
interest in real property is conveyed for a valuable consid
eration , and every assignee o
f




3 . The term “ conveyance " includes every written instrument , b
y
which any estate o
r
interest in real property is created , transferred ,
mortgaged o
r assigned , o
r by which the title to any real property
may b
e
affected , including an instrument in execution o
f
a power ,
although the power be one o
f
revocation only , and an instrument
postponing o
r subordinating a mortgage lien ; except a will , a lease
for a term not exceeding three years , an executory contract for the
sale or purchase o
f
lands , and an instrument containing a power to




§ 291 . A conveyance o
f
real property , within the state , on being
duly acknowledged b
y




this chapter , and such acknowledgment or proof duly
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certified when required by this chapter , may be recorded in the of
fice of the clerk of the county where such real property is situated ,
and such county clerk shall, upon the request of any party , on ten
der of the lawful fees therefor , record the same in his said office .
Every such conveyance not so recorded is void as against any sub
sequent purchaser in good faith and for a valuable consideration ,
from the same vendor ,his heirs or devisees , of the same real proper
ty or any portion thereof, whose conveyance is first duly recorded .
§ 315 . Different sets of books must be provided by the recording
officer of each county , for the recording of deeds and mortgages ; in
one of which sets he must record all conveyances and other instru
ments absolute in their terms delivered to him , pursuant to law , to
be so recorded , which are not intended as mortgages, or securities
in the nature of mortgages , and in the other set , such mortgages and
securities delivered to him .
REVISED STATUTES OF ILLINOIS (1912 , Hurd ) , Chap . 30 , $ 28 .
Deeds, mortgages, powers of attorney, and other instruments relat
ing to or affecting the title to real estate in this state , shall be re
corded in the county in which such real estate is situated ; but if
such county is not organized , then in the county to which such un
organized county is attached for judicial purposes .
§ 30 . All deeds, mortgages and other instruments of writing
which are authorized to be recorded , shall take effect and be in
force from and after the time of filing the same for record , and
not before , as to all creditors and subsequent purchasers , without
notice ; and al
l
such deeds and title papers shall be adjudged void
a
s
to all such creditors and subsequent purchasers , without notice ,
until the same shall be filed for record .
§ 3
1 . Deeds , mortgages and other instruments o
f writing relat
ing to real estate shall be deemed , from the time o
f being filed for
record , notice to subsequent purchasers and creditors , though not
acknowledged or proved according to law ; but the same shall not
be read as evidence , unless their execution be proved in the manner
required by the rules o
f
evidence applicable to such writings , so as to









estate in fee simple , fee tail o
r
for life , o
r
a lease
for more than seven years from the making thereof , shall not be
valid a
s against any person , except the grantor o
r
lessor , his heirs
and devisees and persons having actual notice of it , unless it , or an
office copy a
s provided in section fifteen o
f chapter twenty -two , is
recorded in the registry o
f
deeds for the county or district in which
the land to which it relates is situated .
GENERAL CODE O
F Ohio ( 1910 ) $ 8542 . All mortgages , executed
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agreeably to the provisions of this chapter , shall be recorded in the
office of the recorder of the county in which the mortgaged prem
ises are situated , and take effect from the time they are delivered to
the recorder of the proper county for record . If two or more mort
gages are presented for record on the same day , they shall take
effect from the order of presentation for record . The first pre
sented must be the first recorded , and the first recorded shall have
preference .
$ 8543 . All other deeds and instruments of writing for the con
veyance or incumbrance of lands , tenements , or hereditaments , ex
ecuted agreeably to the provisions of this chapter , shall be recorded
in the office of the recorder of the county in which the premises
are situated , and until so recorded or filed for record , they shall
be deemed fraudulent , so far as relates to a subsequent bona fide
purchaser having , at the time of purchase , no knowledge of the exist
ence of such former deed or instrument .13
BACON v . VAN SCHOONHOVEN .
COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK , 1882 .
87 N . Y . 446 .
RAPALLO, J. On the 4th of February , 1876 , Grodus W . Smith ,
then being sole owner of the premises in question , mortgaged them
to the defendant Van Schoonhoven , to secure a loan of $ 3,800 ,made
by him at the time. Before consummating the loan Van Schoon
hoven examined the title and found on record a mortgage for $ 3,500 ,
on the same premises , made by Grodus W . Smith and Samuel W .
Smith , to Matthew Owen , dated October 10 , and recorded October
13, 1866 , of which he required said Smith to procure a satisfaction
before completing the loan . No assignment of that mortgage ap
peared upon record , and Van Schoonhoven had no notice or knowl
edge of any assignment thereof, or that any person other than Owen
had any interest therein . On the 4th day of February , 1876 , Smith
delivered to Van Schoonhoven his said mortgage for $ 3 ,800 , and
at the same time produced and delivered to him a satisfaction piece
of the Owen mortgage, executed by said Matthew Owen , and ac
knowledged so as to entitle it to be recorded , and Van Schoonhoven
thereupon advanced the $ 3 ,800 . On the 9t
h
o
f February , 1876 , and
before any assignment o
f
the Owen mortgage had been put on
record , Van Schoonhoven caused his own mortgage and said satis
faction -piece to be recorded .
It now appears that the Owen mortgage had been assigned by
1




the recording acts to mortgages . For a brief general treatment o
f
these statutes , see Tiffany , Real Property , Chap . XXXI .
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Owen to William C . Smith , in 1867, and by the latter to the plain
tiff , in 1868 , but that neither of these assignments was recorded
until February 9 , 1877 , one year after the satisfaction -piece and
the mortgage to Van Schoonhoven had been recorded . The plain
tiff brought this action to foreclose the said Owen mortgage, upon
which there is still due and unpaid $ 1 ,000 , with interest from Oct .
1 , 1877 , and she claims priority over the mortgage to Van Schoon
hoven . The satisfaction -piece was procured by Smith from Owen
about February 4 , 1876 , by the false representation that the mort
gage had been paid . No payment was made to Owen at the time
of the execution of the satisfaction -piece . Van Schoonhoven loaned
the $ 3 ,800 , believing the fact to be that the Owen mortgage had never
been assigned , and that it was fully paid and satisfied so as to be dis
charged of record . It was not produced by Smith at the time of the
loan , but was at that time owned by the plaintiff . All these facts
appear from the findings of the trial judge. It is beyond question
upon these findings that Van Schoonhoven advanced his money upon
the faith of the satisfaction -piece and of his mortgage, and that he
stands in the position of a bona fide purchaser of the mortgaged
premises , within the provisions of the Recording Act. ( 1 R . S . 756 ,
sec . 1 , 37 , 38 .)
His conveyance was also recorded before those under which the
plaintiff claims. The term “ conveyance " as used in the act , must
be construed to embrace " every instrument in writing by which any
estate or interest in real estate is created , aliened , mortgaged or
assigned , or by which the title to any real estate may be affected in
law or equity ,” except , etc . The conveyances under which the de
fendant claims are the satisfaction -piece and the mortgage for
$ 3,800. Together they create a lien on the land in his favor, free
from the Owen mortgage. Van Schoonhoven 's mortgage is a con
eyance , within the express terms of the act, and we think that the
satisfaction -piece also comes within the statutory definition . It is
an instrument by which the title to the land may be affected in law
or equity . It purports to discharge the land from the lien of the
Owen mortgage , and it does so effectually , if the assignments of
that mortgage are void as against Van Schoonhoven by reason of
their not having been recorded . It is equivalent to a release of the
mortgaged premises . Instruments creating liens by way of mort
gage , being expressly declared to be embraced , for the purposes of
this act, in the term “ conveyance ,” it is difficult to conceive any rea
son why instruments discharging such liens should not be included
in the general definition of “ instruments by which any estate or in
terest in land may be affected in law or equity .”
The assignments of the Owen mortgage are also conveyances
within the act. This is well settled by authority , and such assign
ments , if not recorded , are void , not merely as against subsequent
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purchasers of the same mortgage, but also as against subsequent pur
chasers of the mortgaged premises , whose interests may be affected
by such assignments , and whose conveyances are first recorded .
(Decker v . Boice , 83 N . Y . 215 ; Westbrook v . Gleason , 79 id . 23 .
See , also , Viele v. Judson , 82 id . 32 .) And we see no escape from
the conclusion , that under the provisions of the act they were void
as to the defendant Van Schoonhoven .
It must be conceded , that under the decisions in Ely v . Scofield
( 35 Barb . 330 ) , and in Van Keuren v. Corkin (66 N . Y . 77 ) , where
the doctrine of the case last cited was affirmed , the plaintiff 's mort
gage would be deemed discharged as to the defendant Van Schoon
hoven , if the satisfaction -piece had been recorded before he ad
vanced his money and took his mortgage. We do not think that
there is any substantial distinction depending upon that circum
stance . The defendant advanced his money on the faith of an in
strument which he was entitled , and had the power , to put on record ,
and which , as the record then stood , was effectual to discharge the
mortgage. The law provided that every other instrument which
might affect the title, and which was not recorded , and of which
he had no notice, would be void as against him , provided he got his
papers on record first . Extreme caution might have dictated that
he should have all his papers recorded before he advanced his money,
but it is not always in the power of a party to exercise this degree
of caution ; he cannot usually obtain possession of the papers until
he has paid the consideration , and he has to run the hazard, as a
general rule , of some other instrument getting on record before his ;
but this is the only hazard which he incurs , if the record is right
when he receives his papers ; and if he succeeds in recording them
before anything else intervenes , he is entitled to the protection of the
Recording Act to the same extent as if he had recorded his papers
before advancing his money.
It is further contended , that the defendant is not a bona fide pur
chaser , because the Owen bond and mortgage were not produced by
Smith when he delivered the satisfaction -piece , and the case of
Brown v . Blydenburgh (7 N . Y . 141 ) and Kellogg v . Smith ( 26 id .
20 ) are relied upon as authority for this position . The first case
cited holds that where a mortgagor pays or satisfies the mortgage
debt by a dealing between himself and the mortgagee , ordinary cau
tion requires him to obtain the surrender of his bond , and the fact
that the mortgagee does not produce it is a circumstance which
should put the mortgagor on inquiry . The second case holds the
same rule with reference to one who takes an assignment of a bond
and mortgage, without receiving the instrument which he purchases .
In neither of these cases was the effect of the Recording Act con
sidered , but the cases are not applicable to the present one. One
who takes a conveyance or mortgage of real estate , relying upon the
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satisfaction of a prior mortgage made by a third party , has no occa
sion to call for the production of the mortgage which has been sat
isfied , or of the bond . He is neither the debtor , who should see that
his own obligation is canceled when he pays the debt , nor is he the
purchaser of the obligation , who should obtain possession of the se
curities which he purchases . He has no right to the possession of
the canceled instrument, and no occasion for it , and it cannot be
that he is bound to suspect a fraud, when he sees that the mortgage
has been satisfied by the party who stands upon the record as its
owner and entitled to satisfy it .
There is another question in the case relating to the mortgage
called the Carpenter mortgage. This mortgage was prior to the
mortgage to Van Schoonhoven , but subsequent to the Owen mort
gage . Van Schoonhoven purchased and took an assignment of the
Carpenter mortgage in December , 1877 , but before that time, viz .,
in February , 1877 , the plaintiff 's assignment of the Owen mortgage
had been put on record . When he purchased the Carpenter mort
gage , therefore, he had constructive notice of the plaintiff 's rights,
her assignment then being on record , and the unauthorized satisfac
tion of the Owen mortgage cannot avail Van Schoonhoven any more
than it would have availed Carpenter to give the Carpenter mortgage
priority over the Owen mortgage . The Carpenter mortgage must
stand in the same position which it would have occupied if not as
signed , and must be paid in the same order .
The order of the General Term should be affirmed , and judgment
absolute rendered against the plaintiff , in favor of the defendant
Van Schoonhoven , pursuant to her stipulation , with costs .
All concur .
Order affirmed , and judgment accordingly .14
14 See also , Havighorst v . Bowen , 214 Ill . 90 ; Connecticut Mut . Life
Ins . Co . v . Talbot , 113 Ind . 373 ; Bullock v . Pock , 57 Nebr . 781 ; Huitink
v . Thompson , 95 Minn . 392 ; Swasey v . Emerson , 168 Mass . 118 ; Swartz
v . Leist , 13 Ohio St . 419 ; Henderson v . Pilgrim , 22 Tex . 464 ; Porter v .
Quarada , 51 Nebr . 510 ; Henniges v . Paschke , 9 N . Dak . 489 ; Marling
v . Nommensen , 127 Wis . 363 ; Williams v . Jackson , 107 U . S . 478 . The
following cases , contra to the principal case , were decided on the ground






mortgage : Reeves v . Hayes , 95 Ind . 521 (before the statute of 1877 ) ;
DeMuth v . Old Town Bank , 85 Md . 315 ; Bartlett v . Eddy , 49 Mo . App .
3
2 ; Watson v . Dundee Co . , 12 Ore . 174 ( quoted ante , Chap . V , note 12 ) ;
Howard v . Shaw , 10 Wash . 151 . See Chap . V , note 9 .
If the statute declares the unrecorded conveyance void as against a
subsequent purchaser , " whose conveyance is first duly recorded , " the
assignee will prevail over the subsequent purchaser , though his assign
ment is not recorded until after the subsequent purchase , if the as
signment is recorded before the conveyance to the purchaser is recorded .
Ely v . Scofield , 35 Bart . ( N . Y . ) 330 . Fallass v . Pierce , 30 Wis . 443 . The
effect o
f
the latter case was , however , substantially modified by the case
of Marling v . Nommensen , 127 Wis . 363 , holding that the as
signee was estopped to assert his mortgage against the purchaser
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PORTER v . QURADA .
SUPREME Court of NEBRASKA , 1897 .
51 Nebr . 510 .
RAGAN , C . This is an appeal by Henry M . Porter from a decree
of the district court of Colfax county dismissing hi
s
suit brought
to foreclose a real estate mortgage .
There is little , if any , conflict in the evidence . The material facts
are as follows : In January , 1887 , Adam Ourada owned certain real
estate in Colfax county . On the 31st day o
f January of said year ,
Ourada became indebted to one C . H . Toncray in the sum o
f
$ 850 .
As an evidence of said debt Ourada and his wife executed and de
livered to Toncray a note for said sum o
f
money , payable to the
order of said Toncray at a bank in Fremont , Nebraska , where Ton
cray resided . This note matured on the 1st day o
f February , 1892 ,
and drew interest a
t the rate o
f
seven per cent . per annum from
February 1 , 1887 , until maturity , such interest payable semi -annually
and evidenced b
y
ten interest notes or coupons o
f
$ 2
9 . 75 attached




the principal note . The principal bond and the coupons were
secured b
y
a real estate mortgage executed b
y
Qurada and wife on
the 31st day o










ruary , 1887 . Soon after the recording of this mortgage Toncray
sold , indorsed , and delivered in the usual course o
f
business the
principal note and interest notes to Henry M . Porter and delivered
to him the mortgage securing the same . It does not appear that
Toncray ever executed any formal assignment in writing o
f
the
mortgage securing these notes ; at all events , if such an assignment
was executed , it was never filed o
f







Colfax county . Until May , 1890 , Ourada appears
to have made his interest payments a
s they matured to Toncray , and
he appears to have remitted them to Porter ' s agent . In May , 1890 ,
Qurada made application to the appellee , the Central Loan & Trust
Company (hereinafter called the trust company ) , for a loan upon
this land . The trust company agreed to and did make Ourada
a loan o
f
$ 1 ,700 , and to secure the same took a mortgage from
Ourada and wife upon this land . By agreement betwen Ourada
and the trust company the latter , instead o
f paying to Ourada the
$ 1 ,700 , undertook therewith to pay off and discharge all liens upon
who had relied on the state o
f
the record . The doctrine o
f estoppel , as
well as the recording acts , was relied on in Bullock v . Pock and Hen
niges v . Paschke , supra .
Compare with the principal case , Brewster v . Carnes , 103 N . Y . 556 ;
Robbins v . Larson , 69 Minn . 436 .
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the land prior to its own mortgage. It paid off several liens on the
land and paid to Toncray the principal of his loan , $850 , not due
until February , 1892 , and paid the matured interest thereon , and
caused Toncray to release his mortgage . It appears that Toncray
failed to remit this money to Porter , who then owned and held the
Toncray mortgage and the debt which it was given to secure . At








the property on which ab
stract appeared the mortgage made b
y
Qurada to Toncray . When
the trust company made the payment to Toncray it had no knowl
edge or notice o
f
the fact that Porter then owned and held the debt
which such mortgage was given to secure . In April , 1891 , the ap
pellee , John Stibal , purchased of Qurada and wife the real estate
in controversy here , paid a valuable consideration for the same , and
in his deed assumed and agreed to pay the $ 1 ,700 mortgage held
b
y
the trust company , it then being o
f
record in Colfax county .
Before Stibal purchased the land he caused the public records o
f
Colfax county to be examined , and they disclosed the mortgage made
b
y




Toncray , and the $ 1 ,700 mortgage made b
y
Qurada and wife in
May , 1890 , to the trust company . Stibal , a
t
the time he purchased
the land , had neither actual nor constructive notice that Porter
owned o
r
had ever owned the debt secured by the Toncray mort
gage , and he purchased the land of Ourada believing that said mort
gage had been paid in full and rightfully discharged of record . On
the 15th day o
f
December , 1892 , Henry M . Porter brought this
suit in the district court o
f Colfax county to foreclose the mortgage
which had been transferred to hi
m b
y Toncray , making the trust
company and Stibal , among others , defendants to the action . Sti
bal answered alleging that he was the owner o
f
the real estate ; that
h





Colfax county that the mortgage sought
to b
e
foreclosed by Porter had been paid and released . The trust
company answered , claiming also to be an innocent mortgagee o
f
the property , and prayed for the foreclosure o
f
it
s mortgage , and
that it might be declared a first lien upon the real estate .
In view o
f
these established facts , What are the rights , liabilities ,
and equities of Porter , the trust company , and Stibal ? Stibal , hav
ing purchased and paid for this real estate a valuable consideration




the mortgage by Toncray , the
original mortgagee , without notice , actual or constructive , that the
Toncray mortgage had been assigned and remained unpaid , and that
the release thereof was unauthorized , he is entitled to protection as
against the Toncray mortgage now sought to be foreclosed by Porter .
(Whipple v . Fowler , 41 Neb . , 675 . ) The principle upon which that
case rests is that where one of two innocent parties must suffer a
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loss, he whose negligence caused the injury should bear it. Al
though Porter is an innocent holder of the debt and mortgage , yet
he might have protected himself by taking a formal assignment in
writing from Toncray of the mortgage purchased by him and caused
it to be recorded in the office of the register of deeds of Colfax
county . (Eggert v . Beyer, 43 Neb ., 711. ) And if his neglect to do this
has caused the loss which either he or Stibal must bear, then , as be
tween those two parties , the loss should fall on Porter. Stibal's
title , then , to the real estate in controversy , so far as this record
discloses , is subject only to the lien of the mortgage of the trust
company . The trust company is not an innocent mortgagee of the
real estate in question . At the time it took its mortgage the Toncray
mortgage stood o
f
record and the debt which it secured had two
years to run . B
y
the agreement with Ourada the trust company
was to pay off the Toncray mortgage out o
f
the loan it had made
to Qurada . It paid this mortgage to Toncray , but Toncray had no
authority to receive such payment . He did not own the paper , nor
was it in his possession , nor was he Porter ' s agent for the collection
o
f
this mortgage debt . The mere fact that Toncray had been in the
habit o
f collecting from Ourada interest and remitting it is not alone
sufficient to authorize the inference or conclusion that his agency was
such a
s
to authorize him to collect the entire unmatured mortgage
debt . (Stark v . Olson , 44 Neb . 646 ; Richards v . Waller , 49 Neb . ,
639 . ) When the trust company paid the mortgage to Toncray it
knew , or must have known , from the records that the mortgage
secured a debt evidenced b
y
negotiable paper , and it paid this debt
to Toncray a
t its peril without receiving from him at the time the
surrender o
f
the negotiable notes . (Eggert v . Beyer , 43 Neb . , 711 . )
The promise made b
y
the trust company to Ourada to pay the Ton
cray mortgage was a promise made to Ourada for the benefit o
f
the
legal owner and holder o
f
the debt secured by the Toncray mort
gage , and the mortgage o
f
the trust company upon this land should
be charged with the amount due Porter on the Toncray mortgage ;
in other words , Porter is entitled to be subrogated to the lien which
the trust company has on this land to the extent o
f
the amount due
and unpaid on the mortgage purchased o
f Toncray .
The decree appealed from is reversed and the cause remanded to
the district court with instructions ( 1 ) to take an account o
f
the
amount due Porter on the Toncray mortgage ; ( 2 ) the amount due
the trust company on its mortgage , and to enter a decree giving
Porter a first lien upon the premises for the amount due upon his
mortgage , and to give the trust company a second lien for the amount
found due on its mortgage , after deducting from such amount the
amount found due Porter , the costs in this entire proceeding to be
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taxed to the trust company and Porter in such proportion as the dis
trict court may deem just .
Reversed and remanded . 15
CURTIS v . MOORE .
COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK , 1897 .
152 N . Y . 159.
VANN , J. On the nineteenth of October , 1885 , Edward S. Curtis
conveyed an undivided one -sixth interest in certain premises situate
in the city of New York , to John B . Armstrong by a deed dated that
day and duly recorded October 26 , 1885. At the same time the
said Armstrong executed a purchase -money mortgage to Edward S .
Curtis to secure a note for $ 2 ,000 , given by the former to the order
of the latter , of even date with the mortgage , and payable two years
thereafter with interest at six per cent. This mortgage was duly
recorded November 24th , 1885 . March 29th , 1886 , said Edward
S . Curtis borrowed the sum of $ 500 of the plaintiff , and delivered
to him the said note and mortgage , and gave him an instrument
of which the following is a copy : “ $ 500 . Chicago , Ill . , Mar . 29 ,
1886 . One day after date , for value received , I promise to pay to
the order o
f
DeWitt H . Curtis the sum of five hundred dollars , at
Chicago , with interest at the rate o
f
8 per cent . per annum after
date , having deposited with said D . H . Curtis , as collateral security ,
a certain real estate mortgage for the sum o
f
two thousand dollars ,
bearing date o
f
19th October , 1885 , given to E . S . Curtis by J . B .
Armstrong & Desire D . , his wife , which I hereby give the said D . H .
Curtis , agent or assignee , authority to sell , or any part thereof , on
the maturity o
f
this note , o
r a
t any time thereafter , or before , in
the event o
f
said securities depreciating in value in the opinion o
f
said D . H . Curtis , at public or private sale , at the discretion o
f
said D . H . Curtis or his assignee , without advertising the same , or
demanding payment , o
r giving me any notice , and to apply so much
o
f
the proceeds thereof to the payment o
f
this note as may be neces
sary to pay the same , with all interest due thereon , and also to the
payment o
f
all expenses attending the sale of the said mortgage , in
cluding attorney ' s fees , and in case the proceeds of the sale of the
said mortgage shall not cover the principal , interest and expenses ,
I promise to pay the deficiency forthwith after such sale .
“ Edward S . Curtis . "
1
5 See also . Keohane v . Smith , 97 111 . 156 ; Jenks v . Shaw , 99 Iowa
604 ; Lewis v . Kirk , 28 Kans . 497 ; Wolcott v . Winchester , 15 Gray
(Mass . ) 461 .
Compare , Vann v . Marbury , 10
0
Ala . 438 ; Van Keuren v . Corkins ,
6
6
N . Y . 77 .
PRIORITY BETWEEN MORTGAGES AND OTHER CLAIMS. 445
On May 20th , 1886 , Edward S . Curtis borrowed from the plain
tiff $ 500 , on the same security as collateral, and on August 25th
in the same year , he borrowed $500 more , each time giving him an
instrument similar in form to that of March 29 , 1886 , but none of
them were acknowledged or recorded . February 7 , 1887, said
Armstrong conveyed the premises covered by the mortgage to Ed
ward S . Curtis by deed duly recorded on the 5th of March , follow
ing . On the 23d of February , 1891 , Edward S . Curtis , for a valu
able consideration , conveyed the premises to the defendant J .
Charles Moore , by deed duly recorded on the 11th of April there
after.
This action was brought to foreclose said mortgage, and the de
fendant Moore alleges in defense that he is a bona fide purchaser of
the premises in question without notice , and that the conveyance
from Armstrong to Edward S . Curtis effected a merger of themort
gage. Upon the trial it did not appear that Mr. Moore purchased
the premises either with or without actual knowledge of the out
standing mortgage and note given by Mr. Armstrong and trans
ferred to the plaintiff . He is presumed , however , to have had no
tice of such facts , as an examination of the record would have dis
closed .
Under the circumstances above stated , the plaintiff became the
owner of the mortgage for the purpose for which it was delivered
or pledged to him , as “ a good assignment of a mortgage is made by
delivery only .” (Fryer v . Rockefeller , 63 N . Y . 268 -276 ; Runyan
v . Merserau , 11 Johns, 534 ; Green v. Hart, 1 Johns , 586 .) If the
omission of the plaintiff to record the evidence of the transfer of
the mortgage to him inured to the benefit of the defendant under
the Recording Act , we may assume that the latter became a bona
fide purchaser without notice, otherwise not. In Purdy v . Hunt
ington (42 N . Y . 334 ) the question was directly passed upon by this
court and decided adversely to the contention of the defendant . It
was held in that case that the assignee of a recorded mortgage upon
real estate , which was conveyed by the mortgagor to the mortgagee
after an assignment of the mortgage , has a valid lien as against
a purchaser from the mortgagee who took without notice of the as
signment , notwithstanding the conveyance to the mortgagee, as well
as the conveyance from themortgagee to the purchaser , were record
ed before the assignment was placed upon record . The court said :
“ The question is then presented , whether Calvin Huntington can be
protected in his title as against the mortgage by reason of the omis
sion to have the assignment thereof recorded . It is conceded that
he is to be charged with constructive notice of the existence of the















s particulars , but
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that it was open and uncanceled of record , and therefore apparently
an outstanding lien and incumbrance on the premises of which he
was taking title . Having that information , he knew or was at least
chargeable in law with the further notice, that it was such lien and
incumbrance in the hands of any person to whom it had been legally
transferred , and that the record of such transfer was not necessary
to it
s validity , nor a
s




r any other person than a subsequent purchaser in
good faith o
f




y ; but on the contrary , that a vendee o
f
the premises took it sub
ject to the lien o
f





. That knowledge and notice made it his duty in the exercise o
f
proper diligence to inquire whether Minott Mitchell , his vendor , was
still the owner and holder o
f
the mortgage , and his omission to make
that inquiry deprives him of the protection of a bona fide purchaser . "
(Citing Brown v . Blydenburgh , 7 N . Y . 141 ; Kellogg v . Smith , 26
N . Y . 18 ; Gillig v . Maass , 28 N . Y . 191 ; Campbell v . Vedder , 3
Keyes , 174 . ) The same principle was laid down in an earlier case ,
where the court said : “ The failure to record an assignment o
f
the
prior mortgage could not blot out the record of the mortgage itself .
If Van Vranken was the purchaser , in good faith , of the prior mort
gage , and an assignment thereof , previously made , had not been





absolute deed , o
r
otherwise , the record
o
f
a priormortgage is sufficient notice thereof to him , no matter how
often assigned , o
r





only alteration made b
y
the Recording Act o
f
1830 , is , that an as
signment must now be recorded as against a subsequent bona fide
purchaser of the mortgage assigned . A ‘subsequent purchaser in
good faith , ' in the Recording Act , as to this case , means a purchaser
o
f
the mortgage assigned , not a purchaser o
f
the premises . A sub
sequent purchaser o
f
the premises is bound b
y
a prior recorded mort
gage , no matter who holds it . ” ( Campbell v . Vedder , 1 Abb . Ct . of
App . Dec . 295 , 302 ; S . C . , 3 Keyes , 174 . )
It is obvious that these cases are analogous to the case before us .
Mr . Moore was not a bona fide purchaser within the principle estab
lished b
y
those authorities , because the record o
f
the mortgage was
notice to him that the mortgage was outstanding and unsatisfied , and
it was no concern of his who happened to be the owner at the time .
In dealing with the property on the assumption that Edward S . Cur
ti
s still owned the mortgage , he acted a
t
his peril and assumed the
risk that Curtis might have transferred the mortgage to some one
non his nauiry and it wasnot enoughelse . He was put upon his inquiry , and it was not enough for him
to examine the record and see that no assignment of the mortgage
appeared thereon , but he should have required a satisfaction -piece




the mortgage and note .
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The case of Bacon v . Van Schoonhoven (87 N . Y . 446 ) is not in
conflict with the cases cited above. In that case the mortgagee
advanced money in reliance upon a satisfaction -piece executed by
the mortgagec in a former mortgage , which had been duly recorded
and in fact had been assigned , but the assignment was not recorded .
The court held that the satisfaction -piece was a conveyance within
themeaning of the Recording Act, and that whoever advanced mon
ey to be secured by a bond and mortgage upon the faith of such an
instrument was a bona fide purchaser within the provisions of the
act. This was the question before the court, and all that was decid
ed that bears upon the subject now before us , although language
somewhat broader in its application was used in the opinion . Al
though both Purdy v . Huntington and Campbell v. Vedder were
cited by counsel upon the argument , neither is referred to in the
opinion , and it is clear that the court did not intend to overrule
them . If Edward S . Curtis had given a satisfaction -piece of the
mortgage standing on the record in his name, the case relied upon by
the defendant would be applicable . He did not do this , however , but
accepted title with constructive notice of an uncanceled mortgage,
recorded and outstanding , without making inquiry or requiring the
production of the mortgage itself , or the note that it was given to
secure . Under these circumstances , he cannot be held a bona fide
purchaser as against the mortgage assigned to the plaintiff , because it
is not necessary to record an assignment of a recorded mortgage
as against a subsequent purchaser of the mortgaged premises , but
only as against a subsequent purchaser of the mortgage itself .
( Purdy v . Huntington , supra ; Campbell v . Vedder , supra ; Miller
v . Lindsey , 19 Hun , 207 .)
There was no merger because the ownership of the mortgage,
with the debt secured thereby , and the title to the land , did not meet
in the same person . When the fee came back to Edward S . Curtis
he had no title to the mortgage, for he had assigned it some months
before . There can be no merger , at law , without a union of titles
in the same person ; nor, in equity , unless , also , there is an intention
on the part of those concerned in the transaction that it should op
erate as a merger . In this case both the union and the intention
were wanting . ( Purdy v. Huntington , supra ; Smith v . Roberts,
91 N . Y . 470 ; Sheldon v . Edwards , 35 N . Y . 279 , 284 ; Bascom v .
Smith , 34 N . Y . 320 . )
The defendant offered to show an agreement between said Arm
strong and Edward S . Curtis, bearing the same date as the mort
gage , which recited the conveyance of the property by Curtis to
Armstrong , and provided for its reconveyance by Armstrong to
Curtis . It contained a stipulation that Armstrong “ has no beneficial
interest in the above -described property , but holds it subject to a
trust . " This agreement was immaterial , and was properly excluded
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on that account. The plaintiff knew nothing of it and was not a
party to it. Armstrong 's title came from Curtis , and the plaintiff
could not be affected by a secret agreement between them that the
former should hold the premises in trust for the latter , when , accord
ing to the record , he held it in fee at the time the mortgage was ex
ecuted , and the mortgage contained the recital that it was given to
secure the payment of a part of the purchase money. Moreover ,
the plaintiff has the interest of both the trustee and the cestui que
trust , for the one executed while the other assigned the mortgage.
After examining all of the exceptions , we think the judgment was
right and that it should be affirmed , with costs.
All concur .
Judgment affirmed .16
AMES v. MILLER .
SUPREME COURT OF NEBRASKA, 1902.
65 Nebr . 204.
HOLCOMB , J . From findings and a decree adverse to him the
plaintiff in the court below appeals his cause to this court. In the
controversy is involved the question of conflicting rights and inter
ests , as between the plaintiff , who is the transferee before maturity
of a negotiable promissory note secured by a mortgage on real es
tate , the lien of which he is seeking by this action to enforce , and
the appellee , Wolcott , who claims such real estate as a bona -fide pur
chaser for value divested of any lien asserted by plaintiff arising
by virtue of the provisions of the mortgage he holds. While other
questions are presented for our consideration by appellee which he
claims preclude a recovery by the plaintiff , we think there is but
one question of a decisive character upon which the decree of the
trial court can be upheld , and if upon consideration that should be
resolved in favor of the appellant , then his right to the relief asked
is fully established , and the decree from which he appeals must be
reversed and vacated . The decisive question is whether , in so far as
it affects the rights of the appellee , there has been a merger of the
legal and equitable estate in the land coverd by the mortgage, in
the grantor of the appellee Wolcott in such a way as to give to Wol
cott , under his conveyance from such grantor, the full estate in the
16 See also , Edgerton v. Young , 43 111. 464 ; Wilson v. Campbell ,
110 Mich . 580 ; Peterborough Sav. Bank v . Pierce , 54 Nebr . 712 ; Pratt
v. Bank of Bennington , 10 Vt. 293 ; Aiken v. St. Paul R . Co ., 37 Wis .
469 ; Oregon Trust Iny . Co . v . Shaw , 5 Sawy. ( U . S .) 336 .
Compare, Ogle v. Turpin , 102 Ill. 148 ; Bank of Indiana v. Ander
son , 14 Iowa 544 ; Bowling v . Cook , 39 Iowa 200 .
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land and unaffected by the mortgage lien theretofore existing there
on . We assume that the plaintiff became the owner and holder of
the note and mortgage before the maturity of the debt and is entitled
to a
ll
the protection accorded to the holder o
f









his failure and neglect to record an assignment of the mortgage
to him showing his interest in the land by virtue o
f
the mortgage and
the assignment thereof , which it is conceded was never done . So
far as disclosed b
y
the record , the estate and interest in the land
created b
y
the mortgage remained in the originalmortgagee in whose
favor the instrument was executed . The appellee Wolcott ' s rights
are based substantially on the following facts , as disclosed by the
record : After the execution and delivery o
f
the note and mortgage
under which plaintiff claims , and after their transfer to him o
r
his
immediate assignor , a judgment was obtained against the owner o
f
the legal title to the land , who had purchased from the mortgagor ,
o
n
which execution was issued , and levied by the sheriff on the
mortgaged land . In making the appraisement for the purpose of
sale under the levy o
f
the execution , there was deducted the amount
o
f
the mortgage debt and some other recorded incumbrances against
the land . After appraisement and due advertisement , the land was
offered for sale and sold to one B . A . Gibson , to whom the mort
gage was originally given under which plaintiff , as assignee , now
claims . Soon after the confirmation of sale and the execution of
the sheriff ' s deed to the purchaser , Gibson , negotiations were entered
into through an agent for the sale o
f
the property to the appellee
Wolcott , who , in pursuance of such negotiations , became the pur
chaser o
f
the property . It is indisputably established b
y
the record
that in the purchase o
f
the land , Wolcott acted in the best o
f
faith ,
and paid full value for the property , believing he was securing




the mortgage which appeared o
f
record as being in favor of his grantor , Gibson . The note at this
time was long past due . At the timeof the purchase , Wolcott made
inquiry as to the status o
f
the mortgage , and was assured by Gibson
that , “ as he had the sheriff ' s deed to the property and was the owner
o
f
the mortgage , he had all there was in the property and his war
ranty was good . ” An attorney present a
t
the time the negotiations
were closed also gave the purchaser advice substantially corroborat
ing the views of Gibson to the effect that a deed executed by Gibson







the mortgage existing thereon . It
is altogether clear that Wolcott , in purchasing the land and paying
full value therefor , relied on the then state o
f
the public records o
f
the county affecting conveyances o
f
real estate or interests therein ,
and , they disclosing that his grantor was the owner o
f
the mortgage
estate , and having acquired , through the execution sale , the legal
2
9
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title also , that he might safely deal with him as one having the entire
estate in and to the land which he was purchasing , and that he con
summated the purchase in that belief. Under such circumstances
may it rightfully be said that as to the purchaser , Wolcott , there was
a merger of the two estates in his grantor, and he therefore obtained
title to the property divested of the lien which the plaintiff is seeking
to enforce ? It is urged by counsel for appellant that there can be
no union of the two estates , because , when Gibson purchased under
the execution and obtained legal title to the property , he was not
in fact the owner of the mortgage before executed and delivered
to him , but which he had, prior to obtaining the legal estae , trans
ferred to others . But in dealing with registry acts which are enact
ed into law expressly for the protection of those who , in good faith ,
deal and engage in a business transaction with reference to real es
tate , relying on the public records, of which constructive notice is
always imputed , the rights of the parties are adjusted and deter
mined , not from the concrete fact of ownership , but from the record
title , on which they may safely rely when acting in good faith and
without notice of the true conditions of affairs . Wemeet with in
numerable instances where actual owners of substantial interests
in real estate acquired by them in good faith and for value lose
such interest because not complying with the registry laws, or by
failing to take notice of the state of the record , of which the law
says knowledge will be imputed even though actual personal notice
is wanting . By the provisions of section 16 , chapter 73 , of the
Compiled Statutes , deeds, mortgages and other instruments re
quired to be recorded are void as to subsequent purchasers without
notice whose deed , mortgages or other instruments shall be first
recorded . And by section 46 , the term “ deed” is construed to em
brace every instrument in writing by which any real estate or in
terest therein is created , aliened , mortgaged or assigned , or by which
the title to any real estate may be affected in law or equity , except
last wills and leases for one year or for a less time. It can hardly
be doubted that an assignment of a mortgage comes within the pur
view of section 46 , and a failure to record the same by the person
claiming rights thereunder will, in many instances , deprive such as
signee of any right to enforce a lien arising by virtue of a mortgage,
and the assignment thereof, as against a subsequent purchaser in
good faith , who has relied upon the public records , and thereby
acquired a better title or superior equity in and to such property .
The scope and purpose of a statute providing for the recording of
instruments affecting the title to real estate and the rights of par
ties claiming under it
s provisions is forcibly illustrated in the case
o
f
bona fide purchasers o
f
real estate who rely on a record disclos
ing release o
f








record of the mortgagee , and who apparently is the owner ,
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and has authority to release such instrument , although at the time,
actually and in fact having no interest in the property by virtue of
the released instrument , because previously thereto such party had
sold and transferred all his interest to some third person of whom
the record gives no information or notice. Whipple v . Fowler , 41
Nebr ., 675 ; Cram v . Cotrell , 48 Nebr., 646 ; Porter v . Qurada , 51
Nebr ., 510 .
" Ordinarily ," it is said , “ when one having a mortgage on real
estate becomes the owner of the fee the former estate is merged in
the latter ." Wyatt -Bullard Lumber Co. v . Bourke , 55 Nebr., 9 . If
this proposition of law is correct and has any practical value , if it
means anything when a record discloses that two unequal estates
have apparently coalesced and a
ll
the facts and circumstances so far
a
s known strengthen and confirm the inferences to be drawn from
the record , and the person in whom the two estates o
f
record have
joined so treat his title , then , in principle , can there be any distinc
tion a
s
to the rights o
f
a bona fide purchaser relying on such record
and the expressed intention of the party in whom such estates have









one having the apparent authority to
make such release , as in the several cases just cited ? If from the
state o
f public record and the facts surrounding the transaction b
y
which the appellee acquired title he was justified in dealing with his
grantor a





mortgage and legal title having become merged , then a
s
to such bona
fide purchaser themortgage estate was destroyed , and he became the
owner o
f
the property divested of the mortgage lien in favor of some
third party , who was a stranger to the record . It seems to us that in
principle , and for reasons just as convincing , his purchase would
give him a
s good title as would be the case were the mortgage re
leased b
y
the mortgagee and apparent owner prior to the purchase ,
and the appellee became a buyer in good faith , relying on a record
which disclosed a release o
f
the mortgage lien b
y
one apparently
holding the legal title thereto , and having the right and authority
to execute such release . In the one instance a prospective purchaser
examines the public records , and finds that , although a mortgage
incumbrance had existed on the property , it had been released and
discharged b
y
one , so far as the record disclosed , who was the own
e
r , and authorized to enter satisfaction thereof ; and that his grantor
was possessed o
f
a perfect title , which he , as purchaser , could safely
rely on . In the other , the record and surrounding circumstances
disclosed that the grantor o
f
the prospective buyer was possessed o
f
the entire estate in the property he was contemplating purchasing ;
that the mortgage and legal estate had become merged , and that
the seller had authority to convey all the title and estate he assumed
to own and to be able to convey . The two purchasers would , on
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principle , stand on an equality , and be entitled to equal protection
when their title to the property was assailed by one having an ac
tual interest therein , evidenced by an instrument not recorded , and
of which the purchasers were without knowledge or notice . The
record discloses , at least presumptively , a merger of the two titles .
The whole transaction was and is consistent with an intention on the
part of the purchaser , Gibson , to have the two estates coalesce . He
did not assume or agree to pay the mortgage debt when he took
by purchase at execution sale the estate of the execution debtor . He
purchased the equity of redemption , obtained the legal title and the
entire interest in the property remaining after the amount of the
mortgage lien had been deducted from the appraised value of the
land . It is true he paid only a nominal consideration ( $ 1 ) , but this ,
in view of the confirmation of the sale, may be presumed to be all the
property was worth over and above the mortgage interest therein and
other incumbrances thereon . He became a purchaser of al
l
the es
tate held by the execution debtor , as much so a
s if he had received
from him a warranty deed wherein was excepted in his covenants
the incumbrances deducted b
y
the appraisers in making the appraise
ment , or as would have been the case had the judgment debtor con
veyed b
y
quit -claim deed all o
f
his interest , right and title in and to
the property . He was , according to the record , the owner o
f
the
mortgage and the estate created thereby , and by the purchase at ex
ecution sale of all the remainder of the estate , and the two estates
thereby centering in the one person with n
o intervening rights , or
dinarily they will be merged into the greater . While this rule is not
without its exceptions , as where an intention to the contrary is ex
pressed o
r may be implied or inferred , it is to be borne in mind in
this case every fact and circumstance shows an intention on the part
o
f
the appellee ' s grantor that the two estates should merge , and that
upon inquiry by the appellee Wolcott , out o
f
a
n abundance of cau
tion , he was expressly advised by his grantor that the two estates
had joined , and that by the deed then to be executed the entire estate
would be conveyed to him . It is quite obvious that as to appellee ' s
grantor , after professing to convey the entire estate to his grantee ,
and executing an instrument to that effect , this would be conclusive
o
n the question o
f merger , and no intention to keep the estates
separate could be inferred , but on the contrary , the merger would
be held irrevocably to have taken place . James v . Morey , 2 Cowen
( N . Y . ) , 246 . As to whether or not a merger was intended , cer
tainly the appelle had made all the inquiries it was possible for him
to make , and brought himself within the rule stated in Peterborough
Savings Bank v . Pierce , 54 Nebr . 712 , although in that case the
rule was carried to its uttermost limit , and was vigorously dissented
from b
y
one of the judges and two of the then court commissioners .
There being , then , nothing in the record or in the conveyances
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through which the appellee claims, and no information coming to
him by inquiry that the apparent union of the estates did not operate
as a merger , and that such was not the intention of his grantor, then
we think , on principle , that as to him , a union of the two estates was
in fact accomplished , and that he obtained title to the property
in controversy discharged of the lien sought to be enforced by the
plaintiff and appellant. * * * In our consideration of the case ,
we have not been unmindful of the rule as to a mortgage being re
garded as an incident to the debt it secures, and passes with an
assignment of the latter , and that the payment to the mortgagee ,
who has assigned the debt , and who is not authorized to receive it ,
which has been a fruitful source of litigation , will not satisfy the
debt or discharge the lien , even though no assignment of the mort
gage is placed of record . But those questions do not enter into
the case at bar. The question here is whether one who purchases
real property , relying on a record which shows a discharge or de
struction of a mortgage lien thereon by one who apparently is pos
sessed with authority to accomplish that result , will be protected
against one who , having an interest in such real estate , has failed
or neglected to have recorded the evidence of such interest . We
conclude , therefore , that the purchaser , under the circumstances
as disclosed by the record in the case at bar, should and ought to be
protected .
The decree of the district court is, for the reasons given , af
firmed .17
DECKER v. BOICE .
COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK , 1880 .
83 N . Y . 215 .
ANDREWS , J . The plaintiff claims title to six undivided ninth
parts o
f
the premises , of which partition is sought in this action ,
a
s purchaser , on a statute foreclosure o
f
two mortgages , dated
April 1 , 1872 , executed b
y
Charles Boice , one to William Henry
Boice , and the other to Catherine Decker , each mortgage being on
the undivided six -ninths of the premises . The mortgages were re
corded December 27 , 1872 . The mortgage executed to William
Henry Boice was assigned b
y
him to one Crossett , November 6 ,
1873 , and the assignment was recorded January 3 , 1874 , and was
afterward assigned b
y
Crossett to one Kellogg , whose assign
ment was recorded June 29 , 1877 . The mortgage to Catherine
1
7 See also , Gregory v . Savage , 32 Conn . 250 ; McCormick v . Bauer ,
122 Ill . 573 ; Artz v . Yeager , 30 Ind . App . 677 ; Pritchard v . Kalamazoo
College , 82 Mich . 587 ; Brooks v . Peoples Loan Co . , 46 W . L . Bul . (Ohio )
214 .
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Decker was assigned by her to Peter E . N . Decker, June 24, 1876 ,
and , on the same day , by him to Hiram Crandall , and both assign
ments were recorded on that day .
The defendants , Mary J. Clark and Sally Ann Rockefeller , each







the plaintiff , b
y
virtue o
fmortgages executed to them sev
erally b
y
Charles Boice , o
f
the same date as the mortgages executed
by him to William Henry Boice and Catherine Decker . The mort
gage to Mary J . Clark was recorded July 24 , 1877 , and the mort
gage to Sally Ann Rockefeller , August 4 , 1877 . The four mort




the mortgagor , Charles Boice ,








f Henry Boice , deceased , in about ninety acres o
f
land ,
of which he died seized , each child being entitled to an undivded
ninth part thereof .
The controversy in this case turns upon the effect to be given
to the recording of the assignments of the mortgages under which
the plaintiff purchased . The court at Special Term found that the
several assignees were purchasers in good faith , and for a valuable
consideration , without notice o
f
the mortgages held b
y
the defend
ants . If the assignees , by the recording of their assignments , ob
tained priority over the defendants ' mortgages , the plaintiff , as the
purchaser on the foreclosure , is entitled to the benefit o
f
their posi
tion , and the defendants ' mortgages , being upon that assumption
subordinate liens , were cut off b
y
the sale . 18
The four mortgages , as has been stated , were executed a
t
the
same time . Each mortgagee had notice o
f
the other mortgages ,
when his mortgage was taken , and the mortgagees mutually agreed
that neither mortgage should have priority over any other , but that
all should be equal liens on the mortgaged premises . It is clear
that Boice and Decker acquired no priority over the Clark and
Rockefeller mortgages by having their mortgages first recorded .
for two reasons : First . They had notice o
f
the Clark and Rocke
feller mortgages when they put their mortgages on record ; and sec
ond , all the mortgages having been executed concurrently , Boice and
Decker were not , a
s
to the holders o
f
the Clark and Rockefeller
mortgages , subsequent purchasers , and the recording acts as be
tween them had n
o application . (Greene v . Warnick , 64 N . Y . 220 . )
So also upon the assignment o
f
the Boice and Decker mortgages ,
the assignees acquired no priority from the fact that the assigned
mortgages were recorded when they took the assignments , o
r
be





the Clark and Rockefeller mortgages . The general rule that the
1
8 See also , Cahalan v . Monroe , Smaltz & Co . , 56 Al
a
. 303 ; Berryhill
v . Kirchner , 96 Pa . 489 .
Compare , Duff v . Randall , 11
6
Cal . 226 ; Ehle v . Brown , 31 Wis . 405 .
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purchaser of a chose in action must abide by the title of the person
from whom he buys and takes subject to the equities of the debtor ,
and also the latent equities of third persons, applies in general to
the assignee of a mortgage. Boice and Decker held their mortgages
subject to the equity growing out of the agreement between the four
mortgagees that all the mortgages should be equal liens and that
neither should have priority . Their assignees were affected by this
equity , although they purchased without notice , and the fact that
the mortgages were recorded does not aid them , for the reason that
it has been authoritatively settled that the assignee of a recorded
mortgage , although an assignee in good faith and for a valuable
consideration , gets no preference over an unrecorded deed or
mortgage by reason of such record when the mortgagee and assignor
himself could not claim it in consequence of his having had notice , or
by reason of any other equity . (Fort v . Burch , 5 Den . 187 ; West
brook v . Gleason , 79 N . Y . 23 .) The contrary rule which was de
clared in Jackson v . Van Valkenburgh ( 8 Cow . 260 ) , under the
former statute, cannot , in view of the decisions made under the
Revised Statutes , be regarded as any longer in force .
We come then to the question whether the assignee of the Boice
and Decker mortgages , by recording their assignments , acquired un
der the Recording Act priority over the unrecorded mortgages of
the defendants . An assignee of a mortgage is by the express terms
of the Recording Act a purchaser , and both the mortgage and the
assignment , if in writing, are conveyances . ( 1 Rev . Stat . 756 , § 37,
38 .) The term " conveyance " is defined by the thirty -eighth section
to embrace every instrument in writing by which any estate or in
terest in real estate is created , aliened , mortgaged or assigned ; or
by which the title to any real estate may be affected in law or equity ,
with certain specified exceptions not material to the present inquiry .
It is doubtless somewhat incongruous , in view of the doctrine now
well settled in this state , that a mortgage is a mere security , and not
a title, to define it as a conveyance of an estate or interest in the
land mortgaged , but the character of mortgages as mere choses in
action was not as well understood when the Revised Statutes were
enacted as it has since been . By the common law , a mortgage was a
conditional conveyance of the land mortgaged , and it still is a con
veyance within the Recording Act. An assignment of a mortgage in
writing is also a conveyance within the act, for the reason that it
is an instrument by which the mortgagee 's interest or title is trans
ferred . This is substantially the construction given to the act by
the chancellor in Vanderkamp v . Shelton ( 11 Paige 28 ) , and it
has been recognized in subsequent cases.
The assignments of the Boice and Decker mortgages were re
corded before the recording of themortgages to the defendants . The
assignees , therefore, were purchasers whose conveyances were first
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recorded , and having taken the assignments in good faith and for a
valuable consideration , the unrecorded mortgages were, as to them ,
by the express terms of the statute, void . Under the Recording
Act an assignee of a mortgage may, as against a prior unrecorded
mortgage acquire a better right than was possessed by his assignor .
This principle was distinctly asserted in the recent case of West
brook v . Gleason (79 N . Y . 23 ) . In that case there were two suc
cessive mortgages on the same land . The mortgagor , in the first
mortgage, was the mortgagee in the second . The second mortgage
was first recorded and was then assigned to a bona fide purchaser
for value before the first mortgage was recorded , but the assignment
was not recorded until after the recording of the first mortgage .
The mortgagee in the second mortgage could not have claimed prior
it
y , because when he recorded his mortgage he had notice o
f
the
prior mortgage which he had himself executed . It was held in a
controversy between assignees of the respective mortgages , that the
assignee o
f
the second mortgage could derive no benefit from the
prior record of his mortgage , as he stood as to that in the shoes
o
f
his assignor , and that he was not entitled to priority by the
record o
f
his assignment because the first mortgage was recorded
before the recording o
f
his assignment . But it was conceded , that
if he had recorded his assignment before the first mortgage was re
corded , he would have gained a preference .
Rapallo , J . , said : " He would have been protected had he taken
the precaution to place his assignment on record before the plain
tiff ' s mortgage was recorded . ” The same principle was decided in
Fort v . Burch ( supra ) . The remark has been made in some recent
cases , following dicta in earlier cases , that the only purpose o
f
the
statute , authorizing the recording o
f assignments o
f mortgages , was
to regulate the relation to each other o
f
successive assignees of the
mortgagee o
f
the same mortgage . (Greene v . Warnick , 64 N . Y .
226 ; Crane v . Turner ,67 id . 437 ; Westbrook v . Gleason , 79 id . 32 ) .
But in none of them was this remark essential to the decision . In
Greene v . Warnick , the controversy was as to priority between two
concurrent mortgages , one of which , in violation of the agreement
between the two mortgagees , had been first recorded and afterward
assigned to Warnick . But the other mortgage was recorded before
the assignment to Warnick had been either made o
r
recorded , and , as
Warnick ' s conveyance , i . e . , his assignment , was not first recorded ,
he was not within the protection o
f
the statute , and it was so de
cided . In Crane v . Turner , the equitable owner of land in posses
sion under a contract o
f
purchase executed a mortgage which the
mortgagee assigned , and the mortgage and assignment were both
recorded . Afterward the mortgagor received a deed o
f
the prem
ises and conveyed them , taking back a mortgage which he recorded ,
and then assigned this mortgage to an assignee who had no actual
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notice of the first mortgage , but who had notice that the mortgagor
in that mortgage had been in possession of the premises under his
contract from before the date of the mortgage. The assignee re
corded his assignment , but it was held that the first mortgage had
priority .
It is doubtless true that it was one object of the provision for
recording assignments of mortgages, to protect a subsequent as
signee of themortgagee of the same mortgage from being defrauded
through a prior assignment not before required to be recorded , and
of which he might have no notice . ( James v . Morey , 2 Cow . 246 ;
Vanderkamp v . Shelton , supra . ) But this was not the only pur
pose .19 The assignee in good faith and for value of a mortgage,
by recording his assignment , may gain priority over a prior unre
corded mortgage , although it could not be claimed by his assignor .
We think the judgment is right and that it should be affirmed .
All concur .
Judgment affirmed .20
HOAG v . SAYRE .
COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW JERSEY , 1881.
| 33 N . J. Eq. 552.
[On Dec. 3 , 1877 , defendant Hoag obtained a chattel mortgage
on the goods in question , to secure $ 2 , 150 . This mortgage was not
recorded in the proper county . On Feb . 14 , 1878 , defendant Fisher
19 Gibson v . Thomas, 180 N . Y. 483 ; Syracuse Bank v . Merrick,
supra . See also , 6 Col. L . Rev . 547 .
20 See also , Burns v. Berry , 42 Mich . 176 ; Butler v. Bank of Ma
zeppa , 94 Wis . 351 ; Jackson v . Reid , 30 Kans . 10.
In Hull v. Diehl, 21 Mont . 71, under a statute identical with that of
New York , supra , a bona fide assignee of a second mortgage was
given priority over an unrecorded first mortgage , although he had
not recorded his assignment, the court holding that he was a
" purchaser " under the statute but that he was excused from the require
ment of first duly recording his conveyance because his assignment was
not a " conveyance .” The court said , “ Is an assignment of a mortgage
an instrument by which real estate , or an interest therein , is 'created ,
alienated, mortgaged or assigned '? The mortgage itself does not create ,
alienate or assign any real estate or interest in real estate , nor does the
assignment of the mortgage have such effect . "
In Congregational Church Bldg . Society v. Scandinavian Church , 24
Wash . 433, an assignee of a second mortgage was preferred to a defect
ively recorded first mortgage , on the doctrine that an assignee of a chose
in action takes it free from latent equities of third persons of which
he has no notice .
Compare with the principal case , Coonrod v. Kelly , 119 Fed . 841 ;
Paul v . Paul, 5 N . Y . S. 743 ; Landigan v. Mayer , 32 Ore. 245 .
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obtained a mortgage upon the same property to secure $ 1, 160 . This
inortgage was recorded in the proper county on Mar . 2, 1878 , but
Fisher at the time he took the mortgage had knowledge of the prior
mortgage to Hoag . Complainant Sayre is the assignee of a judg
ment for $6 ,000 , recovered against the mortgagor on Mar. 2 , 1878 ,
under which an execution was issued and levied on the property in
question .
In the Court of Chancery (Sayre v . Hewes , 32 N . J. Eq. 652 )
the Vice -Chancellor said , inter alia, “He (Fisher ) took his mortgage
with notice that a prior mortgage had been given to Mr. Hoag , and
he must , therefore, as between Hoag and himself , take the subor
dinate position . But he and complainant, as between themselves , oc
cupy equal rank ; the judgment of the one , and the mortgage of the
other , were recovered and filed on the same day . So that the rela
tive positions of the several parties are as follows : The complainant
and Fisher , as between themselves , hold concurrent liens , but Hoag
stands prior to Fisher as betwen Fisher and himself , and the com
plainant, as betwen Hoag and himself , stands prior to Hoag . In
this condition of affairs , it is impossible to give the complainant
the full benefit of the superiority of his position over Hoag, with
out advancing him to the front against everybody . The fact that
the complainant 's position is superior to that of Hoag, and that
Fisher 's is subordinate to that held by Hoag , raises the complainant
above Fisher as well as Hoag . Where a third encumbrancer ac
quires a right of priority as against the first, but the act or omission
from which such right flows does not change his relative position
toward the second , yet , as it is impossible to put him in advance of
the first , without also advancing him over the second , his lien must ,
of necessity , be advanced to the first position as against both the
first and second incumbrancers . Clement v . Kaighn , 2 McCart . 47 .
" The decree will declare the liens of the parties to stand in the
following order : The complainant shall be first paid the amount due
on the judgment assigned to him by Albert H . Hewes ; the defendant
Hoag shall next be paid the amount due on his mortgage, and , last
Jy , Fisher shall be paid the amount due on his mortgage.”
The defendant Hoag appealed .]
BEASLEY , C . J. I agree with the vice -chancellor in his settle
ment of the disputed facts in this case , but it seems to me that
an error has crept into the decree with respect to the marshaling of
the encumbrances . These liens are of this character : the mortgage
first in date is held by the appellant, Hoag ; then comes a mortgage
held by Frederick Fisher , one of the defendants , and lastly is the
judgment of the defendant Sayre . This first mortgage was not
recorded in the proper county , and therefore is subordinate to the
judgment, but it is paramount to the second mortgage, which was
taken with knowledge of the existence of this first lien . In this
PRIORITY BETWEEN MORTGAGES AND OTHER CLAIMS. 459
state of things, the decree places the judgment and the first mort
gage , by way of prference , before the second mortgage. This , as
it seems to me, is unjust and inadmissible .
Upon what possible principle is the result in this case to be jus
tified ? Fisher , when he took his mortgage, knew that there was
an antecedent mortgage on the same property , securing the sum of
$ 2 , 150 , with interest . He had his own mortgage duly recorded , so
that it became incontestably the second legal lien ; in this position
of affairs this judgment is entered , and he at once finds himself ,
without any fault on his part, degraded from the position of a sec
ond encumbrancer to that of a third encumbrancer , and instead
of the mortgaged property being subject to a claim prior to his own
of but $ 2 ,150 , it is subject to paramount claims which amount to
the sum of $ 5 , 150 . If such a principle be correct , it does not appear
that any person , under any circumstances , can take a second or
other subordinate mortgage upon property , without putting his in
terests in the utmost jeopardy. Under the prevalence of such a
rule of law , a subsequent encumbrancer would be obliged to see that
the status of the primary encumbrance was, in all respects , unexcep
tionable , under penalty , if a flaw should be undetected , of having his
lien superseded by every judgment that might be entered at a later
date . Such a rule would be as inexpedient as it would be unjust .
I cannot but think that any one who will look carefully into
the subject will perceive that no rule applicable to such a juncture
as this can be admissible that is not founded on the theory of leav
ing the second mortgagee in the position originally acquired by
him , without respect to the neglects or shortcomings of the holder
of the previous mortgage or the subsequent judgments of creditors .
Viewed in this aspect , this would be the result : the judgment creditor
would , in the marshaling of these liens, take priority over the first
mortgage ; as between the judgment and that mortgage, the former
must be first paid . But with respect to the second mortgage, the
judginent creditor, as such , has no claim to stand first, his only claim
in that regard being his right to stand in the shoes of the first mort
gagee , and assert a
ll
the privileges incident to that position . But he
can exact nothing further than such privileges ; he can legally say





the first mortgage ; but he cannot legally say that ,
with respect to the second mortgagee , he has any paramount lien
beyond this . No additional burthen can be put upon the land to the
detriment o
f
the second mortgagee . If the judgment be for a sum
greater than that secured by the first mortgage , then , by right o
f rep
resentation , such judgment will constitute the first lien to the full
extent , and no further , o
f
the first mortgage ; if it be for a less sum
than the first mortgage , it will take precedence and consume the first
mortgage to that extent only . It will be observed that b
y
these ad
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justments the priority of the first mortgage , with regard to the
second mortgage will be exhausted , either partially or wholly , so
that, to the extent of such exhaustion , it will be postponed to the
second mortgage.
The doctrine thus propounded is but the development of the prin
ciple maintained and acted on in Clement v . Kaighn , 2 McCart . 48 .
In that case there was a judgment without an execution ; then a
mortgage , and then judgments on which execution had been taken
out. These latter judgments were entitled to precedence over the
first , but were subordinate to the mortgage. Chancellor Green de
cided that the first judgment on the mortgaged premises , by reason
of the failure to sue out execution upon it, should be postponed to
the encumbrance of the junior judgments , and , as an inevitable con
sequence , that it should be postponed to the mortgage which was
prior to the junior judgments , and whose priority was not to be af
fected by any laches of the holder of such prior judgment.
In my opinion , the decree in this case should be modified so as
to direct the payment of these encumbrances in this order , viz . :
first , the judgment of Sayre to the amount secured by the first
mortgage ; second , the payment of the residue of such judgment and
the second mortgage , pari passu , as they were concurrent liens , being
entered on the same day ; third , the payment of the first mortgage.
Dixon , J. dissenting .
I agree with the conclusions which the vice -chancellor has reached
upon the facts .
But I dissent from the legal rule by which he fixes the order of
priority , for I do not think it necessary to advance the complainant
Sayre to the front against everybody , in order to give him the full
benefit of his superiority to Hoag .
Nor do I assent to the rule laid down in the opinion just read ,
since I see no reason for regarding the complainant as substituted
in the stead and rights of Hoag as against Fisher , merely because
Hoag failed to comply with the registry laws. The effect of non
compliance with those laws is declared by themselves to be, not that
the rights of him in default shall be transferred to the subsequent
encumbrancers , but that his claim shall be void as to them .
Therefore , if there be three encumbrancers , A , B and C , in the
order of time, and A 's lien be prior to B 's , and B ’s to C 's , but, for
A ' s omission to properly register his lien , it is void as to C 's , then
the fund should be disposed of as follows :
1. Deduct from the whole fund the amount of B 's lien , and apply
the balance to pay C . This gives C just what he would have if A
had no existence .
2 . Deduct from the whole fund the amount of A 's lien , and ap
ply the balance to pay B. This gives B what he is entitled to .
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3 . The balance remaining after these payments are made to B
and C is to be applied to A ' s lien .
To illustrate : Suppose the fund to be $ 5,000 ; A 's lien to be
$ 3,000 ; B 's lien to be $ 4 ,000, and C 's lien to be $ 2 ,000. Then , C
receives $ 5 ,000 , less $ 4 ,000 = $ 1, 000 ; B receives $ 5 ,000 , less
$ 3 ,000 = $ 2 ,000 ; A receives $ 5 ,000 , less ( $ 1 ,000 + $ 2 , 000 ) = $ 2 , 000 .
Or suppose the fund to be $ 5 ,000 , and each of these encum
brances to be $ 5,000 ; then it will appear that A , the first in time ,
will take it all ; since , except for the registry laws, he would clearly
be entitled to it, and the registry laws simply prevent his taking any
thing by which C ' s security may be lessened . But C ' s security was
nothing at the beginning , for B 's prior lien covered the whole fund ;
and C , therefore , has no right by which A 's claim can be impaired .
Where B 's and C 's claims are concurrent in time and lien , but A
is prior to B , and void as to C (as in the present case ) , the dis
tribution should be as follows
1. Divide the whole fund in the proportion of B 's and C ' s claims ,
and give to C his proportion . Thus is A ignored in fixing C 's rights .
2 . Deduct from the whole fund the amount of A 's lien , and ap
ply the balance to B 's claim .
3. The balance remaining after both payments goes to A .
By applying these rules to the case before us, it will be seen that,
in my judgment , Fisher alone is injured by the decree below ; but as
he is not a party to this appeal , the decree cannot be changed here
for his sake, and therefore, I think , should be affirmed .
For affirmance - Dixon - 1.
For reversal — Beasley , C . J ., Depue , Knapp , Magie , Parker , Reed ,
Scudder , Van Syckel, Clement, Cole , Dodd Green — 12 .
LEARNED , P . J., in Bacon v . VAN SCHOON HOVEN , 19 Hun . 158 .
( N . Y . Sup. Ct. 1879 ) .
In the view above taken , the Owens mortgage is prior to the Car
penter mortgage ; the Carpenter mortgage is prior to the Van
Schoonhoven mortgage ; and the Van Schoonhoven mortgage is prior
to the Owens mortgage .
The equitable rule , in such a case , is this . From the avails of the
sale there must be set apart the amount of the Owens mortgage.
That amount, or so much thereof as may be necessary therefor , is
to be applied on the Van Schoonhoven mortgage, and the balance
thereof, if any , on the Owens mortgage. The residue of the avails ,
after thus setting apart the amount of the Owens mortgage, is to
be applied , first on the Carpenter mortgage , and next on the bal
ance remaining on the Van Schoonhoven mortgage ; and, lastly , the
surplus is to be applied on the Owens mortgage .
In the present case this rule is equivalent to paying the Carpenter
and the Van Schoonhoven mortgages before that of Owens. If ,
however , the Owens mortgage had been larger than the Van Schoon
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hoven mortgage, the importance of those special provisions would
have appeared .21
SCOTT , J., in Day v .Munson , 14 Ohio St. 488 . ( 1863 .)
The case , then , stands thus : ‘ The plaintiffs ' mortgages , not hav
ing been re - filed , pursuant to statute, are void as to Younglove &
Hoyt, the third mortgagees ; but the plaintiffs retain their priority
of lien over Warren , who holds under Wilcox , the second mortga
gee, and whose mortgage was taken with actual notice of the plain
tiffs' prior mortgages. Warren 's lien under the Wilcox mortgage,
has priority over that of the third mortgagees , and is not to be af
fected by the laches of the plaintiffs . The plaintiffs ' mortgages, are
then , not to affect the rights of the third mortgagees ; nor is the
laches of the plaintiffs to affect the rights of the second mortgagee ;
and whatever rights these conditions leave to the plaintiffs , they
still retain . The result will be , if the fund is insufficient for the
discharge of al
l
mortgages , that the third mortgagees , Younglove &
Hoyt , are entitled to so much of the fund as would be applicable
o
n
their mortgage , after satisfying Warren ' s prior lien . Warren is




would be applicable to the satis
faction o
f
his claim , leaving the third mortgage out o
f
the question ,
and preserving the plaintiff ' s priority of lien . And the plaintiffs are
entitled to the residue .
COOPER , J . , in GOODBAR & Co . v . DUNN ,61 Miss .618 . (1884 ) .
Dunn has a mortgage on these te
n
acres void for uncertainty a
s
against Goodbar & Co . , but good as against Lemmon & Gale , who
had notice of the mistake , while Lemmon & Gale have a mortgage
which sufficiently describes the land and which has priority over the
attachment of Goodbar & Co .
What are the rights o
f
the parties under these circumstances ? On
a casual examination it would seem that Dunn could take the pro
ceeds o
f
the land from Lemmon & Gale , and that Goodbar & Co .
could take it from him , and that Lemmon & Gale could re -take it to
lose it again to Dunn , and so the one in possession o
f
the fund
would always find his rights postponed to one o
f
the other claimants .
We think , however , the rights of the respective parties are pre
served under such circumstances b
y
the following rule :
If the proceeds of the property are insufficient to discharge all
the liens but exceed the amount o
f
the second mortgage , an amount
equal to the second mortgage is to be set aside and the balance so far
a
s necessary appropriated to the payment of the third encumbrancer .
The priority o
f





their rights for an amount equal to the first
mortgage debt after subtracting therefrom the sum paid to the third
2
1 Same case on appeal , supra .
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encumbrancer ; if , however, the sum realized by a sale of the prop
erty does not equal the second mortgage debt , the third encumbrance
er is to be ignored , and the fund distributed between the first and sec
ond mortgagees , the first being paid his debt in full . In this way
the rights of al
l
the parties are preserved , for the third encumbrancer
is entitled to nothing until the second is paid , and the second has
n
o right to any o
f
the fund until an amount equal to the first mort
gage has been taken therefrom , and the first mortgagee should not
b





his laches has been appropriated to the third . 22
2
2 Compare Porter v . Qurada , supra .
CHAPTER XI.
CONVEYANCE OF THE EQUITY OF REDEMPTION .
KELLER v. ASHFORD .
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES , 1889 .
133 U . S . 610 .
This was a bill in equity by Henrietta C . Keller, the holder of a
promissory note for $ 2 ,000 , made by one Thompson , secured by his
mortgage of land in Washington , against Francis A . Ashford as
grantee of the land subject to this mortgage, and who by the terms
of the deed to him assumed payment of incumbrances on the land .
The bill prayed for a decree in the plaintiff 's favor against Ashford
for the amount of that note, and for general relief . The case was
heard upon pleadings and proofs , by which it appeared to be as fol
lows :
On August 17, 1875 , Thompson , being seised in fee of lot 5 in
square 889 in the city of Washington , conveyed it to one Rohrer,
by a deed of trust in the nature of a mortgage, to secure the pay
ment of Thompson ' s promissory note of that date for $ 1,500 payable
in three years with interest at ten per cent, held by one Harkness .
On February 21, 1876 , Thompson conveyed the same lot by like
deed of trust to one Gordon , to secure the payment of Thompson 's
note of that date for $ 2 ,000 , payable in one year, with interest at
eight per cent. yearly until paid , to the order of Moses Kelly ; and
Kelly endorsed this note for full value to the plaintiff .
On January 1, 1877 , Thompson , at the instance and persuasion
of Kelly , executed and acknowledged and delivered to Kelly a deed ;
expressed to be made in consideration of the sum of $ 4 ,500 ; con
veying this lot , together with lots 6 , 7 and 8 in the same square
( each of which three lots was also in fact subject to a mortgage
for $ 2,000 ) to Ashford in fee, “ subject , however, to certain in
cumbrances now resting thereon , payment of which is assumed by
paid party of the second part ;" and containing covenants by the
grantor of warranty against all persons claiming from , under or
through him , and for further assurance . At the date of this deed ,
the only incumbrances on the land conveyed were the five mort
gages above mentioned , and some unpaid taxes assessed against

















CONVEYANCE OF THE EQUITY OF REDEMPTION . 465
deed , together with a notary 's certificate of its acknowledgment by






No consideration was actually paid for the conveyance . The
value o
f
the lots conveyed was , according to Thompson ' s testimony ,
$ 4 ,000 each o
r
$ 1
6 ,000 in all , o
r , according to Ashford ' s testimony ,
not less than $ 3 ,400 each o
r
$ 1
3 ,600 in all .
Thompson testified that he never had any negotiations with Ash
ford about the property ; and that he was induced to make this deed
by the assurance o
f Kelly that the grantee would assume the in
cumbrances upon the land and relieve him from liability upon the
notes h
e had given secured b
y mortgage .
Ashford testified that he never had any negotiations with any one
about the purchase o
f
the land ; and that in February , 1877 , Kelly ,
who was his father - in -law , to whom he had lent much money and
for whom he had endorsed several notes , told him that , in order to
secure him from loss , he had procured a conveyance to be made to
him o
f
these four lots , in which he thought " there was considerable
equity ; " informed him a
t
the same time that there were incum
brances o
r mortgages upon the property , but did not specifically
mention any o
f
them , except the $ 1 ,500 mortgage upon lot 5 ; told
him that the interest o
n
this was pressing , and that , if he would pay
it , Kelly would relieve him from any further trouble as to the in
cumbrances ; and advised him to g
o
o
n and collect the rents o
f
the
property , so a
s
to indemnify himself against that interest and pay
the taxes in arrears .
It was proved that Ashford in March , 1877 , entered into posses
sion o
f
the four lots , and paid the taxes previously assessed upon
them , and also paid interest accruing under the mortgage for $ 1 ,500
o
n
lot 5 , and collected the rents o
f
the four lots , until December 4 ,
1877 , when he sold and conveyed lots 7 and 8 to one Duncan , sub
ject to existing incumbrances thereon ; and continued to collect the
rents o
f
the other two lots , and to pay the interest accruing under
the mortgage for $ 1 ,500 on lot 5 , until March 14 , 1878 , when this
lot was sold , pursuant to the provisions o
f
that mortgage , b
y public
auction , and conveyed to Harkness for the sum o
f
$ 1 ,700 , which
was insufficient to satisfy the amount then due on that mortgage .
On comparing Ashford ' s testimony with that of Boarman , the
plaintiff ' s attorney , and with a letter written by Ashford to Boar
man on October 3 , 1877 , it clearly appears that Ashford was in
formed o
f
the clause in the deed to him , assuming payment o
f in
cumbrances , and was requested to pay the plaintiff ' s mortgage , as
early a
s September , 1877 , and then , a
s well as constantly afterwards ,
declined to pay it , o
r
to recognize any personal liability to do so .
There was no direct evidence that he knew o
f
this clause before
September , 1877 .
3
0
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The plaintiff brought an action at law upon the note against
Thompson as maker and Kelly as endorser on November 13 , 1877 ,
and recovered judgment against both in December , 1877 , on which
execution issued and was returned unsatisfied , April 15 , 1878 .
The present bill was filed May 13 , 1878 . A decree dismissing the
bill was rendered in Special Term , May 9, 1882 , which , after the
death of Ashford and the substitution of his executrix in his stead ,
was affirmed in general term , February 16 , 1885 , upon the grounds
that Ashford had never accepted the deed to him , and also that the
plaintiff 's remedy , if any , was at law . 3 Mackey , 455.
GRAY , J.
* * * * * * *
The questions to be decided concern the extent , the obligation
and the enforcement of the agreement created by the clause in the
deed of the conveyance from Thompson to Ashford of this and
three other lots, “ subject , however , to certain incumbrances now
resting thereon , payment of which is assumed by said party of the
second part.”
The five mortgages made by the grantor , namely , the plaintiff 's
mortgage for $ 2 ,000 and a prior mortgage for $ 1, 500 on lot 5 , and
a mortgage of $ 2 ,000 on each of the three other lots, and some un
paid taxes which had been assessed against the grantor , were in
cumbrances , and were the only incumbrances existing upon the
granted premises at the time of the execution of this conveyance .
Rawle on Covenants (5th ed .) sec . 77 . The clause in question , by
the words " certain incumbrances now resting thereon ," designates
and comprehends a
ll
those mortgages and taxes , as clearly as if the




r had particularly described each mortgage and each tax . We give
no weight to Thompson ' s testimony as to Kelly ' s previous conversa
tion with him to the same effect , because that conversation is not
shown to have been authorized by o
r
communicated to Ashford ,
and cannot affect the legal construction of the deed as against him .
It was argued that , because the deed contains a covenant of spe
cial warranty against al
l
persons claiming under the grantor , the
words " certain incumbrances " cannot include the mortgages made
by the grantor , but must be limited to the unpaid taxes which , it is
said , would not come within the covenant o
f special warranty . But
the answer to this argument is that any person claiming title b
y
virtue of a lien created b
y
taxes assessed against the grantor would
claim under the grantor , equally with one claiming b
y
a mortgage
from him ; and incumbrances expressly assumed by the grantee are
necessarily excluded from the covenants o
f
the grantor . 1
1 " The clause in a deed referring to the existence o
f
a prior mortgage
is of much importance in other ways than in determining whether the
purchaser engages to pay the mortgage , or merely buys subject to it .
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Ashford is not shown to have had any knowledge of the convey
ance at the time of its execution ; and a suggestion was made in
argument , based upon some vague expressions in his testimony , that
the conveyance was intended to be made to him , b
y way o
f mort
gage only , to secure him against loss on his previous loans to and
endorsements for Kelly . But his subsequent acts are quite incon
sistent with the theory that the conveyance did not vest the legal
estate in him absolutely .
Within a month or two after the conveyance , having been told
that the four lots had been conveyed to him and were subject to in




the incumbrances , ) he entered into possession o
f
the lots , and thence





the clause assuming payment o
f
incumbrances ,
and was requested to pay the plaintiff ' s mortgage , and declined to
pay it o
r
to recognize any personal liability for it ; yet he after
wards sold and conveyed away two of the lots , and continued to
keep possession and to collect rents o
f
the other two . Having thus
accepted the benefit o
f
the conveyance , he cannot repudiate the
burden imposed upon him b
y
the express agreement therein , and
would clearly have been liable to his grantor for any breach o
f
that
agreement . Blyer v . Monholland , 2 Sandf . Ch . 478 ; Coolidge v .
Smith , 129 Mass . 554 ; Locke v . Homer , 131 Mass . 93 ; Muhlig v .
Fiske , 131 Mass . 110 .
The case therefore stands just as if Ashford had himself received
a deed by which he in terms agreed to pay a mortgage made b
y
the
grantor . In such a case , according to the general , not to say uni
form , current o
f
American authority , as shown b
y
the cases col
lected in the briefs of counsel , the mortgagee is entitled in some
form to enforce the agreement against the grantee ; and much o
f
the argument at the bar was devoted to the question whether his





Upon the question whether the mortgagee could sue a
t
law there
In the first place it may qualify the grantor ' s liability upon the cove
nants o
f
the deed against incumbrances by showing the existence of the
mortgage , and that , as between him and the grantee , the latter is to pay
it . It may prevent , by a statement as to what an incumbrance upon the
property is , any liability on the part of the grantor to the penalties im
posed by statute upon one who sells incumbered property without dis
closing the incumbrance . It may preclude the grantee from impeaching
the validity o
f
the mortgage existing upon the property conveyed .
" When land is conveyed 'subject to ' a mortgage , and the amount of
it is deducted from the consideration , with the intention that it shall
be paid by the grantee , it is important that the mortgage be excepted
from the covenants of the deed ; otherwise the grantor may be held to
have covenanted against the incumbrance , and to have made himself
liable for its payment . ” Jones , Mortgages , § 735 . See also , Brewster ,
Conveyancing , $ 204 .
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is no occasion to examine the conflicting decisions in the courts of
the several States , because it is clearly settled in this court that he
could not.
This case cannot be distinguished from that of National Bank
v . Grand Lodge , 98 U . S . 123, and clearly falls within the general
rule upon which the judgment in that case was founded .
It was there held that a contract by which the Grand Lodge , for
a consideration moving from another corporation , agreed with it to
assume the payment of its bonds , would not support an action
against the Grand Lodge b
y
a holder of such bonds ; and Mr . Justice
Strong , delivering judgment , after observing that the contract was
made between and for the benefit o
f
the two corporations , that the
holders o
f
the bonds were not parties to it , and that there was no
privity between them and the Grand Lodge , said : “We do not pro
pose to enter a
t large upon a consideration o
f
the inquiry how far
privity o
f
contract between a plaintiff and a defendant is necessary




f assumpsit . The subject has
been much debated , and the decisions are not all reconcilable . No
doubt , the general rule is , that such a privity must exist . But there
are confessedly many exceptions to it . One o
f
them , and b
y
far
the most frequent one , is the case where , under a contract between
two persons , assets have come to the promissor ' s hands or under his
control , which in equity belong to a third person . In such a case
it is held that the third person may sue in his own name . But then
the suit is founded rather o
n the implied undertaking the law raised
from the possession o
f
the assets , than on the express promise .
Another exception is where the plaintiff is the beneficiary solely in
terested in the promise , as where one person contracts with another
to pay money o
r
deliver some valuable thing to a third . But where
a debt already exists from one person to another , a promise by a
third person to pay such debt being primarily for the benefit o
f
the
original debtor , and to relieve him from liability to pay it , (there
being n
o
novation , ) he has a right o
f
action against the promissor
for his own indemnity ; and if the original creditor can also sue , the
promissor would be liable to two separate actions , and therefore the
rule is that the original creditor cannot sue . His case is not an ex
ception from the general rule that privity o
f
contract is required . "
9
8
U . S . 124 . See also Cragin v . Lovell , 109 U . S . 194 . .
In the earlier case o
f
Hendrick v . Lindsay , 93 U . S . 143 , cited





to one person , to sign an appeal bond , was construed to include an
other person who signed it as surety , and therefore to support a
joint action by the principal and the surety , both o
f
whom had signed
the bond relying upon the promise , so that the only consideration for
the promise moved from them .
In the case a
t
bar , the promise o
f
Ashford was to Thompson and














not to the mortgagees , and there was no privity o
f
contract between
them and Ashford . The consideration o
f
the promise moved from
Thompson alone . The only object o
f
the promise was to benefit
him , and not to benefit the mortgagees or other incumbrancers ; and




assent to the promise a
t
the time it was
made , nor afterwards do or omit any act on the faith o
f
it . It is
clear , therefore , that Thompson only could maintain an action at
law upon that promise .
In equity , a
s a
t
law , the contract o
f
the purchaser to pay the mort





the purchaser to the mortgagee . Parsons v .
Freeman , 2 P . Wms . 664 ; note ; S . C . Ambler , 115 ; Oxford v . Rod
ney , 14 Ves . 417 , 424 ; In re Empress Engineering Co . , 16 Ch . D .
125 ; Gandy v . Gandy , 30 Ch . D . 57 , 67 .
But it has been held b
y
many state courts o
f
high authority , in
accordance with the suggestion o
f
Lord Hardwicke in Parsons v .
Freeman , Ambler , 116 , that in a court o
f equity the mortgagee may
avail himself of the right of the mortgagor against the purchaser .
This result has been attained b
y
a development and application of
the ancient and familiar doctrine in equity that a creditor shall have
the ben fit o
f
any obligation o
r security given by the principal to
the surety for the payment of the debt . Maure v . Harrison , 1 Eq .
Cas . Ab . 93 , p
l
. 5 ; Bac . Ab . Surety , D . 4 ; Wright v . Morley , 11 Ves .
1
2 , 22 ; Phillips v . Thompson , 2 Johns . Ch . 418 ; Curtis v . Tyler , 9
Paige 432 , 435 ; New Bedford Institution for Savings v . Fairhaven
Bank , 9 Allen 175 ; Hampton v . Phipps , 108 U . S . 260 , 263 . .
In Hampton v . Phipps , just cited , this court declared the doctrine
to b
e well settled , and applicable " equally between sureties , so that
securities placed b
y
the principal in the hands o
f







the debt , shall enure to the benefit o
f
all ; " and declined to apply the doctrine to the case before it , because
the mortgage in question was given b
y
one surety to another merely
to indemnify him against being compelled to pay a greater share o
f
the debt than the sureties had agreed between themselves that he










the principal to the surety for the payment of the debt
does not rest upon any liability o
f
the principal to the creditor , o
r
upon any peculiar relation of the surety towards the creditor ; but
upon the ground that the surety , being the creditor ' s debtor , and
in fact occupying the relation o
f surety to another person , has re
ceived from that person an obligation o
r security for the payment
o
f
the debt , which a court o
f equity will therefore compel to be ap




the creditor . Where the person
ultimately held liable is himself a debtor to the creditor , the relief
awarded has n
o reference to that fact , but is grounded wholly on
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the right of the creditor to avail himself of the right of the surety
against the principal. If the person , who is admitted to be the cred
itor's debtor stands at the time of receiving the security , in the rela
tion of surety to the person from whom he receives it , it is quite
immaterial whether that person is or ever has been a debtor of the
principal creditor , or whether the relation of suretyship or the in
demnity to the surety existed , or was known to the creditor , when
the debt was contracted . In short , if one person agrees with another
to be primarily liable for a debt due from that other to a third per
son , so that as between the parties to the agreement the first is the
principal and the second the surety , the creditor of such surety is
entitled in equity, to be substituted in his place for the purpose of
compelling such principal to pay the debt .
It is in accordance with the doctrine, thus understood , that the
Court of Chancery of New York , the Court of Chancery and the
Court of Errors of New Jersey , and the Supreme Court of Michi
gan have held a mortgagee to be entitled to avail himself of an agree
ment in a deed of conveyance from the mortgagor by which the
grantee promises to pay the mortgage. Halsey v . Reed , 9 Paige .
446 , 452 ; King v . Whitely , 10 Paige, 465 ; Blyer v . Monholland , 2
Sandf. Ch . 478 ; Klapworth v . Dressler , 2 Beasley 62 ; Hoy v . Bram
hall, 4 C . E . Green 74 , 563 ; Crowell v . Currier , 12 C . E . Green 152 ;
S . C . on appeal, nom . Crowell v. St. Barhabas Hospital, 12 C . E .
Green 650 ; Arnaud v . Grigg , 2 Stew . Eq. 482 ; Youngs v . Trustees
of Public Schools , 4 Stew . Eq. 290 ; Crawford v . Edwards , 33 Mich
igan 354 , 360 ; Miller v. Thompson , 34 Michigan 10 ; Higman v .
Stewart , 38 Michigan , 513 , 523 ; Hicks v . McGarry , 38 Michigan
667 ; Booth v . Connecticut Ins. Co ., 43 Michigan 299 . See also
Pardee v . Treat, 82 N . Y . 385 , 387 ; Coffin v . Adams, 131 Mass . 133 ,
137 ; Biddel v . Brizzolara , 64 California 354 ; George v . Andrews , 60
Maryland 26 ; Osborne v . Cabell , 77 Virginia 462 .
" Recovery of the deficiency after .sale of the mortgaged prem
ises , against a subsequent purchaser , is adjudged in a court of
equity to a mortgagee not in virtue of any original equity residing
in him . He is allowed , by a mere rule of procedure, to go directly
as a creditor against the person ultimately liable , in order to avoid
circuity of action , and save the mortgagor , as the intermediate party ,
from being harassed for the payment of the debt , and then driven to
seek relief over against the person who has indemnified him , and
upon whom the liability will ultimately fall . The equity on which
his relief depends is the right of the mortgagor against his vendee,
to which he is permitted to succeed by substituting himself in the
place of the mortgagor .” 12 C . E .Green 655 ,656 .
The decisions of this court , cited for the defendant, are not only
quite consistent with this conclusion , but strongly tend to define the
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of, or otherwise made himself a party to , the agreement of the mort
gagor 's grantee to pay the mortgage ; holding on the one hand , that
such a mortgagee has no greater right than themortgagor has against
the grantee , and therefore cannot object to the striking out by a
court of equity , or to the release by the mortgagor , of such an agree
ment when inserted in the deed by mistake ; Elliott v . Sackett , 108
U . S . 132 ; Drury v . Hayden , 111 U . S . 223 ; and , on the other hand ,
that such an agreement does not, without the mortgagee 's assent ,
put the grantee and the mortgagor in the relation of principal and
surety towards themortgagee, so that the latter ,by giving time to the
grantee , will discharge the mortgagor . Shepherd v . May , 115 U . S .
505 , 511 .
The present case is a strong one for the application of the general
doctrine. The land has been sold under a prior mortgage for a sum
insufficient to pay that mortgage , leaving nothing to be applied to
wards the payment of the mortgage held by the plaintiff ; and the
plaintiff has exhausted her remedy against the mortgagor personally ,
by recovering judgment against him , execution upon which has been
returned unsatisfied .
Although the mortgagor might properly have been made a party
to this bill, yet as no objection was taken on that ground at the
hearing , and the omission to make him a party cannot prejudice
any interest of his , or any right of either party to this suit, it affords
no ground for refusing relief . Mechanics ' Bank v . Seton , 1 Pet .
299 ; Whiting v . Bank of United States, 13 Pet. 6 ; Miller v . Thomp
son , 34 Michigan 10 .
Decree reversed , and case remanded with directions to enter a
decree for the plaintiff .2
2 " It is a curious circumstance that though a promise by a third per
son to pay a mortgage debt can not be distinguished in principle from
a promise to pay any other debt , the question has been to some extent
separately dealt with . Perhaps , because the subject of mortgages fell
within the scope of equity jurisdiction , the attempt was early made by
mortgagees to sue in equity those who had assumed an obligation to pay
the mortgage , while no such attempt was made with other debts ." Wil .
liston ' s Wald 's Pollock on Contracts , 260 .
In Kollen v. Sooy, 172 Mich . 214 , it was held that, by reason of statu
tory limitations upon the powers of the court of chancery , the mort
gagee' s only remedy against the assuming grantee is the remedy ex
pressly given by statute of joining the grantee in a bill to foreclose the
mortgage and obtaining a decree against him for any deficiency which
may arise , and that he can not maintain an independent bill against such
grantee. See also Ward v. De Oca, 120 Cal. 102 , and Cal. Code Civ . Proc.
§ 720 .
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BURR v. BEERS .
COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK , 1861.
24 N . Y . 178 .
Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court. The action was
brought to recover the amount of two mortgages executed , with
his bonds, by E . F . Bullard to John Cramer , committee of the estate
of Charles Burr ( the plaintiff 's intestate ) , for $ 1 ,000 and $ 2 , 000
respectively . After giving themortgages , which covered several par
cels of land , Bullard conveyed both parcels to the defendant by a
deed containing a recital and covenant in the following words :
“ Subject to two mortgages held by John Cramer, committee of the
estate of Charles Burr, bearing date , & c . (describing the mortgages ) ,
which mortgages are deemed and taken as a part of the considera
tion of this conveyance , and which the party of the second part
hereby assumes to pay." Charles Burr was restored to the pos
session and control of his estate , by an order of the Supreme Court ;
and he prosecuted this suit to judgment, but died pending this ap
peal , when the action was continued in the name of the plaintiff as
his administratrix . The plaintiff on the trial proved the actual de
livery of the deed by Bullard , to the defendant. The defendant ob
jected that there was no privity of contract between him and the
plaintiff ; but the justice (before whom the case was tried without a
jury ) held otherwise. Judgment was given for the plaintiff for the
amount of the mortgages , which was affirmed at a general term
when the defendant appealed to this court.
DENIO , J . If the plaintiff had sought to foreclose the mortgages
in question , and to charge the defendant with the deficiency which
might remain after applying the proceeds of the sale , and had made
both the mortgagor and the present defendant parties , the authori
ties would be abundant to sustain the action in both aspects . (Cur
ti
s
v . Tyler , 9 Paige 432 ; Halsey v . Reed , id . 446 ; March v . Pike , 10
id . 595 ; Blyer v . Monholland , 2 Sandf . Ch . R . 478 ; King v . Whitely ,
1
0 Paige 465 ; Trotter v . Hughes , 2 Kern 74 ; Vail v . Foster , 4 Comst .
312 ; Belmont v . Coman , 22 N . Y . 438 . ) But I do not understand
that the right to a personal judgment for the deficiency is based
upon the notion of a direct contract between the grantee of the
equity o
f redemption , and the holder o
f
the mortgage . The cases
proceed upon the principle , that the undertaking o
f
the grantee to
pay off the incumbrance is a collateral security acquired b
y
the
mortgagor , which inures b
y
a
n equitable subrogation to the benefit
o
f
themortgagee . Then the statute relating to foreclosures provides
that if the mortgage debt be secured b
y





any other person besides the mortgagor ,
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such person may be made a defendant , and may be decreed to pay the
deficiency . ( 2 R . S ., p . 191, sec . 154 .) Chancellor Walworth , puts
the right to a personal judgment in such a case, upon the equity of
this statute ( 9 Paige 432 ) ; and Vice -Chancellor Sandford express
ly says , that the obligation is not enforced as being made by the
grantee of the equity of redemption under such a deed to the mort
gagee, but as a promise by the former to the mortgagor to pay him
the amount of the mortgage, by paying it to the mortgagee in pay
ment of his debt , which promise themortgagee is equitably entitled to
lay hold of and enforce under the equity of the statute referred to .
( 2 Sandf . Ch . R ., 480 .) It is obvious, that the judgment of the
Supreme Court in the present case , cannot be sustained upon the
doctrine referred to . The plaintiff does not ask to foreclose the
mortgage and does not make the principal debtor Bullard , a party .
If the judgment can be supported at all , it must be upon the broad
principle that if one person make a promise to another , for the
benefit of a third person , that third person may maintain an action
on the promise . Upon that question there has been a good deal of
conflict of judicial opinion . As long ago as 1817 , Chancellor Kent ,
laid it down as a point decided , and referred to not less than eight
English and American cases, as sustaining the principle . (Cumber
land v . Codrington , 3 J. C . R ., 255 ;) and since then it has been fre
quently affirmed by judges , after an attentive examination of cases ,
as in Barker v . Bucklin ( 2 Denio , 45 . ) and in the cases therein re
ferred to . These cases, and also those referred to by Chancellor
Kent , are doubtless subject to some of the criticisms which have
since been applied to them . Some of the opinions were pure ohiter
dicta , and in others , the cases though presenting the point were de
cided upon other grounds. It cannot however be denied , that the
doctrine had been so often asserted , that it had become the prevail
ing opinion of the profession , that an action would lie in such a case
in the name of the creditor, for whose benefit the promise was made.
Finally the question came squarely before this court in Lawrence
v . Fox (20 N . Y ., 268 ) , and we held , with hesitation on the part of
a portion of the judges who concurred , while others dissented , that
the action would lie . Wemust therefore regard the point as definite
ly settled , so far as the courts of this State are concerned .
The judgment appealed from being in accordance with the law
a
s adjudged in that case , must be affirmed .




Judgment affirmed . 3
3 For a collection of authorities , see Williston ' s Wald ' s Pollock on
Contracts , 260 ff .
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NORWOOD v. DE HART.
COURT OF CHANCERY OF NEW JERSEY , 1879 .






On bill and general demurrer by De Hart .
The Chancellor [RUNYAN ). This suit is brought to obtain a de
cree against the defendants for the amount remaining unpaid upon
a decree in favor of the complainants in a suit for foreclosure of a
mortgage upon premises w ich were owned by the defendants re
spectively at different times, subject to the mortgage. The mort
gaged premises were sold under the execution issued on the decree
in that suit , and were purchased by the holder of a mortgage prior
to that of the complainants ', for a sum less than the amount due on
his mortgage, so that nothing was realized by the complainants on
their mortgage .
The bill states that the complainants ' mortgage , which is for
$ 2 ,000 and interest , was given by Charles Meyenberg, on or about
the 30th of July , 1869 ; that the prior mortgage , which was for $ 2 ,000
and interest , was given in 1868 , by Frank Hunkley ; that in May ,
1871 , one Nicholas Pflaum , then being the owner of the mortgaged
premises , and both of the mortgages being subsisting liens thereon
for the full amount of the principal thereof , conveyed the property
to De Hart , for the consideration of $ 10 , 000 , as stated in the deed ;
that the deed contained the declaration and acknowledgment that the
conveyance was made subject to the mortgages, and that the princi
pal thereof was computed as part of the purchase -money , and con
tained , also , the stipulation that the existence of the mortgages
should not be held to work a breach of any of the covenants in the
deed ; that in August, 1871 , De Hart conveyed the premises to Ben
jamin Sire expressly subject to those mortgages and a subsequent
one for $ 1,000 and interest , which had been given thereon by De
Hart ; that the deed to Sire contained the declaration that the prin
cipal of those mortgages was computed as so much of the purchase
money of the property ; that in September , 1871 , Sire conveyed the
property to Moses H . Williams , expressly subject to the three mort
gages , and Williams therein assumed the payment of them ; that Wil
liams afterwards died , and the executors of his will, in March , 1873 ,
conveyed their right, title and interest in and to the property , to
De Hart , subject to the three mortgages , the payment of which he
thereby assumed ; that subsequently , in December , 1873 , De Hart
sold and conveyed all his interest in the premises to the defendant
Genung , subject , as stated in the deed , to the encumbrance of two
mortgages, the principal of which amounted to $ 4 ,000 , the payment
of which Genung thereby expressly assumed ; and that , in January ,





1872, the complainant 's testator began the above -mentioned suit for
foreclosure , which resulted as before stated .
The complainants ' claim to a decree against the defendants , rests
on the ground that the creditor is entitled to the benefit of all the
collat l securities which the debtor has obtained to re -enforce the
primary obligation . Klapworth v . Dressler , 2 Beas . 62 . But a
mortgagee cannot avail himself an assumption to pay his mort
gage contained in a deed to a subsequent purchaser , unless the
grantor was himself personally liable to pay the debt . Crowell v .
Hospital of St. Barnabas , 12 C . E . Gr. 650 , 656 ; King v . Whitely ,
10 Paige 465 ; Trotter v. Hughes, 12 N . Y . 74. In this case , it does
not appear , from the bill, that De Hart 's grantor, Pflaum , was per
sonally liable for the payment of the complainants ' mortgage. It,
therefore, does not appear (giving to the acknowledgment con
tained in the conveyance from Pflaum to De Hart, that the mort
gage debt was allowed as part of the consideration of the convey
ance all the effect which , under the decision of this court in Tichenor
v . Dodd ,4 3 Gr. Ch . 454 , it would have as between grantor and
grantee ) that there has ever existed any obligation, on the part of
De Hart , to indemnify Pflaum against the complainants ' mortgage
debt . And this consideration is equally fatal to the claim made un
4 In this case the conveyance recited that “ The above lots are con
veyed subject to the payment of a certain mortgage * * * which said
mortgage , or the amount thereof , is computed as so much of the con
sideration to be paid to the said grantor ," and the grantee seems to have
paid the consideration named in the deed , less the amount of the mort
gage . The grantor , having been required to pay the deficiency due on
themortgage after a sale , sued his grantee for reimbursement . It was
held that he should recover , the court saying, “ The purchaser agrees to
pay a sum of money for the land ; but a part of that sum is to be applied
to the discharge of the mortgage . Had he paid the whole sum to the
mortgagor , he would have had the means with which to pay the mort
gage. If he withhold the money , he has no ground of complaint if the
mortgagor asks him to pay the amount remaining due. "
“ Even though there is no clause in the conveyance imposing a per
sonal liability upon the transferee , he may assume such liability by a
collateral agreement , either written or oral ; (Schmucker v. Sibert , 18
Kans. 104 ; Strohauer v. Voltz , 42 Mich . 444 ; Merriman v. Moore , 90 Pa.
St. 78 ; Wright v. Briggs, 99 Ind . 563 ; Bowen v. Kurtz , 37 Iowa 239 ;
Bolles v. Beach , 22 N . J . Law 680 ; Society of Friends v. Haines , 47 Ohio
St. 423) and , according to a number of decisions , such an agreement is
implied from the fact that, when a purchaser has agreed to pay a par
ticular sum for the mortgaged land, the amount of the mortgage is de
ducted from this sum in fixing the amount actually paid by him , and the
land is conveyed to him subject to the mortgage . ( Twitchell v. Mears,
Fed . Cas. No . 14 , 286 ; Townsend v. Ward , 27 Conn . 610 ; Comstock v. Hitt ,
37 Ill . 542 ; Bristol Sav . Bank v . Stiger , 86 Iowa 324 ; Tichenor v . Dodd ,
4 N . J . Eq . 454 ; Heid v . Vreeland , 30 N . J . Eq . 591 ; Rockwell v . Blair
Sav . Bank , 31 Nebr . 128 , as explained in Green v . Hall , 45 Nebr . 89 ;
Thompson v . Thompson , 4 Ohio St . 333 . But see Belmont v . Coman , 22
N . Y . 438 ; Bennett v . Bates , 94 N . Y . 354 ; Fiske v . Tolman , 124 Mass .
E
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der the assumption contained in the deed from the executors of Wil
liams, for it does not appear that they were liable to indemnify their
grantor . Each grantee who assumed the payment of the mortgages
was bound thereby only to indemnify , and if no liability to pay the
mortgage debt existed on the part of his immediate grantor, there is
no ground for claim of indemnity on the part of the grantor , and ,
consequently , no personal liability on the part of the grantee to pay
the mortgage debt .
The fact that it does not appear that Pflaum was personally liable
to pay the mortgage debt, is fatal to the claim of the complainants
against the demurrant.
The demurrer will be sustained , with costs . 5
HARE v. MURPHY.
SUPREME Court of NEBRASKA , 1895 .
45 Nebr . 809 .
HARRISON , J. The plaintiff , as assignee and owner of two prom
issory notes, and a mortgage on certain real estate given to secure
their payment , instituted this action against the defendant, to whom
the real estate had been sold by the grantee or party purchasing from
the mortgagor , to recover the amount due upon the notes and mort
gage , basing the suit upon a clause in the conveyance of the lands
to defendant , by which it is claimed defendant assumed and agreed
on his part to pay the mortgage indebtedness . * * * * *
There was a trial of the issues to the court and a jury, and at the
close of the testimony the trial judge instructed the jury to return
a verdict for defendant, which instruction was complied with by
the jury , and after motion for new trial heard and overruled , judg




the parties , in the briefs filed , agree in the statement
that the trial judge was moved to instruct the jury to return a
verdict for the defendant b
y
the following considerations : That
the petition di
d
not allege , and the evidence failed to show , that de
fendant ' s grantor was in any manner or to any extent connected
254 ; Granger v . Roll , 6 S . Dak . 611 ; Moore ' s Appeal , 88 Pa . St . 45
0
. ) "
Tiffany , Real Property , $ 526 .
For a discussion of the construction of various unusual and more or
less ambiguous stipulations , such as that of “ subject to the payment of ,
& c . , " see Jones , Mortgages , $ 749 .
5 Compare Ward v . De Oca , 120 Cal . 102 . As to whether the grantee ' s
promise is one of indemnity only , see Williston ' s Wald ' s Pollock on
Contracts , 268 - 270 .
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with the mortgage debt, or liable or bound for the payment of it ;
that the rule of law applicable and governing in such cases is that a
mortgage indebtedness assumption clause in a deed , or an agreement
by the purchaser of lands to pay incumbrances existing against their
lands, will not become operative , or is of no validity , and cannot be
enforced by the mortgagee , unless it further appears that the
grantor in the conveyance , or the person to whom the promise is
made, was personally liable for the payment of the mortgage debt .
In adopting this view of the law , we think , the learned judge who
presided during the trial in the district court erred . It is undoubt
edly supported by decisions , many of which are cited by counsel
for defendant in their brief , of courts of last resort, the opinions of
which , as authority , rank among the very highest and are entitled to
great weight , but we do not think best to follow them . It is an
established rule of law that where one makes a promise to another
for the benefit of a third person , such third person can maintain an
action upon the promise , though the consideration does not move
directly from him . ( Shamp v . Meyer , 20 Neb . 223 ; Sample v .
Hale , 34 Neb . 220 ; Barnett v . Pratt, 37 Neb . 349 ; Doll v . Crume,
41 Neb . 655 .) In Keedle v. Flack , 27 Neb . 836 , a case in which
the right of a mortgagee to enforce such a promise as the one in
the case at bar was in controversy , the rule just quoted was applied
and held to be the basis of the mortgagee 's right to recover . Where
a party , purchaser of lands, agrees as a part of the contract of pur
chase to assume and pay a mortgage debt existing against the lands ,
the promise so to do is for the benefit of the owner and holder of
the debt and may be enforced by such party . The purchase price of
the lands is the consideration moving between the purchaser and his
grantor , and it is immaterial and of no consequence to the grantee
that his grantor may or may not be personally liable or bound for
the payment of themortgage debt , and by such promise the promisor
becomes personally liable to the mortgagee, or assigns , for the mort
gage debt , regardless of whether his grantor was so liable or not.
(Merriman v . Moore, 90 Pa. St., 78 ; Dean v . Walker , 107 III . , 540 ;
Bay v . Williams , 1 N . E . Rep . ( 11
1
. ) , 340 . )
There are some issues of fact in regard to which the evidence was
conflicting , and if the view of the law with reference to the liability
o
f
a grantee who assumes and agrees to pay a mortgage debt , which
we have announced herein as the correct one , had been taken , they
should , and doubtless would , have been submitted , under proper
instructions , to the jury for their consideration and determination .
It follows that the judgment of the district court will be reversed
and the cause remanded for further proceedings .
Reversed and remanded .
6 See also , Dean v . Walker , 107 I1
1
. 54
0 ; Marble Sav . Bank v . Me
sarvey , 101 Iowa 285 ; Enos v . Sanger , 96 Wis . 150 .
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GARNSEY v . ROGERS .
Court of APPEALS OF New York . 1872 .
47 N . Y . 233.
On and prior to the 23d of January , 1861, the plaintiff , Lewis R .
Garnsey , was the owner of two mortgages upon the premises de
scribed in the complaint, one of which was given to him directly ,
and the other of which he had acquired by purchase and assign
ment from the original mortgagee named therein . At the date above
inentioned , the premises covered by these mortgages were owned by
the defendant , Richard M . Hermance , who had assumed and agreed
to pay them . At this time they amounted together to the sum of
$ 2 ,000 , besides an accumulation of interest .
On the 23d of January , 1861, Hermance was indebted to the de
fendant, Harvey J . Rogers, in the sum of $650 . For the purpose
of securing the payment of this sum , Hermance executed and de
livered to Rogers a deed of the premises covered by the mortgages,
containing a covenant on the part of Rogers that he would assume
and pay the said mortgages . This deed was given , however , upon
the parol condition that whenever Hermance should pay the said
$ 650 and interest to Rogers , the premises should be reconveyed by
Rogers to Hermance .
On the 1st of August, 1866 , Hermance gave to Rogers his note
for $700 , and on the same day Rogers reconveyed the premises to
Hermance by deed , in which Hermance covenanted to reassume and
pay these mortgages.
Upon these facts the referee found , as a conclusion of law , that in
case the amount of the mortgages could not be collected from a sale
of the land itself , nor from the defendant Hermance , then and in
that case the defendant Rogers, was liable for the same. To this
conclusion the defendant , Rogers, excepted .
Upon the report of the referee , judgment was entered charging
the defendant , Harvey J . Rogers, with any deficiency which
might arise upon the sale of the mortgaged premises , in case such
deficiency could not be collected of the defendant , Hermance . From
this portion of the judgment, the defendant, Rogers , appealed .
RAPALLO , J . :
* *
The cases to which reference has been made, exhibit , I believe ,
every ground upon which it has been hitherto claimed that a grantee ,
Compare, Vrooman v . Turner , 69 N . Y . 280 ; Brown v . Stillman , 43
Minn . 126 .
For a general discussion of beneficiary contracts , see Williston ' s
Wald 's Pollock on Contracts , 237 -278 .
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who , by agreement with his grantor assumes the payment of an ex
isting mortgage on the premises conveyed , becomes personally liable
to the mortgagee ; and thematerial question now to be considered
is , whether the principles of any of these cases apply to such an
agreement , when contained , not in an absolute conveyance , but in a
mortgage, or in a conveyance which , in equity , amounts only to a
mortgage, and impose upon the second mortgagee making such an
agreement , an absolute , continuing , personal liability , which can be
enforced by the first mortgagee against the second .
The conveyance from Hermance to Rogers is found by the ref
eree to have been intended only as a security for an existing debt ,
and accompanied by an agreement for redemption , and must in
equity be treated as a mortgage and nothing more . The covenant
therein , whereby Rogers assumed the payment of the prior mort
gages held by the plaintiff , should therefore be construed as if con
tained in a mortgage . It having been established , by repeated ad
judications , that a deed , though absolute on it
s
face , may be proved
by parol to have been given as security for a debt , and that when
that fact is established it is defeasible by redemption , and vests in
the grantee only the rights o
f
a mortgagee , consistency requires that




and that the obligations which it purports to impose upon the grantee
should have no greater effect than if the defeasance , which is proved
b
y parol , had been incorporated in the instrument ; especially when
third parties claim equitable rights under such covenants .
Assuming for the moment that in such a case the agreement o
f
the grantee o
r mortgagee to pay off prior incumbrances is founded
upon a sufficient consideration , it is still difficult to see how it can
b
e brought within the principle o
f
the earlier cases cited , they being
all founded upon the doctrine that as between the grantor and gran
tee the latter becomes the principal debtor for the mortgage debt ,
which has been allowed him out o
f
the purchase -money . Where he
takes only a mortgage he owes no money for the land , which he
can promise to pay to the prior mortgagee , for he does not acquire
title to the land . To become a debtor to any one , he must owe a
debt . Where he buys the land absolutely for a stipulated price , and
instead o
f paying the whole o
f
it to his grantor , he is allowed to
retain a part , which he agrees to pay to a creditor o
f
the grantor
having a lien upon the land , the amount which he thus agrees to
pay is his own debt , which b
y arrangement with his grantor he has
agreed to pay to the creditor o
f
the latter , and although this arrange
ment , not being assented to by the creditor , does not discharge the
grantee from liability , yet as between him and the party who has
thus assumed it , the grantor is a mere surety . If the grantee pays
it , he pays only what he agreed to pay for the land , and pays it in
the manner agreed upon . And there is no hardship in allowing
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either the grantor or the mortgagee to enforce its payment . But in
the case o
f
a party having the land merely a
s security , such an un
dertaking is simply a promise to advance money to pay the debt of
his grantor or mortgagor , which money when advanced the junior
mortgagee can collect under his mortgage . (Western Ins . Co . v . Vil
lage o
f
Buffalo , 1 Paige , 284 . ) If Rogers had paid the liens in
question , and on a foreclosure o
f
his own mortgage the premises
had not brought enough to satisfy it , together with the sums paid
b
y
him to discharge the prior liens , Hermance would have been
liable to him for the deficiency .
Where a party , taking from his debtor a lien on property subject
to prior liens , assumes and pays them off , he is certainly entitled to
add the amounts so paid to his original debt ; the payments , though
made in pursuance o
f
his agreement , are made for the benefit o
f
the debtor , and upon his debts , and to protect him and his property .
It is obvious that an agreement of this character is a mere agree








f equitable subrogation .
The judgment cannot be sustained on the principles which pre
vailed prior to the case o
f
Burr v . Beers ( 24 N . Y . 178 ) , and the next
inquiry is whether it can be sustained on the doctrine o
f
that case .
Was this a promise made to Hermance for the benefit of the
plaintiff ? I do not understand that the case of Lawrence v . Fox
has gone so far as to hold that every promise made b
y
one person
to another , from the performance o
f
which a third would derive a
benefit , gives a right o
f
action to such third party , he being privy
neither to the contract nor the consideration . To entitle him to an
action , the contract must have been made for his benefit . Hemust
be the party intended to be benefited ; and all that the case o
f Law
rence v . Fox decides is , that where one person loans money to an
other , upon his promise to pay it to a third party to whom the party
so lending the money is indebted , the contract thus made by the
lender is made for the benefit o
f
his creditor , and the latter can
maintain an action upon it without proving an express promise to
himself from the party receiving the money . Johnson , C . J . , and
Denio , J . , placed their votes upon the distinct ground that the con
tract could b
e regarded a







his creditor , and that the latter could ratify the contract
thus made for his benefit . In Burr v . Beers ( 24 N . Y . 178 ) , the
amount due upon the mortgage was reserved out o
f
the purchase
money and left in the hands o
f
the purchaser , upon his agreement
with the vendor to apply it to the payment of the mortgage debt .
The purchaser was bound to pay the whole price , but b
y
this agree
ment a portion o
f
it was set apart for the use of themortgagee , and
the purchaser undertook to pay it to the mortgagee , and no one
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else. No other person was entitled to receive it. That arrange
ment was regarded as a contract made for the benefit of the mort
gagee, and it was held that he could enforce it. In that case the
purchase -money was in fact a fund in the hands of the purchaser ,
which he had agreed to apply to the use of the mortgage creditor .
In performing that agreement he would have done nothing more
than to pay his own debt in the manner in which he had agreed
to pay it.
But in the present case the agreement was not to apply money
which the promisee delivered for the purpose or which was due him
from the promisor , to the use of a third party , but the promisor
engaged to advance his own money for the purpose of protecting the
property of the promisee , which advance when made would become
a lien on the property of the promisee . Regarding the conveyance
as a mortgage , the stipulation was in effect to advance to the prom
isee on the security of the property , to discharge prior liens , and
was made for the benefit of the promisee only .
If such a contract could be enforced by the creditor who would
be incidentally benefited by it
s performance , every agreement , by
which one party should agree with another , for a consideration mov
ing from him , to become security for him to his creditors , o
r
to
advance money to pay his debts , could be enforced by the parties
whose claims were thus to be secured o
r paid . I do not understand
any case to have gone this length . This is not the case o
f
a trust .
If the property had been conveyed to Rogers in trust , to pay the
plaintiff ' s claims , the legal estate would have vested in Rogers , and
he would have been compelled to execute the trust . But no such
trust was declared in the deed , nor could it be created by parol , as
to real estate .
It must further be considered , that , where such an assumption is
made on an absolute conveyance o
f
land , it is unconditional and ir




r undertaking ; but , when contained in a mortgage , the
conveyance is defeasible . The grantor reserves the right to annul
it b
y
paying his debt , and , when he does so , he discharges the agree
ment to pay the prior mortgage . The reservation of this right is
inconsistent with the idea that the assumption b
y
the grantee was
for the benefit of the prior mortgagee ; for , if it were , the grantor
would have n
o control over the rights thus acquired b
y
a third




the grantor shows that
the agreement was for his benefit only , and prevents its enuring to
the benefit o
f any third party . In the present case , the control had
actually been exercised , and the grantor had redeemed and resumed
the enjoyment o
f
his property , in pursuance o
f
the condition , before
this action was commenced , and the grantee had ceased to have any
interest in o
r
claim upon it .
31
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I am not quite prepared to hold that the agreement of the defend
ant, to pay the prior mortgages , was absolutely void for want of con
sideration .
In the case of Ricard v . Sanderson , 41 N . Y . 179, the property
was placed in the hands of Sanderson for the purpose of securing
debts due not only by the grantor , but by others , and not to Sander
son individually , but to a firm of which he was a member. The
agreement was in writing , and its terms are not given in the case
a
s reported , and it may be that they created a trust in Sanderson ,
and that the legal title was vested in him . Moreover , the case does
not show that the instrument or the title , or possession o
f
Sanderson
under it , had at the time o
f
the recovery against him been extin
guished o
r
terminated in pursuance o
f any condition to which it was
subject .
It may be that constituting Rogers mortgagee in possession , of
real estate exceeding in value the amount of his debt , was a consid
eration for the undertaking of Rogers to advance the money neces
sary to pay off the prior liens , and that while themortgage remained
in force , and Rogers continued in possession , Hermance could have
compelled the performance o
f
that agreement for the protection o
f
his own estate . It is true that the giving of the security was less ,
so far as the defendant was concerned , than Hermance was already
under a legal obligation to do . It was not so beneficial to the de
fendant as would have been the payment of his claim . But at the
same time it was an act which Hermance was not legally bound to
perforin , and which might be prejudicial to him ; and it was not un
reasonable that when he parted with the possession o
f
his property ,
and added to the previous incumbrances thereon , thus disabling
himself from protecting it , he should exact o
f
the party to whom
he thus gave it as security , that he should protect it ; and the latter
may have been willing to bind himself to do that which , without
any agreement , he might have been obliged to do to protect his own
security . A stipulation b
y
a mortgagee in possession to keep down
prior mortgages , taxes , etc . , might , perhaps , be enforced by the
mortgagor . But when the mortgage is canceled , and the mortgagor
is restored to the enjoyment o
f
the property , such stipulations are
extinguished with the mortgage .
The judgment should b
e affirmed with costs .
All concur .
Judgment affirmed . ?
7 See Williston ' s Wald ' s Pollock on Contracts , 265 , 266 . As to the ef
fect , upon the liability of an assuming grantee to the mortgagee , of a
release by the grantor , see Bay v . Williams , 112 Ill . 91 ; Gifford v . Cor
rigan , 117 N . Y , 257 ; Crowell v . Hospital , 27 N . J . Eg . 650 ; Youngs v .
School Trustees , 31 N . J . Eq . 290 . And see Williston ' s Wald ' s Pollock
o
n Contracts , 273 .
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McLENNAN , J., in HYDE V . MILLER , 45 Hun 396 . ( N . Y . Sup.
Ct., 1899 .) As between the mortgagor , who is the plaintiff in this
action , and the defendant Miller , her grantee , he by assuming the
payment of the mortgage by his agreement contained in the deed of
conveyance to him , became the primary debtor and the plaintiff his
surety . (Calvo . v . Davies, 73 N . Y . 211 ; Johnson v . Žink , 51 id .
336 ; Marshall v . Davies , 78 id . 421 ; Mutual Life Insurance Co .
v . Davies, 12 J. & S . 172 ; Blyer v . Monholland , 2 Sandf. Ch . 478 .)
It is equally well settled that by the acceptance of the conveyance
to him from the defendant Miller , the defendant Oldfield became
liable to the mortgagee and also to the mortgagor , for any deficiency
which might arise upon the sale of the mortgaged premises . ( Ferris
v . Crawford , 2 Den . 595 .)
The mortgagee Bird , when his mortgage became due and payable ,
had a right to commence an action to foreclose the same, and to
make all persons parties who had , subsequent to the date of record of
his mortgage, acquired any interest in the premises , and to recover
judgment for deficiency against this plaintiff , the mortgagor , against
her grantee , the defendant Miller , against Miller 's grantee , Oldfield ,
and against Oldfield 's grantee , Elizabeth Bennett .
Bird also had the right to demand and to recover judgment for
deficiency against any one of such parties, and the action of Bird in
that regard could in no way affect the rights of such parties as
between themselves . If judgment for deficiency had only been de
manded and recovered against the plaintiff in this action she could
not have complained , but would have had the right immediately
to commence an action against Miller to recover the amount paid
by her upon such judgment.
If the plaintiff in that action had recovered judgment for defi
ciency against Miller, he in turn could have recovered the amount
thereof from Oldfield , and so Oldfield could recover from Elizabeth
Bennett . So far as Bird was concerned , each of the defendants
in the action above named was jointly and severally liable to him ,
and it was entirely optional with him whether he would pursue
them all, or , if any , which one or more he would seek to recover
against .8
8 This was an action by the mortgagor against her grantee, Miller ,
and Miller ' s grantee , Oldfield , each of whom had assumed the payment
of the mortgage , to recover the amount which the plaintiff had paid
upon a deficiency judgment recovered against her by the mortgagee . A
verdict against both defendants was directed by the court and the judg
ment rendered thereon was affirmed in the Appellate Division of the
Supreme Court, McLennan delivering an opinion from which the above
excerpt was taken . The defendants seem not to have questioned the
positions quoted , but claimed that the plaintiff had been discharged from
liability to the mortgagee at the time of her payment, so that her pay
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CALVO v . DAVIES .
COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW York , 1878 .
73 N . Y . 211.
This action was brought to foreclose a mortgage. The complaint
alleged in substance the execution of the mortgage by defendant
Davies and wife as collateral security for the bond of Davies , the
assignment of the bond and mortgage to plaintiff , and that there
had been a default , and that there was a specified amount due and
unpaid thereon . The complaint further alleged that defendant
Davies and wife conveyed the premises to defendant Leslie , who
took the conveyance subject to the mortgage, and in and by the
conveyance assumed and agreed to pay the same ; that on the 21st
day of November, 1872 , by an agreement between plaintiff and Les
lie , “ the time for the payment o
f
the principal sum aforesaid was
extended from the 8th day o
f
March , 1872 , to the 15th day o
f Oc
tober , 1874 , with the express understanding that the said bond and
the mortgage should remain in every other respect unaffected by
said agreement ; " also , that Leslie subsequently conveyed the prem
ises to defendant Woodruff . Plaintiff asked judgment fo
r
any de
ficiency against defendants Davies and Leslie .
Defendant Davies demurred , on the ground that the complaint a
s
to him did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause o
f
action .
ANDREWS , J . The mortgaged premises became , on the convey
ance by Davies to Leslie o
f
the equity o
f redemption , as between
Davies and his grantee , the primary fund for the payment of the
mortgage ; but the right o
f
the mortgagee to resort to the bond for
the collection o
f
his debt was not affected or impaired b
y
the con




contract with Leslie ,
ment was voluntary and would not support the recovery sought . The
opinion of the court on this part of the case is omitted . The decision
was affirmed without opinion in 168 N . Y . 590 .
Compare Flint v . Cadenasso , 64 Cal . 83 ; Stover v . Tompkins , 34
Nebr . 465 .
" Where there are successive grantees of mortgaged premises , each
assuming payment of the mortgage debt , the decree for a deficiency
should determine and adjudge the order of the liability of the several
grantees , especially where matters occurring between the parties may
require a marshalling of securities . As a general rule , where there are
successive transfers of the mortgaged premises , with an assumption of
the mortgage debt , it will , as between the successive grantees , be cast
upon them in the inverse order of the conveyances . But where the inter
mediate grantees have executed releases to each other , the liability of
the parties may be in a different order , even where the releases may
b
e impeached for fraud upon creditors . A voluntary conveyance or
release , though it be void as to creditors , is valid as between the par
ties to it . ” Depue , J . , in Youngs v . School Trustees , 31 N . J . Eq . 290 .
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change the rights of the creditor to proceed on the bond , or com
pel him to resort in the first instance to the land . (Marsh v . Pike ,
10 Paige, 595 .) On the other hand Davies relation to the debt was
not changed by his conveyance so as to take away his right as debtor,
to pay the debt at any time after it became due, and upon his pay
ing the debt , either voluntarily or by compulsion , he would , upon
the doctrine of equitable subrogation , be entitled to be substituted to
the mortgage security as it originally existed , with the right to pro
ceed immediately against the land for his indemnity . ( Tice v . An
nin , 2 J. Ch ., 125 ; Vanderkamp v . Shelton , 11 Paige, 28 ; Marsh v .
Pike , supra .) The mortgagee , after the conveyance by Davies ,
could not deal with the grantee of the equity of redemption , to the
prejudice of his right of subrogation , without discharging Davies
from liability for the debt , either wholly or pro tanto . If , for exam
ple , he had , pursuant to an agreement with Leslie , without the con
sent of Davies , satisfied or released the lien of the mortgage it is
plain that he would thereby , as to Davies , have discharged the debt,
at least to the extentof the value of the land . The rule that a mort
gagee is bound , in dealing with his security and with the bond , to ob
serve the equitable rights of third persons , of which he has notice ,
has been frequently recognized . ( Tice v . Annin , supra ; Halsey
v . Reed , 9 Paige, 446 ; Stevens v . Cooper , 1 J. Ch ., 425 ; Howard Ins.
Co . v . Halsey , 8 N . Y . 271. ) And the doctrine that a surety is dis
charged by dealings between the creditor and principal debtor , in
consistent with the rights of the surety , has been applied , although
the creditor did not know , in the origin of the transaction , that one
of the parties was a surety , and also when , by an arrangement be
tween two original joint and principal debtors , one of them assumed
the entire debt , and this was known to the creditor . (Pooley v .
Harradine , 7 El. & Bl., 431 ; Oriental Financial Corporation v .
Overend , Gurney & Co ., L . R . 7 Ch . App . 142 ; Millerd v . Thorn ,
56 N . Y ., 402 ; Colgrove v . Tallman ,67 id ., 95 .)
We think it must be held , upon the authorities , that the rights
of the parties in this case are to be determined by the rules governing
the relation of principal and surety , and that if the dealings between
the mortgagee and Leslie would have discharged Davies, if he
had been originally bound as surety only , the action against him can
not be maintained . (Halsey v . Reed , 9 Paige , supra ; Burr v .
Beers , 24 N . Y ., 178 ; Flower v . Lance, 59 id ., 603. )
That an agreement by the creditor with the principal debtor , ex
tending the time for the payment of the debt, without the consent
of the surety , discharges the latter , is established by numerous au
thorities, and the court will not enter into the question , what injury
the surety has sustained . (Rees v. Berrington , 2 Ves . Jr ., 540 ;
Rathbone v . Warren , 10 J. R ., 58
7 ; Miller v . McCan , 7 Paige , 452 . )
The plaintiff , in her complaint in this case , sets forth facts which
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justify a judgment of foreclosure ; but she also demands a judg
ment for any deficiency against the defendant Davies . The de
fendant Davies interposed a general demurrer to the complaint .
The complaint avers the making of the bond and mortgage by
Davies, its assignment to the plaintiff , the conveyance b
y
Davies to




redemption , subject to
the mortgage , and his agreement to pay the same , and the amount
due and unpaid thereon . If the plaintiff had stopped here a cause of
action against the defendant Davies would appear in the complaint ;




made by the plaintiff with the defendant Leslie , the time for the
payment of the debt was extended from March 8 , 1872 , to October
1
5 , 1872 , " with the express understanding that the bond and mort








f payment of the mortgage , prima facie op
erated to discharge Davies from liability on his bond . It was valid
and binding between the parties , and themortgage could not be en
forced during the time covered by the agreement , either b
y
the
plaintiff or by Davies . Davies , on paying the debt , would be en
titled to b
e subrogated to the security , but he would stand in the
place o
f
the creditor , and would take the mortgage subject to the
agreement . (Ducker v . Rapp , 67 N . Y . , 471 ; Bangs v . Strong , 10
Paige , 11 . ) The learned counsel for the plaintiff contends that the
agreement a
s alleged reserves the right o
f
the creditor against
Davies . When , in an agreement between a creditor and the prin
cipal debtor extending the time o
f payment , the remedies against
the surety are reserved , the agreement does not operate as an abso





action . The stipulation in that case is treated in effect as if it
was made in express terms , subject to the consent o
f
the surety , and
the surety is not thereby discharged . (Story ' s Eq . Jur . , sec . 326 ;
Bangs v . Strong , 10 Paige , 18 ; Kearsley v . Cole , 16 M . & W . , 128 ;
Oriental Financial Corporation v . Overend , Gurney & Co . , 7 H .
of L . Cas . , 348 ; Morgan v . Smith , 70 N . Y . 537 . ) But we are of




The " understanding ” that the mortgage should in all other re
spects remain unaffected b
y
the agreement , except as to the time o
f
payment , emphasizes the one purpose o
f
the agreement , viz . , to ex
tend the time o
f payment . The other stipulations in the mortgage
were to remain in force as if the agreement extending the time had
not been made . It would be a forced and unnatural construction
to hold that the parties designed to reserve to the creditor a right to
proceed a
t
once against Davies , which would enable the plaintiff
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to defeat the sole purpose of the agreement . The court in Claggett
v . Salmon ( 5 Gill. & Jo ., 314 ) affirmed the decree of the chancellor,
who held that the extension relied upon in that case was consistent
with the obligation entered into by the sureties , and the agreement
expressly provided that it should not interfere with or invalidate the
liability of the sureties on the mortgage executed by them .
The further point is taken by the plaintiff that the averment of
the agreement of extension may be rejected , leaving it for the de
fendant to bring the agreement to the notice of the court by answer .
But we think the whole complaint is to be considered in determin
ing whether it states a cause of action , as well the allegations which
tend to discharge the defendant Davies , as those which tend to
charge him .
These views lead to an affirmance of the judgment.
All concur, except Miller , J ., absent .
Judgment affirmed .9
9 For collection of authorities , see Williston 's Wald 's Pollock on
Contracts , 264.
" By the settled law of this court, the grantee is not directly liable to
the mortgagee , at law or in equity ; and the only remedy of the mort
gagee against the grantee is by bill in equity in the right of the mort
gagor and grantor , by virtue of the right in equity of a creditor to avail
himself of any security which his debtor holds from a third person for
the payment of the debt. Keller v. Ashford, 133 U . S. 610 ; Willard v.
Wood , 135 U . S. 309. In that view of the law , there might be difficulties
in the way of holding that a person who was under no direct liability
to the mortgagee was his principal debtor, and that the only person
who was directly liable to him was chargeable as a surety only , and
consequently that the mortgagee , by giving time to the person not di
rectly and primarily liable to him , would discharge the only person who
was thus liable. Shepherd v. May, 115 U . S . 505, 511 ; Keller v. Ashford ,
133 U . S . 610 , 625 .” Gray , J., in Union Mut . Life Ins. Co. v. Hanford ,
143 U . S . 187 , holding that under the law of Illinois the grantor is dis
charged by an extension of time to the grantee without the grantor' s
consent.
"While in equity as between the parties to the deed the vendor is
regarded as the surety, and the vendee as the principal debtor , the
mortgagee may treat them both as principal debtors as to him and have
a personal decree against either or both . And until he has done some
act, or it in some manner sufhciently appears that he recognizes the
purchaser or vendee as the principal and the original mortgagor as
surety merely , both of them will as to such mortgagee be treated as
principals . * * * But it is claimed , that the extension of time to
Hopkins for valuable consideration was in equity treating him as the
principal debtor , and Waterman as the surety . * * *
“ The language of the agreement is quite as consistent with the idea
that the mortgagee still regarded the mortgagor liable as a principal,
as that he designed placing him in the position of or recognizing him as
a surety , and there is nothing in it from which the mortgagor could be
led to infer that he was to be so treated , or that he was likely to be
misled thereby .
“ There was no such agreement however between the parties , as made
Hopkins the debtor of Corbett, to the extent that Waterman could not
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MURRAY v . MARSHALL .
COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK , 1884 .
94 N . Y . 611.
This action was upon a bond executed by defendant to plaintiffs '
testator . The answer averred , and the court found in substance ,
that at the time the bond was executed , a mortgage was also exe
cuted by defendant to secure the payment thereof ; that thereafter
defendant sold and conveyed the mortgaged premises subject to said
mortgage ; that plaintiffs ' testator , in consideration of the payment
to him by the grantee of $ 500 of the principal and of the interest
due upon the bond and mortgage, executed and delivered to said
grantee , without the knowledge or assent of defendant , an instru
ment under seal, extending the time of payment of the balance un
paid for three years , whereby the answer claimed , and the trial
court found defendant was released and discharged from all lia
bility .
Finch , J. The trial court held , that the extension by plaintiffs '
testator of the time of payment of defendant's bond and mortgage,
by a valid agreement with her grantee , who had taken a deed subject
to the mortgage but without assuming its payment , operated to dis
charge the defendant wholly from liability . This conclusion rested
upon the rule applicable to principal and surety , which forbids the
former to change the essential terms o
f
the contract without the con
sent o
f




the surety ' s complete dis
charge . In most o
f
these cases the courts have refused to enter





change , and the justification o
f
such refusal ordinarily lies in the
fact that the surety is bound only by the contract which he made ,
and not b
y
the new and substituted one which alone can b
e legally
enforced . (Ducker v . Rapp , 67 N . Y . 473 . ) But the present is
not a case o
f principal and surety in the strict and technical defini
tion o
f
such relation ; and upon that fact the General Term found
e
d
a different view of the rights o
f
the parties , and reversed the
decision o
f
the Special Term on appeal . Conceding that , b
y
the
conveyance subject to the mortgage , the land became the primary
interfere and control for the protection o
f
his own rights . Thus we see
no reason why Waterman could not have sued Hopkins at any time after
the maturity of the note to Corbett and compelled him to pay by virtue
of his promise and undertaking as recited in the deed . ” Wright , J . , in
Corbett v . Waterman , 11 Iowa 86 . See also Iowa Loan & Trust Co . v .
Haller , 119 Iowa 645 ; Crawford v . Edwards , 33 Mich . 354 .
Compare Travers v . Dorr , 60 Minn . 173 .
Compare with the principal case Goodyear v . Goodyear and Dicka
son v . Williams , supra .
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fund for the payment of the mortgage debt , and that the grantor in
defense of his liability on the bond had the right to pay the mort
gage debt and be subrogated to the remedies of the creditor , and so
could enforce payment out of the land to the extent of its value.
( Johnson v. Zink , 51 N . Y . 336 ; Flower v . Lance, 59 id . 603 ) , the
General Term nevertheless held , affirming the authority of Penfield
v . Goodrich ( 10 Hun , 41) , that the mortgagor and grantor was all
the time the principal debtor , and the grantee only became such
when he covenanted to pay the mortgage debt and assumed it as a
personal liability . We do not approve of this conclusion , or the
result to which it leads , and deem it our duty to affirm the decision
of the Special Term , although not approving the doctrine upon
which it rests , except with some necessary qualification .
While , as we have said , no strict and technical relation of prin
cipal and surety arose between the mortgagor and his grantee from
the conveyance subject to the mortgage, and equity did arise which
could not be taken from the mortgagor without his consent , and
which bears a very close resemblance to the equitable right of a
surety , the terms of whose contract have been modified . We cannot
accurately denominate the grantee a principal debtor, since he owes
no debt , and is not personally a debtor at al
l
, and yet , since the land
is the primary fund for the payment o
f
the debt , and so his prop





of the bond , it is not inaccurate to say that as grantee , and in re
spect to the land , and to the extent o
f
it
s value , he stands in the re
lation of a principal debtor , and to the same extent the grantor has
the equities o
f
a surety . This follows inevitably from the right
of subrogation which inheres in the original contract of sale and
conveyance . It is a definite and recognized right , which , in the
absence of an express agreement , will be founded upon one implied .
(Gans v . Thieme , 93 N . Y . 232 . ) When the mortgagor in this case
sold expressly subject to the mortgage , remaining liable upon his
bond , he had a right as against his grantee to require that the land
should first b
e
exhausted in the payment of the debt . Presumably
the amount o
f
the mortgage was deducted from the purchase -price ,
or at least the transfer was made and accepted in view of the mort
gage lien . Seller and buyer both acted upon the understanding that
the land bound for the debt should pay the debt a
s
far as it would
g
o , and their contract necessarily implied that agreement . Through
the right o
f subrogation the vendor could secure his safety , and that
right could not be invaded with impunity . It was invaded . When
the creditor extended the time o
f payment by a valid agreement
with the grantee , he at once , for the time being , took away the
vendor ' s original right of subrogation . He suspended its operation
beyond the terms of the mortgage . He put upon the mortgagor a
new risk not contemplated , and never consented to . The value o
f
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the land , and so the amount to go in exoneration of the bond ,might
prove to be very much less at the end of the extended period than
at the original maturity of the debt , and the latter might be in
creased by an accumulation of interest . The creditor had no right
thus to modify or destroy the original right of subrogation . What
he did was a conscious violation of this right, for the fact that he
dealt with the grantee for an extension of the mortgage shows that
he knew of the conveyance , and that it left the land bound in the
hands of the grantee . Knowing this he is chargeable with knowl
edge of the mortgagor 's equitable rights , and meddled with them
at his peril. But it does not follow that the vendor was thereby
wholly discharged . The grantee stood in the quasi relation of prin
cipal debtor only in respect to the land as the primary fund , and to
the extent of the value of the land . If that value was less than
the mortgage debt , as to the balance he owed no duty or obligation
whatever, and as to that the mortgagor stood to the end , as he was
at the beginning , the sole principal debtor. From any such balance
he was not discharged , and as to that no right of his was in any
manner disturbed . The measure of his injury was his right of
subrogation , and that necessarily was bounded by the value of the
land . The extension of time, therefore , operated to discharge him
only to the extent of that value . At the moment of the extension
his right of subrogation was taken away , and at that moment he
was discharged to the extent of the value of the land , since the ex
tension barred his recourse to it, and once discharged he could not
again be made liable . From that moment the risk of future depre
ciation fell upon the creditor who by the extension practically took
the land as his sole security to the extent of its then value , and as
sumed the risk o
f getting that value out of it in the future . But the
Special Term went further and held that the mortgagor was abso
lutely discharged b
y
the extension . That might or might not be ,





fell below the debt . For conceding the general rule that
the surety is discharged utterly b
y




payment , and that the mortgagor stands in the position and has
the rights of a surety ; it must be steadily remembered that he can
only be discharged so far as he is surety ; that he holds that position
only up to the value o
f
the land ; and beyond that is still principal
debtor without any remaining equities .
In this case the evidence is not before us . We have only the
pleadings and the findings o
f
the court . They do not show directly







the mortgage debt . But two things g
o
far to justify such an infer
ence . No claim that the value was less , and that the surety was
only partially discharged appears to have been made on the trial .
There was no request for such a finding , and the case seems to have
















the assumption that the value equalled the amount
o
f
th mortgage debt . But a very significant fact is found b
y
the
trial court . The grantee obtained the extension complained of by
paying upon the mortgag the sum o
f
$ 500 o
f principal and $ 87 o
f
accrued interest . He was under no obligation to make this pay
ment or procure the extension . The act is unexplainable except
upon the theory that he deemed the land worth more t the mort
gage , and that his interest was to pay off the incumbrance . It is an
act which speaks a
s plainly a
s
if he had said and the court had found
that he had said that the land exceeded in value the amount o
f
the
mortgage . Every legitimate inference which the findings warrant ,
must be drawn to sustain the judgment founded upon them . In
Kellogg v . Thompson ( 66 N . Y . 88 ) it was said that where the
evidence given o
n
the trial was not contained in the case , we must
assume not only that the facts proved were sufficient to sustain
the findings , but also any additional findings necessary to sustain
the conclusion o
f
law not in conflict with the affirmative facts found .
That , in the present case , the value o
f
the land equaled the amount
o
f
the mortgage debt , is a fair inference from the facts which were




the trial so far as the ab
sence o
f
any such objection is concerned , and under the rule to





the Special Term .
The judgment o
f
the General Term should be reversed and that
o
f
the Special Term affirmed with costs .
All concur .
Judgment accordingly . 10
COYLE v . DAVIS .
SUPREME COURT O
F
WISCONSIN , 1866 .
2
0 Wis . 564 .
[One Jarman , being the owner of certain parcels o
f
land , made
several mortgages thereon and then , on July 12 , 1862 , conveyed .
a part o
f
said land to the plaintiff and another part to plaintiff ' s
1
0 Compare , Chilton v . Brooks , 72 Md . 554 ; Travers v . Dorr , 60 Minn .
173 ; Bunnell v . Carter , 14 Utah 100 .
That the grantor , " subject to " the mortgage , upon paying the debt is
subrogated to the mortgagee ' s rights against the land , was held in Kin
near v . Lowell , 34 Maine 299 ; Pratt v . Buckley , 175 Mass . 115 (semble ) ;
Greenwell v . Heritage , 71 Mo . 459 ; Johnson v . Zink , 51 N . Y . 333 . See
also In re Wisner , 20 Mich . 442 ; Manwarring v . Powell , 40 Mich . 371 .
Compare Arnold v . Green , Hartshorne v . Hartshorne and Spencer v .
Harford , supra ; and cases cited thereto .
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husband , the conveyances being warrany deeds which were recorded
in September , 1862 . On July 12, 1864 , defendant Edward Davis
purchased from Jarman the equity of redemption of the whole of
said mortgaged lands , and at the same time the agreement referred
to in the opinion was made between Jarman and the defendants
Edward Davis and Joseph Davis , the latter being at that time the
owner of three of the mortgages , of which one had been executed
to him , and the others , executed to one Griffiths and one Prentiss ,
respectively , had been assigned to him . There was no connivance
or understanding between the said Edward and Joseph to injure
the plaintiff . The plaintiff sought by this suit to have the lands
which were conveyed to her and her husband , in the latter of which
she claimed dower, discharged of the said mortgages . The fore







judgment was rendered for the defendants , from which plaintiff
appealed . ]
Dixon , C . J . * * *
* * * * * *









Richard Jarman to the defendant , Ed
ward Davis , it was verbally agreed between Jarman and the de
fendants , Joseph and Edward Davis , that Jarman should be released
from a
ll personal liability to pay the amounts secured b
y
the mort
gages , and that Joseph Davis should rely upon Edward Davis and the
lands described therein for the payment o
f
the same . This finding
is fully justified b
y
the evidence , and its correctness not questioned
by the counsel for the defendants . Upon this finding , we think
the judgment must be reversed , and that upon the cause being re
manded the plaintiff will be entitled to judgment in her favor for
the relief demanded in the complaint as to the mortgages owned b
y
the defendant Joseph Davis , namely , the mortgage to himself and
the Griffiths and Prentiss mortgages . The mortgage to Daniel
Davis , it seems , was never owned b
y
Joseph , and consequently his
agreement to release the personal liability o
f
Jarman can have no
effect upon that mortgage in the hands o
f
Daniel .
Our reasons for this opinion are the same urged by the counsel







the mortgaged premises ,
acquired the right to redeem from a
ll
the mortgages , b
y
paying the
entire mortgage debt , and then to obtain satisfaction by the fore




the premises , and if they proved
insufficient , to resort to the personal liability o
f
Jarman , the mort
gagor . This right o
f
action against Jarman personally , either before
o
r
after foreclosure and sale , was or might have been a very valu
able right ; and after the death o
f
her husband and before the con
veyance to Edward Davis and the release b
y
Joseph , the plaintiff
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was in a situation to have acquired it, both as to the land conveyed
to her husband and as to that conveyed to herself . By the release ,
Joseph Davis, with full knowledge of the facts , deprived her of this
right. He put it beyond her power to acquire it , still leaving the
mortgage a burthen upon the estate in her hands . Can he insist
upon the burthen and at the same time deprive her of any material
benefit or advantage incident to her obligation to discharge that
burthen ? We think not. She stands in the relation of a surety for
Jarman , and any agreement between Joseph Davis and him , which
operated to diminish her security or to increase her liability , was a
release of all obligation on her part. The right of insisting upon
the personal liability of Jarman , was one of the safeguards of the
plaintiff 's title , and, by voluntarily depriving her of that, Joseph
Davis deprived himself of the right of insisting upon the liens of his
mortgages upon the lands owned by her . She is accordingly entitled
to have them discharged .
It is objected that the plaintiff lost nothing by the release, be
cause she has the same remedy over against Jarman upon the cove
nants of his deeds to her and to her husband . This is not so , or at
least it is very doubtful . On the covenant of warranty , the meas
ure of damages is the consideration money and interest . In an
action for the breach of the covenant against incumbrances , it has
been held that the true measure of damages is the amount paid
to remove the incumbrance , with interest , provided the same does
not exceed the consideration money and interest . Dimmick v .
Lockwood , 10 Wend ., 142 ; Foote v . Burnet , 10 Ohio , 334 . In this
case , the sums due upon the mortgages greatly exceed the price or
value of the lands owned by the plaintiff , and she might be obliged
to pay much more than the consideration money and interest in
order to remove the incumbrances .
It is furthermore objected that in place of the personal liability
of Jarman , the plaintiff has that of Edward Davis, who took title
to his part of the mortgaged premises subject to themortgages and
covenanting to pay and satisfy them . It seems almost needless for
us to observe that the substitution of the personal liability of Ed
ward Davis for that of Jarman , though good as between Jarman
and Joseph Davis , is not obligatory upon the plaintiff without his
consent , of which there is not the slightest evidence .
Again it is objected that the agreement to release Jarman is void
because it was not reduced to writing and signed , and because it
was without consideration . Neither of these objections is well
taken . The agreement , having been fully performed by Jarman
according to it
s terms , b
y
the conveyance to Edward Davis and his
acceptance o
f
the grant , is binding upon Joseph Davis , although
resting in parol . Joseph Davis is as much bound to the perform
ance as he would have been if the conveyance had been made to
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himself, or as he would have been to pay Jarman a sum of money
agreed upon as a consideration for the conveyance . It is in effect,
the same as if the conveyance had been made to himself , and hence
there is no want of consideration . The agreement being fully exe
cuted by Jarman , Joseph Davis cannot accept and enjoy the benefit
of it, either by himself or his brother Edward , and at the same
time, repudiate the obligation to perform on his own part. Any
loss by the promisee , as well as any gain by the promisor, constitutes
a valid consideration for a promise .
By the Court . — The judgment is reversed , and the cause remanded
with directions to enter judgment for the plaintiff in accordance
with this opinion .11
WELCH v . BEERS .
SUPREME COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS , 1864.
: 8 Allen (Mass. ) 151.
Bill in equity to redeem land from a mortgage . Upon agreed
facts , which are sufficiently stated in the opinion , the bill was dis
missed , and the plaintiff appealed to the whole court.
HOAR , J. This case differs in only one respect from that of Brad
ley v . George , 2 Allen , 392 ; and this is rather a difference in form
than in principle. The defendant Mrs. Prescott holds a mortgage
of $ 500 upon the whole tract of land , and has taken possession for
the purpose of foreclosure . Subsequently to the making of that
mortgage, the mortgagor conveyed a part of the land , with the
agreement recited in the deed of conveyance that the grantee should ,
as a part of the consideration , assume and pay the whole mortgage .
Afterward the mortgagor conveyed the remainder of the land to the
plaintiff in fee , not covenanting against the mortgage, but with an
express understanding that the mortgage was to be paid in full
by the previous purchaser . Mrs. Prescott has now become the
mortgagee of the first part, by a new mortgage for $ 1,200 ; and it
is conceded by the counsel , though not expressly found in the state
ment of facts , that the value of that part is much more than sufficient
to pay the $ 500 mortgage.
In Bradley v . George , the first conveyance of a part of the land
by the mortgagor , after the mortgage of the whole , was by a deed of
warranty ; and the mortgagee of the whole afterward took another
11 See also , Metz v. Todd , 36 Mich . 473 ; Case v. O 'Brien , 66 Mich .
289 ; Dedrick v. Den Bleyker , 85 Mich . 475 ; Barnes v. Mott , 64 N . Y . 397 .
As to the right of a junior mortgagee to pay off a senior encum
brance and be subrogated thereto , see Chap. IV .
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mortgage of the remaining part . It was held that the deed of war
ranty exempted the land described in it from contribution to pay
ment of the mortgage , as between the mortgagor and his grantee ;
and that neither the mortgagor himself , nor any person claiming
title under him to the remaining part of the land , with notice , could
claim such contribution . The right of the mortgagee , as such , to
enforce the security against the whole mortgaged premises was not
questioned . But if the mortgagee became also owner of the equity
of redemption of that part of the land which , as between the mort
gagor and his grantees , was chargeable with the whole amount of
the mortgage, then in this latter capacity equity would require him
to make the exemption of the other effectual , if it could be made
so consistently with the full satisfaction of his mortgage.
In the case at bar , the exemption of the plaintiff 's part of the land
from contribution does not arise from a deed of warranty to him ,
leaving the whole burden to rest on the other part , but from an
express annexation of the whole to the other part by contract , before
the plaintiff purchased . Mrs . Prescott took a mortgage of the
equity of redemption of the part to which the payment of the whole
original mortgage belonged , with full notice of the arrangement ;
and the reason on which the decision in Bradley v . George is found
ed would therefore seem to be fully applicable . The deed of war
ranty of a part does not of itself directly create a lien on the re
mainder for the amount of the mortgage ; but equity recognizes the
contract of the mortgagor as binding upon any subsequent purchaser
who acquires a title with knowledge of his grantor's agreement .
See George v . Kent, 7 Allen , 16 .
The general doctrine is established in Chase v . Woodbury ,
6 Cush . 143, and has been recently fully considered , with an exam
ination of many of the authorities , by the Supreme Court of New
Hampshire , in the case of Brown v . Simons, 44 N . H . 475 .
Decree according to the prayer of the bill.12
12 Compare Calvo v . Davies , supra ; also , Skinner v. Harker , 23 Colo .
333 ; Caruthers v. Hall , 10 Mich . 40 ; Judson v. Dada , 79 N . Y . 373.
In Mason v. Payne , Walker (Mich .) 459 , it was held that a convey
ance of a part of the mortgaged land, " subject to the payment of the
whole " mortgage , made the part conveyed the primary fund for the pay
ment of the mortgage .
In Engle v. Haines , 5 N . J . Eq. 186 , 632 , it was held that where a part
of the mortgaged land was sold with an assumption by the purchaser of
$ 500 of the mortgage , the parcel sold was the primary fund for the pay
ment of that amount of the mortgage . See also , McCullum v. Turpie ,
32 Ind . 146.
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CARPENTER v. KOONS .
SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA , 1852 .
20 Pa. St. 222.
This was an action of assumpsit for contribution , brought by C .
S . Carpenter , executor of the will of Powell Carpenter, deceased , v .
Isaac Koons.
In 1829 , Isaac Koons , the defendant, and R . A . Parrish , were
tenants in common of a large lot of ground on Willow and Fifth
streets , Philadelphia . On the 27th February , 1829 , they mort
gaged the same to the contributors to the Pennsylvania Hospital , to
secure $ 8 ,000. On 30th June, 1830 , they divided the ground and
executed a release to each other ; Koons releasing to Parrish lots
No . 1 and 2 , and Parrish releasing to Koons lot No. 3 , the largest
of the three lots . On 1st July , 1830 , an agreement was executed
by Isaac Koons, by which he acknowledged that as between Parrish
and himself , he was responsible for $ 5 ,000 of the mortgage, and
R . A . Parrish for $ 3 ,000 , from the 1st day of March , 1830 .
Subsequently , Parrish became embarrassed , and under a judg
ment obtained against him alone on 24th June , 1843 , lot No. 2 was
sold by the sheriff in 1844 , and was purchased by Isaac Koons, the
defendant in this suit, for $ 975 , the sale being, by the Act of 1830 ,
subject to the mortgage. There was, however , no such condition
expressed in the levy , sale , or deed . The sheriff 's deed to him was
dated 22d June, 1844 .
Another judgment had been obtained against Parrish on 25th
February , 1843 , under which lot No. 1 was sold at sheriff 's sale in
1846 , and was purchased by Powell Carpenter for $ 1,050 , the sale ,
by the Act of 1830 , being also subject to the said mortgage. The
sheriff 's deed was dated 21st November, 1846 .
On the 16th October, 1843 , William Overington procured an as
signment of the mortgage, and on 21st March , 1847 , he obtained
judgment on it against Koons and Parrish , Carpenter appearing
as terre tenant . By virtue of an alias lev . fa . lot No. 1 was, on 1st
November , 1847 , again sold , and it was again purchased by Powell
Carpenter for $ 4 ,400 ; and lot No. 2 was afterwards sold under
the same writ , at the same sale , for $ 5 ,025 , to Isaac Koons, who paid
to the sheriff $ 500 and afterwards transferred his bid to Overington ,
the assignee of the mortgage . The lot No. 3 was not sold .
The executor of Powell Carpenter , the purchaser of lo
t
No . 1 ,
which had been thus last sold under the judgment against Parrish ,





the mortgage debt a
s Koons was relieved from paying
by reason o
f
the sales and distribution o
f
the fund .
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The case was tried before Stroud , J., who charged as was as
signed for error ; and verdict was rendered for the plaintiff for
$720 .22 .
It was assigned for error , 1. That the judge charged the jury
that “ where several pieces of ground are subject to a joint mort
gage , and a sale of one of such pieces be made ; as between the
purchasers of such piece and those remaining unsold , the whole en
cumbrance is to be thrown on the latter.” Whereas he should have
charged that such is the rule only where such first purchaser buys
for full value .
BLACK , C . J. In Nailer v. Stanley, 10 Ser. & R . 450 , it was
decided that , where mortgaged land was sold in pieces and at dif
ferent times , the several pieces were liable for themortgage debt in
the inverse order of their alienation . This was supposd to be over
ruled in the Presbyterian Corporation v . Wallace , 3 Rawle 109 .
But Cowden 's Appeal , 1 Barr 297 , and several cases since , have
settled it so firmly that all attempts to shake it must be vain .
We are now to determine whether the same rule applies when the
sales of the several parcels of the mortgaged premises are made , not
by the mortgagor himself , but by the sheriff under a junior judg
ment .
A man who purchases part of a tract covered by a mortgage ,
buying the title out and out, clear of encumbrances , and paying a
full price for it , has a plain right to insist that his vendor shall
allow the remainder of the mortgaged premises to be taken in sat
isfaction of the mortgage debt before the part sold is resorted to .
This being the right of the vendee against the mortgagor himself ,
the latter cannot put the former in a worse condition by selling the
remainder of the land to another person . The second purchaser
sits in the seat of his grantor , and must pay the whole value of
what he bought towards the extinguishment of the mortgage, before
he can call on the first purchaser to pay anything . The first sale
having thrown the whole burden on the part reserved , it cannot
be thrown back again by the second sale . In other words the sec
ond purchaser takes the land he buys subject to all the liabilities
under which the grantor held it.
But if the rule is to cease when the reason of it ceases , it cannot
extend to a case where the first sale was made subject to a mort
gage ; and that is the condition of the present one. The defendant's
deed is older than his adversary 's, but it conveys him nothing but the
equity of redemption . The act of 1830 provides that if the oldest
lien be a mortgage, and the land be sold on a judgment, the sheriff 's
vendee shall take it subject to the mortgage. When the defendant
made his purchase therefore , he had manifestly no claim either on
the mortgagor or on anybody else to pay off the whole mortgage and
relieve him entirely from what was probably the most burdensome
32
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part of his contract . His share of the mortgage formed a part
of the price he agreed to pay for the land . The statute of 1830 en
tered into and made one of the elements of his contract .
There is a wide and palpable difference between one who buys
land subject to a mortgage, and has a reduction in the price equal to
the amount of the lien , and another who pays its full value and
stipulates for a title clear o
f
encumbrances . Such a distinction is
anything in the world but a " theoretical subtlety . ”
A plausible argument might b
e
made in favor o
f
the doctrine op
posite to that o
n
which this cause was ruled below . There might
b
e specious reasons given in support o
f
a rule which would make
different parts of the mortgaged land liable in the direct order o
f
their alienation , and compel him who first bought subject to the







this has not been contended for , nor do we conceive that the law is
so . Two purchasers a
t
a sheriff ' s sale , subject to a mortgage which
is a common encumbrance on the land o
f
both , stand on a level .
Neither o
f
them has done o
r
suffered anything which entitles him
to a preference over the other . Equality is equity . They must
pay the mortgage in proportion to the value o
f
their respective lots .
The value o
f
the lots is to be ascertained and determined b
y
the
jury on all the legal evidence which the parties see fit to produce .
We do not think the biddings at the sheriff ' s sale amount to more
than a circumstance from which the jury might make their own
inference .
Judgment reversed and venire d
e novo awarded . 13
IGLEHART v . CRANE & WESSON .
SUPREME COURT O
F






Mr . Justice LAWRENCE delivered the opinion of the Court :
On the 8th day o
f January , 1853 , the appellees , Crane & Wesson ,
resident in Detroit , sold and conveyed to Nicholas P . Iglehart , o
f
Chicago , blocks 27 and 28 in the southeast quarter o
f
section 17 ,
township 39 , range 4 , in said city . Iglehart paid $ 500 in hand and ,
for the balance , $ 24 ,500 , executed to the vendors his bond , secured
b
y
a mortgage upon the premises . The deed and mortgage were
duly recorded . The bond called for payment in certain sums quar
1
3 Compare Murray v . Marshall , supra ; also Briscoe v . Power , 47 I11 .
447 ; Erlinger v . Boul , 7 Ill . App . 40 ; Burger v . Greif , 55 Md . 518 ; Hall
v . Morgan , 79 Mo . 47 ; Hoy v . Bramhall , 19 N . J . Eq . 563 ; Woods v .
Spalding , 45 Barb . ( N . Y . ) 602 . See also Zabriskie v . Salter , 80 N . Y . 555 .
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terly , the last payment maturing June 1, 1861, and also for the pay
ment every three months of all moneys received by Iglehart upon
the sale of lots, to be applied as a credit upon the installment next
falling due upon said land . At the same time Crane & Wesson
executed an instrument by which they agreed to discharge from the
mortgage " any lots fronting upon Hoosier avenue on payment of
$ 200 each , not less than five lots at a time, and any lots on Hoosier
avenue at $ 350 each , not less than three at a time.” This agree
ment was not recorded untily February 14 , 1859 .
On the 29th of November , 1853 , Iglehart subdivided the blocks
into 151 lots and commenced their sale . In May , 1857 , Crane &
Wesson , having received the amount then due upon the land , re
leased thirty -two lots from the mortgage . Other lots were released
from time to time until October , 1859 , when the last releases were
executed . Fifty - seven of the lots sold were thus released . At the
October Term , 1861 , of the Superior Court of Chicago , Crane &
Wesson , to whom a large balance was due upon the bond , filed their
bill to foreclose the mortgage upon the unreleased lots , making the
several purchasers parties. The cause came on to a hearing upon
bill , answers, replications and proofs , and the court pronounced a
decree for the unpaid purchase money and distributed the payment
among a
ll
the unreleased lots . The master , to whom the case had
been referred , reported that the amount already received on the re
leased lots was sufficient to cover their equitable portion o
f
the
mortgage debt , on the principle o
f equality o
f
burden among all the
lots , and the decree was framed upon this principle . The defend
ants who were interested in lots 83 , 84 , 89 , 116 , 117 , 118 , 149 , and
150 , appealed from the decree so far as it related to those lots , and
have brought the record to this court .
These lots were sold and conveyed b
y Iglehart , in 1855 , long prior




Crane & Wesson , and long prior
to the registry o
f
the agreement above referred to , given by them
to Iglehart , o
f
which agreement it does not appear the purchasers
o
f
these lots had notice . A part o
f
the lots released were not sold




to which the appeal was taken .
Whether they were all sold after these lots , or how many o
f
them ,
is not necessary to be determined for the purposes of this opinion .
It is contended b
y





the mortgaged property , to
different persons having notice o
f
the prior sales , and the mortgagee
afterward files a bill to foreclose , the different parcels are to be
subjected to the payment of the mortgage in the inverse order of
their alienation . It is further contended , as a consequence of the
foregoing principle , that , if the mortgagee , with actual knowledge
o
f
all the facts , releases a part o
f
the property thus conveyed , he
thereby discharges his lien pro tanto , and to the extent o
f
the value
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of the part released , upon those parcels held under prior convey
ances from the mortgagor . It is further urged , that the court below
erred in subjecting the lots of the appellants to the payment of the
mortgage upon the principle of equality of burden among all the
lots , and in disregard of the foregoing rules. On the other hand ,
it is insisted by the appellees that this rule , as to the inverse order
of alienation , is not so firmly established in chancery practice as to
be obligatory upon the court by force of precedent , and that upon
it
s
own merits it ought not to be adopted . It is further urged , that ,




The counsel for the appellees has presented his views with much
force , but we cannot concur in them .
This question was incidentally before the court in the case of
McLaurie v . Thomas , January Term , 1866 (reported in 39 Ill . 291 ) ,
but was not definitely decided . We have now given it a full exam
ination , and , although the courts in Kentucky and Iowa have de
clined to adopt the principle contended for b
y
appellants , yet we find
the large current o
f
authorities , both in Great Britain and in this
country , so decidedly in its favor , and the rule itself rests upon such
grounds o
f equity and reason , that we cannot refuse to accept it as
the law . It rests , indeed , upon a simple principle . If a mortgagor
conveys a portion o
f
the mortgaged premises , retaining a portion




the cases , that , as be
tween the mortgagor and his grantee , that portion retained b
y
the
mortgagor should be first applied to the payment o
f
the mortgage .




s against the parcel held b
y
the mortgagor . The equity o
f
this
rule is apparent , on the plain ground that a man ' s own property
should be first applied to the payment o
f
his own debts , and when
a court o
f chancery requires a mortgagee first to exhaust that part
of the mortgaged property still held by the mortgagor , it is only
another application o
f





equity , that , where there are two creditors standing in
equal equity , one o
f
whom has security upon two funds and the
other upon only one o
f
the two , the former is required to proceed
primarily against the fund upon which the latter has no claim .
The justice o
f
first subjecting to the payment o
f
the mortgage
so much of the mortgaged property as may still remain in the hands
o
f
the mortgagor , cannot be denied , and is admitted b
y
the counsel
for the appellees . If , then , this species of equitable lien has at







against the residue in the hands of the mortgagor , how is this
residue to be considered as discharged from the lien , merely by a
sale and conveyance o
f
it to a third person taking with notice o
f
all
the facts ? The purchaser with notice simply steps into the shoes
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of the mortgagor. He can claim no equity which would displace
that of the prior grantee of the other portion of the mortgaged
premises , because , having voluntarily and knowingly become the
purchaser, he cannot , by such act, and at his own mere volition ,
displace or impair the equity of another .
This is the ground upon which rests the rule that mortgaged
premises are to be subjected to the lien in the inverse order of their
alienation , where the subsequent purchasers have bought with no







The only States in which this doctrine is distinctly repudiated , so





among all the purchasers of the mortgaged premises applied , are
Kentucky , in Dickey v . Thompson , 8 B . Mon . 312 , and Iowa , in
Bates v . Ruddick , 2 Clarke , 423 . 14 We do not deem the reasoning
in those cases satisfactory , and their authority must yield to that
o
f
the many courts that have laid down a different rule .
From this rule , as to the order in which mortgaged premises are
to b
e charged , it follows as a corollary , that , if the mortgagee , with
actual notice o
f
the facts , releases from the mortgage that portion
o
f
the premises primarily liable , he thereby releases pro tanto , the
portion secondarily liable . When the mortgage is sought to be en
forced against the owner o
f
the latter , he can claim an abatement
of his liability to the extent of the value of that portion which should
havemade the primary fund . But the notice to the mortgagee must
be actual and not constructive . It would be unreasonable to re





sequent to his own mortgage . He is neither a " creditor " nor a
“ subsequent purchaser , " and therefore falls neither within the letter
nor spirit o
f
the recording laws . See Mattison v . Thomas , decided
a
t
the present term of the court ( reported in 41 Ill . 110 ) and cases
there cited . See also Washburne on Real Property , 572 ; Patty
v . Pease , 8 Paige , 277 ; Taylor , Exr . , v .Morris , 5 Rawle , 51 ; Cheese
brough v . Millard , 1 Johns . Ch . 409 ; Stuyvesant v . Hone , 1 Sand .
Ch . 419 ; James v . Brown , 11 Mich . 26 ; George v . Wood , 9 Allen ,
8
0 ; Stuyvesant v . Hall , 2 Barb . Ch . 151 . It is easy for the first
purchaser from the mortgagor to give notice to the mortgagee , but
to require of the latter an examination of the registry for subse
quent conveyances which cannot impair his lien , and in which he
has n
o direct interest , would be imposing upon him a burden that
does not belong to his position . All the authorities agree , that this
doctrine o
f
inverse order is to be so applied b
y
the courts as not
1
4 The cases referred to concede that any part of the mortgaged land
which is retained by the mortgagor is primarily liable , but hold that ,
as between several purchasers , the burden should be born ratably .
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to impair the security of themortgagee . But, when the mortgagee ,
having actual notice , releases thepart primarily liable , the act draws
after it the consequences above stated . This has been often decided .
Skeel v. Spraker , 8 Paige, 195 ; Patty v . Pease , id . 277 ; Brown v .
Simons , 44 N . H . 475 ; Stuyvesant v . Hall, 2 Barb. Ch . 151 ; Lyman
v . Lyman , 32 Vt. 79 ; Chase v . Woodbury , 6 Cush . 143 ; Carter v .
Neal, 24 Georgia , 346 ; Shannon v . Marselis , 1 Saxton ( N . J .) 413.
But, while the mortgagee must have actual notice in order to
affect his rights , a second or subsequent purchaser from the mort
gagor is bound by the constructive notice furnished by the regis
try of prior conveyances of any portion of the mortgaged premises .
When the first grantee from the mortgagor has duly recorded his
conveyance he has done all in his power . Not knowing who may
be future purchasers of other portions of the premises , he cannot
give them actual notice. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire
in Brown v . Simons, 44 N . H . 475 , speaking of the subsequent
purchaser , say : " in the examination of the title to the part he pro
poses to buy, he is led directly to the original mortgage , and he finds
that his is but part of an entire tract in which his grantor has only
a right of redemption , and which was originally subject to a com
mon burden , but liable to be affected by a prior sale of another part
of the entire tract . Under such circumstances the different parcels
of the tract mortgaged cannot be considered as separate and dis
tinct, so as to relieve him of the duty of inquiring into the title to
the other part ; but, we think , that , in examining the title to the part
he proposes to buy , he is led directly to a deed that puts him on
inquiry as to the remaining part of the land ." In support of these
views the court refer to 2 Fonbl. Eq. b . 3, ch . 3, section 1 , note ; 4
Greenl. (Cruise ) 452 , note ; Parkert v . Alexander , 1 Johns . Ch. 398 ;
Chase v . Woodbury , 6 Cush . 113 ; La Farge Fire Ins. Co . v . Bell ,
22 Barb. 54 ; Montgomery v . Dorion , 6 N . H . 255 ; French v . Gray ,
2 Conn . 108 .
We concur in the views expressed by the Supreme Court of New
Hampshire .
It remains to be considered whether the case at bar falls within
the principles above stated .
It is urged by the counsel for the appellees , that they had no actual
notice of the prior conveyances when they executed the releases .
There is , it is true , no direct and positive proof, but the inference
of notice, from the correspondence introduced in evidence , and from
other circumstances proven , is irresistible . The land was sold in
June, 1853 , and the arrangement between the parties at that time
was, that it was to be subdivided into not less than one hundred and
fifty lots for the purpose of sale to various purchasers . Iglehart
was to pay twenty - five thousand dollars . He paid only five hun
dred in hand , giving bond and mortgage for twenty -four thousand
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'five hundred . It is evident, from the character of this contract ,
that the vendors relied for payment on the proceeds of the sale of
the lots, and accordingly they inserted in the bond a provision , not
only for the payment of the balance in stipulated sums quarterly , but
also that Iglehart was to pay over quarterly a
ll
the moneys he had
received on sales o
f
lots . The peculiar character o
f
this contract
thus furnished the strongest inducement to the vendors to keep
themselves fully informed o
f
the sales made b
y Iglehart . The first
release was executed May 18 , 1857 , and , prior to that time , a large
number , we believe more than half , o
f
the lots had been sold . We
find , in the correspondence prior to that date , numerous letters from
Crane & Wesson to Iglehart ( those from Iglehart to Crane & Wes
son , it should be observed , are not in the record ) pressing for pay
ment , stating their need o
f money , and giving reasons why they
should not send releases asked for by Iglehart . There is a large
mass o
f
this correspondence , and it shows , on the part o
f
Crane &
Wesson , who were themselves professional dealers in real estate ,
a perfect knowledge o
f
their business with Iglehart . But these
letters furnish only a part of the proof . It appears by the testi
mony o
f
several witnesses , who were clerks in the office o
f Igle
hart , that one o
f
the firm of Crane & Wesson was in Chicago two
o
r
three times every year , and that , when a
t
the office of Iglehart ,
he would examine the books relating to this transaction , one of
which was a volume having these lots numerically arranged , and
showing what sales had been made and the condition o
f
each lot .
Now it is not conceivable that an intelligent business man , himself
a real estate dealer , and having a contract o
f
this peculiar kind with
another real estate dealer , by the terms of which both his security ,
and the amount due , would depend largely on the disposition that
had been made o
f
the different lots , needing money , pressing for
payment , and not very well satisfied with the doings o
f
his vendee ,
and actually examining from time to time a book containing a plain
statement o
f




least taking the books and going with
his vendee into an inner room , a
s appears by the testimony — it is
not conceivable , we say , that he should not have ascertained how the
business was progressing , and what lots were sold . Moreover , the
first release was for thirty -two lots which were sold in a body when
the release was executed , and Crane came on from Detroit , and par
ticipated personally in the transaction . The lots in controversy had
then been sold for more than two years , and a large number o
f
all
the lots had been sold a
t that time . The complainants knew this
fact , and , although Crane , when he delivered this release in Chicago ,
may not have been able to give from memory the number of each
lot sold , and the name of the purchaser , yet these facts must have





the business were a
t
hand in the books o
f Iglehart ,
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which he often examined . We are obliged to consider the complain
ants as chargeable with notice .
It is also urged by counsel for appellees , that the appellants should
have filed a cross-bill . If the complainants had executed no re
leases , and the appellants had sought merely to procure a decree
directing the lots last conveyed to be first sold , it would doubtless
have been necessary to file a cross -bill , making their co -defendants
parties , as they would have been asking a decree to the prejudice
of their co -defendants . But, for the mere purpose of setting up
against the complainants a release executed by them , as a ground
for holding the mortgage , to a certain extent , discharged , we see
no reason for filing a cross -bill .
It is further urged , that the special agreement to release each lot
whenever a certain amount should be paid upon it, must be con
sidered as withdrawing this case from the ordinary rule . But that
agreement was not recorded until February 14 , 1859 , and there is
no pretense that it was known to the purchasers of the lots in con
troversy. Their equity , therefore , attached as if no such agreement
were in existence .
The decree , so far as it relates to these appellants , is reversed , and
the cause is remanded for further proceedings in conformity with
this opinion . Before a decree can be pronounced against the lots
of appellants , the value of the lots released , at the time of such re
lease over and above the amount paid on them , must be ascertained
and allowed as a credit on the mortgage.
Decree reversed . 15
GRAY v . LOUD & SONS LUMBER COMPANY.
SUPREME COURT OF MICHIGAN , 1901.
128 Mich . 427 .
Bill by Emma R . Gray against the H . M . Loud & Sons Lumber
Co . impleaded with Anthony Muer , to set aside a foreclosure sale .
MOORE , J. On the 22d day of October , 1887 , complainant pur
chased from Hibbard Baker , by land contract, lo
t
No . 162 of the
Waterworks subdivision of private claim 257 , in the township of
Hamtramck , county o
f Wayne , for a consideraion o
f
$ 500 . Fifty
dollars o
f




0 and interest November 25 , 1887 , $ 300 and interest during the




interest April 1 , 1890 . Complainant did not record her contract .
The lo
t
was a vacant , unimproved one . Complainant received a
1
5 Compare Coyle v . Davis and Murray v . Marshall , supra .
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warranty deed of the lot from Hibbard Baker and wife , in pursuance
of said contract , on the 22d day of September , 1890 , and two days
later recorded it.
On May 3, 1887 , Hibbard Baker and Howard G . Meredith , exe
cuted to the State Savings Bank a mortgage on 45 lots of the Water
works subdivision for a consideration of $ 5 ,000 , which mortgage
contained the following clause : "With the privilege of having any
lot released at any time on payment of $ 300 and accrued interest ,
with three months ' extra interest ." This mortgage included lots
162 , 251, 252, and 253 . Releases were executed by the State
Savings Bank at various times , releasing a
ll




aOn the 28th day of February , 188 , Hibbard Baker and Howard
G . Meredith executed to Caroline E . Richards a warranty deed for
lots 251 , 252 , and 253 . On the 18th of March , 1889 , Caroline E .
Richards deeded said lots to Gustave E . Mann , and on January 31 ,
1890 , he deeded them to the H . M . Loud & Sons Lumber Company ,
which deed was recorded on the 15th of March , 1892 .
On the 12th day o
f April , 1895 , after all the lots subject to the
mortgage had been discharged therefrom except lots 162 , 251 , 252 ,
and 253 , the State Savings Bank assigned the mortgage to the H . M .
Loud & Sons Lumber Company for $ 472 . 42 . Immediately on ob
taining the assignment o
f
this mortgage , the H . M . Loud & Sons
Lumber Company commenced foreclosure proceedings against a
ll
of these lots , and on the 12th day of August , 1895 , lot 162 was bid
off to the H . M . Loud & Sons Lumber Company for $ 520 . 49 , being




said mortgage , together with
the costs and expenses of foreclosure and sale . On the 13th of
October , 1899 , the H . M . Loud & Sons Lumber Company sold and
deeded lot 162 to Anthony Muer for the sum o
f
$750 . The defend




this mortgage to the State Savings Bank until some





this mortgage until the 3d day o
f February ,
1896 , and she paid all the taxes on this property from the time she
purchased it until November , 1895 .





the Louds from the bank be decreed
to be a full payment and satisfaction thereof as against Gray ; ( 2 )
that the foreclosure and sale of lot 162 by the Louds may be declared
null and void against Gray , and that the Louds may be decreed to





the mortgage and foreclosure thereof ; ( 3 ) for
general relief . The court made a decree that neither party was en
titled to have the other ' s land sold prior to its own , but that the bal
ance due on the mortgage , and expenses , amounting to $ 520 . 49 ,
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should be paid ratably by each of the four lots . The court also held
that , as the defendant had sold lot 162 to a bona fide purchaser
for $750 , that amount was a fair valuation of the lot , and that the
defendant should account to the complainant for that sum , less
$ 130 .12 ; and a decree was entered requiring the defendant to pay
to the complainant the sum of $619.88 , that being the difference be
tween the amount for which the lot was sold and one -quarter of
the mortgage and expenses . Both parties appealed from this de
cree , though complainant does not object to having it affirmed .
It is a claim of the complainant that, having purchased , and sub
stantially paid for , her lot before the other lots were sold to de
fendant's grantor, although her conveyance was recorded subse
quent to the record of the first conveyance of the other lots , she
was entitled to have those lots sold first for the satisfaction of the
mortgage ; citing Cooper v . Bigly , 13 Mich . 463 ; James v . Hubbard ,
1 Paige, 228 ; Ellison v. Pecare , 29 Barb . 333 ; Libby v. Tufts , 121
N . Y . 172 . In Libby v . Tufts, though the second purchaser put
his conveyance on record first, the first purchaser had fully com
pleted his contract , and entered into possession of the premises . A
reference to the other cases will show they , too , are not controlling
in this one.
Complainant insists that , even though she may not insist upon the
lots being sold in the inverse order of alienation , the decision of the
circuit judge is undoubtedly in accordance with the law applicable
to a
ll
cases where it would be inequitable to apply the general rule ,
and is a
s
favorable to the defendant as the circumstances warrant ;
citing Cooper v . Bigly , 13 Mich . 463 ; Bernhardt v . Lymburner , 85
N . Y . 172 ; Woods v . Spalding , 45 Barb . 602 ; Hill ' s Admr ' s v .
McCarter , 27 . N . J . Eq . 41 . In Hill ' s Adm ' rs v . McCarter the first
purchaser took his deed subject to the mortgage , and the court very
properly held his land was not wholly relieved from the lien . An in
spection of the other cases cited will show they are not decisive
o
f
this case in favor o
f complainant .
If Miss Gray ' s contract had been put upon record , or if she had
gone into possession of her lot , and her possession had been so ob
vious that it would have been notice to subsequent purchasers , her
contention that the lots purchased by the defendant must first be
sold would be sustained b
y
the great weight o
f authority . As she
did not put her contract upon record , and her lot was a vacant , un
occupied lot , can the decree o
f
the circuit judge be sustained ?
When Miss Gray obtained her land contract , and made payments
thereon , she obtained an interest in the land described therein .
Balen v . Mercier , 75 Mich . 47 . Section 8988 , 3 Comp . Laws , reads :
" Every conveyance o
f
real estate within this State hereafter made ,
which shallnot be recorded as provided in this chapter , shall be void
a
s against any subsequent purchaser in good faith , and for a valu
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able consideration , of the same real estate , or any portion thereof ,
whose conveyance shall be first duly recorded .”
Sections 9035 -9038 , 3 Comp. Laws , provide for the recording of
land contracts .
The object of the recording laws is to protect subsequent bona
fide purchasers (Godfroy v . Disbrow , Walk . Ch . 260 ) , and to pre
vent fraud by securing certainty and publicity in such dealings (At
wood v . Bearss , 47 Mich . 72 ) . In Burns v . Berry , 42 Mich ., at page
179, in commenting on the policy of the recording acts , the court
says :
“ The protection which this statute gives to a bona fide purchaser
does not proceed upon the theory , and is not made to depend upon
the fact, that the grantor, at the time of such conveyance , had any
interest in the premises whatever , or that any passed from him by
his conveyance to such subsequent purchaser . It is not by force
of the conveyance , but by the terms of the statute , that such sub
sequent purchaser acquires title to the premises . His grantor, hav
ing previously conveyed , has no title left to convey , and could there
fore by his deed , unaided by the statute , pass none to any third
person . Our registry laws, however , step in , and , for the purpose
of protcting an innocent purchaser, give him what he supposed , and
from an examination of the records had a right to suppose, he was
acquiring by his purchase , and to this extent cut off the previous
purchaser who negligently failed to record his conveyance .”
* * * * * * *
Brown v . Simons is [44 N . H . 475 ] an instructive case ,not only
because it is quoted with approval by Justice Campbell [ in Cooper
v . Bigly ), but also because it comments upon and disapproves Elli
son v . Pecare , which is relied upon by the complainant . We quote :
" If, however, at the time of the subsequent conveyance by the
mortgagor , the grantee has no notice of the prior conveyance , in fact
or constructively ( the same not having been registered ) , such sub
sequent grantee ought not to take the land so granted subject pri
marily to the whole debt. On the contrary , as the prior grantee
has failed to record his deed , and thus give notice of the true state
of the title , the subsequent grantee , unless otherwise notified , may
rightfully regard the land which is thus apparently in the hands of
the mortgagor as primarily liable for the whole debt. It is true
that the first grant by the mortgagor of a part of the property does
not in terms impose a lien upon what is left, but in effect it creates
upon it , as between the parties , a new incumbrance , and makes it
liable primarily for the whole debt, as much as if such mortgagor
had mortgaged it to such purchaser to indemnify him against the
original mortgage. It makes a case, then , that clearly comes within
the spirit of our statute of enrollments , which is designed for the
security of subsequent purchasers and creditors , to give notice of
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all conveyances of any estate in lands , whether legal or equitable . 1
Story , Eq . Jur. par. 403 ; Parkist v . Alexander , 1 Johns. Ch . 398 ;
4 Greenl . Cruise , 448 , 452 , and notes ; General Ins. Co. v . United
States Ins. Co., 10 Md. 517 ; Brush v . Ware , 15 Pet. 113 .
“ In accordance with these views is the doctrine of Chase v. Wood
bury , 6 Cush . 143, where a mortgagor conveyed the whole of the
mortgaged property to S .and R ., to each an undivided half, and S .,
having recorded his deed , conveyed his half to C . before the deed
to R . was registered ; and , upon the payment by the representative
of R . of the whole mortgage debt, it was held that he could not
require contribution of C ., because C . had purchased without any
notice of the sale to R ., and might , therefore, rely upon the other
half being first held for the whole debt , although had the deed to
R . been recorded , it would have been notice of a lien on the land sold
to S . equally with the other ; but the failure to record it was a fail
ure of one claiming an incumbrance , namely , a lien on the estate for
a contribution fo
r
one -half the money hemight pay to redeem it , and
this , the court held stood upon the same footing as if R . had a
mortgage from the first grantor , which he had failed to record . The
result of this case is that a party purchasing a part of an estate under
mortgage would be charged with notice o
f
a registered conveyance
of another part , when the effect would be to render his part so pur
chased liable to contribution equally with the other ; and for the
same reason he would be charged with such notice in a case where
the effect would be to make his purchase primarily liable for the
whole debt . The case of Chase v . Woodbury is directly in point ,
and fully sustains the views we have expressed .
" It is true it has been suggested that this right to have first ap
plied the lands remaining in the mortgagor ' s hands , and those last
sold , is a mere equity , and not a lien or incumbrance that comes
within the provisions o
f
the register laws , and so it is directly held
in Ellison v . Pecare , 29 Barb . 333 ; and therefore it was decided
that the deed first delivered would take precedence over a subse
quent deed o
f
another parcel , although the latter was first recorded .
In this case , however , it appeared that neither of these purchasers
had knowledge o
f
the original mortgage at the time o
f
their pur
chase , and the court expressly declined to give an opinion as to the
result had the second purchaser known of the existence of the mort
gage , and had he examined the records , and , finding no previous
conveyance , been induced to buy , supposing in good faith that he
was the first purchaser , in which case it is said there would be
some show o
f equity in favor o
f
the second purchaser . In the case
of LaFarge Fire Ins . Co . v . Bell , 22 Barb . 54 , it was held , upon
much consideration , that the register act , which provides that ‘Ev












chaser in good faith of the same real estate , or any portion there
of, whose conveyance shall first be duly recorded ,' does apply to the
equitable right which is acquired by a purchaser of a parcel of the
mortgaged property to have the residue first applied to the payment
of the mortgage debt, and that such equitable right will not be de
feated by a prior conveyance of that residue , unless it be by deed
duly recorded , or other notice at the time of his purchase ; and the
reasons assigned for this doctrine are in no degree shaken by the
subsequent case of Ellison v . Pecare, which appears to have been
decided without an examination of the case of La Farge Fire Ins.
Co. v . Bell . Indeed , it is difficult to see how any other result can be
reached . The deed of a parcel of the tract mortgaged carries with
it a well -established right to require the mortgagee first to exhaust
the residue in the hands of the mortgagor before applying the parcel
so conveyed ; and , whether this right can be enforced only in equity
or not , it is clearly a substantial interest in such residue , and one
which it is the policy of the registry laws to protect. See Montgom
ery v . Dorion , 6 N . H . 255 ; French v . Gray , 2 Conn . 108 ; 4 Kent.
Comm . 456 ; Brown v . Manter, 22 N . H . 468 ."
See 2 Jones, Mortg. (4th Ed. ) § 1620 .
When the defendant 's grantor purchased the three lots , the record
did not disclose a sale to Miss Gray, and he had a right to assume
that the mortgagee would resort to the land still standing in the
name of Mr. Baker before selling the land purchased by him .
Counsel say :
“ Themortgage contained the following provision : ‘With the privi
lege of having any lot released at any time on payment of $ 300 and
accrued interest , with three months' extra interest .' Under this
clause complainant was entitled to have her lot released at any time
from the mortgage on payment of $ 300 , and her lot should not be
made liable to more than that amount on foreclosure of the mort
gage, and any excess over that amount would have to be borne by
the other lots , in any view of the case ," — citing Clark v . Fontain ,
135 Mass. 464 .
It is doubtless true that complainant might have had her lo
t
re
leased from themortgage b
y
paying to themortgagee $ 300 , but she
never sought to do so . She waited nearly four years after the mort






It is claimed there was paid to the bank about $ 70 extra interest ,
which was usury , and which should have been applied as a general
payment on the mortgage debt . It has been repeatedly held that
the defense o
f usury is a personal one , and may be waived . Sellers
v . Botsford , 11 Mich . 59 ; Gardner v . Matteson , 38 Mich . 200 .
This case is an unfortunate one for the complainant , but it is
made so b
y
her failure to put her contract upon record .
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The decree is reversed , and the bill of complaint dismissed , with
costs .
The other Justices concurred .16
























NEW JERSEY , 1878 .
3
0
N . J . E . 40 .
Bill to foreclose . On petition to open fi l decree , etc .
The Chancellor [RUNYON ) . By the final decree in this cause , it
is directed that a rt in part o
f
the mortgaged premises , which
was conveyed by Joseph Coult and his wife to Isaac A . Walker , on
the 1st o
f July , 1868 , be sold to raise a part o
f
the money due on
the complainant ' s mortgage , which was , when the conveyance to
Walker was made Coult , an encumbrance on that and other
land . alker , subsequently , b
y
two deeds , one date January 18th ,
1869 , and the other dated February 4th in that year , conveyed two
parcels o
f
the property to the petitioners . On the 20th o
f
Novem
ber following , he conveyed the rest of the property to the com
plainant , who , on the 16th o
f September , 1876 , conveyed it to Mary




to direct that the property be sold to raise the before -men
tioned proportion of the money due on the complainant ' s mortgage ,
with interest and costs , in inverse order o
f
the conveyances ; that is ,
that the part conveyed to and now held b
y Mary E . Schofield be
sold for that purpose before the property o
f








f warranty , and neither
the petitioner nor the complainant knew , at the time of taking the
conveyances to them , of the existence of the mortgage now held by
the complainant . They a
ll , however , had constructive notice o
f
it ,
it having been duly recorded .
It is the established rule of this court that , if a mortgagor sell the
land covered b
y
the mortgage in different parcels and at different
times , the parcels shall be sold to raise the money to discharge the
mortgage debt in the inverse order o
f
their alienation . Shannon
v . Marselis , Sax . 413 . And this rule applies though the sales in
parcels were made , not by the mortgagor , but by a person claiming
under him . Wikoff v . Davis , 3 Gr . Ch . 224 . It is applicable , also ,
to a case such a
s
the present . When the petitioners bought the part
o
f
the property which was conveyed to them , it was subject to the
mortgage , but the rest o
f
the property remained in the hands of
Walker , and , as between him and them , that part so retained b
y
him
was liable , in equity , to be first sold to pay the mortgage . It is to
1
6 Compare Sternberger v . Hanna , 42 Ohio St . 30
5
.
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be regarded as having been then equitably charged with the payment
of the mortgage debt , and the complainant , when he purchased it
from Walker , took the place of the latter , and took the land so
charged in equity . That land , now owned by Mary E . Schofield ,
must , as between her and the petitioners , be first sold to raise the
proportion of the mortgage debt , interest and costs , decreed to be
raised by sale of the Walker property .
RAPALLO , J ., in HOPKINS v . WOLLEY, 81 N . Y . 77 ( 1880 ) .
We concur with the learned judge in holding that , in the ab
sence of any circumstance showing a contrary intent, the reconvey
ance by William D . Wolley to Samuel Staples of 180 acres , out of
the larger tract, said to contain 361 acres, which Wolley had pre
viously conveyed to Staples , constituted the land remaining in the
hands of Wolley the primary fund for the payment of the incum
brances , subject to which the entire tract had been conveyed by
Staples to Wolley . That the facts that Staples was personally
liable for these incumbrances to the persons in whose favor they
existed , and that Wolley was not so liable , did not affect this equity
between him and Wolley and his subsequent grantees , but that as
to the 180 acres Staples was entitled to the benefit of the rule that
the lands should be sold in the inverse order of their alienation , to
the same extent as if he had had no previous connection with the
lands .17
CAMPBELL, J ., in COOPER v . Bigly , 13 Mich . 473 ( 1865 ) . It has
always been understood to be the settled law of this state that, where
mortgaged premises are conveyed or incumbered in parcels , they
are , upon a foreclosure , to be sold in the inverse order of such con
veyances or incumbrances , unless themortgagee will be prejudiced by
having the property sold in parcels — a thing which can never happen
where property , when mortgaged to him , was treated as separate .
This doctrine was recognized in Mason v . Payne , Walker 's Ch . R .,
459, and Caruthers v . Hall , 10 Mich . R ., 40, in both of which cases
the principal exception to the rule was referred to and enforced . The
same principle was recognized and explained in James v . Brown ,
11 Mich . R ., 25. It rests chiefly , perhaps , upon the grounds that
where one who is bound to pay a mortgage confers upon others
rights in any portion of the property , retaining other portions him
self , it is unjust that they should be deprived of their rights, so
long as he has property covered by the mortgage , out of which the
debt can be made . In other words, his debts should be paid out of
his own estate , instead of being charged on the estates of his gran
tees . Any other rule would be, in effect , to enable him to enjoy
for his own benefit that which he has once vested in another, and ,
17 Compare Wikoff v . Davis , 3 Green Ch . (N . J.) 22
4
.
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in a measure , to recall his own grant. The rule cannot , therefore ,
depend upon the existence or non -existence of covenants of war
ranty . It depends simply on the fact whether he has or has not
seen fi





ises , to charge it primarily , with the payment o
f
the incumbrance .
Whenever he so charges any part , the purchaser takes it subject to
the burden , and the relative date o
f
his purchase is immaterial . See
cases cited above ;Welch v . Beers , 8 Allen ' s R . , 151 ; Kilbourne v .
Roggins , 8 Allen ' s R . , 466 . It has , indeed , in several cases cited
a
t
the bar , been held that the covenant o
f warranty was very im
portant , in determining the intent of the mortgagor not to charge the
mortgage on the property sold . But there is no satisfactory au
thority holding that , in the absence o
f
such a warranty , no such
intent could be presumed . On the contrary , wherever the doctrine
of priority is respected at all , it has been enforced unless an op
posite intent was made out . And such appears to us the common
sense inference ; for a man owing a debt , for which his own prop
erty remains liable , must naturally be supposed to expect to have it
paid out o
f
his own means , unless he has bargained to the contrary .
And this equity , having arisen in favor of the first purchaser , must
remain in hi
s
favor against any subsequent equities o
f
other parties
derived from his grantor .
* * *
And the question next arises , whether the conveyance to Thomas
B . Bigly is to be preferred before the rights of Eldred and Vincent .
That his deed is prima facie prior in equity to their claims , is plain
from the considerations already referred to . But it is claimed that
this deed contains a provision which postpones it . The deed con
tains the usual clauses o
f warranty ; but the warranty and the
covenant against incumbrance , except “ a certain mortgage , ” the
date and amount whereof , and the mortgagee ' s name , are left
in blank . It was insisted on the argument that this exception is
void for uncertainty . In the absence of proof o
f any mortgage but
Cooper ' s , we are not disposed to regard it so . That is certain which
can b
e made certain ; and , until two mortgages appear , there
is n
o ambiguity . The question , then , arises , whether , b
y
this phrase
ology , the Cooper mortgage is chargeable primarily on this lot . We
do not think the language leads to this conclusion . It only protects
the grantor from any liability over , in case this land should become
necessary and bc disposed o
f
to pay the mortgage . But it does not
provide that this lot whall be charged in preference to the Fort street
property , still retained b
y
him ; and we think it would be a strained
construction to consider this deed a
s depriving the grantee o
f any
advantage the priority o
f conveyance would afford him . If the
Fort street lo
t
should be insufficient , the warranty without the ex
ception could not have saved this lot , but without the exception John
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Bigly would have been responsible on his covenants , had it been sold
on the mortgage. By inserting this exception , he conveys the prop
erty subject to the risk that the remaining property yet unsold and
unincumbered will not suffice to pay the debt , and no more . In
other words , the deed is , so far as the Cooper mortgage goes, a mere
conveyance without warranty ; but it is not a conveyance upon con
dition , or subject to any specific duty or burden . It is quite as
effectual as any deed without covenants , and in some respects inore
so , and the absence of covenants does not vitiate or change a title ,
or deprive it of priority .
It is claimed , however, that , as against Vincent and Eldred , this
deed is void for want of consideration , and is designed to defraud
creditors . We do not deem it necessary to examine into the proof
of consideration . There is nothing before us which would show
that John Bigly was not entitled to deal with the property as he
pleased . It does not appear that, at that time, he owed unsecured
debts , or was in embarrassed circumstances . But had he been so ,
it could not concern these parties . They stand on the record simply
as subsequent purchasers of other property , having full record no
tice of this deed , and at liberty to purchase or not, as they saw fit .
They have no greater rights than John Bigly would have had if he
had not conveyed to Eldred , o
r if his equity of redemption had not
been purchased by Vincent . He could not have revoked his own
deed , had it been without any consideration whatever . No one can
assail such a conveyance , except some creditor who has taken the
requisite steps to entitle him to resort to the land in payment of a
debt , as against which it can be made out to have been fraudulent ;
Fox v . Willis , 1 Mich . R . , 321 . Eldred and Vincent , so far as the
present case goes , stand in John Bigly ' s shoes , and not in opposition
to his rights , as they remained after the deed to Thomas .
We think the Fort street lot should be sold before any resort is




8 Compare Carpenter v . Koons and Inglehart v . Crane & Wesson ,
supra . In Aiken v . Gale , 37 N . H . 501 , it was held that two successive
purchasers by quitclaim deed should contribute ratably . In Aderholt
v . Henry , 87 Ala . 415 , it was said that a warranty deed is necessary to
raise the equity of exoneration . In Erlinger v . Boul , 7 111 . App . 40 , and
Woods v . Spalding , 45 Barb . ( N . Y . ) 602 , it was said that a warranty
deed is not necessary . In Jackson v . Condict , 57 N . J . Eq . 522 , it was
held that a deed on a nominal consideration and without covenants of
warranty made the grantee liable to a ratable contribution , Emery , V .
C . , saying , " As between different portions of the premises subject to a
common charge , the general and fundamental rule of equity is , that the
burden is to be borne by the different portions ratably . The exception
to the operation of this fundamental rule , which is made for the pur
pose o
f marshalling the portions in favor of a prior grantee of a por
tion of the premises , is based not on the simple fact of the earliest
grant , but upon the conclusion that the character and circumstances of
33
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Mr . Justice Paxson delivered the opinion of the court , January
7th , 1884 .
It was decided in Nailer v . Stanley , 10 S . & R . 450 , that , where
mortgaged land was sold in pieces and at different times , the sev
eral pieces were liable for the mortgage debt in the inverse order
o
f
their alienation . This principle was fully recognized in the later
case o
f
Cowden ' s Appeal , 1 Barr . 267 , and has been uniformly fol
lowed since . It is now settled law . In Carpenter v . Koons , 8
Harris 222 , it was held , the principle did not apply to two or more
purchasers at a sheriff ' s sale , who had bought subject to a common
incumbrance . In such instances equality is equity .





Mrs . Margaret Chalfant , and gave to her a purchase
money mortgage covering the whole , for $ 14 ,040 . He then divided
the property into lots for the purpose o
f
sale , which we will desig
nate b
y
classes , as 1 , 2 and 3 . Afterwards ; he mortgaged class 1
to Wm . A . Shaw , the plaintiff below ; then he mortgaged class 2 to
Robert E . Stewart , one o
f
the defendants below ; lastly , he con
veyed class 3 to Robert Milligan in fee , and b
y
divers subsequent
conveyances , the title thereto became vested in Mary E . Milligan ,
another o
f
the defendants below , and one of the appellants .
During al
l




Stewart , one o
f
said mortgagees , foreclosed his mortgage , and
bought the lots embraced therein , a
t
the sheriff ' s sale .
Subsequently , Carothers was adjudged a bankrupt in the United
States District Court , and his title became vested in his assignee .
The latter sold the lots in class 1 , in pursuance of authority de
rived from the court in bankruptcy , free and divested from a
ll
liens ,
and realized therefor the sum of $ 7 ,700 . The register in bank
ruptcy distributed the proceeds to the Chalfant mortgage , disregard
ing Mr . Shaw ' s claim to have the proceeds applied to his mortgage ,
which , as before stated , covered this class of lots . As the Chalfant
mortgage was the first lien , this distribution could not have been
avoided . The result was , however , that Shaw found his security
swept away for the benefit o
f
the subsequent incumbrancers and
purchasers of other portions of the property . He therefore filed
the earliest conveyance are such as show that it was the intention of the
parties to the conveyance that the portion conveyed should be free from
the common burden . "
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this bill in the court below for the purpose of being substituted to
the rights of the Chalfant mortgage upon classes 2 and 3. The
court below so decreed , which was the occasion of this appeal.
It was contended for the appellants that the case came within the
ruling referred to in Carpenter v . Koons ; that the parties stood in
the relation of purchasers at a sheriff' s sale , where equality is the
rule , and that at most it was a question of contribution , and not of
subrogation .
We are unable to see the force of this position . When Shaw took
his mortgage on class 1, he had an equity to compel Carothers to
pay the paramount mortgage out of the remaining portions of the
property not embraced in his (Shaw 's ) mortgage . This is too clear
to need elaboration . It was not the case of a purchase subject to
the Chalfant mortgage, with a portion of the purchase money with
held to meet it. No such element exists in the case . It is true ,
Shaw ' s mortgage was in point of fact subject to the paramount
mortgage, but he held no funds of Carothers to meet it . On the
contrary, he had the clear equity , as before stated , to compel the
latter to pay it out of the remaining property . This equity Caroth
ers could not defeat by subsequently conveying or mortgaging classes
2 and 3 . Such grantees or mortgagees had record notice of Shaw 's
equity .19
I see no significance in the fact that Stewart became the pur
chaser at a judicial sale under his own mortgage. It did not change
his position in any essential degree . He has the rights as purchaser
at such sale which he previously held under the mortgage — nothing
more .20
Without any action on the part of Mrs . Chalfant or any of the
parties , the land bound by Shaw 's mortgage has thus been taken to
pay the paramount mortgage , which , as between the parties , Milli
gan 's land first , and Stewart ' s land secondly was liable for. We do
not think the cases of Lloyd v . Galbraith , 8 Casey 103 ; and Con
ser 's Appeal, 11 W . N . C . 220 , are in conflict with this view . As
was correctly said by the learned judge below : “ These cases dif
fer from the present one in this, that the parties seeking to be sub
rogated to the rights of creditors who had liens on two tracts of
land , did not acquire their liens until after the common debtor had
19 See also Fassett v. Mulock , 5 Colo . 46






466 ; Cooper v . Bigly , 13 Mich . 463 ; Stulb v . Ainslie , 14 Wash . 567 ; War
ren v . Foreman , 19 Wis . 35 .
2
0
" This order of sale being established for the protection of the sec
ond mortgage , a purchaser on foreclosure o
f
that mortgage must have a
right to insist upon being protected in his purchase , inasmuch as the
right in the mortgagee to have the securities marshalled would be of no
value to him if it did not continue for the protection of the purchaser . "
Cooley , J . , in Sibley v . Baker , 23 Mich . 312 . Compare , Carpenter v .
Koons , supra , and cases cited . See also Sternberger v . Sussman , 69
N . J . Eq . 199 .
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aliened that part of the land sought to be reached . This is an es
sential difference .”
Nor do we see any force in the objection that because the Chal
fant mortgage has been paid by process of law there can be no sub
rogation . Actual payment discharges a judgment at law ; but in
equity , it may still subsist if the justice of the case requires it . And
an equitable right to such judgment may exist without any actual
assignment of it ; Fleming v . Beaver , 2 Rawle 128 ; Morris v . Oak
ford, 9 Barr 498 ; McCormick 's Admin . v . Irwin , 11 Casey 111.
*
The decree is affirmed , and the appeal dismissed at the costs of
the appellants .
BERNHARDT v . LYMBURNER .
Court of APPEALS OF NEW YORK , 1881 .
85 N . Y . 172 .
ANDREWS , J . The question in this case arises between subsequent
mortgagees of different parts of the premises embraced in the plain
tiff 's mortgage, upon an exception of the defendant Howard , to the
direction in the judgment that the part of the premises covered by
his mortgage, should be first sold .
The plaintiff ' s mortgage is upon a lot on the west side of Main
Street , in the city of Buffalo , one hundred feet front, and one hun
dred and thirty -two feet in depth . It was executed by Harriet C .
Lymburner , the owner of the premises , September 1 , 1871 , and
was recorded September 2 , 1871 , and there is due thereon $ 5 , 000 ,
and interest from March 1 , 1878 . The defendants , Hamilton M .
Lymburner and George C . Torrey , as executors , hold a second
mortgage, dated October 1 , 1872 , also executed by Harriet M . Lym
burner, which originally covered the whole lo
t
. On the 24th o
f
March , 1873 , the executors upon the request o
f
the mortgagor , re
leased the northerly forty feet o
f
the lot from the lien o
f
their mort
gage , so that , from that time , their mortgage was a lien only upon
the southerly sixty feet ; and there is due thereon the sum of $ 6 ,300
and interest from June 20 , 1877 . The defendant Ethan H . Howard ,
is the assignee of a mortgage on the northerly forty feet of the lot ,
executed by Harriet C . Lymburner , March 24 , 1873 , on which is
unpaid $ 5 , 462 , and interest from March 24 , 1878 ; and this mort




the mortgagor . Mrs . Lymbur
ner , the mortgagor , died seized o
f
the whole lot June , 1878 , and b
y
her will devised the sixty feet and the forty feet , b
y
separate de
vises , in trust for different beneficiaries named .
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It was admitted on the trial, that the value of the sixty feet cov
ered by the mortgage to Hamilton M . Lymburner and George C .
Torrey as executors , is $ 12 ,000 , and that the value of the forty feet
covered by Howard 's mortgage, is $ 8 ,000 , and the judge found that
the value of the forty feet, was four -tenths of the value of the entire
premises . The sum due upon the three mortgages exceeds by a few
hundred dollars the value of the whole lo
t
. It is plain that if the
forty feet are first sold on the plaintiff ' s mortgage , and should sell
for their full value , there would remain , after paying the plaintiff ' s
mortgage , less than $ 2 ,000 to apply upon the Howard mortgage , and
h
e would be left with an unsecured claim o
f
more than $ 4 ,000 . The
devisees o
f




the plaintiff ' s mortgage out of the proceeds of the
sale o
f
the forty feet , hold the equity of redemption in the sixty




the original mortgage , and subject only
to themortgage to Lymburner and Torrey , as executors .
This result would be manifestly inequitable . The sixty feet , ac
cording to the admission o
f
the parties , is worth several thousand
dollars more than the amount of that mortgage . Mrs . Lymburner
was bound to pay the Howard mortgage in full , and as between
her , and Howard , the latter had a clear equity to demand that the
sixty feet should be first sold , and her interest therein exhausted ,
before resort is had to the forty feet covered b
y
his mortgage . “ Her
devisees stand in her shoes , and equity requires , if it can be done ,
that the value o
f
the equity o
f redemption in the sixty feet , over and
above the mortgage to Lymburner and Torrey , should be applied
to reduce the plaintiff ' s mortgage , and thereby pro tanto relieve the
forty feet , and protect the Howard mortgage .
The difficulty is to work out this result without impairing the
rights o
f
Lymburner and Torrey , whose mortgage is prior to the
Howard mortgage . The mortgage to the plaintiff being upon the
whole lo
t
, and the mortgage to the executors being upon the sixty
feet alone , and the Howard mortgage being alone upon the forty
feet , and subsequent in date , they are entitled , upon the well - settled
doctrine o
f
equity , to have the forty feet first sold to satisfy the
plaintiff ' s mortgage , if necessary for their protection . The general





mortgaged premises , the land on foreclosure , is to be sold
in the inverse order of alienation , and this secures the equitable
rights o
f
the parties as between themselves . The first grantee of
a part o
f
the mortgaged premises , who has purchased for full value
and without any agreement to assume themortgage , may justly claim
that the burden o
f
the incumbrance shall b
e
cast in the first instance
upon the remaining lands o
f
the grantor , and a second o
r
other
grantee takes subject to the equity o
f
the prior grantee . The same
principle is applicable to the case of successive mortgagees of parts
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of mortgaged premises , on a foreclosure of a prior mortgage on the
whole property , where by its application the equitable rights o
f
all
parties will be secured . (Stuyvesant v . Hall , 2 Barb . Ch . 151 . )
But this is a rule o
f equity and yields to circumstances . (Guion v .
Knapp , 6 Paige , 35 ; Kellogg v . Rand , 11 id . 59 . ) The rule is es
tablished to adjust and preserve the equitable rights o
f
claimants
holding distinct interests in parts o
f
the mortgaged property , accord
ing to the maxim prior tempore potior jure .
The application of the rule between grantor , and successive
grantees o
f parts o
f mortgaged premises , if applied in this case , by
requiring that the forty feet should be first sold , would destroy , to
a great extent , the security of the Howard mortgage . If the pro
tection o
f
the mortgagees in the second mortgage , required that this
course should be taken , there would be no alternative , and the rule
should be applied . But if the land can be sold so as to protect both
securities , then equity requires that the sale should be so made ; o
r
if they cannot be protected in full , then that the sale should be made
so as to make the loss upon the Howard mortgage as small as pos
sible , consistently with the rights o
f
all parties . The object o
f
the
rule adverted to will then be attained , although the rule itself in
this particular case , is departed from . We think the judgment in
this case should direct that the whole lot be sold on the plaintiff ' s
mortgage , and that out o
f
the proceeds , the liens be paid according
to their priority .
The claim o
f
the counsel for the defendant Howard , that the
judgment should direct the sale in the first instance o
f
the sixty
feet , and that , if this part o
f
the lot should not bring enough to pay
the first and second mortgages , then that the forty feet be sold to
pay the deficiency , is impracticable . The plaintiff could not sell the
forty feet under his judgment , after he had realized sufficient from
the sale o
f
the sixty feet , to pay his mortgage and costs . By selling
the whole property and distributing the proceeds as we have in
dicated , upon the conceded facts , neither o
f
the subsequent mortga








The judgment should be modified in accordance with this opin
ion , and also b
y striking out the costs awarded against the defend
ant Howard , in the court below , and awarding costs to the plaintiff
in the Supreme Court , and in this court , payable out o
f
the pro
ceeds of sale .
All concur except Miller , J . , not voting and Rapallo , J . , absent .
Judgment accordingly . 21
2
1
" A subsequent mortgage of a part of the equity of redemption , by
the owner o
f
the whole of the mortgaged premises , is only an alienation
of that part thereof to the extent of the money due on such junior mort
gage , and for which the owner o
f
such junior mortgage has no other




GILLIAM v . McCORMACK .
SUPREME COURT O
F
TENNESSEE , 1886 .
8
5 Tenn . 597 .





a full statement of the facts . The reasoning , as well as the con
clusions , of Judge Caldwell , who prepared that report , being alto
gether satisfactory , is adopted and made a part o
f
this opinion . It
is a
s follows :




f marshaling securities .
“ The defendant , M . McCormack , owned three lots o
f ground
A , B and C — in the city of Nashville , which he mortgaged to various
creditors , as follows :
“ First - A , B and C , to McFarland , May 31st , 1877 , to secure
$ 1 ,000 .
"Second - A and B , to McFarland , June 26th , 1877 , to secure
$ 6 ,996 . 55 .
“ Third - B , to James McCormack , June 8th , 1878 , to secure
$ 4 ,075 .
( “ Fourth — A and B , to Jane Gilliam , July 31st , 1878 , to secure
$ 1 ,500 .
" Fifth - C , to Merritt & Ronaldson , November 20th , 1878 , to se
cure $ 1 ,671 . 66 .
"Sixth - A and B , to Annie Lawrence , January 28th , 1879 , to se
cure $ 1 , 160 .
“ There were other mortgages , which need not be mentioned .
" All the necessary parties were brought before the Court , and
the three lots were sold under decree , and reports o
f
sale confirmed .
The amount realized for A was $ 8 ,660 , for B $ 6 ,500 , and for C
$ 3 ,125 . The total being less than the aggregate o
f
the secured debts ,
a loss must fall on some creditor ; hence this contention .
" The Chancellor decreed that the costs and taxes accrued be paid
pro rata out o
f
the funds realized from the three lots respectively ,
and further , ( 1 ) that the whole debt of Merritt & Ronaldson be
paid out o
f
the net proceeds o
f
lot C ; ( 2 ) that the balance o
f
such
proceeds be applied in satisfaction o
f
McFarland ' s debt secured by
mortgage on A , B , and C ; ( 3 ) that the residue o
f
the latter debt ,
and the other debt o
f





A and B ; ( 4 ) that the balance o
f
the net proceeds o
f
B shall b
e applied to debt o
f
James McCormack ; ( 5 ) that the
balance o
f
the net proceeds o
f
A be used first in payment o
f
Jane
Gilliam ' s debt and then in payment of that of Annie Lawrence .
security which should in equity be first resorted to . ” Walworth , Ch . , in
Kellogg v . Rand , 11 Paige ( N . Y . ) 59 .
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“ This division of the funds paid all the debts mentioned in full ,
except those of Annie Lawrence and James McCormack .
“ The latter only has appealed , and by his counsel insists upon a
different distribution.
“ Our solution of the case is this : The three funds should seva
erally pay their proportionate part of McFarland 's debt secured by
mortgage on A , B , and C ; then the remaining proceeds of A and B
should proportionately pay the other debt of McFarland secured
by mortgage on A and B . From the residue of the three funds
payment should be made as follows : McCormack should receive
the residue of the proceeds of B , on which he had a mortgage ;
Merritt & Ronaldson should be paid out of the residue of the pro
ceeds of C , on which they had a mortgage ; Jane Gilliam should
receive payment out of the residue of the proceeds of A , and the
balance of that fund should be paid to Annie Lawrence , the two
ladies having successive mortgages on A . They likewise had mort
gages on B at the same time ; but B 's proceeds are previously ex
hausted by McCormack , a prior mortgagee . Such an order of dis
tribution will give to every mortgage creditor the benefit of his or
her security according to priority in time, which is eminently just
and equitable to a
ll .
“ The result o
f
the Chancellor ' s decree is substantially the same as
we have indicated . The first debt of McFarland being small , that
part of it chargeable upon the proceeds of C , by the rule of pro
portion we have stated , would leave more than enough of that par
ticular fund to pay Merritt & Ronaldson . It being evident , then ,
that they should receive full payment , the Chancellor directed , in
the first instance , that their debt be paid . That being done , the
whole residue of the proceeds o
f
C ( and not simply it
s propor
tionate part ) was first applied to McFarland ' s first debt that se
cured b
y
A , B , and C . To this extent the securities were marshaled
in favor o
f
the subsequent incumbrance o
f
A and B , and McCor
mack got the benefit o
f
it .
“ Our view as to the rule that should govern such a case is sus
tained b
y
Green v . Ramage , 18 Ohio 428 . The case of Conrad v .
Harrison , 3 Leigh , Va . R . , 576 , seems to be an authority in con
flict . Nevertheless , we have not a doubt as to the correctness o
f
our conclusions .
“ The decree o
f






the appellant . "
In support o
f
the conclusion contained in the report in favor of
the pro rata payment o
f
the several mortgages , in the order o
f
priority , out o
f
the proceeds of the parcels covered by each mort
gage , we add certain suggestions which occur as additional reasons
for declining to marshal these securities to the prejudice o
f
the sec



























ond mortgage on lot C , and o
f
the third and fourth mortgages on
lot A . The equitable doctrine o
f marshaling securities is a pure
equity , and in nowise depends upon contract . The whole principle ,
a
s
stated by Professor Pomeroy , is this :
“ That a person having two funds to satisfy his demands shall
not , b
y
his election , disappoint a party having but one fund . The
general rule is that if one creditor , by virtue of a lien or interest ,
can resort to two funds , and another to one o
f
them only — a
s , for
example , where a mortgagee holds a prior mortgage on two parcels
of land , and a subsequent mortgage on but one of the parcels is
given to another — the former must seek satisfaction out o
f
that fund
which the latter cannot touch . ” Pomeroy Eq . Jurisprudence , Sec .
1414 .
Now , if in this case there were but two mortgages - one on three
lots and the other on only one — the equity o
f marshaling would be
applied , and the dominant creditor having a mortgage on all three
o
f
the lots would be required to first exhaust the two lots upon
which the second mortgagee could not proceed . So , if there were
but three mortgages , the first being on lots A , B , and C , the second ,
a
s
is the case here , on lots A and B alone , and the third , as is like
wise the fact , upon lot B alone , the securities would be so marshaled
a
s
to require the senior mortgagee to first exhaust lot C , upon which
he alone could g
o , and thus leave lots A and B to be subjected by
the two second mortgagees . Indeed , there would be no trouble in
going further , and in behalf of the third mortgage , which rests upon
lot B only , the two prior mortgagees might well be required to first
subject lot A , upon which they alone could g
o
. But this is not the
situation of these securities at the time that the equity of marshaling
is invoked . Before the third mortgagee had successfully invoked
the marshaling in his favor , which we have shown could have been
granted without prejudice to the rights or equities o
f any one , a
fourth mortgage is executed , which is placed upon lots A and B , and
a fifth is placed upon lot C . Now , when the third mortgagee asks
to have the first mortgagee forced to subject lot C to his debt , the
demand is resisted by the fifth mortgagee , who says this is to my
prejudice ; there was upon lot C — upon which alone I have a mort
gage — but one mortgage senior to mine , and that ought to be satis
fied pro rata out o
f
the three lots upon which it rests , that my se
curity may bear only its proportionate part o
f
the prior burden . The
situation has , therefore , changed from what it was when the third
mortgage was executed upon lot B alone .
The contention o
f
the learned counsel representing this third mort
gagee is that the common debtor could not , b
y
the execution of an
other mortgage upon lot C , cut off or deprive the third mortgagee
o
f
the right he had , or , rather , might have had , if the doctrine o
f
marshaling has been invoked a
t
the time the third mortgage was
x 34
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made, or at any time before another mortgage was placed on lot C .
The proposition contended for would amount to this : That if at
any time the situation of several subsequent mortgagees is such that
as between themselves such a marshaling of securities could have
been invoked , by proper application to a court of equity , as would
result in the satisfaction of the senior mortgages out of a fund
which the junior mortgagee could not reach , whereby the fund upon
which he could only go should be left for his satisfaction , that this
inchoate equity cannot be disturbed , displaced , or defeated by any
subsequent alienation or mortgage by the common debtor or mort
gagor . This rule , if admitted , would result in elevating an inchoate
equity to marshal assets or securities to the high plane of a lien .
Yet it would be an incumbrance or lien of which a subsequent mort
gagee would have no notice by record or otherwise . It would clearly
be in antagonism to our registry laws.
This equity to have securities marshaled , if it can be called an
equity until actually invoked , cannot be of a higher order than the
equity of the vendor. Yet the latter is defeated , according to our
decisions , by alienation of the lands to a purchaser , to a mortgagee ,
and even to a trustee under an assignment to pay debts , before the
actual filing of a bill to enforce the equity . A marked distinction
exists between the cases holding lands sold subject to the lien of a
vendor , or that of a mortgage or judgment liable for the discharge
of such lien in the inverse order of alienation . In all such cases
the parcels were all actually bound by a lien or incumbrance , of
which the alienees had notice , either actual or constructive , and not
by a mere equity , such as that to have a marshaling .
It follows , therefore , from this view of the question , that the
equity to marshal assets is not one which fastens itself upon the sit
uation at the time the successive securities are taken ; but, on the
contrary , is one to be determined at the time the marshaling is in
voked . The equity can only become a fixed right by taking proper
steps to have it enforced ; and until this is done it is subject to
displacement and defeat by subsequently acquired liens upon the
funds. The qualification upon the doctrine of marshaling — that
marshaling will not be permitted to the prejudice of the third per
son , whether wholly or only partially dependent upon this principle
- is one well settled , and operates to defeat the contention of ap
pellant.
Upon these two grounds the case of Green v . Ramage , 18 Ohio ,
428 , rests . That case was this : W had a lien on lots 14 and 39 ,
and G on 14 , and H on 39 , in this order of date . G contended ( just
as does the third mortgagee in this case ) that as he had the right ,
before H took his second mortgage on 39 , as between himself and
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the situation so as to turn H ' s second mortgage on 39 , when taken ,
into virtually a third mortgage .
The Court , after conceding that if there was nobody to be con
sidered but W with two funds and G with only one of them , W
would have to exhaust his exclusive fund before touching the com
mon fund , added :
" In this case, however , there are three parties interested . If G
compel W to exhaust lot 39 before he comes on lot 14 , then G will
have the benefit of the fund arising from lot 39 , although he took
no security on it. But H , by this arrangement , will be deprived
entirely of this security on 39 , although he took a mortgage on it.
We think the rule cannot be applied in a case of this kind . The
principle is one established for the purpose of securing to parties
the rights to which , upon the principles of natural equity , they are
entitled . To deprive H in this manner of his security would be
manifestly unjust .” 22
So in the case of Lieb v . Stribbling , 51 Md., 285 , S mortgaged to
R five lots. Afterward four of these lots became incumbered with
a mechanic 's lien , and the fifth lot by a second mortgage to C . The
contention was that S should first exhaust the fifth lot upon which
C had his mortgage, so as to disincumber the four lots upon which
the mechanic 's lien was an incumbrance second to that of S . This
was refused upon the ground that the assets would not be marshaled
to the prejudice of C , who had no notice of the equity of the com
plainant .
In the case of Marr v . Lewis , 31 Ark ., 203 , the facts were that A
held a mortgage upon two tracts of land ; B also held a mortgage
on one of them . In a proceeding to foreclose , B sought to compel
him to exhaust the tract not embraced in his mortgage first . The
widow of the mortgagor , who was also a party , claimed a home
stead in the latter tract . Held : that by reason of the widow 's equity
the securities should not be marshaled . The rule as laid down by
the Court in that case was this :
"When one creditor has a security upon two funds , another hav
ing a security on one of them , may , if necessary to the protection of
his security , compel the other to resort to the fund not embraced in
it, if it can be done without prejudice to the other creditor , or in
22 The report of this case states that " Ramage had the legal title
to lot 14 , and an equitable title to lot 39. * * * He conveyed by
mortgage , recorded October 10th , lot 14 to Wilson . He also assigned
the title bond, by which he held lot 39, to Wilson to secure the same
debt secured by the mortgage .” The court said , “ There was nothing
connected with Wilson 's lien that was even calculated to put him
(Hillier , the mortgagee of lot 39 ] on inquiry in reference to Wilson ' s
mortgage on lot 14 , because Wilson 's liens on these two lots were cre
ated by separate instruments ."
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justice to the common debtor or third person having interest in the
fund .”
In the case ofMcArthur v . Martin , 23 Minn ., 75 , the Court said :
" Where A holds a security upon two tracts of land , one of which
is a homestead , and B holds a security only upon one not a home
stead , A will not be compelled to exhaust the homestead tract first
in order to leave the other tract for B.” 23
The English editors of White & Tudor 's Leading Cases in Equity ,
4th Am . Ed ., Vol. II., Part I., 205, say :
" Marshaling is not enforced to the prejudice of third persons .
Thus, in Averall v . Wade , L . & G ., t ., Sugden , 252 , where a person ,
being seized of several estates , and indebted by judgments , settled
one of the estates for a valuable consideration , with covenant against
incumbrances , and subsequently acknowledged other judgments , it
was contended by the subsequent judgment creditors that, as they
only affected the unsettled estates , on the principle in Aldrich v.
Cooper , as they had only one fund , they had a right to compel the
prior judgment creditors who had two funds — the settled and un
settled estates — to resort to the settled estates ; or , at any rate , that
the settled estates ought to contribute to the payment of the prior
23 The authorities are about equally divided as to the right to mar
shal an encumbrance onto homestead property . See Jones , Mortgages ,
§ 1632 . In respect to this problem , no distinction seems to have been
taken between a junior mortgagee of the non -homestead land and a
subsequent purchaser of the same by warranty deed , except in Iowa .
In Abbott v. Powell , 6 Sawyer 91 ( U . S . District Court , District of
California ) , Hoffman , J ., said , “ In this state , it appears to be settled , that
a mortgagee of lands not included in a homestead, can not compel a
prior mortgagee , whose mortgage includes those lands and also the
homestead , to resort to the latter before selling the lands mortgaged
to the junior mortgagee . (McLaughlin v. Hart , 46 Cal. 638 .)
" It has also been held that the wife may , after a judgment against
her husband has become a lien on the home property , file a declaration
of homestead upon it, and acquire such an interest in it that she can
compel the sheriff to exhaust the husband' s individual property before
subjecting it to sale . (Bartholomew v. Hook , 23 Cal. 277.) But neither
of these cases contains the slightest intimation that where a person has
made a mortgage on two pieces of property , and afterwards makes a
second mortgage on one of them , the equitable right of the junior mort
gagee to compel the first mortgagee to resort in the first instance to the
property on which he has an exclusive claim , can be taken away or im
paired by a declaration of homestead , by either husband or wife , on the
property exclusively mortgaged to the first mortgagee . I have been re
ferred to no case which hints at so inequitable a rule . The junior mort
gagee , when accepting the security of a second mortgage , had a right to
repose upon the protection afforded him by the familiar rule of equity ,
and to act upon the assurance that the first incumbrancer would be com
pelled to resort to the property on which he had an exclusive claim ,
before coming on the property covered by the second mortgage , and
that no act of the mortgagor could deprive him of the right to compel
him to do so ."
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judgments . Lord Chancellor Sugden , however, held that the subse
quent judgment creditors had no equity to compel the prior judg
ment creditors to resort to the settled estates . On the contrary , that
the prior judgments should be thrown altogether on the unsettled
estates , and that the subsequent judgment creditors had no right to
make the settled estates contribute ; observing , after a close exam
ination of Aldrich v . Cooper, that upon the whole of the case you
will find Lord Eldon , in the application of the principle , 'carefully
avoids dealing with the rights of third persons .' So in Barnes v .
Racster , 1 Y . & C . C . C ., 401 ( a case almost identical with the one
under consideration ) , Racster , being seized of Foxhall coppice and
a piece of land noted on plan of the estate as No . 32 , mortgaged , in
1792 , Foxhall to Barnes ; in 1795 , Foxhall to Hartwright ;
in 1800 , Foxhall and No. 32 to Barnes ; and in 1804, Fox
hall and No. 32 to Williams ; the subsequent incumbran
cers took with notice . It was held by Sir Knight Bruce, R . C .,
that the Court ought not , as against Williams, to marshal the se
curities . His Honor said that, circumstanced as the case was , Hart
wright and Williams stood , with regard to the matter in dispute , on
an equal footing ; that Barnes ought to be paid out of the respective
proceeds of No. 32 and Foxhall , pari passu and ratably according
to their amounts ; that the residue of the proceeds of Foxhall ought
to be applied toward paying Hartwright , and that the residue of
the proceeds of No. 32 ought to be applied toward paying Williams
- a conclusion , as he considered , entirely in accordance with the
principles on which Larry v . Duchess of Athol , Aldrich v . Cooper ,
and Averall v . Wade were decided .”
These cases , and the sound equity upon which they are manifestly
founded , sustain the proposition that marshaling is a pure equity ,
and does not at all rest upon contract, and will not be enforced to
the prejudice of either the dominant creditor , or third persons, or
even so as to do an injustice to the debtor. We are not disposed to
extend the doctrine so as to affect the equities or legal rights of third
persons .
The case in 3 Leigh , Va., 576 , so far as we have been able to dis
cover , stands alone . It is not supported by authority , and we are
not content with its reasoning . The other cases relied upon by
counsel for appellant all seem to be cases of sales of lands actually
incumbered by an express lien , and are not in conflict with the views
expressed by us. 24
24 See also , Terry v. Woods , 6 Smedes & M . (Miss.) 139 ; Williams v .
Washington , 16 N . Car. 137 ; Wilson v. Otis , 5 Ohio Cir. Ct. 228 .
If, in the principal case , McCormack had been a purchaser by war
ranty deed of lot B , the authorities in Tennessee would have entitled him
to exoneration as against Merritt & Ronaldson . Hunt v. Ewing , 80 Tenn .
519.
That a junior mortgagee acquires, by the “ two fund " doctrine , an
equity which is enforcible against a subsequent purchaser or encum
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WORTH v . HILL .
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN , 1861.
14 Wis . 559.
By the Court, Paine , J. This was an action to foreclose a mort
gage, and the appeal presents a contest merely between two subse
quent incumbrancers of different tracts covered by this mortgage,
as to which was entitled , in equity , to have the tract of the other
sold first . Perhaps the following general statement of the situa
tion of the parties , will be sufficient to a proper understanding of
the question decided .
The mortgage being foreclosed covered two different tracts in
different towns . The defendant Buck , who is the appellant , held a
mortgage next to this in point of time, covering one of the tracts
contained in this mortgage , and other land not covered by this , in
the same town . The defendant Mowry held a mortgage next to
Buck 's in point of time, but upon the land in the other town coy
ered by this mortgage, and also upon another tract . Thus it will
be seen that the mortgage of Mowry was not upon any part of the
land mortgaged to Buck , but their interests conflict by reason of the
mortgage which is being foreclosed , which is prior to both , and
covers a part of the land incumbered by each of these defendants .
It further appeared that there was a mortgage prior to all these , cov
ering the tract in the Buck mortgage and the one in the Mowry
mortgage which are not contained in the mortgage now being fore
closed and that such prior mortgage had been foreclosed , and that
part which was covered by Mowry 's mortgage adjudged to be sold
before the part covered by Buck ' s. It was further proved that the
other tract covered by Buck 's mortgage was ample security for the
amount of the debt secured by that mortgage. It was even shown
to be of greater value than the entire amount of the Buck mort
gage and the first mortgage before referred to , prior to all, for the
satisfaction of which the other tract covered by Mowry ' s mortgage
had been adjudged to be first sold . Upon this state of facts , the
court below decreed that the portion covered by Buck ' s mortgage
should be sold in this foreclosure before that covered by Mowry 's,
and from that part of the decree Buck brought this appeal.
His counsel relies upon the established equitable rule , that in
brancer with actual or constructive notice , was held in Hunt v. Town
send , 4 Sandf. Ch . ( N . Y .) 510 , and The Olive A . Carrigan , 7 Fed . 507 .
See also Meek v. Thompson , 99 Tenn . 732 . In Bank of Orangeburg v.
Kohn , 52 S. Car. 120 , it was held that an amendment to the state consti
tution curtailing this equity was not to be construed as affecting the
equity of a mortgagee whose mortgage antedated the amendment, as the
equity was a substantive right and not a mere matter of remedy .
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foreclosure cases , where the land has been subsequently conveyed
by the niortgagor , it shall be sold in the inverse order of alienation .
The justice of this rule has been sometimes questioned , but we re
gard it as not only well settled , but correct upon principle , and have
repeatedly enforced it. But at the same time we think it may be
controlled by other established equitable principles , where the facts
render them applicable , and such , we think , was the case here . It is
a familiar principle , that where one creditor has security upon two
funds , and another has security upon one of them only , the latter
may compel the former to resort first to that fund which he cannot
reach . And although this is not a direct proceeding to accomplish
that object, yet it is substantially that , inasmuch as Mowry sets up
these facts to rebut the equity Buck would otherwise have as against
him . For the result , if the judgment had been otherwise , would
have deprived Mowry of his security entirely . The one tract cov
ered by his mortgage having already been adjudged to be sold first ,
for Buck ' s benefit , now if the other should be adjudged to be sold
first, he would have nothing left. Whereas it appears by the testi
mony , that upon the decree as rendered , Mowry is protected , and
Buck left with ample security for his debt .
Suppose A mortgages a tract to B , then gives a second mortgage
on a part of it to C , which mortgage also covers other tracts , and
then gives a mortgage on another part to D ? On a foreclosure of
B 's inortgage , the ordinary rule , based merely on the order of alien
ation , would be to sell D 's part first . But suppose D could show
that the other tracts covered by C 's mortgage were an ample se
curity for his debt, would not that raise an equity sufficient to over
come the ordinary rule , and require , as between C and D , that C 's
part should be first sold ? I think so ; and that is substantially the
relation which these defendants hold to each other in the present
case . I can see no reason why the principle requiring the creditor
having two funds to resort first to the one which the other creditor
cannot reach , is not applicable to such a case . It is true that or
dinarily the adequacy of the first fund might be tested by an actual
sale , and the creditor who was compelled first to resort to thatmight
still be in a position to resort to the other to supply any deficiency ;
and here Buck may not be left in such a position . I think that is
good reason why such a decree as the one made in this case , should
be made only upon clear proof of the entire inadequacy of the re
maining security . But I am not prepared to say that courts should
not act upon such proof, or that a party so situated has any abso
lute right to have the adequacy of his remaining security tested in
all cases by an actual sale . It is obvious that such a test could not
be had in a case like this, and consequently , if that rule were adopted ,
it would lead to the injustice of cutting off the last mortgage en
tirely , though it might not be at al
l
necessary for the protection o
f
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the second. Courts are constantly adjudicating upon the most im
portant rights of parties upon the theory that human testimony can
establish facts with sufficient certainty to justify such adjudication ,
and I think the question of the adequacy or inadequacy of a secur
it
y
should form no exception .
I think the judgment should be affirmed with costs , against the
appellant , in favor o
f
the plaintiffs and o
f Mowry .
Judgment affirmed accordingly .
QUACKENBUSH v . O 'HARE .
Court OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK , 1892 .
129 N . Y . 485 .
O 'BRIEN , J . The order appealed from disposed of surplus moneys
amounting to the sum o
f
$ 2 ,737 . 75 , arising upon the foreclosure of
a mortgage made by the defendant to one Elizabeth Hillenbrand ,
February 28 , 1884 , and recorded the following day . It was subse
quently assigned to the plaintiff and covers certain premises on Sec
ond avenue in the city of New York . The controversy in regard
to the surplus was between the defendant Cannon on the one hand
and the defendants Washburn & Barnes on the other . The referee
reported that Cannon was entitled to have his claim paid out of the
fund first , and this report was confirmed at the Special Term , and
the order o
f
that court affirmed a
t
General Term . Washburn &
Barnes are the only parties who appeal to this court .





$ 2 ,000 , dated January 9 , 1885 , and recorded
July 22 , 1885 , which covers the premises sold under the decree of
foreclosure in the action , and it is beyond all dispute a lien next to
that o
f
the mortgage foreclosed b
y
the judgment upon which the
surplus arose . But this mortgage is a lien on three separate pieces
o
f
real estate : ( 1 ) The house on Second avenue which was sold
under the judgment in this case , and from which the surplus came ;
( 2 ) certain premises on Seventy - fourth street ; ( 3 ) certain premises
o
n West Third street . Washburn & Barnes hold a junior mortgage
for over $ 3 ,000 , dated January 28 , 1887 , and recorded February 11 ,
1887 , covering the Second avenue property only . The Murray Hill
Bank holds a mortgage o
f
$ 2 ,500 , dated November 11 , 1886 , which
covers the Seventy -fourth street property only . One Steers holds
a mortgage o
f
about $ 11 ,000 , dated February 2 , 1887 , covering the





$ 2 ,000 , dated July 9 , 1885 ,which covers the three pieces
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of property , and the same has been assigned to Cannon as trustee
for the owner .
Washburn & Barnes insist that they should have the surplus to
pay their mortgage , which is a lien next to that of Cannon , and that
he should be driven to a sale of the other two pieces of property
covered by his mortgage, which they claim is abundant security for
the payment of his debt. But the Murray Hill Bank , holding a
mortgage on the Seventy - fourth street property , objects to this , as
its security will thereby be endangered . Steers also objects , as this
will endanger his security , which is confined to the West Third
street property only , while Cannon , holding a mortgage on the three
pieces , also objects . The lien of Cannon upon the land , next to that
of the mortgage foreclosed , was transferred from the land to the
surplus fund. No one claims that he has not the first lien , and the
only question is whether he can be prevented from enforcing his
prior lien to enough of the surplus money to satisfy his mortgage .
The owners of the Seventy - fourth street and West Third street
property are not parties to this action . Had all the parties inter
ested in these two pieces of property been made parties to this ac
tion , and all the property sold and the proceeds in court , it is pos
sible that a court of equity could apply the doctrine of sale in the
inverse order of alienation , or would so marshal the securities as
to accomplish the purpose which Washburn & Barnes seek to at
tain in these proceedings . (Burchell v . Osborne, 119 N . Y . 486 .)
But thatmust be done in an action for that purpose where the whole
fund resulting from the sale of all the pieces of property is under
the control of the court , and all the parties interested are before it.
There is no room for the application in a proceeding like this , and
upon facts such as exist here , of the equitable rule that where a
creditor has a double fund to which hemay resort for satisfaction of
his debt , and another creditor has only one of these funds , the first
creditor will be required primarily to resort to that fund for the
satisfaction of his debt , over which he has the exclusive control. That
rule , of course , implies the right of the creditor with the double
fund or security to appropriate both funds if necessary . The at
tempt is made in this proceeding to displace the prior lien of Cannon
not by payment , but by proof which , it is claimed , shows that the
remaining two pieces of property are sufficient to pay the debt . But
the owner of a mortgage cannot be deprived of his lien on the ap
plication , in a proceeding like this , of a junior mortgagee upon
proof, however strong or apparently conclusive , that he still has
sufficient property to pay his debt. The court cannot release a lien
without actual payment merely because witnesses testify , and the
referee finds, that the holder of the lien has other property of his
debtor to which he can resort for the satisfaction of his debt. Had
Washburn & Barnes offered to pay the prior mortgage held by Can
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non , and demanded an assignment of it, it is possible they might
be subrogated to a
ll
the rights and to the position o
f
Cannon , and
after receiving the surplus money here be entitled to call upon the
owners o
f
the Seventy - fourth street and West Third street property
tu contribute towards the payment o
f
the mortgage . But whatever
equitable rights they might have in an appropriate proceeding , it
is quite clear that they cannot in an application for surplus money ,
displace the prior lien b
y proof or finding that the other property
is sufficient in value to pay and discharge the debt secured by the
lien . Their remedy , if any , is by means of some other proceeding .
The order should , therefore , be affirmed , with costs .
All concur , Andrews and Gray , JJ . , in result .
Order affirmed . 25





creditors who have attached the entire stock in trade
o
f
a trading firm to compel another creditor , who has a prior at
tachment on the same property , to exhaust certain mortgage se




the firm before resorting to
the fund in court arising from the sale o
f
the attached property .
* * * * * *
But a further well -established equitable rule is invoked b
y
the
defendant , and that is that equity will not marshal assets in the man
ner desired here , to the injury o
f
the prior creditor : 3 Pomeroy ' s
Equity Jurisprudence , sec . 1414 . We are unable to see what sub
stantial injury will be inflicted upon the defendant b
y requiring him
first to exhaust his mortgage security , at least upon lands within
this state . It is true , there must result some delay , in case foreclos
ure is necessary , but there will be no diminishing of security , be
cause the fund realized from sale o
f
the stock o
f goods should and
must be kept intact pending the defendant ' s attempt to realize upon
his mortgages . During this time , no part of his security will be





a bar to the relief here asked , but we are
not ready to subscribe to the doctrine that mere delay is sufficient
to compel the court to deny the relief when no other injury is in
volved . Some delay is a necessary consequence of the enforcement
of al
l
rights , and , if a possible delay would defeat the right o
f
a
junior creditor to have the assets of his debtor marshaled , such
marshaling would rarely , if ever , take place . The true rule , we
think , is well expressed in Everston v . Booth , 19 Johns . 486 , where
it is said that the relief will not be given “ if itwill endanger thereby
2
5 Compare , Welch v . Beers , Inglehart v . Crane & Wesson , and Gray
v . Loud & Sons Co . , supra .
See also , Mason v . Payne , Walker Ch . (Mich . ) 459 ; Mix v . Hotchkiss ,
1
4 Conn . 32 ; Long v . Kaiser , 81 Mich . 518 .
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the prior creditor , or in the least impair his prior right to raise his
debt out of both funds,” and it is further said that there is “ no
principle in equity which can take from him any part of his security
until he is completely satisfied .” Applying these principles to this
case , we discover no ground on which to refuse the relief which
the plaintiffs ask , if it shall prove that the allegations of the com
plaint are true. With the funds realized from the sale of the at
tached property in court , the defendant 's rights are not endangered ,
nor his right to raise his debt out of both funds impaired , nor is
any part of his security taken from him . It seems very questionable
whether the court should require the defendant to foreclose the
mortgages on the Minnesota and Dakota lands , because they are be
yond the jurisdiction of the courts of this state : Denham v . Wil
liams, 39 Ga . 312 . But it is not necessary to decide this point on
this demurrer , as we think that so far as the mortgages cover lands
within this state , at least , the plaintiffs are entitled , under the alle
gations of the complaint, to some relief .26
26 See 19 Am . & Eng . Enc . (2d ed. ) 1262 , 1264 .
As to whether a mortgagee may be compelled to exhaust his real se
curity before pursuing a personal security , see Warren v. Hayzlett, 45
Iowa 235 ; Jones , Mortgages , $ $ 1220 , 1221 . See also , Tiffany , Real Prop
erty , $ 558 .
As to whether a mortgagee may be compelled to exhaust a personal
security before pursuing his real security , see Whittaker v. Belvidere
Co., 55 N . J . Eq. 674 .
As to whether a mortgagee may be compelled to exhaust one per
sonal security before pursuing another , see Hyde v. Miller , supra ,
and note ; also , Jones v. Stienbergh , 1 Barb . Ch . ( N . Y .) 250 .









